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PRESENTED BY

HERMAN MUELDER

AN
EMBASSY
*TO THE
COURT OF ST. JAMES'S
IN 1840.

BY F. GUIZOT,
AMBASSADOR FROM HIS MAJESTY LOUIS-PHILIPPE.



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AN EMBASSY

TO THE

COURT OF ST. JAMES'S.

CHAPTER I.

MY EMBASSY IN ENGLAND.

MY ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND; GENERAL ASPECT OF THE COUNTRY.—MY ESTABLISHMENT AT HERTFORD HOUSE, THE HOTEL OF THE EMBASSY.—I PRESENT MY LETTERS OF CREDENCE TO QUEEN VICTORIA.—INCIDENT AT THAT AUDIENCE.—RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.—MY FIRST DINNER AND FIRST EVENING PARTY AT LORD PALMERSTON'S.—LORD MELBOURNE AND LORD ABERDEEN.—THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.—MY FIRST DINNER WITH THE QUEEN AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE.—LEVEE HELD BY THE QUEEN AT SAINT JAMES'S PALACE.—FALL OF MARSHAL SOULT, AND ACCESSION OF M. THIERS.—DISPOSITIONS OF KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE.—SITUATION OF M. THIERS.—DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF MY FRIENDS ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER I OUGHT TO CONTINUE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.—REASONS WHICH DETERMINE ME TO REMAIN.—MY LETTERS TO MY FRIENDS.—COMMENCEMENT OF MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH M. THIERS.

I HAD closely studied the history of England and of English society. I had often taken part, in our Chambers, on questions of foreign policy; but I had never been in England, and had never acted as a diplomatist. We know not how much we are ignorant of, or the extent

of what we require to learn, when we have not seen with our own eyes the country, or practised the profession of which we speak.

My first impression on landing at Dover, the 27th of February, 1840, was one of contrast. At Calais there was less population than space, little stir of business, a few idle loungers in the square or on the quay, a group here and there talking carelessly, children running and playing noisily about. At Dover, a bustling, silent crowd, seeking neither conversation nor amusement, but all intent on their affairs. On one coast, animated leisure; on the other, activity entirely engaged in its object. On my arrival at Dover, as on my departure from Calais, inquisitive persons approached me; the latter with idle curiosity, the former with attentive observation. While posting from Dover to London, my first conviction remained the same. Traversing the fields, or passing through the towns, in the aspect of the country and the people, it was no longer France that I beheld; after a journey of two hours, this impression faded away. I felt myself as in France, in the midst of a well-regulated society, and an intelligent, active, and peaceful population. Under different physiognomies there was the same general civilization. In England, we pass incessantly from one to the other of these impressions; the differences and resemblances of the two countries alternately appear. I reached London towards the close of the morning. I had travelled under a clear cold sun which entered, like myself, into the vast fog of the city, and suddenly became extinguished there. It was still day, but day without light. As I

passed through London, nothing particularly attracted my attention ; public buildings, houses, and shops, all appeared to me little, monotonous, and meanly ornamented ; every where columns, large and small, pilasters, statuettes, and embellishments of all kinds ; but the whole strikes by its extent. London conveys the idea of unlimited space, filled with men incessantly and silently displaying their activity and their power. And in the midst of this general greatness, the external neatness of the houses, the wide footpaths, the effect of the large panes of glass, of the iron balustrades, and of the knockers on the doors, impart to the city an air of careful attention and an attractive appearance, which almost counterbalance the absence of good taste.

The first face I recognised in the streets was that of Lady Palmerston whose carriage crossed mine. At length I reached the mansion at that time occupied by the French embassy, Hertford House in Manchester Square, a large building between a little gravelled court and a small damp garden, with a handsome ground floor, well arranged for official and ceremonious purposes, but bare, and inconvenient, in the first story, for domestic life. I was alone, with the staff of the embassy, having left my mother and children in Paris ; my installation therefore was easy. Altogether, the appearance of the house and neighbourhood suited me. A few days afterwards, I wrote thus : " I experience here, during the morning, a strong impression of tranquillity. Nobody visits or speaks to me, I hear no noise, it is the repose of night without its darkness. I

am surrounded by a hive of bees who work without humming."

I saw Lord Palmerston the day following my arrival, but without touching on public business. The ministerial crisis at that moment culminating in Paris called upon me to pause, and he readily admitted this, while at the same time expressing his anxiety to resume the negotiations on Eastern affairs. The son of Count Nesselrode had arrived on the preceding evening from St. Petersburg, bearing instructions to the Baron de Brünnow, in which the Emperor Nicholas authorized him to give to the English cabinet, "a very great latitude," in the arrangements which were to lead to a conclusion. I requested Lord Palmerston to receive without delay the Queen's orders for my audience of reception. Touching this there was a question to be previously settled. In presenting his credentials to King William IV, on the 6th of October 1830, M. de Talleyrand had addressed him in a short political harangue. When in February, 1835, General Sebastiani replaced M. de Talleyrand at St. James's, he abstained from saying anything. How was I to act? King Louis-Phillipe had conveyed to me his desire that I should take the first opportunity of recalling to Queen Victoria the intimacy he had maintained with her father, the Duke of Kent. In a receptional interview this reminiscence might naturally be introduced. I begged Lord Palmerston to tell me, what, in his opinion, would be most agreeable to the Queen. He replied that my reception would be a purely official formality, and gave me to understand that the Queen would much prefer not having to reply

to any speech. I resolved therefore to abstain from making one. The day after, February the 29th, at ten minutes past one I received a note from Lord Palmerston, telling me that the Queen would receive me that same day at one o'clock. I immediately sent to him to explain the delay and my own innocence. I dressed with all speed, and reached Buckingham Palace a little before two. Lord Palmerston arrived at the same moment. The Queen's orders, he told me, had been forwarded to him late; they had not been dispatched on the instant. Fortunately the Queen had other audiences to give which occupied her while expecting us. But at the moment of entry, there was no master of the ceremonies to introduce me; Sir Robert Chester, apprised as tardily as myself, had not been so quick. Lord Palmerston therefore performed his office. The Queen received me with a gracious manner at once youthful and serious; the dignity of her deportment added to her stature. "I trust, Madam," said I, on entering, "that Your Majesty is aware of my excuse, for of myself I should be inexcusable." She smiled as if little surprised at the want of punctuality. My audience was short; the King, the Queen, the Royal Family, the intimacy of the King with the Duke of Kent, with surprise that I had never before visited England, formed the topics of conversation. As I was retiring, Lord Palmerston, who had remained a moment with the Queen, rejoined me hastily: "There is something more," he said; "I am going to introduce you to Prince Albert and the Duchess of Kent; you could not otherwise be presented to them, but at the

next levee, on the 6th of March, and it is necessary, on the contrary, that on that day you should be already old friends." The double presentation took place. I was struck with the political intelligence, which, though with much reserve intermingled itself in the conversation of Prince Albert. While I was passing through the hall of the palace, to return to my carriage, the master of the ceremonies, Sir Robert Chester entered, alighting from his own, and anxious to apologize to me, with temper somewhat ruffled, for his involuntary uselessness. The same day I dined with Lord Palmerston, and he employed the evening in making me acquainted with a portion of that English aristocracy, which is usually regarded, although much beyond the truth, as the government of the country.

For three quarters of a century, two powerful words, *liberty* and *equality*, constitute the ferment which excites and causes our French society to boil over; I might say the whole social system of Europe. By a concurrence of causes, the inquiry into which would here be unseasonable, England has had this peculiar fortune, that in the labour of her civilization, her efforts and progress have pre-eminently tended towards liberty. The struggle has been carried on, not between different classes, to raise the one while debasing the other, but between the sovereign power and a people jealous in defending their rights, and resolved to participate in their own government. The spirit of equality has had, in this contest, its place and portion; the ascending movement of democracy powerfully contributed to the great Revolution which, from 1640 to 1688, agitated and

transformed England. For a moment even, the democratic classes had possession of the scene, changed the form of government, and verged towards direct dominion. But this was merely a superficial and passing crisis. The spirit of liberty was the true moving spring of the country; the battle was fought between absolute royalty and free government. A great section of the aristocracy maintained the cause of public freedom, and the people grouped heartily round it as round a necessary ally and natural leader. The English Revolution was, from 1640 to 1660, much more aristocratic, and in 1688 much more democratic than is commonly believed; democracy appeared to be dominant in 1640 and aristocracy in 1688; but at both epochs, it was a combination of the English aristocracy and democracy, animated by the same spirit and closely united, which produced together for the defence and advancement of their common liberties, these two equally important events.

Their union in the interest, and under the flag of liberalism, has led to two admirable results. Aristocracy has neither been sovereign nor annihilated, democracy has neither been impotent nor absolute. English society has not been overthrown root and branch. Power has not descended from the regions in which it ought naturally to dwell, neither has it remained there isolated, and without communication with the soil which contains its roots. The higher classes have continued to direct the government of the country, but on two conditions: one, that of ruling in the general interest, and under the preponderating influence of the country itself; the other, that of holding their ranks

constantly open, and of recruiting and renewing themselves incessantly by accepting the chosen aspirants engendered and raised up by the ascending movement of democracy. This is not the aristocratic government of antiquity, or of the middle ages; it is the free and combined government of the different social forces and natural influences which co-exist in the bosom of a great nation.

The part of democracy in this alliance has in our days greatly expanded, but without breaking the alliance, or dispossessing aristocracy of its due share; power generally still remains in the hands of the latter; it directs the affairs of the country, but it regulates them more and more according to the impulse, and under the control of the country in its extended sense. While preserving its social rank, it is to-day servant but not master; it is the habitual but responsible minister of public sentiment and interest. Aristocracy governs, democracy dominates;—and dominates as a master extremely dreaded, and sometimes obeyed with too much docility.

From my first acquaintance with English society, I was struck by this state of minds and institutions in England. The guests I met at Lord Palmerston's table on the 29th of February, belonged nearly all to the high aristocracy; the Duke of Sussex, sixth son of King George the Third, and uncle to the Queen, the Dukes of Norfolk and Devonshire, Lord Carlisle, Lord Albemarle, Lord Minto. I saw pass before me during the evening many leading men of the different parties—Whigs in a great majority, but also Tories and Radicals,

from Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Grote. I entered with several into short conversations; but amongst men mutually inquisitive as to each other, few words suffice to reveal the general tendency of dispositions and ideas. I found all my interlocutors, although in unequal degrees, extremely modest—I might even say timid—with regard to popular opinions and sentiments, and much more intent on thoroughly recognizing to follow, than on aspiring to direct them. Evidently, aristocratic pretensions and independence scarcely retain any place in the thought and conduct of public men.

Amongst those with whom I became acquainted on that day, two in particular, Lord Melbourne, and Lord Aberdeen, attracted, the one my curiosity, the other my sympathy. Lord Melbourne, the least radical of the Whigs, was impartial from clear sense and indifference; a judicious epicurean, an agreeable egotist, gay without warmth, and mingling a natural air of authority with a carelessness which he took delight in proclaiming. "It is all the same to me," was his habitual expression. He pleased the young queen, while he inspired her with confidence, amusing her as he advised, and adopting in his demeanour an affectionate freedom which resembled the paternal sentiment. Lord Aberdeen, the most liberal of the Tories, was serious and mild in temperament, upright and refined, dignified and modest, penetrating and reserved, imperturbably just, with a heart profoundly saddened, for he had been stricken by repeated blows in his warmest affections, while he still remained tender and full of delightful companionship, under a frigid exterior and a sombre aspect. I was far from anticipa-

ting, when first introduced to him, the ties of business and friendship which were destined shortly to unite us, but I felt, and I may say, we reciprocated a prompt and natural attraction.

During this early tide of introductions and visits, I chanced not to meet the foremost of the leading men of England—the Duke of Wellington. He was absent from London. When I first saw him, his aspect surprised me; I found him aged, thin, shrunk and bent, much beyond what his years demanded. He looked with those dimmed and vacant eyes in which the soul, ready to depart, seems no longer to take the trouble of showing itself; he spoke with the short and wavering utterance, the feebleness of which resembles the emotion of a last adieu. But once entering into conversation, all his firm and accurate intellect still manifested itself, though with labour, and sustained by the energy of his will. He apologized for not having yet called upon me, according to custom. “I was in the country,” he said; “I require the country.” The physical decline was striking when associated with the moral vigour and public importance still unimpaired.

On Thursday, the 5th of March, I dined for the first time with the Queen. Neither during the dinner nor in the drawing-room afterwards, was the conversation animated or interesting. Political subjects were entirely avoided; we sat round a circular table, before the Queen, who was on a sofa; two or three of her ladies were endeavouring to work; Prince Albert played at chess; Lady Palmerston and I, with some effort, carried on a flagging dialogue. I observed over the three doors

of the apartment, three portraits, Fénelon, the Czar Peter the Great, and Anne Hyde, daughter of Lord Clarendon, the first wife of James the Second. I felt surprise at this association of three persons so incongruous. No one had remarked it, and no one could explain the reason. I thought of one; the portraits were selected for their size—they fitted well in their respective places.

On the day after, the 6th of March, the Queen held a Levee at Saint James's Palace. A long and monotonous ceremony, which, nevertheless, inspired me with real interest. I regarded with excited esteem the profound respect of that vast assembly, courtiers, citizens, lawyers, churchmen, officers, military and naval, passing before the Queen, the greater portion bending the knee to kiss her hand, all perfectly solemn, sincere, and awkward. The sincerity and seriousness were both wanting to prevent those antiquated habits, wigs, and purses, those costumes which no one even in England now wears, except on such occasions, from appearing somewhat ridiculous. But I am little sensible to the outward appearance of absurdity, when the substance partakes not of that character.

While I was thus beginning to establish myself in London, I had to decide the question whether I should remain, or ought to wish to remain there. The cabinet which had appointed me to that embassy, fell. Marshal Soult, M. Duchâtel, M. Passy, and M. Dufaure, tendered their resignations. The rejection by the Chamber of Deputies of the dotation they had proposed for the Duke of Nemours, a rejection pronounced without

debate, and by an indirect vote much resembling a surprise, had equally offended and shaken them. The King vainly endeavoured to retain them in office. They had a clear perception of the difficulties of the position, and of the weak points of the majority that had failed them, through their own incaution rather than by design. "Though I should retire alone, I would still retire," replied M. Duchâtel. The cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839, had courageously formed itself to stem a revolt; it retired on the 29th of February, 1840, before a parliamentary check which a debate boldly faced might perhaps have evaded altogether.

It was certainly not without dissatisfaction that the King then sent for M. Thiers, and commissioned him to form a cabinet. It was irksome to him to take for first minister one of the chiefs of the coalition. The refusal of the dotation to the Duke of Nemours, opened the door of power to M. Thiers. The King apprehended from him, in foreign affairs, a disposition somewhat too warlike and adventurous. Those who construe these personal sentiments of King Louis-Philippe into an attack on the constitution, are poor moralists and very shallow politicians. A crown placed on a man's head cannot utterly extinguish his human nature, and because he can only govern in concert with the Chambers and by responsible ministers, he does not of necessity sink into a mere machine. All that has a right to be demanded and expected from him is, that he should accept finally the advisers presented to him by the Chambers, and having accepted, that he should not secretly labour to oppose and counteract them.

King Louis-Philippe never failed in either of these duties. He sometimes yielded too much to petulance in the expression of his individual feelings, but this was far from being the rule of his public conduct ; he never rejected the obvious wish of parliamentary majorities ; he was ever loyal even to the cabinets that he disliked. "To-morrow I shall sign my humiliation," he said rather indiscreetly to M. Duchâtel on the 28th of February, 1840 ; and on the day following, the 29th, when M. Thiers felt embarrassed in finding a suitable Minister of Finance, "That shall be no difficulty," said the King, "let M. Thiers present to me, if he pleases, a door-keeper of the Chamber, I am content to take him." This was his real sentiment, for a few days later, on the 11th of March, a man in whom he placed full confidence, General Baudrand, first aide-de-camp to the Duke of Orleans, and one of my firmest friends, wrote thus to me to London : "The King is already alarmed at seeing his new cabinet overthrown ; he dreads these ministerial crises, and would wish the edifice not to be destroyed until the materials are all ready for its reconstruction."

Towards the King as well as with the different fractions of the Chambers whose support he required, M. Thiers conducted himself with tact and circumspection. His situation was complicated and difficult. He was neither the representative nor chief of any opinion or group capable in itself of forming or sustaining a government. To gain a majority in the Chambers, he required to rally round him men and politics extremely opposed, conservatives, liberals, doctrinarians, members

of the coalition against M. Molé, and partisans of that statesman, defenders of the policy of resistance, and advocates of the policy of concession, the left centre, a portion of the left, and a part of the right centre. He was unable to form a cabinet or raise an army, except by recruiting on every side, and by sowing disorganization in all the old ranks. He went to this work boldly and with the most unreserved perspicuity. At first he sought the Duke of Broglie, and offered him whatever he might desire in the ministry. Then he tried Marshal Soult, to whom he proposed to reconstruct, with some new elements, the cabinet lately dissolved. From very different reasons and dispositions, the Duke of Broglie and the Duke of Dalmatia declined his offers.

M. Thiers next urged their friends and mine to unite with his in the future ministry, even avowing himself ready to renounce the Presidency of the Council, if a plausible combination could be found to replace him. With the King, he exhibited the same pliability, without being either exacting or impatient. As to foreign affairs, the Spanish difficulty was smoothed down, and he accepted in principle the policy until now followed in the Eastern question. Internally he required no great constitutional innovation, nor any material administrative changes. I presume that in making such opposite advances, he foresaw that some would not be accepted, and that in his heart, he fully calculated the consequences of his advent to power, and of the new paths into which he would lead the government. He is much too clear-sighted not to know what he does, and where he goes; but he displayed little premeditation,

and no eager pretension. He sought only to satisfy the new interests and desires, which, since the fall of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, had changed, as it was said, the state of parties and minds. He wished to enter into terms and even alliance with that opposition of the left, which lately he had so vehemently combatted; but he promised, and no doubt intended, to restrain and bend rather than to satisfy it.

I watched from a distance, but with eager solicitude, the process of this ministerial child-birth in which my political cause and personal position were equally interested. My friends acquainted me with all its phases, but their appreciations were as different as their dispositions. Disengaged from all entanglement with the past, and all ambition as regarded the future, the Duke of Broglie looked upon the accession of M. Thiers to power, and consequently the preponderance of the left centre and a certain degree of alliance with the extreme left, as inevitable, at least for some time. He had little dread that M. Thiers would give himself up entirely to this bias, or that he could not be checked should he prove to be so disposed; he therefore aided the formation of the cabinet, by engaging some of our common friends to enter it, as M. Thiers proposed to them, to modify its character and direction. M. Duchâtel felt much uneasiness at this first step, diverging from the policy we had sustained, and towards that we had ever opposed. According to his foresight, situations far more than intentions should determine conduct, and be prepared, in concert with the chief portion of the conservative party, to resist the alliance which the new cabinet

was negotiating with the old opposition. M. Villemain and M. Dumon adopted the sentiment of M. Duchâtel. M. de Rémusat, on the other hand, was ready to join M. Thiers, flattering himself that by this association, he might at once revive and maintain the policy which since 1830 he had courageously supported, but which he now found somewhat old and languishing. "I do not conceal from myself," he wrote to me, "a single objection, danger, chance of reverse, and what is still worse, a single vexation; I shall experience many and bitter ones, but I feel within myself an unworked mine of ambition, activity, and resources, which this perilous opportunity excites me to bring into action, and I have in me an indescribable spirit of adventure, which though deeply concealed is now irresistibly tempted."

M. Duvergier de Hauranne, an enthusiastic but equally disinterested champion of the coalition, and his brother-in-law, Count Jaubert, who had acquired a well-earned reputation by his pointed attacks and replies in the tribune, entertained the same views with M. de Rémusat. Of all the fractions of the Chamber of Deputies, my particular friends the Doctrinarians were the most divided, and in the letters which they addressed to me daily, some urged me to remain as ambassador in London under the new cabinet, which anxiously desired it; others, with more reserve, allowed me to perceive their desire that I should send in my resignation, and return to associate myself in the Chamber with their attitude of mistrust, and perhaps speedily of opposition.

For myself, and in my own sincere conviction, I did

not hesitate a moment. If M. Thiers had assumed office alone, resting on the left centre, and accepted by the left, I should have at once quitted London to resume in Paris my place in the defence of our party so evidently abandoned. But M. Thiers protested against the idea of this desertion. He had proposed to the Duke of Broglie, combinations which would have entirely dissipated all such apprehensions; he pressed some of my friends to join him, and those who felt so disposed gave me positive assurances of their resistance to a tendency the danger of which they foresaw. On the 4th of March I wrote to M. Duchâtel:

“My dear friend, I waited, before writing to you until all was decided. The *Moniteur* will this morning inform me of the cabinet. Everything well considered, I think I ought to remain. I believe my doing so to be consistent with the interest of our cause and party as well as with my own.

“It is clear that the danger lies in the tendency towards the left; that is to say towards electoral reform and the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies within, and towards war without. As to war, I here occupy the decisive position. It is here alone that the policy disposed or suffering itself to be urged towards war, or what might lead to war, could seek any resting point. While this position remains in our hands, we are prepared to avert and arrest. England, as regards foreign policy, is a country at the same time egotistical and rash. She might engage in measures by which she would in no way be compromised herself, but which might seriously compromise us, upon the continent,

You have seen an instance in the question of intervention in Spain. It is here that we ought to defend, and can defend the policy of peace.

“As to internal affairs, this is what Rémusat writes to me:—‘The ministry is formed upon this idea; no electoral reform, no dissolution. However, it is evident that as regards names, above all for the first month, it will assume the air of inclining towards the left. Appearances will bear such an interpretation, and I admit that this is serious. But I answer for the reality on all important points.’ You will understand that in replying to him I build on these words:—‘No electoral reform, no dissolution.’ On these conditions alone can I remain. While here I must be considered a guarantee for the policy of conservatism, and that my retirement, should it become necessary, will be a decisive signal.

“From things I pass to persons.

“I do not deceive myself as to what has happened, and the concomitant danger. But I cannot equitably, reasonably, honourably retire because a cabinet comes in, formed under the influence of the Duke of Broglie, containing Rémusat and Jaubert; and retire also before any act, on the single indication of certain individual names. I have never been wanting to my friends. All know this. At the moment when they seem to divide, I shall not fail more to one than to the other. I shall separate from no one on prejudices, presumptions, fears, or even dangers. When acts declare themselves, should they justify fears and disclose dangers, on that day I shall separate openly and without hesitation. Speaking

of myself alone, I am not sorry, I confess to you, to be a little removed from the struggles of persons and the decomposition of parties. No one has engaged more deeply in them than myself, in the common interest, and without private considerations. It suits me to repose from them. If any other combination of government appeared to me possible, I might seek for it; for the moment, I see none, nor do I think it would be profitable for the country and for ourselves, nor honorable and consistent after the coalition, to aggravate still farther, without absolute and evident necessity, this burden of incompatibilities and impossibilities which weighed so heavily upon us.

“Unless I deceive myself, my dear friend, all the moderate, patriotic, and un-intriguing portions of the old government party (and it is much the most important of all) ought to rally round us. This gives us for the present, immense strength; for the future almost certain success. Preserve this position. I shall assist you here, for I shall equally watch over it. We have not, in my opinion, a better or a safer line of conduct to pursue.”

M. Duchâtel has very lively first impressions, and sometimes abandons himself a little hastily to words, under these impulses; but in the hour of serious reflection and definitive resolve, I know no judgment or honour more steady than his. He had evinced some desire that I should instantly return to Paris to take my place in the struggle which he foresaw; but he understood and fully approved my reasons for remaining in London,

and gave me an assurance to that effect to which I attached much value.

I was equally anxious to explain myself without reserve to M. de Rémusat, anticipating, as he did himself, that the path on which he was entering, might one day sadly complicate relations which would still remain dear to me, even though they should cease to be intimate. I wrote to him on the 5th of March: "My dear friend, I have waited the arrival of the *Moniteur* to reply to you. I have reflected well, and I remain at my post. I remain seriously. I shall co-operate loyally. I shall not separate myself on the mere indication of names, and the embarrassment of positions, from a cabinet of which you are a member, and which the Duke of Broglie has so materially assisted to form. Your bias is dangerous, particularly so to you, on account of your natural tendency, of that adventurous spirit which you name to me, and which can scarcely satisfy itself, except by looking towards the left. Believe me, there are moments when strength may be found in the left, but never a permanent support. It possesses neither the sound practical sense, nor the true principles, the moral principles of government, and less of free government than of any other. It has neither what can satisfy and sustain the man of business nor the philosopher. It shakes and weakens instead of strengthening the two bases of social order, regulated interests and moral convictions. It can give, and has sometimes given useful and memorable checks; its prolonged influence and domination humble and dissolve, sooner or later, power and society. You tell

me that the ministry is based upon the idea—no electoral reform, no dissolution. Allow me to record this, for it is what I require for myself. I can only march under this flag and in this direction. Let the cabinet deviate therefrom, and I shall be compelled to separate from it.”

It was not only to my intimate friends, to the principal political actors that I thus communicated the motives and limits of my determination; I wished that the bulk of the conservative party, the spectators and judges of the parliamentary struggle, should be distinctly made acquainted with them; I therefore wrote, on the 8th of March, as follows, to one of the most enlightened amongst them, M. Molin, Deputy for Puy-de-Dôme: “My dear colleague, after mature deliberation on the subject, I have decided to remain for the present at my post. One of these three things will happen. Either the cabinet will struggle against the vice of its origin and bias, and in which case I shall assist the good cause in this contest; I shall weigh on the right side. Or the cabinet will soon give way under its bad position; I shall thus have given proof of moderation and equity, I shall have abstained from mingling with these personal squabbles, these decompositions of parties, incompatibilities, impossibilities, precarious separations and alliances in which for several years I have been engaged more vehemently than any other person, and which have so much embarrassed and wearied the country and ourselves. Or, finally, the cabinet will maintain itself by marching on the side towards which it inclines, and in that emergency, as soon as acts go to *the left*, I

shall separate from it, to resume my place on my bench and my share in the combat. The ministers have written to me, thus : 'The ministry is formed upon this idea—no electoral reform, no dissolution.' I have taken note of these words, replying that I neither could nor would serve under any other flag. I remain here, therefore, anxious and observant, to defend the policy of peace, as long as the policy of order does not appear to me even more compromised at home and more in need of protection. This, if I mistake not, is the proper position for my friends in Paris, as it is mine here. A sudden and declared hostility, a step taken to throw out the new cabinet by preventing it absolutely from moving, when it contains some of our own party, men of intelligence and honour, and before any thing has been done—such a hostile act, I say, would appear to me bad policy in itself, and quite unsuitable to us. We have always offered to support a government disposed to act in accordance with our views. The present ministry inclines towards the left, and many causes will draw it in that direction. Others also, the necessities of power, the instinct of its own preservation, will recall it to us. I trust a little, I confess, to the incorrigible nature of the left, for a hope that it will restore to us the very men driven into office by the breath of its influence. Let us remain steady in our camp, without issuing to attack, and without closing the gates against those who may desire to enter. Perhaps also we may succeed in re-constructing within the Chamber a government majority. This is the object we have pursued through many opposing situations since the fall of the

cabinet of the 11th of October; this, in my opinion, is still the end we ought to hold in view."

I had an undoubted right to give to my attitude and its motives the publicity which could not fail to result from all this correspondence, for I had, from the first moment, entered into clear explanations with M. Thiers himself. On the day following the formation of the cabinet, the 2nd of March, before I had communicated to any one my resolution of remaining in London, he had written thus to me: "My dear colleague, I hasten to tell you that the ministry is complete. You will see amongst the members who compose it, two of your friends, Jaubert and Rémusat, men with whom you would willingly have associated yourself. Our frequent communications for eighteen months have proved to both of us, that we were in accord as to what was to be done, whether at home or abroad. On leaving Paris, you declared to me in the Hall of Conferences that our foreign policy was the same. I shall feel very happy if, in fulfilling our respective tasks, you in London, I in Paris, we should add a page to the history of our old relations; for, to-day, as on the 11th of October, we both labour to extricate the country from fearful embarrassments. You will find in me the same confidence and friendship as at that epoch. I reckon in return on similar sentiments from you. I shall not at present enter on business. I could not do so profitably. I wait your next communications and the pending deliberations of the new council to confer with you on the mission with which you are charged. This is merely

a word of regard which I address to you to-day at the outset of our new relations."

I replied without delay on the 5th of March: "My dear colleague, I believe with you that there are great embarrassments from which the country must be delivered. I will assist you from hence, loyally and to the utmost of my ability. We have carried out together, from 1832 to 1836, acts which I hope will one day be considered great. Let us recommence. We know each other and require but few words. You will find in me the same confidence and friendship which you promise, and which I thank you for inviting. We have satisfied ourselves, in fact, in these latter times, that we can move together towards the same end. Rémusat writes to me that the cabinet is based upon the idea of no electoral reform, and no dissolution. I accept this standard, the only one under which I could act usefully for the cabinet, and honorably for myself. Should any circumstance arise calling upon me to modify our relations, I should tell you so on the instant and very frankly. I am sure you would understand me, at the same time that you would approve of my so doing.

"I do not here touch upon public affairs. You have received yesterday the official account of my first conversation with Lord Palmerston. I transmit a second to-day. I shall then have told you all that I have seen here up to this time, and you will communicate to me your opinion in reply."

CHAPTER II.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.

DIFFICULTIES OF MY POSITION IN LONDON WHEN RESUMING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.—MY INSTRUCTIONS.—MOTIVES AND BASES OF THE POLICY OF THE CABINET OF MARSHAL SOULT.—PRELIMINARY CONVERSATION WITH LORD PALMERSTON.—I LEARN THE FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF M. THIERS.—MY FIRST CONVERSATION WITH LORD PALMERSTON ON THE EASTERN QUESTION.—CONVERSATION WITH LORD MELBOURNE.—DISPOSITIONS OF SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE ENGLISH CABINET.—LORD HOLLAND, LORD LANSDOWNE, AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE WHIGS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE CABINET.—LORD GREY.—LORD DURHAM.—MY RELATIONS WITH THE TORIES.—THE DIPLOMATIC BODY IN LONDON.—BARON DE BULOW.—BARON DE NEUMANN.—BARON DE BRÜNNOW.—M. VAN DE WEYER, GENERAL ALAVA, M. DEDEL, COUNT DE POLLON.—I NOTIFY SEVERAL TIMES TO THE FRENCH CABINET THE DANGER OF THE SITUATION, AND THE CHANCES OF AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS WITHOUT FRANCE.—INSTRUCTIONS FORWARDED TO ME FROM M. THIERS.—OPENING OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR POSITION.—MY CONVERSATION ON THE 1ST. OF APRIL WITH LORD PALMERSTON.—THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, NOURI-EFFENDI, ARRIVES IN LONDON.—HIS NOTE OF THE 7TH. OF APRIL TO THE FIVE POWERS.—MY ANSWER.—OVERTURES MADE TO ME SUCCESSIVELY BY BARON DE BULOW, AND BARON DE NEUMANN.—IMPORTANT CONCESSION OF LORD PALMERSTON.—SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE NEW TURKISH AMBASSADOR, CHEKIB-EFFENDI, WHO COMES FROM CONSTANTINOPLE.

My position in entering on negotiations in London on the Eastern Question, was singularly embarrassing

and difficult. By the note remitted to the Porte on the 27th of July, 1839, we had engaged to treat this question in concert with Austria, Prussia, Russia, as well as with England, and we had detached the Sultan from all direct arrangement with the Pacha of Egypt, promising him that "accordance between the five powers was assured." Since then, however, we had declared for the pretensions of the Pacha not only to the hereditary possession of Egypt, but also of Syria; and when I was appointed to the English Embassy, despite the obstacles we had already encountered, we persisted in our resolution. "The King's government," said Marshal Soult, in the instructions given to me on the 19th of February, 1840,* "has believed and still continues to believe that in the position in which Mehemet Ali finds himself, to offer him less than hereditary rule in Egypt and Syria, would be to expose ourselves to a certain refusal on his part, which, in case of need, he would sustain by a desperate resistance, the rebound of which, would shake and perhaps subvert the Ottoman Empire."

Thus pledged, on one side to concert with the five powers, and on the other, to the pretensions of the Pacha of Egypt, we had against us, in the negotiation, England, who refused absolutely to the Pacha the right of inheritance in Egypt; Russia, who wished to retain Constantinople under her exclusive protectorship, or only to sacrifice it by embroiling us with England; and finally Austria and Prussia themselves, sufficiently indifferent on the question of territory between the Sultan and the Pacha, but determined to follow, as occasion

* See Historic Documents, No. I.

might arise, alternately England and Russia, rather than unite with us to restrain the pretensions of both.

The cabinet presided over by Marshal Soult had a feeling of the incoherence and embarrassments of this situation, for in its instructions it recommended me to avoid carefully all that might tend to lead us into the path of conferences and protocols ; it being too evident after what had so recently passed, that we should in most cases find ourselves isolated there. But this was a useless precaution. None of the Powers thought of demanding an official conference on the affairs of the East. When I named it to Lord Palmerston, with the view of banishing the idea, " There is not the slightest question," he said, " of conference, protocol, or any thing of the kind. You are perfectly right ; such proceedings would embarrass us all, without tending to any advantage. It is only necessary to negotiate to arrive at some arrangement in which we may all agree, and thus terminate the matter." It was precisely on this understanding, whether officially debated or not, that the problem in question rested ; and in refusing all conference or protocol, the French cabinet fed itself on an illusive security. The absence of those diplomatic forms in no way diminished the difficulty of its position.

Its entire policy rested on a triple confidence. In Paris, they reckoned firmly on the perseverance of Mehemet Ali in his pretensions to the hereditary possession of Syria, and on his energy in supporting them by arms if attacked. They looked upon the means of coaction that might be employed against him either as absolutely ineffective and vain, or as gravely compro-

missing for the safety of the Ottoman Empire and the peace of Europe. Finally, it was not believed that Russia would ever consent to abandon really her exclusive, or at least preponderating protectorship at Constantinople. Strong in these convictions, the French cabinet willingly lent itself to the animated pressure of public opinion in favour of the Pacha of Egypt, and felt no imperious necessity of resisting it.

My mission in London was to obtain from the English government great concessions to the advantage of the Pacha, and my weapons in the effort were the triple conjecture I have just named on the chances of the future, in case of a contest, and the necessity of the permanent union of France and England to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the peace of Europe.

My opening intercourse with Lord Palmerston was easy and agreeable. He knew me to be devoted to intimate relations between France and England, and from our first interview, hastened to give me, in that respect, and as I believe sincerely, the strongest assurances. "The superior and predominant interests of the two countries," he said to me, "will ever, in the end, dissipate the clouds which sometimes are raised up between them by accidental facts, or the mischievous efforts of certain organs of the periodical press. Nevertheless," he added, "these clouds are a real evil; the evil has increased from a certain epoch, and I confess that we ourselves, since the ministry of Count Molé, have remarked in the French government a less friendly disposition as regards us, and some leaning in favour of

other allies." I repelled this supposition : " The King's sentiments towards England are always the same," I replied ; " nothing has been modified, but his situation in Europe in respect to the continental powers. By the influence of time, and especially through the consequence of the efforts and success of the King's government in the maintenance of order and peace, the suspicion, and to speak without reserve, the repugnance which some of these powers entertained against him, are dissipated, or at least much weakened. They have learned to do him justice, and to understand the importance to Europe of his firm establishment on the throne. They have since evinced more confidence and good-will towards him, and he has thus approached nearer to them, without, for that reason, estranging himself from you. His attachment to the English alliance remains as steady and sincere as in the first days, although more free and less exclusive. You surely cannot think, my lord, that to be united with England, we are called upon to remain isolated in Europe, or in unfriendly relations with other states." " No, no," resumed Lord Palmerston, " we are not jealous on that point ; but so many facts have concurred to inspire us with doubt, that it was difficult to look upon them all as accidental."

He then took a review of the different questions, trifling or important, which since 1836, in Europe, America, and Africa, had sprung between the two countries, and had proved subjects of disagreement or uneasiness. He dwelt particularly on the obstacles opposed by us to the commercial negotiations entered into

by the English cabinet, whether with Spain or ourselves. I gladly seized this opportunity of indicating the maxims which directed, and in my opinion, ought to direct the French government in such matters. "Here, my lord," I said, "are some imperative facts to which we should mutually resign ourselves, interests essentially opposed, which both parties are called upon to protect, and are compelled to treat with circumspection. The King's government is disposed and decided to use its best efforts to deal with these interests in the most equitable sense, and to second, by the application of liberal principles, the general prosperity of the two countries. It has just given you a proof in the negotiations accepted, and now in progress for the modification of our respective tariffs. But progress in this road is difficult, and must be slow. The King's government is bound to consider, first, the actual interests of the French manufacturers, and of the working population, which live by the labour they supply. You are not ignorant, my lord, that in France a portion of the proprietors of the soil, even without associating themselves with any conspiracy, any project of overthrow, entertain still towards the government of July, 1830, a malevolent disposition, and withholds from it the force which that class of society generally gives to power. Another class, that of the great manufacturers, masters of forges, and merchants, is, on the contrary, attached to the King's government, and brings to it, on all occasions, the support of its activity, intelligence, wealth, and influence. It is impossible, therefore, for the government not to bestow the most attentive care on the

interests and feelings of that class, and of the population attached to it ; and it is only after the most scrupulous inquiries, the most minute examinations, and on the evident demonstration of the general interest of the country, that it can impose on it the sacrifices and efforts, the necessity of which is fully recognized."

I did not allow any of the grievances which Lord Palmerston enumerated to pass by without refutation or explanation. He insisted on none ; no prolonged acrimony had infused itself into this little retrospective summary ; he seemed more inclined at the outset of our communications to disembarass himself of his past dissatisfactions than to take advantage of them for the future ; and his frame of mind appeared to me exempt from all unfriendly mental reservation, though impressed with a certain degree of susceptibility, and with some doubt as to a future good and solid understanding between the two governments.

Not a word passed between us that day, on the affairs of the East. Anxious to get to the House of Commons, and to prepare the documents he had to lay before it, on the war with China, Lord Palmerston requested me to adjourn to the day after the next, the 4th of March, our first and serious conversation on the great question which comprised the essential object of my mission.

I repaired to his house on the appointed day, at one o'clock. I had just received notice of the fall of Marshal Soult, to whom I had addressed my first despatches, and of the formation of the ministry under the presidency of M. Thiers. I said to Lord Palmer-

ston on entering, "I have not, nor could I have yet received, my lord, any positive instructions on the affairs of the East, and the views of the new cabinet." "So much the better," replied he, "we shall converse more freely on the question itself; we require to be mutually explicit." "I shall be delighted," I replied; "I am not a diplomatist by profession; I have taken some part in the internal government of my country, and I am desirous of bringing under the eyes of your ministry the state of minds in our Chambers and our public. There is great unanimity amongst us on the Eastern question; our debates themselves bear testimony to this; I may venture to say that I shall be with you, at the same time, the organ of the intentions of the King's government, and of the general opinion of the country. It is not, my lord, that the King's government regulates itself, in this matter, by public prejudices and adopts them as the rule of its policy. There are some, strongly advocated and loudly clamorous, with which it is far from associating. You hear in England continually of ambitious pretensions, and views of aggrandizement on the part of France, and assuredly you do not participate, on this subject, in all the fears by which you are assailed. We also, my lord, have our popular suspicions; we are incessantly told of the ambition and aggrandizing projects of England, that she wishes to take possession of Candia, to predominate alone in Egypt and Syria. The King's government is well aware that these rumours have no foundation. It is fully convinced that your cabinet is too wise to desire any thing in the East beyond the maintenance

of peace and established order between the States. We regard the French and English interest in this question, should rather say the superior and controlling interest of the two countries as precisely similar. You desire, and we desire also in common with you that the Ottoman Empire should continue, and hold its place in the balance of European power. For you, as for us, the grand point is Constantinople. The security and independence of Constantinople are what we are both determined to guarantee. Events have raised up in Egypt and Syria another question on which it may be supposed that we are not equally unanimous. But this new question does not prevent that of Constantinople from still holding the first place. The events in Syria oblige us to think of Constantinople : but it is always at Constantinople that our mutual interest is concerned ; it is ever with Constantinople in view, and to reach a satisfactory solution of the question there involved, that all other points must be considered and determined. Well then, my lord, in order to solve the question of Constantinople in a manner satisfactory to you, to us, to the peace and political equilibrium of Europe, it is necessary that the Egyptian difficulty should be pacifically settled by an arrangement accepted both by the Sultan and the Pacha ; and which may be definitively regulated by mutual consent and their reciprocal position. What this arrangement ought to be, and what the territorial limit between the two rivals, are indeed serious, but in our eyes, secondary considerations. Whether the Sultan or the Pacha should occupy any specified extent of territory, interests us little ; what we

deem more important is, that the East should not be given over to the chances of a great commotion, and that we should not set the torch to it by employing force. Think well over this, my lord, consult the past; every event, every shock in the East compromises the safety and independence of Constantinople by favouring the influence we both desire to restrain. Every employment of force in the East turns to the profit of Russia; first, because Russia always appears on that scene with the greatest amount of strength, and next, because every employment of force, every great shock opens chances impossible to foresee, and which Russia, more than any other Power is in a condition to take advantage of. Allow me, my lord, to propose one question: I know that you consider the arrangement concluded at Kutaieh in 1833, as a bad one, and I have no wish now to discuss its merits; nevertheless, if it had been possible a few months ago, before the explosion of the fresh struggle between the Sultan and the Pacha to guarantee the duration of the treaty of Kutaieh for ten years, would you not most assuredly have accepted that *statu quo* as an actual benefit, a pledge of security to the Ottoman Empire, and consequently to Europe? And why so? Because, above all other considerations, what the East requires is peace, and the absence of any commotion that might open perspectives and chances to foreign ambition."

Lord Palmerston who up to this point had listened with immovable attention, interrupted me at those words. "The *statu quo* of the treaty of Kutaieh, was impossible," he said; "the ambition of Mehemet Ali is

always increasing, he has never confined himself within his limits."

"Pardon me, my lord, I do not dispute the ambition of Mehemet Ali; but in this last occurrence he cannot be accused as the aggressor."

"Yes, I know that is said in France, but they are deceived; it was on Turkish and not on Egyptian territory that the battle of Nezib was fought."

"It is true, my lord; but the Egyptian territory had been previously invaded by the Turks; they had occupied several Egyptian villages; Ayn-Tab where they first entered is on Egyptian ground."

"I think not," said Lord Palmerston, and he looked for a map of Syria, by which we soon ascertained that Ayn-Tab was on the right bank of the Sed-Jour which then divided the two territories. Lord Palmerston expressed doubts as to the correctness of his map: "I have brought," I said, "an excellent map of Syria, published recently at Gotha, in which also Ayn-Tab is placed on the right bank of the Sed-Jour." Lord Palmerston abandoned this ground of debate. "It signifies little," he said, "whether on that day the Sultan or the Pacha was the aggressor; in their relative positions one was sure to be found. How restrain an ambitious vassal and an irritated sovereign, with their armies in presence, and without strong or well-defined frontiers? What has happened was inevitable, and ever would occur under the same circumstances. We should have foreseen this in 1833. I said so at the time, and I asked for other measures than the treaty of Kutaieh. But we had then pressing matters

on hand at home and the cabinet declined. We were wrong. Let us not fall again into the same error. We must prevent the recurrence of events similar to those by which we are at present so much embarrassed. The means are to strengthen the Sultan, to weaken the Pacha, and to prevent that habitual and inevitable contact between them which tempts at every instant the ambition of the one and the vengeance of the other. To strengthen the Ottoman Empire, we must restore to it a portion of the territories it has lost; Syria is a rich and populous province; the Porte will draw from thence men and money, and will be better able to resist the Pacha, who, on his side, will have much fewer opportunities and means of attack."

"Do you believe, my lord, that you will really strengthen the Ottoman Empire by restoring to it more territory? Let us not cherish illusions; that empire is not dead but dying; it is falling into shreds; we may prolong its life, but cannot resuscitate it effectively. You do not give it, with Syria, the power of governing and protecting that province; Turkish anarchy, pillage, violence, and impotence will resume their sway, and you will be responsible for its fate. You will be compelled alternately to restrain and support the Turks. I admit that you may succeed; I admit that Mehemet Ali may be subdued and driven back to Egypt. Do you believe that he will content himself and renounce the ambition which you consider so indomitable? No, my lord; he has given proofs of perseverance and address; he will resume his designs; he will labour to reconquer Syria. The means will not be wanting to him.

Let Mehemet Ali possess Syria,—the Sultan will maintain intelligence there and foment rebellions ; let the Sultan possess it,—the Pacha will excite revolts, render precarious the sovereignty of his rival, and perhaps soon re-establish his own. Instead of having secured the supremacy of the Porte, you will, on the contrary, have rekindled the struggle, aggravated the confusion, and prepared new hazards of which Russia will, as ever, be the first to take advantage.”

“You have,” replied Lord Palmerston, “too bad an opinion of the Ottoman Empire, and you are not well informed as to the real disposition of the Russian Government. A state which is a corpse, a body without a soul, and falling into shreds, are figures of speech we ought not to put faith in. Let a sick state recover territories capable of supplying men and money ; let it restore regularity to its administration ; it will cure itself and again become strong. This is already taking place in Turkey. The hattî-sheriff of Redschid Pacha is in operation. Its good effects are developing themselves. And as to Russia, be assured that her disposition to act in concert with the other Powers on the affairs of the East is sincere. I do not say that the desire of alienating France and England reckons for nothing in her conduct ; but she also wishes not to remain in the East in the position which she has assumed. Her treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi weighs upon her. If troubles break out in Turkey, if Mehemet Ali threatens Constantinople, if the Porte demands Russian aid according to the specified terms, the Emperor Nicholas is resolved to act upon them ; he believes

that his honour requires him to do so, but the necessity is not agreeable to him. He foresees that neither you nor we would suffer him to take this course, and he has no wish for the contest ; he seeks rather to stand upon less compromising ground. It is our interest, yours, and the interest of Europe to second this disposition. Let us seize it while it exists ; let us profit by it to bring back the Ottoman question within public European law. It will be a great advantage to us all to have destroyed, without contest, this exclusive protectorate which justly inspires so much mistrust, and to have bound within treaties the power which desired to assume it."

"I hope, my lord, you may be right upon both these points ; I hope the Ottoman Empire may recover strength and that Russia may renounce her control over it as protector. But the Russian abdication appears to me very doubtful, and as for the restoration of Turkey, the dangers which beset that country at this moment are more pressing than the remedies of which you speak can be prompt. Under the most favourable suppositions, the Ottoman Empire will not long be in a condition to provide for itself, and when great internal disorders demand from it new efforts, for many years to come, foreign forces, or rather Russian forces will be called in to protect it."

"When the Russians come in virtue of a treaty, and in the name of Europe, the danger will no longer be the same, and the end once attained, they will retire."

"I believe, my lord, in the virtue of treaties ; I believe in the loyalty of sovereigns ; but I believe also in

the empire of situations, passions, and a secular policy. It will be much if the Russians leave Turkey after having entered it; but even when they have retired, it will be a great evil that they should ever have interfered. And who tells you that they will be able to retire promptly? Who tells you that the war, once excited in Syria, will not continue longer than you may have foreseen? The Pacha has there a considerable army; he may, even when his communications by sea are interrupted, support and provision that army in the country itself, and by land. Already, it is said, he is organizing the means across the desert and through Palestine. They speak of five thousand camels engaged in this object. You will not disembark English troops in Syria; Austria will not send hers; against all the difficulties of that war, wherever it may break out, in Syria, in Asia Minor, or at Constantinople, it is Russia alone that will be called on to provide."

"English troops, no; we have none to send there; but Austrian troops—eh, eh, we don't know, we don't know."

I continued incredulous. Lord Palmerston resumed: "Besides it might not perhaps be necessary that the Russians should enter Asia Minor or Syria; we could land in Egypt itself, in the heart of Mehemet Ali's power, a Turco-Russian corps; he has only bad troops there, mere labourers; he would have to recall his army from Syria;" and Lord Palmerston re-opening his map, showed me how Lower Egypt might be occupied.

"My lord," I observed, "we have tried that experiment; we know the efforts it requires, and the risks it

involves ; you will not send there a better army or an abler general than we had in 1797. But allow me to return to the question itself. Why all these attempts ? Why expose the peace of the East, the safety of the Porte and of Europe to so many hazards ? To refuse hereditary sovereignty to an old man of seventy-two. What is this heirship in the East, my lord, in that violent and precarious state of society, in those numerous and disunited families ? The history of Mehemet Ali is not a new fact in the Ottoman Empire. More than one pacha before him has raised himself and achieved conquests, has become powerful and almost independent. What has the Porte done ? It has waited, the pachas have died, their sons have quarrelled, and the Porte has regained its territories and power. This appears still its best chance and most prudent line of conduct."

"There is truth in what you say there ; heirship probably would not value much. Nevertheless, Ibrahim Pacha is an able leader, loved by his troops, and a better administrator, they say, than his father ; he has also some good French officers. We speak without reserve do we not ? Would not France be glad to see established in Egypt and Syria a new and independent power, almost her own creation and of necessity her ally ? You possess the regency of Algiers. Between you and your Egyptian friend what would remain ? Scarcely anything, merely the poor States of Tunis and Tripoli. The whole coast of Africa, and a part of that of Asia on the Mediterranean, from Morocco to the gulf of Alexandretta, would then be in your power and under your influence. This would never suit us."

The discussion while running to length, advanced at the same time. I entered without hesitation into this new track. "You are right, my lord; we speak freely and we may do so without restraint, for our words do not dispose of the future. What that may one day produce, what new combinations of states and politics may spring up round the Mediterranean, neither you, nor I, nor any one can tell. We may amuse our minds by trying to anticipate all this, but it is certainly not upon such hypotheses or presentiments that our policy of to-day ought to be regulated. The King's government will never fail in its duty towards the destinies of France; but it feels convinced that at present the paramount interest of France consists in the maintenance of peace, the consolidation of European order, and the regular development of the resources of the different states each contained within its own limits. This is our policy, my lord, it is yours also; and, in truth, I cannot understand why in the East we should not act in concert, since beyond or above all secondary or future points of disagreement, we have there evidently the same interest and the same object."

I paused, and regarded Lord Palmerston steadily: "Permit me, my lord," I said, "to ask a point blank question. Has this matter gone farther than we are aware of? It has been said elsewhere, or at least implied, that the negotiation of which we are now speaking of was almost concluded, and the means of coercion to be employed against Mehemet Ali, nearly settled. Is there any truth in that report?"

Lord Palmerston replied without hesitation: "There

is nothing, absolutely nothing more than you are acquainted with." He rose, opened a desk at which he usually wrote standing, and took out two papers. "Here," he said, "are two draughts of an arrangement, of a treaty if you will, between all the powers, on this subject. The first is mine, a mere sketch, a simple digest of my own ideas which I have not even shown to my colleagues. The second is an analogous sketch sent to me from one of the continental powers." He did not name the power, but I had reason to believe that this second rough draught was of Austrian origin.

"Read them both," he said. In fact he read the first to me himself, and I looked over the second. They were conceived, in principle, on different systems. Lord Palmerston's was a treaty between the five powers and the Ottoman Porte; in the second, the five powers treated only amongst themselves, and the Porte received and accepted their propositions. This essential distinction laid aside, the two plans differed little in other respects; both contained: 1. The engagement of the five powers to guarantee the Ottoman Empire against any new attack from the Pacha of Egypt, and any invasion beyond the Taurus. 2. The arrangement in that case of the mode of occupation of Constantinople and the Sea of Marmara. 3. Finally, the indication of the means to be employed against the Pacha of Egypt, in case he should refuse the injunctions of the Sultan and of the five powers. Except the employment of the European fleets to intercept the communications between Egypt and Syria, and to support local insurrections and the disembarkations of Turkish or allied

troops, these means of coaction were very vaguely expressed, and ended in an engagement to concert anew in case more active measures should become necessary.

While reading the paragraphs which withdrew Syria from Mehemet Ali and left him only the right of inheritance in Egypt, Lord Palmerston observed, "Pass that over, it is in litigation." Our interview ended there. "I am very glad," said his lordship, "that we have thus gone to the very bottom of the business. I shall wait till you have made your report to the King's government, and have received its further instructions."

Although newly arrived in London and as yet imperfectly acquainted with the exact measure of personal weight and importance in the English cabinet and political world, I know that Lord Palmerston was, in fact, the effective minister in Foreign affairs, and that I must convince him to carry my point with his government. But several of his colleagues, Lord Melbourne in the first place, the head of the cabinet, Lord Lansdowne, Lord John Russell, and Lord Holland interested themselves warmly in questions of external policy, and exercised on the resolutions of the ministry and on the mind of Lord Palmerston himself an important influence. I had with some of them old and cordial social relations, which, from the first days, I took care to cultivate; but I was quite unacquainted with Lord Melbourne, who I met for the first time in Lady Palmerston's drawing-room. It was natural and suitable that I should open intercourse with him on matters of official business; I requested an interview to this effect, which he appointed

at his own house for the 8th of March. I found him well disposed towards France, and satisfied that the good understanding between the two countries was equally important to both, for their internal prosperity, and as a pledge for their common interest—the peace of Europe. Reclining in his arm-chair by the side of mine, turning his head and bending his ear towards me, he speaking in English and I in French, each in his turn, and in a regular dialogue interrupted only by his laughter, Lord Melbourne listened and replied to me with that mixture of carelessness and serious attention which indicates free conviction rather than premeditated resolve, and seems to invite and authorize the most unreserved confidence. I repeated to him the essential particulars of what I had said to Lord Palmerston. As he dwelt complacently on the mutual advantages of the alliance; “Admit, my lord,” I observed, “that it would be strange indeed, if this good intelligence, this concert between the two powers should be interrupted precisely on a question in which their leading interest is the same. I can understand such and such a country or occasion respecting which, notwithstanding our general alliance, we might have different views; but it is clear that in the East we participate in the same fears and designs. We both wish to maintain peace, to support the Ottoman Empire, to prevent Russia from taking possession of it either materially by conquest, or morally by influence. I should indeed be lost in surprise if on account of secondary or remote questions we should in some degree lose sight of our common star, and cease to act and think together on the very theatre in which

we are most naturally called upon to combine. Assuredly, my lord, in that case, one of the two cabinets would seriously deceive itself, and fail in its true and leading policy. In treating on Eastern affairs let us constantly revert to that general and permanent course which forms the basis of our position and interest; let this be the touchstone of all combinations and measures. I am confident, that in the end we shall both find the advantage of this mode of proceeding."

Lord Melbourne evidently assented, and repeated several times in the course of the conversation: "Yes, we have in fact the same interest, and ought to act in concert; we can do no good without you. But do you think it possible," he said, leaning towards me, "to leave Syria to the Pacha of Egypt without a constant renewal of the recent war and the embarrassments into which it has thrown us? The Pacha will always want to extend his dominions beyond Syria, the Sultan will ever wish to reserve that province. The position is untenable, we must put an end to it."

I resumed all I had said to Lord Palmerston to show him that the evacuation of Syria, far from re-establishing a desirable peace between the Sultan and the Pacha, would only embitter the quarrel and increase the chances of commotion in the East. "The Sultan," I said, "who has been unable to defend or recover Syria with his own forces, will be equally unable to govern it; and Europe, who gives it back to him will be incessantly compromised and compelled to interfere either to preserve that country to him, or to protect it against him. There are Christian populations there who will be dis-

turbed, plundered, and oppressed by the Turks in an intolerable manner; we have traditional duties towards them; their sufferings and clamours will excite European sympathy. The administration of Mehemet Ali, in that province, wants neither force nor a certain degree of religious equity; let it remain in his hands; we shall seldom hear it mentioned, and that portion of the East at least will enjoy a gleam of peace and afford a little security to Europe."

Lord Melbourne listened to me with attention almost amounting to curiosity, giving from time to time marked assent to my words, sometimes proposing questions which appeared to solicit a favourable answer, as if he were seriously desirous of finding the point on which we might agree. But nothing implied that he himself saw that point of union, and he seemed more inclining to a favourable uncertainty than converted to our opinion.

"Permit me, my lord," I said in conclusion, "to reduce the question to its simplest form. To what does it amount? To giving or refusing the hereditary sovereignty of Syria to an old man of seventy-two, who desires it because he has nothing more to look for, but who is very far from having any certainty of transmitting it effectively to his family, or of founding thus a dynasty and a state. If this is granted to him—if an arrangement is proposed that he can accept, we secure peace in the East while he lives, and after his death, we incur the chances of that confusion and those quarrels amongst his heirs, of those returns towards the centre of Mussulman faith, which, in the Ottoman Empire, have always

accompanied the extinction of great personal influences suddenly created, and which have much more brilliant branches than strong roots. If we refuse the hereditary rule in Syria to Mehemet Ali, if we undertake to expel him from thence by force, we excite fresh troubles in the East; we kindle a new war, the consequences or duration of which it is impossible to foresee, and a certain result of which will be to increase the preponderance of Russia; for whatever may be the measures adopted, whatever limitations may be insisted on, it is by the presence of Russia and Russian forces that they will be carried into effect, and maintained when accomplished."

I paused. Lord Melbourne continually buried in his easy chair, remained silent, as if still listening. He then regarded me with a smile, but said nothing. I left him with his mind slightly impressed and disturbed in his nonchalance, but neither seriously alarmed nor convinced. I had to contend against the assurances of Lord Palmerston, who promised to his colleagues an easy victory over Mehemet Ali, and much diplomatic complaisance from Russia, without the probability of being compelled to require from that power, on the scene of action, an active and compromising concurrence.

Amongst the colleagues of Lord Palmerston—Lord Holland, Lord Lansdowne, Lord John Russell, and Lord Minto, were those with whom I held the most free and frequent intercourse. Lord Holland, charming in mind, and generous in disposition, as amiable in character as in intellect, was the declared friend of France, the

kind host of French visitors in England, the persevering advocate of the alliance between the two countries, and on all occasions taking delight in the manifestation of his sentiments. He, and Lady Holland also, received me with the most pressing courtesy. I find, in a letter which I wrote to Paris, on the 22nd of March: "Lady Holland invited me to dinner on Wednesday. I was engaged. On Sunday. I was engaged. I believe I must wait their return to Kensington. They will soon go there. Lord Holland is dying for the time to arrive. In his house in South Street he has scarcely a room to himself. He dresses in the dining-room. There is not a corner for books or papers. He has all his luggage in a small trunk, which he takes into the dining or drawing-room, or wherever he goes. Lady Holland is very partial to this small house, which is, I am told, her own property."

As soon as they were established at Kensington, I sought and found in Holland House the highest enjoyments of conversation and social life. Lord Lansdowne and Lord John Russell were less expansive, but equally sincere in their liberal and friendly feelings towards France. I met them at dinner on the 28th of March, at Lord Normanby's; we had just received news of the favourable vote of the Chamber of Deputies for the cabinet of M. Thiers, on the question of the secret supplies. "Well," said they to me, both together, and in the most amicable tone, "we must now conclude this Eastern matter, and in concert." The Whigs had no leader more important, enlightened, and respected than Lord Lansdowne; and Lord John Russell, by his inex-

haustible readiness and indefatigable energy, advanced every day with his party. The aged poet, Rogers, called him *our little giant*. An unexpected circumstance gave me with Lord Minto a particular tie. I met one evening at his house, Sir John Boileau, his brother-in-law, with whom I was, until then, unacquainted, but who accosted me with warm earnestness, saying that his ancestor was a French Protestant gentleman, who emigrated from Nismes, after the revocation of the edict of Nantes, and took refuge in England, where his descendants had found prosperity with liberty. On quitting his own country, he had left a brother of early age, who perpetuated the family, always Protestants and connected with mine by bonds of relationship and friendship. This introduction which, in 1840, was an agreeable surprise, became, for me and mine in 1848, the source of a profound and tender intimacy.

I had thus, in the very bosom of the cabinet, friends who sincerely desired a pacific solution of the Eastern question, and the maintenance of the alliance between the two countries. But they held still more closely to the success of their policy and their ministry, and I did not deceive myself as to the value of the good feeling they evinced, and the support they had the appearance of giving me. I wrote thus, on the 7th of April, to the Duke of Broglie: "We are progressing here, and I say so to Thiers and Rémusat; but be assured I tell them to the full extent. Lord Palmerston is extremely engaged, and the opposition to his views occupies him still more, for he always defends himself. It is in vain for me to watch this sedulously, to study to keep on the

best terms with him, to say nothing to any one until I have previously communicated it to him, to abstain from all secret practice, from all untimely conversation, to reject sometimes the favour exhibited towards me by men who are not of his opinion: in spite of all my circumspection, he sees and feels that the atmosphere changes a little around him, that new ideas, and reasons he has not calculated, spring up, expand, and modify, or, at least, stagger convictions and intentions. This embarrasses and frets him. Sometimes shaken in his own ideas, he endeavours to re-assure himself. He acts, and causes others to act upon his wavering colleagues. If I have time, I despair of nothing; but shall I have time? Let me make you clearly understand my position. All the world is at the feet of England; all the world offers to do what she pleases; we alone say *No*—we, who call ourselves her particular friends. And it is in the name of our friendship, to maintain our alliance, that we ask her not to accept what all the others offer. We are in the right, but we are not accommodating.

“Add to this the mistrusts contracted during five years, and which are deeply seated, more so than I suspected. And be well assured that Lord Palmerston is influential, very influential in the cabinet; as active, laborious, and resolute men always are. It is often perceived that he is in the wrong; but he has acted, and he acts. To reject what he has done, would require to do something else; to act also—to take trouble. Very few men can decide on this course.”

Beyond the cabinet, amongst his friends, the Whigs,

I was also favourably received, and in conversation, I found many allies. The most illustrious man of the party—the head of the cabinet which, nine years before, had introduced and carried Parliamentary Reform—Lord Grey, returned to London some weeks after my arrival. I met him for the first time at Lord Lansdowne's. His countenance, his tone of voice, pleased me infinitely. There were the elevated head, the dignified and gentle demeanour, the placid look, ready to become animated if any subject of interest arose, the remains of early beauty under the sadness and weariness of age. He expressed a desire to see me again, and to converse with me. "We ought not to separate from you," he said; "without you we can do no good." His brother-in-law, Mr. Ellice, a very active member of the House of Commons, a lively conversationalist, and a most hospitable host, hastened to bestow on me all the friendly attentions and good offices which could contribute to the pleasure of a London life, or to the success of my mission of cordial feeling between the two countries. We often walked out together. He took me one day to Putney, to the house of Lord Grey's son-in-law, Lord Durham, recently ambassador at St. Petersburg, and afterwards Governor-general of the British Possessions in North America, but then out of office, and suffering under a mortal illness. A spoiled child of the world, clever, popular, still young and handsome, satiated with the successes, and irritated by the trials of life. We talked of Russia, of the East, of Canada; conversation animated him for a moment, but he relapsed suddenly into silence, fatigued even by what pleased him, and

enduring with a sad and apathetic pride, the malady which consumed him, in addition to the political checks and domestic vexations by which he had been assailed. He would have interested me warmly, if, in his haughty melancholy, I had not recognized a strong imprint of egotism and vanity.

The Tories received me as kindly as the Whigs. These two great parties were not then as much disorganised and obliterated as they are at present. The ardent animosity excited by the Reform Bill was, however, somewhat calmed down; the Tories returned to Court, where the Queen began again to invite them. Lord Melbourne advised this step with liberal moderation, particularly recommending her to pay attention to Sir Robert Peel, "the leader of a powerful party," he said, "and, moreover, a most able and honourable man, with whom the Queen ought to be on good terms."

I consider it both proper and profitable for an ambassador to hold himself disentangled from party divisions in the country in which he resides, and not to acknowledge all the little restraints which they impose on society. This independence, exercised with intelligence and discretion, becomes, for him, a pledge of influence and also of dignity. I soon ascertained that I could, without inconvenience, lend myself to the favourable reception of the Tories. Soon after my arrival, nearly all the important members of the party called upon me. A few days later, I met several of them at dinner at Sir Robert Peel's. I entered freely into intercourse with them. Lord Londonderry alone I abstained from visiting; his language against the government of July

was violent. Neither General Sebastiani, nor any member of the French embassy, had gone to his house. I remained faithful to these traditions.

I considered the representatives of the foreign powers, who formed the diplomatic body in London, as important to me both in a social and political sense. I did not find amongst them, the two principal ones, Prince Paul Esterhazy, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, respectively ambassadors from Austria and Russia. The first was on leave of absence in Vienna, the second ill in Paris. They were replaced, Prince Esterhazy by a *chargé d'affaires*, the Baron de Neumann, and Count Pozzo di Borgo by the Baron de Brünnow, Russian minister at Darmstadt, despatched to London, as I have before named, on an extraordinary and special mission respecting the affairs of the East.

Amongst the great continental powers, Prussia was the only one which had, at that moment, in London, a titular minister, Baron de Bülow, a man of talent, enlightened, well versed in European diplomacy, more liberal, and better disposed towards France than he wished to appear, but anxious as to his health, with a degree of inquietude, which he alternately endeavoured to conceal, or displayed with an air of melancholy. The wind, the fog, the rain, the sun, the cold, the heat, the world, or solitude, everything agitated and made him ill. He was evidently in a state of nervous excitement, which threatened to become, and, subsequently, when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, became, in fact, extremely serious. From the period of my arrival in London, he often visited me; soon as-

sumed almost a friendly tone, taking pleasure in speaking of history, philosophy, and literature, as well as of politics, with an extent of knowledge and ideas by no means deficient in accuracy and acuteness.

Baron de Neumann was a confidential servant of Prince de Metternich, intelligent, prudent, seriously discreet, carefully avoiding to commit his court and himself, and much more taken, as I think, with my cook than with my conversation. My intercourse with Baron de Brünnow was more significant and complicated. Alone amongst the diplomatic corps, and contrary to usage, he abstained from visiting me during the first six weeks of my residence. We met in society; he asked to be presented to me at Lord Clarendon's, and on the 17th of March, at the Queen's levée, he himself introduced to me the son of the Count de Nesselrode; we interchanged a few words, but no visit. I returned coldness for coldness, incivility for incivility. One evening, at Lady Palmerston's, I passed M. de Brünnow several times without appearing to see him. Towards the end of March, he began to apologise to our mutual friends for not having yet called upon me, assigning as a pretext, as he said to Baron de Bülow and to M. de Bourqueney, that he held no defined position in London. He was still Russian minister at Darmstadt. He regretted the embarrassment which this circumstance had produced in our relations, but added that as soon as he had presented his letters of credence to Queen Victoria, he would pay me a visit. He announced this to me on the 8th of April, in the waiting-room at St. James's Palace, and came, in fact,

on the next day, to acquit himself of an official ceremony, which, without doubt, the instructions of his master had, until then, interdicted. A frivolous token of imperial humour.

The representatives of the other continental powers, General Alava, Minister from Spain, M. Van de Weyer, from Belgium, M. Dedel, from Holland, Count de Bjoernstierna, from Sweden, Baron de Blome, from Denmark, and Count Pollon from Sardinia, evinced towards me from the beginning a friendly or inquisitive attention, and soon fell into the habit of frequent conversational visits. The representatives of the great powers, pay in general too little respect to diplomacy of the second order, as also to the information and assistance they might receive from that source. Little engaged in the grand questions of the day, and exposed to endure their consequences rather than to take an active part in them, the agents of the secondary states are, at the same time, interested and impartial spectators, attentive in observing facts, and free in the judgments they deduce from them. General Alava was a loyal Spaniard, much liked in England, and neither hostile nor mistrustful towards France. M. Van de Weyer was a clever interpreter of King Leopold, and his political notions on European affairs, discreet, and holding a good position in English society. M. Dedel represented with perfect frankness and propriety the old republican aristocracy of Holland, ever able and respectable, though it has ceased to be powerful in Europe. The Count de Pollon was a gentleman of highly cultivated mind, equally unassuming and liberal. During my embassy, I had frequent

reason to congratulate myself on my relations with these tranquil diplomatists, whose intercourse, more than once, instructed without compromising me.

I carefully informed my government of all that passed in this English centre of European policy. I supplied M. Thiers both in my official despatches and private letters with an exact account of my observations, interviews and attitude, of the state of feeling whether in the cabinet or the public, and of the fears as well as hopes that I entertained. As early as the 12th of March, fifteen days after my arrival in London, when relating to him my first conversation with Lord Palmerston, I wrote as follows: "I am now convinced that Lord Palmerston has no intention of doing or deciding any thing until the arrival of the Turkish plenipotentiary. We have therefore time before us. But I must even now observe to your Excellency that this advantage would become a danger, should we suffer ourselves to suppose that because he does nothing now, he will do nothing later, and that we shall be definitively released from taking a resolution because we are not pressed to do so immediately. The more I observe, the more I satisfy myself that the British cabinet considers the present circumstances as favourable for settling the affairs of the East, and wishes seriously to take advantage of them. It would much prefer to act in concert with us; it is disposed to make concessions to establish that concert. Nevertheless, if on our part, we do not decide something positive, if we appear to desire only to adjourn and convert all difficulties into impossibilities, a moment may, I think, arrive, when by some sudden re-

solution, the British cabinet would act without us, and with others, rather than not act at all. Time may perhaps aid us much in leading this cabinet to the plan of conduct and arrangements which appear to us sound and practicable ; but unless we employ time in advancing effectually towards that result, I confess, I should much fear that it might ultimately turn against us."

Four days later, on the 16th of March, at the end of a long interview with Lord Palmerston who had announced to me the consent of Russia to the admission of the Turkish plenipotentiary to the negotiations, and the expected arrival of that minister, I said to M. Thiers : " Here are two important facts, the origin of which is much anterior to my arrival in London, and which modify the state of the affair. It is possible that these facts may be impeded or annulled by some new incident, and we shall then find ourselves again in the situation of expectancy in which we recently stood. But should they verify themselves, as Lord Palmerston tells me, it might happen that instead of prolonged negotiations we should find ourselves speedily confronted with the solution and its difficulties." And on the following day, the 17th of March, in a private letter, while recalling M. Thiers's full attention to my despatch of the 16th, I added : " It is possible that we might be able to return to the policy of waiting and of obstacles incessantly renewed, at the end of which we think we see, in the East, the maintenance of the *statu quo* ; but it is also possible that events may hurry on, and that we may find ourselves soon compelled to form a determination. Should this occur, we shall be reduced to

the following alternative:—either to join England by acting with her in the question of Constantinople, and by obtaining from her, in the question of Syria, concessions for Mehemet Ali; or, to retire from the matter altogether, leaving it to be settled between the four powers and to hold ourselves aloof while watching the course of events. I do not affirm that, in this case, the conclusion between the four powers is certain; new difficulties may interpose; I only say that this conclusion appears to me probable, and that, if we do not endeavour to bring about between us and England, on the question of Syria, an arrangement with which the Pacha may be contented, we must expect the other issue and hold ourselves prepared to meet it.”

It was not to M. Thiers alone that I imparted my prognostics and anxieties. General Baudrand wrote to me on the 30th of March. “The King asked me yesterday if I had heard from you: on my replying in the negative, he said, I see that M. Guizot is well received in London by men of all ranks in society, and that he is treated with great consideration there. I hope this will increase; I observe only that in his last letters to the president of the council, M. Guizot seems too much impressed with the dispositions of England, which seem to him doubtful towards us. He is inclined to think that the English ministers will treat, in the affairs of Turkey, with the foreign powers without us. Be satisfied, my dear General, that the English will never, on such a subject, conclude any convention with the other powers unless France is a contracting party. I wish our ambassador was as thoroughly convinced of this as

I am." I replied immediately to General Baudrand: "I would willingly feel the same assurance which the King has signified to you. I hope nothing will be done without us, and I labour to that end; but this is only a hope, and the work is difficult. English policy sometimes engages itself lightly and very rashly in foreign affairs. In this matter, moreover, all the powers, except us, flatter the inclinations of England, and appear ready to do whatever she wishes. We alone, her close allies, say *no*. The others think only of pleasing; we wish to be reasonable, at the risk of displeasing. It is not a position particularly agreeable or perfectly safe. We may succeed in it by skilful management and time; but I think it would be wrong to be too confident in that result. We have ever to apprehend some sudden and interfering stroke."

M. Thiers did not deceive himself as to the dangers of this position; he wrote thus on the 21st of March:

"If Lord Palmerston really wishes to take steps against the Pacha, in conjunction with three of the continental courts instead of four, if this should be the case,—a little sooner or a little later the Brünnow propositions will be signed, under one form or another. This situation has been created neither by you nor by me. We can do nothing in the matter." M. Thiers referred the mischief to the note of the 27th of July, 1839, in which the five powers detached the Sultan from any direct arrangement with the Pacha, by promising him their accord and common action. "At the commencement," he wrote to me on the 16th of July, "we might have held another course; but after the note

of the 27th of July, 1839, the time had passed by. You can judge now whether I was right in saying to the ministers of the 12th of May, that that note was the greatest error they could have committed. It was the rut in which the carriage was upset, and from whence we have never yet been able to extricate it." M. Thiers, I think, attributed to that note more importance than really belonged to it. Even if France had not joined in it, if the European step had been taken with the Porte in July, 1839, by four great powers in place of five, it would equally have prevented all direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha, and the concert established in July, 1840, between the four other powers, without us, would only have commenced a year sooner. Be that as it may, M. Thiers undertook quietly to combat with the vices of the position he inherited, which he neither wished to accept fully, nor expected to be able to repudiate openly. In this hope, he gave me two leading points of instruction. The first, to gain time, to say that we had formed no absolute opinion or resolution, to discuss the various lines of policy, to demonstrate the inconveniences of that which Lord Palmerston was anxious to see adopted, and thus to retard a final decision; the second, to decline all common deliberation with the four powers, to hold no official relations whatever except with the English ministers, and thus to disengage the French government from the ties imposed on it by the note of the 27th of July, 1839. His object was to establish that no direct arrangement whatever between the Porte and the Pacha should be secretly negotiated, and that France would

not recede from the obligation she had contracted of European concert ; but he hoped that with time, under the weight of the danger and embarrassments of the situation, in presence of the difficulties incessantly recurring of concert between the five courts, that the Sultan and the Pacha would at last agree between themselves ; or rather, that from being tired of the question, the powers would accept and guarantee between the Porte and its vassal, the maintenance of the *statu quo* ; which, according to his opinion, was the best of the combinations.

This policy had the serious defect of being more complicated and exacting, in reality, than it wished to appear. It advanced towards its end by slow and indirect paths ; and this end could it have been attained, would have proved a startling check for the four powers and especially for the English cabinet. The entire hope of M. Thiers founded itself on the double confidence that Mehemet Ali would energetically reject any combination that deprived him of Syria, and that all the means of coercion that could be attempted against him would prove vain. “ We shall lose what we wish to save,” he wrote to me ; “ we expose the Turkish Empire to dissolution by prolonged doubt, and the Egyptian Empire to aggression by imprudent provocations.” The state of minds in France, in the Chambers as well as with the public, confirmed this confidence of the French ministers in Mehemet Ali, for it made it a point of duty for them to sustain the Egyptian cause ; the good fortune of the Pacha seemed to be a certain pledge of his power and energy ; he had impressed

imagination, he had won over interests and individuals. This was one of those sudden illusions which sometimes take possession of nations, and which experience, the roughest experience alone can dissipate.

I still participated in this illusion; but I began to mistrust it, nevertheless, and to feel strongly the weak point of the policy I was charged to defend. I endeavoured to make my government partake in this impression by pointing out to it alternately the approaching peril of a solution adopted and imposed, without us, by the concert of the other four powers; and the important objection of our disposition to leave the three continental powers aside in order to treat seriously with England alone. In my reply on the 16th of April to the dispatch of the 14th, in which M. Thiers gave me this instruction, I said to him: "It would be more prejudicial than advantageous were I to make official use of the dispatch which your Excellency has just forwarded to me. I believe, that if I communicated it, even partially, and by reading, to Lord Palmerston, it would probably lead him to extreme resolutions, as containing, not a refusal to associate ourselves with the conferences, which he does not require, but a refusal to continue negotiation in concert with the four powers through the simple medium of conversation, and with the sole object of agreeing upon some arrangement. Lord Palmerston attaches much importance to this concert; either because his self-love is engaged in it, or because he looks upon it as the only means of profiting by the disposition of Russia to abandon the exclusive protectorate of Constantinople, and to assume simply

her place in the European protectorate. The English cabinet, as I think, will desire nothing better than to see us treat this great affair specially in conjunction with it, and through its intervention. The position thus established is suitable to it, and we can, on our part, draw our advantage therefrom. But the cessation of all communication on the Eastern question with the three other continental powers, the official abandonment of all effort to bring about, between them and us, an effective co-operation, would embarrass and irritate, not only Austria and Prussia, who appear at this moment well disposed, but perhaps the English cabinet itself, and would alter the actual situation in the points at present favourable."

Our position, in fact, was then in process of amendment. Many persons in the two Houses of Parliament, and amongst the English public, appeared to be more and more impressed with the value of our alliance, with the necessity of making sacrifices to preserve it, and with the danger that any arrangement concluded without us might prove ineffectual, and turn to the advantage of Russian influence. I was well acquainted with the internal disagreements in the cabinet, with the efforts of Lord Holland to assimilate the English policy to ours, with the increasing doubts of Lord Melbourne, with the rising uncertainty of Lord Lansdowne, and, perhaps, even of Lord John Russell. I knew that amongst the Radicals of the House of Commons, and the Whigs approaching nearest to Radicals, the idea of separation from France to unite with Russia, and of risking a war in the East, with all the concomi-

tant expenses and hazards, to wrest Syria from Mehemet Ali, more and more displeased and disturbed many men of influence. But if I had been eager to interfere in this increasing sentiment, if I had given the least pretext for supposing that I wished to foment it, with the view of hastening its explosion, not only would it have been arrested, but, in all probability, would have given place to a reaction in a contrary direction. I therefore thought it best to leave the movement to its natural course, and to make no effort to accelerate or take advantage of it too soon. I kept myself perfectly quiet; I never courted conversation on the subject: I sometimes avoided it when proposed, and the opportunities were not wanting.

On Monday, the 30th of March, I was at the Queen's ball. Lord Palmerston, passing with me into a saloon adjoining the gallery of Buckingham Palace, appeared clearly disposed to enter on Eastern matters. I thought it best still to hold off, and leave him engaged with the exclusively English view of the question which was fermenting around him. Some reports, however, reached me that he seemed to believe, or, at least, affected to say that there was no cause for uneasiness, that no necessity would arise for separating from France, that at the last moment, rather than remain alone, she would accept the proposed arrangements. He added, I was told, that provided Lord Melbourne, Lord John Russell, and himself, remained united, this result was secure. These reports assumed, by degrees, a greater consistency. It seemed to me evident, from that time, that Lord Palmerston was himself much prepossessed by the

disposition of minds, and the internal disagreements of the cabinet. If I continued to elude rather than to seek conversation with him, he might attribute to me a formal intention of directing this little opposition, and become imbued with suspicion and ill-humour. The time had therefore arrived for trying to draw Lord Palmerston into this movement so favourable to us, instead of appearing to exclude him from it, and the slight uneasiness he felt might, perhaps, turn to our profit, if after allowing it to spring up, I interposed to dissipate it, by resuming the question with him, as if his opinion alone ought to decide it. Finally, it appeared to me that the moment had also come for signifying anew, in compliance with my instructions, the limit of our policy, and for not leaving to Lord Palmerston any hope of enticing us into his. I wrote to him, therefore, on the 1st of April, to say that I requested an interview, and on the same day, towards four o'clock, I repaired to the Foreign Office, where he was waiting for me.

We discoursed at first, and very amicably and confidentially, of the English cabinet, and in what consisted its real strength in a situation incessantly menaced and in appearance so precarious. Lord Palmerston spoke much to me of Ireland, of its advancement in order and general prosperity, and of the absolute impossibility of governing that country on the old principle. "They are well convinced of this," he said, "even in England, more so than they like to admit. If Parliament were dissolved, we should have nothing to fear; we should gain something in the boroughs, and should lose nothing in the counties." I noted this declaration which no-

thing had led to, but without attaching much importance to it. It was the expression of a sentiment rather than the indication of a design.

As the conversation languished ; “ My lord,” I said, “ I have desired to see you, not that I have anything new to communicate, nor that I wish to receive any answer to what I may say to you. On the contrary, I beg you beforehand to make no reply. But at the moment of the arrival of Nouri Effendi, and when the negotiation is about to recommence, I am extremely anxious that you should know exactly what we think, the point to which we hold, and what we can and cannot accept. You have done me the honour to treat me with some confidence ; I should be much grieved if you could ever reproach me with having left you, for one moment, in doubt as to the intentions of the King’s government. To explain thoroughly, to say at the beginning what will be said in the end, is, in my opinion, the best proof of sincerity, and the surest pledge of a good understanding, which allies can reciprocate.”

Lord Palmerston assented warmly. He was evidently much pleased to find that I entered into discussion with him, and waited inquiringly for what I was about to say. I continued :

“ Well, my lord, we are convinced that the only good and effectual arrangement for the East, is a pacific one, equitable towards the two parties, and freely accepted by both. We are convinced, at the same time, that such an arrangement is possible : and to go directly to the point, we think that the Pacha, by obtaining, always

under the title of a vassal, the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt and Syria, would restore Candia to the Porte, with the Holy Cities and the district of Adana. This would be a reasonable transaction, and such as the Porte ought to accept. Observe well, my lord, that this is no proposition on my part, and that I do not ask your answer to it. I merely wish to say to you clearly what would appear judicious to us, and what we could trust. Beyond these limits, we see nothing but impossibility and danger. Any attempt to force the Pacha to surrender Syria, we consider, in the first instance, ineffectual, and in the next, full of peril to the balance of power and the repose of Europe; for it must produce two effects: the first, to excite civil war in the East; the second, to increase, in that quarter, the influence of Russia. We could not, therefore, consent to this; and if, which God forbid, such an effort should be made, we should be compelled, after having loyally declared our opinion to our allies, to hold ourselves apart, and to decline, as far as we are concerned, any participation in the accompanying embarrassments and dangers."

Lord Palmerston listened to me with the utmost attention, and in silence. I paused for a moment; he said nothing, and I resumed; "I repeat to you, my lord, that so far from seeking an answer, I request you to make none, and that you will once more reflect, and alone, on this most important matter, on all the hazards it involves, and on the idea we have adopted. Whenever I have had the honour to speak with you on this subject, you have seemed to me justly anxious to restore to the Ottoman Empire some entirety, some strength, so

as to place it in a condition to act of itself, and by its own weight, as a barrier against Russia. It is in this view that you have appeared so impressed with the importance of replacing the Holy Cities in the hands of the Sultan, the only symbol of the religious tie in an empire where that tie is almost the only one that still subsists. What you have said to me on this subject struck me very forcibly, and we think, in fact, that the Holy Cities ought to be restored to the Sultan. But this restoration, my lord, means nothing, if it is only a restoration in appearance. At the same time that you remit to the Sultan the symbol of the religious unity of Mohammedanism, you must re-establish that unity itself. You must conduce all Mussulmen to re-combine and act in concert. Now, if you attempt to take Syria from the Pacha, you will do precisely the contrary; you will profoundly separate the Mussulmen; you will establish civil war amongst them. At the very moment when you restore, in appearance, religious unity to the Turkish Empire, you will, in reality, destroy it. You will give to the Sultan the keys of a tomb, while you deprive him of the arms of his most powerful vassal."

"Such a vassal as the Pacha!" exclaimed Lord Palmerston.

"Yes, my lord, a very ambitious vassal, without doubt, and who requires to be restrained; but who has also, on occasions, known how to restrain himself, and to lend his sovereign effectual aid. With what troops and treasures did the Sultan contend against the Greek insurrection? With the troops and treasures of the Pacha. It was the Pacha who then supported the

Mussulman interest, and he supported it loyally and energetically. And if the Porte lost Greece, it was you, my lord, and us, and Europe, that occasioned that loss, when the Pacha was struggling to prevent it. What Mehemet Ali did then he would do again, if he were satisfied with his position and relations with the Sultan. Let an arrangement be settled now which would satisfy his just hopes, while imposing on him, towards the Porte, reasonable duties, and he will fulfil those duties when the time requires. He has already proved that he knew how to do so. The Ottoman Empire will thus recover, in him, an effective ally, and you will truly restore to that empire, according to the limits and conditions at present practicable, the unity you so justly desire it should possess."

Lord Palmerston continued to dispute these ideas, which, nevertheless, made some impression on him. He enumerated all the distinctions which could be pointed out between the position of Mehemet Ali at the time of the Greek insurrection and in 1840. He insisted on the importance of Syria to the Ottoman Empire, not only on account of the resources which that empire could draw from thence, but because, in the hands of the Pacha, it intersected the territories of the Sultan, and left him only precarious and difficult communications with his Eastern provinces. He repeated his usual arguments on the necessity of raising up the Porte, and of not giving sanction to the pretensions of an ambitious vassal. "Is it then impossible," he asked, "to convince France that therein also lies her true and important interest?" "France believes this, my lord," I

replied, "and it is not necessary to convince her of it. But she does not admit the same idea with you as to facts in the East, and the means of attaining our common end. Therein lies our disagreement, and we sincerely wish it were ended, for, in fact, I cannot repeat too often, there is none between us, on the Eastern question, except in secondary matters. The real, leading interest is the same, as you observe, both for you and for us."

Having reached this point, so far from seeking to prolong the conversation, I suffered it to die away. Lord Palmerston, on his part, had been feeble and uncertain; while still maintaining his policy, he appeared to be a little embarrassed and somewhat shaken in his convictions. He neither agreed with the ideas I expressed, nor rejected them altogether. He seemed pleased with the friendly confidence of my language, perhaps, also, with the frankness of my declarations, and without yielding anything, hesitated to meet them by replies equally explicit. I had no wish to entangle him in a political argument, and left him, as I thought, sufficiently impressed by our interview. He had said nothing which authorized me to suppose that his intentions were changed, or ready to be changed; but since we had debated on the subject, this was the first time that the possibility of an arrangement, giving to Mehemet Ali the hereditary sovereignty over Syria as well as Egypt, and restoring to the Porte only the island of Candia, the district of Adana, and the Holy Cities have been named to him without offending his self-love, and extracting from him a peremptory rejection.

I immediately reported this interview to M. Thiers, but while endeavouring to show him that it opened favourable chances, I considered them so uncertain, that I hastened to add: "I beg your Excellency not to give my words a more extended bearing than I attach to them myself. I hold their scope exactly in balance with all the oscillations, good or bad, of a difficult and complicated position, where the danger is always eminent, and in which, up to this date, we have rather succeeded in shaking our adversaries on their own ground, than in drawing them over to ours."

On the evening of the 7th of April, I found, when I reached home, a note from the Turkish plenipotentiary, Nouri Effendi, dated the same day, and requesting the renewal of the negotiation. Nouri Effendi was ambassador in ordinary from the Porte to Paris, and had come to London on a special and temporary mission. "If he is instructed to settle the question," said M. Thiers to me in announcing his departure, "we have time to reflect, and shall not be forestalled by an unexpected and sudden result. I must apprise you that he told me he had neither powers nor instructions. He requested a most particular introduction to you, desiring, as he said, to be governed by your advice. I received all that with demonstrative politeness, but without placing much reliance on it. Meanwhile, Nouri Effendi having to return to Paris, wishes to be on friendly terms with us. It is possible that he may desire our favour rather than that of England. You may possibly therefore, draw some advantage from this circumstance." The note of Nouri Effendi scarcely accorded with this

expectation. Evidently drawn up by a European, and probably more or less directly in concert with Lord Palmerston, its principal object was to represent France as closely allied with the four other powers ; and the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt as the only concession the Porte was disposed to make to Mehemet Ali. Nouri Effendi declared himself, "furnished with the necessary authority to conclude and sign, with the representatives of the five courts, a convention, the object of which would be to assist the Sultan in carrying out the proposed arrangement ;" and this demand the Turkish plenipotentiary referred to the note of the 27th of July 1839, as to the source and rule of the negotiation.*

I replied without delay to Nouri Effendi, by a simple acknowledgment, telling him that I should hasten to lay his note before my own government. Two days after, I had occasion to see Lord Palmerston on other matters : "Well," he said as I was leaving him, "we have all received a note from Nouri Effendi." "Yes, my lord, I transmitted mine immediately to my government." "It seemed to me very well drawn up, at all events, it is a point of departure." I made no answer. Two days later, on the 12th of April, I heard at Holland House that the four plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had, not officially, but in fact, concerted their answers, that they were nearly identical, that they did not confine themselves to a simple acknowledgment of reception, and that they regretted that mine was not similar to theirs, and had been dispatched first. On the following morning, I received this note

* See Historic Documents, No. II.

from Lord Palmerston : “ My dear ambassador, I enclose you a copy of the answer I have given to the note of Nouri Effendi. Do you not reply nearly to the same effect ? ” The English answer did not expressly limit, as did the Turkish note, the concessions of the Porte to Mehemet Ali to the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt ; but it equally referred to the original and common engagements of the five powers, declaring that “ the British government was ready to concert with Nouri Effendi, and in accordance with the representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, the best means of realizing the amicable intentions which the plenipotentiaries of the five powers had manifested, in the names of their respective courts, with respect to the Porte, in the collective note of the 27th of July 1839 ”

I had, by my reserve, well anticipated the intentions, and seconded the position of the King’s government. M. Thiers in his reply to me, severely criticised the note of Nouri Effendi. His first impression was not to treat as serious a document, which, without alluding to incidents that had occurred in the negotiation since the 27th of July 1839, confined itself to a simple and pure repetition of an argument so often and so successfully repulsed. “ As it would be superfluous,” he said, “ to prolong indefinitely such a debate, we shall not reply to the note in question.” He soon perceived that total silence would lead to an inconvenient rupture, and was not necessary to assure the independence of our policy. I was therefore authorized to reply, on the 28th of April, to Nouri Effendi, by a note which without any reference to that of the 27th of July 1839, without any

collective engagement, confined itself to declaring that "conformably with the instructions I had received from the King's government, I was ready to investigate, with the representatives of the courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, the best means of completing an arrangement in the East, which should terminate a state of things as contrary to the common wish of the five powers as to the interests of the Ottoman Porte."

Neither the demand nor the answers had as yet produced any advance in the negotiation; but movement towards it had commenced. As soon as it was known that Nouri Effendi had arrived in London, and before the transmission of his note, the Baron de Bülow called to see me: "All we desire," he said, "is, that France should not separate from the other powers in this matter; this is nearly the only instruction I have received from my sovereign. Can we not find some middle course which may preserve to all parties their old engagements and personal situations, and form the basis of a pacific settlement between the Sultan and the Pacha? We must look for varied combinations, for some trifling concessions on all sides, some modifications in the form or quality of the Pacha's dominion; in a word, a ground somewhat new on which we may unite."

The same idea had sprung up in the conversation of some members of the diplomatic body, unconnected with the affair, but who occasionally spoke with me on the subject. I had neither accepted nor rejected it. I confined myself to saying, as I had said to Lords Palmerston

and Melbourne, that the King's government had formed no conclusive resolution or personal system as to the distribution of territories and form of domination in the East, and that its only fixed principle was the maintenance of peace by a treaty acceptable to both parties. After the note of Nouri Effendi, insinuations became more precise and urgent. Baron de Bülow came to me again: "It is not for me," he said, "to propose or even to indicate anything directly; my government is, of all, the least interested in the question, but it desires most anxiously that it should be settled by concert between the five powers. There are existing embarrassments; what is decided on, must refer to the common note of the 27th of July 1839, and must, in a certain measure, satisfy its promises. The dignity and position of all parties must be considered, so that each may accept the transaction without falsifying itself. Why, for example, could not Mehemet Ali receive the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt, and the government of Syria for life? Here is a possible arrangement. Perhaps there may be others. I repeat that it does not belong to me to propose them; but they ought to be sought for, and we shall finally discover one."

I listened attentively, and replied in general and insignificant terms. M. de Bülow continued; "Why even the hereditary rule over Syria accorded to Mehemet Ali, while at the same time Arabia and the district of Adana were restored to the Porte—even this would not be impossible, if we were sure that in case of the Pacha's refusal, you would effectually join us to coerce him; and that we should not again

find ourselves where we are at present. The fear of falling back into that position, even after having yielded, is perhaps the cause which most embarrasses and restrains Lord Palmerston. The Emperor of Russia repeats incessantly that he attaches no great importance to any particular distribution of territory between the Sultan and the Pacha, and that he is ready to accept that which suits the other Powers ; but when once determined on, the decision ought to be effective, and that he is not willing to participate in the absurdity of all Europe powerless against the Pacha. And even Austria, although not at all disposed to coercive measures, would, nevertheless, when assenting to an agreement, desire and declare that it should be thoroughly carried out. Do not deceive yourself on this point. If we were sure that, when the decision was once formed, the five powers will cordially unite to press so on the Pacha as to make him accept it, it is probable, as regards the conditions of the transaction itself, that we should be more yielding."

The day next but one, the 15th of April, the Austrian plenipotentiary himself, the Baron de Neumann paid me a visit. I was not within. He returned in two hours, and confirmed all that Baron de Bülow had already told me of his dispositions. He even went farther. He expressed an anxious desire that positive instructions might reach me, and that the other plenipotentiaries might clearly ascertain what arrangement would definitively receive the approbation of the King's government. I was going to speak, M. de Neumann continued : " We consider it indispensable," he said, " that

the Sultan should not remain in the state of humiliation and impotence to which he is reduced; that he should recover a certain extent of territory, that he should obtain pledges against any fresh designs of ambition which the Pacha may form; that the Holy Cities, for instance, should be restored to his rule, that Candia should be given up to him, that the restitution of the district of Adana should replace him in possession of the defiles of the Taurus." I continued to listen; M. de Neumann paused there: "For our part," I then replied, "we have no objection to this arrangement. We consider it reasonable, and think if the proposition were made, the Pacha ought to accept it." "But the proposition might come from the Porte itself," resumed M. de Neumann; "it is with the Porte that we have treated and are now treating; it is to the Porte that we addressed conjointly the note of the 27th of July 1839; we acknowledge only the Porte, we stand behind it. If the Sultan were to propose to the Pacha the arrangement of which we are speaking, while granting to him the right of inheritance in Egypt, and leaving Syria as he possesses it to-day, the five powers would have nothing to do, beyond declaring that they approve this transaction and will support it in concert." "I am quite ignorant, Baron," I replied, "whether the Pacha would content himself with retaining Syria as he now holds it, and not persist, in demanding hereditary rule there as well as in Egypt. The King's government, on its own account, attaches little importance to the distribution of territory between the two parties; but it earnestly desires that the transaction should be accept-

able to both and permanently pacific. Now, nothing authorizes us to believe that the Pacha would be disposed to give way on the heirship of Syria."

M. de Neumann neither admitted nor disputed anything on this point; his silence, however, seemed to imply that even the last concession was not, in his eyes, impossible on the part of the Porte, if in other respects, the settlement of which we were speaking should be approved of and effectively supported by the five powers. He resumed: "My government is as anxious as yours for the maintenance of peace in the East; it is very little disposed to employ means of compulsion; it well knows, with you, the accompanying dangers and difficulties. What we consider important is, that there should be a really effective settlement, and this cannot take place unless we all fall into the same view. The Emperor, my master, and the King of Prussia equally desire this. Do you then propose such an arrangement as you consider suitable; it may assume various forms; we shall be strongly disposed to adopt it, and Lord Palmerston himself may be brought round to the same point. Be assured that the question approaches maturity and that the moment is at hand for a definitive understanding."

Shortly after making these overtures to me, the two German plenipotentiaries, accompanied by the Russian minister, went to pass some days at Stratfieldsaye, to consult with the Duke of Wellington, whose opinion always had much weight with the courts of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin. I had been told that the Duke was vehemently opposed to the Pacha of Egypt,

and favourable to the employment of coercive measures. He was not so. His opinions were on the contrary, moderate. He told the continental negotiators that in the impending arrangement, the territorial limits signified little; the important point was that the five powers should agree, that the slightest disunion amongst them would be a more serious evil than the concession of any specified district, and that this above all was what should be avoided. On their return from Stratfieldsaye, M.M. de Neumann and de Bülow conveyed to me convictions similar to those they had before expressed.

In these interviews with the two plenipotentiaries, nothing indicated whether they had already spoken with Lord Palmerston on the concession, the possibility of which they implied, and whether they had found him disposed to entertain them. When reporting their overtures to Paris, I demanded precise instructions as to the answer I was to return. The French cabinet saw nothing in these overtures beyond a symptom of the embarrassment and hesitation of the continental powers who had recently wished to impose such hard conditions on the Pacha of Egypt. The perpetual tergiversations by which the policy of Vienna had been signalized for a year, did not, as was written to me, permit much credit to be attached to such an incomplete return to more reasonable ideas; and the only principle to which Austria had remained faithful in this great question, was evidently an absolute desire not to side with us against the other cabinets, even though our interests should be identical with her own. Besides which, the news from

Constantinople gave reason to believe that the hopes which the Porte had founded on the negotiations in London were beginning to disappear. It had almost ceased to reckon on an approaching agreement between the powers to force Mehemet Ali to forego his pretensions ; and as the exhausted resources of the Ottoman Empire did not permit it to accept an undefined *statu quo*, the ideas of conciliation and the chances of a direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha regained strength by degrees. I was therefore instructed to give no encouragement to the attempts of Russia and Austria.

But overtures at the same time more limited and more pressing speedily reached me. On the 5th of May, I received a second visit from Baron de Neumann ; he came, he said, not to bring me, on the affairs of the East, a proposition from the Austrian cabinet, but to announce, what, according to the ideas of that cabinet, and the instructions he had just received, were the bases in which we might agree, and in favour of which he even was ready to use his utmost influence with Lord Palmerston, in the hope of inducing him to accept them. These bases were a partition of Syria between the Sultan and the Pacha, a partition by which the Pacha would retain all the territory comprised within the south and west of a line beginning at Beyrout and extending to the northern point of the lake of Tiberias ; that is to say, the greatest portion of the pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre, including the fortress of that name, and stretching almost to the frontiers of the pachalics of Tripoli and Damascus.

This was a considerable addition to the concession which, on the 30th of October, 1839, Lord Palmerston had for a moment proposed to General Sebastiani, for that did not comprise the northern section of the pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre, nor the fortress itself; and on our hesitating to accept which, Lord Palmerston hastened to retract his offer, evidently a less extended one than that which Baron de Neumann now communicated to me.

Without making any observation, in reply to the Austrian plenipotentiary, I asked him whether these territories were to be conceded to the Pacha with hereditary succession. He answered that he could not speak with certainty; Lord Palmerston still raised, on that point, a serious difficulty. He believed, however, that it would ultimately be yielded, in regard to the portion of Syria as well as Egypt. He added, that on the preceding evening he had made the same overture to Lord Palmerston, who desired him to converse with me, saying that he should also do so himself. Baron de Neumann ended by saying that if Mehemet Ali rejected this proposal, Austria, without furnishing troops, was disposed to unite her flag to that of England and Russia in the employment of means of maritime constraint, and that Lord Palmerston appeared to him quite determined to push matters to that end, even though the execution should be left to England alone.

I saw Lord Palmerston two days later, and he spoke first on the overture which Baron de Neumann had made to me, with positive acquiescence. The surrender of the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre to Mehemet Ali he

evidently considered a painful sacrifice; for which he consoled himself by telling me what I knew already, that to effect this arrangement, and in case of the Pacha's refusal, Austria agreed to participate in coercive measures, by joining her flag to those of England and Russia. He then detailed his plan of compulsion, which consisted in a triple blockade of Alexandria, the coasts of Syria, and the Red Sea. He seemed satisfied that such a blockade, obstinately prolonged, if requisite, would force the Pacha to submit, without any necessity of a campaign by land, or of employing Russian troops. He was, he said, quite determined to follow up this plan rigorously if the new bases of arrangement were not accepted. I made some observations without entering into argument. At the point which the matter had now reached, discussion was more likely to excite obstinacy than to smooth difficulties. The moment, besides, was unfavourable. I saw that Lord Palmerston was, at the same time, extremely annoyed by the surrender of St. Jean d'Acre, and very confident of success, through the adhesion of Austria to the adoption of violent measures. I confined myself to persevering in the system I had previously advocated, saying that I had already transmitted these overtures to the King's government, that I waited its answer, and that under all circumstances, it would require time to consider whether the success of such an arrangement could be brought about by pacific measures, the only course of proceeding it considered practicable and effectual.

Time was not wanting to the King's government for debate as to the resolution to be taken. The Porte had

merely dispatched Nouri Effendi from Paris to London to obtain official record of the admission of its plenipotentiary to the treaty ; it was anxious to be represented by an abler agent, who, coming direct from Constantinople, would be better informed as to the state of affairs in the East, and more capable of enlightening the Western diplomatists as to the chances of success in their various combinations. The speedy arrival was announced of Chekib Effendi, one of the most intelligent confidants of Redschid Pacha. The Eastern Question was thus suspended for a time, and other affairs, much less weighty, but still of considerable momentary interest, became, for several weeks, the principal objects of attention and negotiation between Paris and London.

CHAPTER III.

VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

QUARREL BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES ON THE QUESTION OF THE SICILIAN SULPHURS.—ITS ORIGIN AND CAUSES.—LEGITIMACY OF THE DEMANDS OF THE ENGLISH CABINET, AND VIOLENCE OF ITS ACTS.—OVERTURES MADE BY ME TO LORD PALMERSTON FOR THE MEDIATION OF FRANCE.—HE ACCEPTS THEM.—INSTRUCTIONS FROM M. THIERS ON THIS SUBJECT.—THE NEGOTIATION CONTINUES.—OSCILLATIONS OF THE KING OF NAPLES, FERDINAND II.—HE DECIDES TO ACCEPT THE MEDIATION OF FRANCE.—DOUBTS OF LORD PALMERSTON.—FAVOURABLE ISSUE OF THE NEGOTIATION, AND DEFINITIVE ARRANGEMENT.—M. THIERS INSTRUCTS ME TO ASK THE RESTITUTION TO FRANCE OF THE REMAINS OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON, INTERRED AT ST. HELENA.—MY OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT.—NOTE ADDRESSED BY ME ON THE 10th OF MAY TO LORD PALMERSTON.—THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT ACCEDES TO THE REQUEST.—MEASURES FOR EXECUTING IT IN PARIS AND LONDON.—CHOICE OF COMMISSIONERS DISPATCHED TO ST. HELENA.—MY INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPANY ENTRUSTED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE RAILROAD BETWEEN PARIS AND ROUEN.—ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE QUEEN VICTORIA.—STEP TAKEN BY THE DIPLOMATIC BODY IN LONDON.—MY DINNER IN THE CITY, AT THE MANSION HOUSE.—ANNUAL DINNER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE FINE ARTS.—MY SPEECH, AND THE RECEPTION I MET WITH.

SOME weeks after my arrival in London, a report gained ground that war was about to be declared between England and the kingdom of Naples. Nothing was known as to the cause of this war, or how far it was probable. People talked of the sulphur products of Sicily, of the obstacles opposed by the King of Naples

to their free exportation, and of the damage thereby done to the commerce of England ; but no visible act, no public declaration of the British cabinet gave reason to believe that hostilities could arise from that cause ; and the military preparations ostentatiously ordered at Naples seemed quite out of proportion to the question and the danger. All the coasts of the kingdom were placed in a state of defence ; a camp was formed near Reggio ; a general levy of the reserve was decreed ; from ten to twelve thousand men received orders to embark for Sicily ; King Ferdinand himself was said to be on the point of assuming personally the defence of that island. The cause of these alarms was not explained. The best informed English journals sought for other pretexts than the sulphur question. According to the *Morning Chronicle*, supposed at that time to be Lord Palmerston's organ, the Neapolitan measures were to be attributed to the probability of a rupture with the Bey of Tunis, rather than to the fear of any attack on the part of England. The uncertainty was so great in London, that I sought information in Paris. "I enquire here of everybody," I wrote, "as to this quarrel ; no one replies ; no one seems to know anything about it, not even the ministers ; and they have really the air of not answering because they cannot tell. But it seems more than quite enough for this country, and at this time, to have two wars on hand, one in China for pills, and another at Naples for matches."

I received a letter, dated March the 29th 1840, from M. d'Haussonville, then chargé d'affaires for France at Naples, which gave me more complete and precise

notions on the question and position. Until 1838, commerce in Sicilian sulphur had been perfectly unrestricted ; many French and English merchants were engaged in it ; several English speculators had even bought or taken on lease some of the Sicilian mines (*solfatare*) and had become working proprietors or farmers as well as traders. The manufacture of artificial alkali, at first in France and subsequently in England, had given to this branch of traffic a rapid development. In France alone, the importation of Sicilian sulphur had risen from 536,628 kilograms in 1815, to 18,578,710 kilograms in 1838. Important interests had thence been formed, more extensive even in England than in France. At the same time abuses crept in, particularly in the management of the mines. Complaints arose on the part of the small proprietors in the interior of the island. No impost had until then been attached to the working of the commodity. King Ferdinand believed that he could at once pacify murmurs, reform abuses, and secure a considerable revenue to the Neapolitan treasury by granting to a French company at Marseilles, on certain conditions and by means of an annual rent of 400,000 ducats,* the monopoly, a little disguised but real in fact, of the trade in Sicilian sulphur. This contract, ratified on the 9th of July, 1838, and which derogated from the most elementary maxims of political and commercial economy, became speedily in England, and to a small extent in France, the subject of the most animated remonstrances. Two English chargés d'affaires, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. MacGregor, at different intervals

* 1,700,000 francs.

demanding the abolition of the monopoly. After much debate and hesitation, the King of Naples promised it for the 1st of January, 1840. The Prince of Cassaro, his minister for foreign affairs, pledged his word to that effect. In compliance with Lord Palmerston's orders, and by a note more founded on right than considerate in terms, Mr. Kennedy demanded fulfilment of the promise he had received ; namely, the annulling of the contract entered into with the Taix company, and the abolition of the monopoly. The promise was renewed, but still continued unperformed. At the commencement of March, Mr. Temple, English minister at Naples, and brother to Lord Palmerston, returned to his post after a long absence, and once more demanded in a peremptory note, the abolition of the monopoly and an indemnity for the English merchants who had suffered by it. King Ferdinand, more moved by the offence he had received than by the promise he had made, declared that he would not yield to the English exactions, and commanded the Prince of Cassaro to notify to Mr. Temple his positive refusal. The Prince of Cassaro, a man of sense and honour, resigned his post and left Naples for Rome, half exiled. Mr. Temple, in virtue of instructions from Lord Palmerston, immediately transmitted to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, who commanded the English naval forces in the Mediterranean, orders to dispatch to the Neapolitan and Sicilian waters ships of war, with directions to seize all the Neapolitan vessels they encountered, and to send them to Malta, where they would be detained until the promises of the King of Naples were fulfilled, and the demands of England

satisfied. During the first fortnight of April, these reprisals were in full exercise, and the King of Naples in apprehension of even more serious attacks, was making the military preparations I have alluded to.

Finding myself on the 5th of April at the Foreign Office, I asked Lord Palmerston for some details with respect to this strange quarrel on which the papers were beginning to enlarge, and of which, amongst the best informed classes, no one seemed to have the slightest knowledge. Lord Palmerston then gave me a full recital of the facts I have briefly stated, and arriving at the last phase of the affair: "When I saw," he said, "that the King of Naples instead of complying with what we required and he had already promised, was adopting defensive measures, I sent a courier to my brother, bearing a note to be communicated to the Neapolitan government; and if, within fifteen days that government does not return a satisfactory answer, my brother will instantly dispatch orders to Admiral Stopford, in compliance with which the Admiral will adopt reprisals, such as I hope may approve efficacious." And as I appeared not to comprehend exactly what these reprisals might be, "the Admiral is to seize some Neapolitan vessels," added Lord Palmerston, "and after that we shall see."

The demands of the British cabinet were well founded; English interests had been seriously wounded and Neapolitan promises strangely forgotten. But there is no cause so good that it cannot be damaged by weak arguments and wrong proceedings, both in reality and appearance. Instead of solely founding their demands

on the losses their countrymen had sustained, and on the promises their government had received, the English agents pretended that the monopoly of sulphur was a flagrant violation of the treaty of commerce concluded on the 26th of September, 1816, between England and Naples, and they supported their pretensions with a tone of arrogance which rendered concessions on the part of the King of Naples more bitter and difficult. In principle, the argument drawn from the treaty of the 26th of September, 1816, was worth nothing; and the English legal authorities, Sir Frederick Pollock and Dr. Phillimore, who were consulted by the crown, admitted this with honourable loyalty. They declared, on the one hand, that according to the general maxims of the law of nations, a sovereign had full right to adopt, in his own states, measures similar to those of the monopoly in question, unless by stipulations concluded with other sovereigns he had expressly renounced that right: on the other, that the treaty of the 26th of September, 1816, contained no such stipulation, and was not thus violated by the monopoly granted at Naples in 1838. In fact, the haughty harshness of the English agents in their conversations and notes had been equally offensive: "We must bring matters to an end with this petty monarch," they said; and the measures adopted by the cabinet in unison with this language, although natural, and probably the only ones likely to prove efficacious, were so unexpected that they were generally considered as extreme, and it was thought that the King of Naples, though he might be to blame, was also justified in defending, as he did, his sovereignty and

dignity. It was said in all quarters that there was little true pride in being so coercive with the weak, and that if the English cabinet had had this difference with France or the United States of America, it would have acted with more forbearance. Lord Palmerston himself entertained this feeling of the position, and felt somewhat embarrassed by it. Having occasion to visit him on the 10th of April, I spoke to him of the internal state of the kingdom of Naples, and of the consequences which the recent measures of the cabinet might entail ; consequences, beyond doubt, quite different from and much more serious than those he desired. Lord Palmerston recapitulated the whole matter, with a marked desire of proving to me that he was not to blame in any respect, that he could not have acted otherwise, that the King of Naples notwithstanding his repeated promises had no intention of abolishing the sulphur monopoly ; and that, on their side, the British government could neither leave such important English interests unprotected, nor suffer pledged promises to remain unfulfilled. It was evident to me that Lord Palmerston, despite his perseverance in his resolutions, was uneasy on the entire affair, on the sensation it had caused in Europe, on the agitation it might excite in Italy ; and that he had no wish to be compelled to push matters to extremity. I urged the dangers of the situation, the state of minds in Sicily, the personal irritation of the King of Naples, the complications so easily stirred up in Europe ; I reminded him that on the sulphur question and its origin, the French government maintained interests analogous to those of the English

cabinet, and had acted in concert with it. "I know that," replied Lord Palmerston, "we also desire to act always with you. Can you help us in settling this affair, and how?" "My lord," I answered, "the word *mediation* is perhaps too strong for the occasion, and I have no positive instructions on this subject; but I am confident that the King's government would willingly employ its good offices in putting an end to a dispute which might lead to such untoward results." "Well, then, let your government in this sense use its good offices, its influence, and intervention; we shall accept them with much pleasure. What is done is done. Help us in obtaining justice. Meanwhile we shall take no farther step; we shall issue no fresh orders. We ask nothing better than to wind up the business amicably, and to owe the obligation to you."

I immediately reported this interview to M. Thiers: "I have made," I said to him, "no distinct proposition, nor entered into any engagement in the name of the King's government; but when Lord Palmerston appeared desirous of accepting the intervention of France, it appeared to me proper and profitable on our part to respond with equal readiness. The King's government may perhaps find, in this character, if not of official mediator, at least of anxious intermediary, the means of arranging a difference fraught with danger. Under any view, it suits us, as I think, more than ever, to show England united to us, acting in concert, and seeking in her own embarrassments our friendly intercession. I have, therefore, without hesitation, seized the proffered opportunity. The King's govern-

ment will give to these overtures the consequence and turn it may judge convenient. I merely request your Excellency to direct the attention of the King and his council promptly to this incident, for Lord Palmerston having himself told me that he would suspend all fresh action, it is necessary that I should speedily acquaint him with the opinion and intention of the King's government."

The answer of the French cabinet was transmitted without delay. M. Thiers replied on the 12th of April: "Say to Lord Palmerston that desiring to give England a proof of our good will, we offer to interfere, as follows, in the Neapolitan question. We are ready to act either as mediators or negotiators, as he may prefer to call us; but Prince Castelcicala who leaves Paris for London within three days, must be informed that the care of treating with relation to the pending difficulty is entrusted exclusively to France. If, in fact, there should be, on this question, simultaneous negotiation in Naples, Paris, and London, our part would be utterly ridiculous; the arbitration could lead to nothing but confusion. France alone must be empowered to treat. That point settled, we shall signify to the King of Naples that England has committed the arrangement of this affair to us, and we shall invite the same on his part. To induce him to accept our intervention, we require to be furnished with authority to suspend hostilities against the Neapolitan flag. Fortified with this power by Lord Palmerston, we shall oblige the King of Naples to receive us as arbitrators. Lord Palmerston must be assured that we shall decide for the abolition of the

monopoly. With respect to indemnity for the English merchants, if our opinion should not suit Lord Palmerston, he would be left at liberty to decline our final decision. In that case reprisals would recommence, and each of the two contending parties would be left to itself and its own strength. This is evidently a mediation, but it rests with the English cabinet to select the name it may prefer."

The English cabinet accepted, without hesitation, the fact and its true name. I communicated to Lord Palmerston on the 14th of April the propositions of M. Thiers. He fully admitted the necessity of the two conditions attached to the mediation, and seemed pleased with this opportunity of giving a public proof of the good intelligence of the two governments and of their mutual confidence, adding that he had only occasion to mention it to Lord Melbourne, and that I should not wait long for his answer. Two days after, in fact, the cabinet decided to accept the mediation of France on the bases we had proposed. Lord Granville announced this officially in Paris; the English Minister at Naples, Mr. Temple, was authorized to suspend hostile measures from the moment of opening the negotiation, and M. Thiers wrote thus to me on the 20th of April: "I yesterday communicated by telegraph, and again to-day by express, with M. d'Haussonville, directing him to make known to the Neapolitan government the proposal to mediate. He will require that it shall take place at Paris, and that the ambassador from Naples, the Duke of Serra Capriola may be furnished with unlimited powers. This last condition is so absolutely necessary,

that if refused, our offer of intervention must be considered as not having been made. What has led me to deem it advisable to fix the place of negotiation here, is much less a desire to consider the feelings of the King of Naples by sparing him the humiliation of a treaty concluded, as I may say, in sight of the English forces, than the much more important advantage of abstracting the negotiation from the continual tergiversations, doubts, and shifts which constitute at present the entire policy of the Neapolitan cabinet."

These were, in truth, the rocks on which the negotiation ran the risk of being wrecked. There is no worse school of government than absolute power. The princes who exercise it lose sight of penetration, forethought, a just appreciation of facts, obstacles, and strength. Because they can, at home, and without resistance say, *I will*, they also persuade themselves that they can say the same to foreigners and to events; they act upon momentary impressions and caprices, at once, light and obstinate, haughty and thoughtless. If they are strong, they push their will to madness; if they are weak, they advance and retire, do and undo, like children. Even their personal qualities turn against them. Pride does not save them from inconsistency or weakness, and the dignity of their character only aggravates their errors and perils. Already, in 1840, King Ferdinand II. suffered the penalty of this frivolous blindness of absolute sovereigns, and while wishing to escape from the evil position he had courted, persisted in the measures which had led him to it. On the 26th of April he accepted

the mediation of France, but at the same moment, to gratify his ill-humour, he laid an embargo on the English ships anchored in the port of Naples, which prevented the English minister from issuing, as he had promised, the order to suspend hostilities, and seven Neapolitan vessels were captured while the mediation was being proclaimed. Twenty-four hours later, the King acknowledged the necessity of taking off the embargo, and hostilities then ceased; but the first instructions sent to Paris to the Duke of Serra Capriola to open negotiations, were incomplete; and in London, although all interference in the matter was interdicted to Prince Castelvicala, and Lord Palmerston refused conversation with him on the subject, that discontented ambassador continually endeavoured to mix himself up with it, either to gratify his own vanity, or from flattering himself that he should please his master by throwing some embarrassment into the mediation.

These tergiversations and complications which seemed gratuitous, revived the suspicions and demands of Lord Palmerston, which he exhibited by urging that our mediation should promptly end an affair, the issue of which always appeared to him doubtful. M. Thiers wrote to me on the 11th of June: "Lord Granville has communicated to me a dispatch from Lord Palmerston in which that minister expresses some impatience for the settlement without further delay of the Sicilian sulphur question. You may assure him that I am doing all in my power to hasten the results of the mediation confided to my care; but not having yet received either from London or Naples the data indispensable to

enable me to classify the indemnities to be liquidated, I am compelled to pause until the necessary information reaches me. As to the objections raised by Lord Palmerston to the idea of a commission sitting in Paris to regulate these indemnities, and composed of Englishmen, Neapolitans, and Frenchmen, I should regret his persisting in them. The King of Naples would have preferred that the French government alone should determine, in a lump, the sum total of the amount. He is very reluctant to see this sum result in a liquidation, properly so called. With more reason, perhaps, he might feel humiliated if that liquidation were carried out at Naples, under his own eyes. I will add, moreover, that the efficacy of the plan proposed by Lord Palmerston would be more than uncertain, for it is evident that the English and Neapolitan commissioners, without a third arbitrator to give the casting vote, would be very unlikely to agree. I incline to think that these considerations will suffer to lead the cabinet of London to our view of the matter. Lord Palmerston also wishes that without waiting the issue of the negotiation, the King of Naples should at once propose the abolition of the monopoly. The obstacle I see to this is, that the Neapolitan government before adopting that measure, wishes to establish its right to impose a rate on the sulphurs and to regulate their mode of working. This right is, moreover, so evident, that I do not well understand how Lord Palmerston can believe that to acknowledge it fully, there is any occasion to wait for more complete explanations. You may assure him that, on this point, Neapolitan legislation conforms entirely to

ours. It is in obedience with the principle laid down in our code on the rights of government in the question of working mines that the subjects of England have treated either as purchasers or farmers of the Sicilian sulphurs."

Lord Palmerston agreed with nearly all the observations of M. Thiers, but always insisting on the immediate settlement of the question. "I found him," I replied to M. Thiers on the 15th of June, "extremely anxious that the mediation should attain its object, and that the sulphur monopoly should be abolished. He reminded me of the fears he had expressed from the beginning as to the desire they might have at Naples to gain time, and of the delays of the negotiation in Paris. 'I do not understand,' he had said, 'why the King of Naples should not immediately abolish the monopoly by his own act, and without waiting the close of the negotiation. He has conceded this abolition. He has equally conceded the principle of an indemnity in favour of the English speculators who have suffered by the monopoly. What occasion has he to know, for the abolition of the monopoly, even the approximate amount of that indemnity, or the different classification of the claimants? Let the abolition be once declared, the mediator is always there to protect the Neapolitan government in the question of the indemnities. And as to the right of the King of Naples to levy an impost on the sulphurs, and to regulate their working, I do not comprehend either how that right can in any manner interfere with the immediate abolition of the monopoly. The King of Naples cannot expect that we

should wait the decree for this abolition until he has published his new tariff on the working of the mines. We do not dispute any inherent rights of sovereignty. We understand, as regards mines, a legislation different to our own; and we admit, reserving the right of enquiring as to its just application, that the general principle we claim is, that this legislation shall not establish in Sicily any exception or privilege unfavourable to our countrymen. But, in any case, the abolition of the monopoly cannot lie at the mercy of the future measures of the Neapolitan administration, and in suspense, until these measures may be adopted. The King of Naples ought, moreover, to consider, that the longer the abolition is delayed, the greater will be the injury sustained by the English in Sicily, through the effect of that monopoly, and their demands for indemnities will rise in proportion. So that, in fine, delay is profitable to no one, and can only increase expenses and difficulties. This was what I wished to forestall by assigning a term of three weeks to the suspension of hostilities. I beg you to bring these considerations without delay under the eyes of the King's government.'"

M. Thiers persisted, with patient firmness both towards the English cabinet and the King of Naples, in the principles he had laid down, and the impartial attitude he had assumed from the opening of the negotiation. He drew up, under the title of *conclusum*, a plan of arrangement, which, while protecting the dignity of the King of Naples, and expressly maintaining his rights of sovereignty, whether in regard to working the

mines in his states, or settling the tariffs imposed for the export of sulphur, declared the abolition of the monopoly granted to the Taix company, determined the limits assigned to the English demands for indemnity, and regulated, while securing effective pledges to both parties, the mode of their liquidation. The terms of this arrangement were still, during six weeks, the object of minute negotiation. I had some trouble in persuading Lord Palmerston to adopt them all; not that he had any strong reluctance; he sincerely desired the success of the negotiation, and set forward no excessive or inadmissible pretension; but his mind is exact, attentive to details, inclined to argue, and disposed to debate, even in his most conciliatory mood, with subtle obstinacy. At Paris, on his part, the Duke of Serra Capriola often hesitated, fearing not to seize exactly the floating intentions of his master. Finally, the King of Naples forwarded to his ambassador precise instructions and full powers; and Lord Palmerston declared himself satisfied with the indemnities and securities contained in the plan of arrangement prepared by M. Thiers. On the 7th of July, I transmitted this *conclusum* officially to the English cabinet, and received the same day, its official acceptation.* The mediation had fully attained its special object by putting an end to the quarrel which threatened to disturb the kingdom of Naples, and its general end by testifying the good intelligence between the cabinets of Paris and London, and their desire to afford each other mutual aid. And thus the relations of the sovereigns, as well as the interests

* See Historic Documents, No. III.

of the states, drew advantage from this conclusion. King Louis-Philippe had effectually supported the house of Bourbon at Naples; and the King of Naples, despite his sallies of hesitation and caprice, felt so strongly the service which the mediation had rendered him, that in token of his gratitude, he celebrated on the 1st of May, at Naples, the fête day of King-Louis Philippe with unusual solemnity.

At the same time, I had to conduct a negotiation of quite another character, and for which I was little prepared. One of my friends, in a letter from Paris of the 7th of April, wrote thus: "M. Molé says that M. Thiers is negotiating with the English government the removal of the body of Napoleon to France! Is this true? M. Molé declares that this will be a moment of great emotion, for he judges of it by himself. Politically, it might produce warlike excitement, and catching the suitable time, will have its effect. But is it necessary?" I replied immediately, "There is no question whatever of the removal of the body of Napoleon to France;" and, in fact, I had not heard the subject mentioned. But on the 4th of May, after discussing with me the Eastern Question and the Neapolitan mediation, M. Thiers added, "I have now to speak to you of a totally different matter, but which also has its importance, although only an affair of sentiment. I here invite your utmost zeal, for if you succeed, it will confer as much honour on you as on us, and I shall owe you a heavy amount of personal gratitude for the result. This, then, is the question. The King consents to transport the remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to

the Invalides in Paris. He is as anxious on this point as I am, and that is not speaking lightly. The consent of the English cabinet must be obtained. I know not how it can be honourably withheld. If we were to adopt an indirect course, by feeling the ground we might supply arguments for rejection ; but by making the request purely and simply, we challenge a pure and simple denial, and this will be well considered. England cannot say to the world that she wishes to retain a corpse in captivity. When a criminal is put to death, the body is restored to his family. May Heaven pardon me for comparing the greatest of men to a culprit executed on the scaffold ; but I wish to express the extent to which I should feel the indignity of not restoring to us the remains of the illustrious prisoner. If England gives us what we require, she will set the seal to her reconciliation with France ; the entire past of fifty years will be abolished ; the effect in her favour, here, will be enormous. It is under this point of view that the matter must be proposed. A refusal, on the contrary, would produce an injurious impression. I do not, and I cannot expect it, but we must be armed against every hypothesis. Endeavour to make it felt how revolting an adverse reply would be. I will tell you between ourselves that this step must be taken so as to remain secret, that we may not be called upon to quarrel in consequence. Lord Granville has been commissioned to write on his part. Conduct the matter so that we may either speak or not in the event of non-compliance. Lord Granville does not apprehend refusal. If the request is complied with, a ship will sail immediately to receive

the remains. An English commissioner must accompany the vessel to assure the restitution. Succeed in this affair, and we shall leave you all the honour."

My first emotion, on receiving these instructions, was surprise. Had then the Emperor Napoleon no longer partizans nor an heir? Were the intrigues of King Joseph, in 1830, the attempt at Strasbourg, in 1836, forgotten? Was it for the government of King Louis-Philippe thus to glorify and resuscitate a rival? Would the presence in France of the body and tomb of Napoleon be, within, a pledge of security, and without, a symbol of peace? According to sound judgment, objections presented themselves in crowds. But there were both generosity and grandeur in the step; also a noble confidence of the King and his advisers in the strength of his government, the goodness of his cause, and the adherence of France to his policy. It was the particular characteristic, and will form the honour of King Louis-Philippe, that he always associated himself ardently and spontaneously with the national sentiment, while ever ready and determined to resist it, when, in his eyes, the national interest required. He was at once, in his relations with his country, imbued with sympathy and independence, moved by what moved the people, and firm in the policy of his government. And no personal anxiety, no subordinate jealousy troubled him, if he found himself opposed to a popular wish. When he repulsed any such demonstration, the public good imposed that course on him as a law.

For myself, when I recovered the first emotion of surprise, I was touched by the sentiment which had

inspired this step, and I accepted readily the part I was invited to take. Some of my friends expressed their doubts and anxieties. I replied, "I comprehend all that is said, or may be said, on this affair. I am required to arrange it here; I am not responsible for the consequences. Free countries are three-decked men-of-war. They exist in the midst of tempests; they mount, they descend, and the waves which agitate are also those which bear and impel them onwards. I love this kind of life, and the scenes it supplies. I participate in them in France; I witness them in England. Here are objects worth living for! Few indeed are the things of which so much may be said!"

I hastened at once to Lord Palmerston, and communicated to him the desire of the King's government. He also expressed surprise, and although he endeavoured to conceal it, I saw a passing smile upon his lips which revealed his impression. He received my request with courtesy, promising to lay it before the cabinet without delay; and two days after, on the 9th of May, I was enabled to inform M. Thiers that the English government consented to the removal of the remains of Napoleon. "I thank you," he wrote back on the 11th, "for the good news you have transmitted. I beg you now to reply to the following points. We are anxious to know, as soon as possible, how the English cabinet intends to proceed. Will it send an order to St. Helena, or dispatch a commissioner? Or will either order or commissioner proceed thither in an English vessel? In that case, it should be without delay, lest our ship should arrive first. What would do quite as well would

be that the French vessel should convey the English commissioner or order. Are there places to put into, with supplies of coal, on the passage? Let me know all this as soon as possible. I should also like to have the official reply, to be able to introduce a bill to the Chambers for the expenses. Rémusat will present it. We are very grateful for the zeal you have evinced in obtaining the success of this affair."

On the 10th of May, I addressed in the subjoined terms, to Lord Palmerston, the official request intended to produce the official reply which M. Thiers expected :

"The undersigned, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of the French, in conformity with the instructions he has received from the King's government, has the honour to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, that the King entertains a most anxious desire that the remains of Napoleon should repose in France, in the land he defended and rendered illustrious, and which preserves with respect the mortal relics of so many thousands of his companions in arms, leaders and soldiers, devoted, with himself, to the service of their country. The undersigned feels convinced that the government of Her Britannic Majesty will only recognise in this desire of His Majesty the King of the French, a just and pious sentiment, and will hasten to issue the necessary orders, that the remains of Napoleon may be transferred from St. Helena to France."

I received the following answer from Lord Palmerston, on the same day.

“The undersigned, Her Majesty’s principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note, dated this day, addressed to him by M. Guizot, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of the French, and in which is expressed the desire of the French government, that the remains of Napoleon may be transported to France. The undersigned cannot reply to the note of M. Guizot better than by forwarding to his Excellency the copy of a dispatch which the undersigned has addressed to Her Majesty’s ambassador in Paris, in answer to a verbal communication which the President of the French Council, M. Thiers, had made to Lord Granville on the same subject to which M. Guizot’s note refers.”

On the 9th of May, in fact, immediately after the decision of his cabinet, Lord Palmerston forwarded the following dispatch to Lord Granville :

“My lord, Her Majesty’s government having taken into consideration the desire of the French government to obtain authority for the removal from St. Helena to France of the remains of Napoleon Bonaparte, I request your Excellency to assure M. Thiers that Her Majesty’s government will accede with great pleasure to this request. Her Majesty’s government hopes that the promptitude of this reply will be considered in France as a proof of its wish to eradicate all traces of those national animosities which, during the life of the Emperor, armed the French and English nations against each other. Her Majesty’s government feels confident that if such sentiments still exist in any quarter, they

will be buried in the tomb wherein the remains of Napoleon are about to be deposited."

These noble words were repeated in the speech delivered by M. de Rémusat, when presenting to the Chamber of Deputies, on the 12th of May, the bill which announced the result of the negotiation, and asked a credit of one million to defray the expenses of the removal and tomb. At first, the enthusiasm was general; those to whom the measure imparted no uneasiness were vehemently excited, and the emotion even won over others who felt disturbed by it. But soon a return of reflection manifested itself. When the committee appointed to examine the bill made their report through Marshal Clauzel, the terms of that report considerably exceeded those named in the speech of the Minister for the Interior; and in place of one million, which the government had asked for, the committee proposed a credit of two millions. Several journals, either from momentary excitement, or premeditation, adopted a tone which exhibited hostility, more or less disguised, towards the King's government. The debate was short but significant. M. de Lamartine expressed with courageous eloquence, the apprehensions with which he felt inspired by this solemn ovation in honour of "fortunate despotism, and genius at any cost;" and he marked the limits within which the friends of liberty confined their adhesion. Animated by the same sentiment, the majority of the Chambers rejected the augmentation of the credit proposed by the committee; not from paltry economy, for it was universally known that the expenses of the transfer and tomb would much exceed the

first estimate of the cabinet ; but because they wished to avoid all retrospective idolatry, and to perform an act of attachment to free monarchy, while rendering homage to the glory of absolute power. The public sentiment responded to that of the Chamber, for several journals having endeavoured to collect the sum refused to be voted, by means of subscription, the attempt ridiculously failed, and its promoters were compelled to abandon it.

While negotiating with the English government the necessary measures for the accomplishment of its promise, I found myself, in London, engaged with other causes of disquiet, and other jealousies excited by the same subject. I speedily communicated this to M. Thiers. "The cabinet," I said, "prefers sending its orders to St. Helena by an English vessel. There is one at Portsmouth, ready to depart. The captain will be in London to-morrow, Sunday, to receive his instructions. On Tuesday he will return to Portsmouth, and will sail on Wednesday, May the 20th. I have read the official instructions, of which we shall receive an authentic copy. They are perfectly suitable. They prescribe and regulate the exhumation, the removal of the coffin to the place of embarkation, and, finally, its consignment to the French commissioners, and the drawing up of an official report. Lord Palmerston has acquainted me, confidentially, with the private instructions which will also be forwarded to the governor of St. Helena, Major Middlemore. They especially direct and recommend him to do nothing that, either in reality or appearance, might imply any contradiction or reproach to the prior conduct of the English government during

the residence of Napoleon at St. Helena. The cabinet would view with much displeasure any act or word which might afford the Tories subject or pretext for complaint or objection. Until now the Tories are well disposed in the matter ; the Duke of Wellington particularly so. He readily assented, from the first moment when Lord Melbourne named it to him in confidence. He has repeated this approval openly since the business has been made public. Care must be taken that nothing may disturb this harmony, or stir up recriminations and party questions. Be assured that the cabinet attaches great importance to this. I know that Lord John Russell, in particular, is much interested in it. They see, with some uneasiness, the old companions of Napoleon's captivity dispatched to receive his ashes. They fear their reminiscences, the warmth of their feelings, and perhaps some bitter or incautious words. They desire and request that you will convey to them the most precise instructions, the most earnest recommendations. They ask this in a spirit of sincere friendship, and for the dignity of the great international act so nobly commenced, and which ought to be carried through as it has been begun."

The same feeling of sincere friendship and delicate forethought dictated the executive measures adopted by the French cabinet. "All is for the best in what has yet passed;" M. Thiers wrote on the 23rd of May ; "it is better that the English vessel and commissioner should precede ours ; we shall thus find everything prepared. I am about to select a commissioner to represent the French government, and to sign the official

report of the consignment of the body. This commissioner will not be one of the four captives who accompanied Napoleon—neither Bertrand, nor Gourgaud, nor Las-Cases, nor Marchand—he will be an officer of the department of Foreign Affairs. Thus nothing can disturb the susceptibility of the English Tories. The four companions of his exile, who go to take charge of the remains of their master, will receive instructions to be mute and unmoved witnesses of the exhumation and embarkation. There will be no speech, no manifestation. Painters, writers, all that could attract notice, will be kept away. The stir will be domestic, and confined to France. The English cabinet shall have no cause to repent of its conduct in this matter, and we will take care not to expose it to any attack from the Tories. We owe it this reserve in return for its loyal promptitude.”

The choice of the commissioner, the Count de Rohan-Chabot, accorded perfectly with the position and intention of the two cabinets. With a heart as thoroughly French as devoted to the King, and well known in England where he had resided several years as secretary to our embassy, no one could have been selected better suited to accompany the Prince of Joinville, who was placed by his father at the head of this peaceful expedition. With such a naval commandant and such a diplomatic commissioner, the French government felt assured that neither dignity nor tact would be wanting in this delicate mission. I informed M. Thiers that the English cabinet retained no longer the slightest doubt, and would give all the instructions we could

desire. A report had been spread, that in 1821, at the interment of the Emperor Napoleon, quick lime had been placed in the coffin. This report was formally denied. The dispatch from Sir Hudson Lowe to Lord Bathurst, dated May 14th, 1821, containing full details of the burial was communicated to us,* and the subsequent exhumation, entirely confirmed its accuracy. Lord John Russell, to whom as Secretary of State for the Colonies, all the local arrangements had been committed, thought for a moment that the coffin when exhumed, should be given over at once to the French commissioners without being previously opened. M. Thiers conveyed to me his desire that this public opening should take place, to put an end, by establishing the identity of the remains, to many absurd rumours. He also instructed me to request that the title of *Emperor*, admitted by Lord Palmerston in his note of the 9th of May, which promised restitution of the body, should be retained in the official report confirming the act. The necessary authority on both points was forwarded to the governor of St. Helena, and at the moment when the object of the mission was accomplished, the report signed by Major Middlemore and the Count de Rohan-Chabot was drawn up in strict conformity. Finally, the dispatch which contained these supplementary instructions to the English governor was carried to St. Helena by the French commissioner; and when on the 7th of July 1840, the frigate *Belle Poule* sailed under the orders of her royal commander, she commenced her voyage charged with all

* See Historic Documents, No. IV.

the tokens of good will and mutual confidence which two governments could evince towards each other, eager on both sides to affix this last seal to their bond of peace.

Letters from Paris informed me that in all the conversation produced by this affair, and notwithstanding the part I have taken in it, my name had never once been mentioned, neither in the chambers nor elsewhere. I replied, "I was not much surprised at being unnoticed in the speech of M. de Rémusat, which I considered quite in keeping. In that discourse four names alone could with propriety be admitted; those of the King, Napoleon, France, and England. But I remarked without any surprise at all, the ingenuity with which the ministerial papers, or those of the Left, have avoided speaking of me in connection with this subject. This will often happen, even when they write, "succeed in this affair and we shall leave you all the honour."

While we were thus endeavouring to efface all traces of enmity between the two countries, we applied ourselves to the multiplication of their pacific relations and the union of their material interests. Count Jaubert, Minister of Public Works, was then preparing a bill for the construction of a railroad between Paris and Rouen. Some rich English capitalists, who until that time had taken no part in the associations projected for our rising enterprises in great public undertakings, announced their intention of co-operating in the one above named to the amount of twenty millions. Four amongst them requested me to submit, in their name, to the French government, a desire for some modifications in the pro-

posed schedule of conditions. I wrote thus to Count Jaubert : " If these modifications are not conceded, particularly that of article 42 in the schedule of conditions, I firmly believe that you will have no concurrence from the English capitalists, and that this great affair will break down once more. The four persons whose names are appended to the request are amongst the best money securities this country can offer. Every body tells me that they alone could readily supply the twenty millions in question. One of them, M. Easthope, is proprietor of the *Morning Chronicle*, and a member of the House of Commons. Without immediate reference to the Rouen railway, it is well to be on amicable terms with him. He called on me on this subject, never having until then set foot within the embassy." The modifications asked for, had nothing in them beyond what was reasonable. Count Jaubert admitted the leading ones, and the English capitalists embarked largely in the enterprise. I interposed several times to remove obstacles encountered by the company, or to procure facilities of which they stood in need. When the Chamber of Deputies passed the bill, the town of Southampton wished to celebrate by a municipal fête the legislative act destined shortly to make their port one of the principal Anglo-French commercial stations. I was invited to attend it, on the 20th of June, with the Duke of Sussex, Lord Palmerston, and many others, interested actors or curious spectators. The festival was celebrated with that solemnity at once animated and regular, in which the gratification of interests and the habits of liberty are reciprocally revealed. In the course of the

banquet, I delivered a few words in English, which were favorably received;* and returned to London the same day, well satisfied with having been the first to notice publicly this new pledge of peace and prosperity for the two countries.

Eight days before, a most unlooked for incident had proved the extent to which on both sides of the Channel, evil as well as good was contagious. On the 10th of June, between six and seven in the afternoon, as Queen Victoria, alone with Prince Albert, was passing through St. James's Park in an open carriage, two pistol shots were fired at her. Seized on the instant by the passengers who were near him, the intentional assassin, Edward Oxford, proved to be a youth of eighteen, with the appearance of being three years younger, employed as a waiter at a tavern in Oxford Street. The report of this attempt spreading rapidly through London, excited a general sentiment of indignation mixed with surprise and a sort of melancholy shame. England considered herself secure from such crimes and dangers. I dined on that day with Sir Robert Inglis, the most determined, respectable, and kind-hearted Tory I ever met with. On leaving his house, I went to a Whig drawing-room at Lord Grey's, where there was a musical party. I found the same impression every where. The Queen, who was pregnant at the time, had evinced firm and unaffected courage. All were touched by the emotion which prompted her on the instant to desire that she might be driven to the residence of her mother, the Duchess of Kent. All repeated and listened with

* See Historic Documents, No. V.

eagerness to the details which came in from time to time. I listened with the rest, alternately to the music and the conversation ; and while thus engaged, I thought of the crowned heads, the constant aim of the madmen, unrecognised in number as in name, whose dark passions were ever fermenting by the side of these frivolous amusements. They spoke of the assassin almost as much as of the Queen herself. "Who is this young man? Of what class is he? Has he a genteel air? Is he good looking? How does he speak? What does he say of his motives?" I witnessed with a painful feeling this explosion of curiosity as lively in the saloons as in the streets. "Here," I said to myself, "is precisely what these perverted fanatics thirst for; a theatre, a public, themselves insignificant and obscure, an opportunity to exhibit and shine in the mid-day sun. Under what system, and in what country will there ever be enough of moral and political judgment to leave them to their level, and not to give them the notoriety they seek?"

On the following day, June the 11th, several members of the diplomatic body hastened to my residence to inquire whether it would not be becoming to adopt a measure with regard to the Queen, in testimony of our sentiments on the attempt to which she had been exposed. In concert with them, I wrote immediately to Lord Palmerston :

"My dear Viscount, several members of the diplomatic body, amongst others, the Baron de Bülow, M. de Hummelauer, and the Count de Pollon who are now at my house, with General Alava, who has this moment

written to me, have signified an ardent desire that they could find some means of expressing to the Queen the deep interest with which the atrocious attempt of yesterday has inspired them, and how cordially they participate in the joy of her people. I write to ask you what we can do, and if you think it would be convenient to take the orders of Her Majesty, and to solicit for the diplomatic body an audience in which they could offer to her, as also to His Royal Highness Prince Albert, the expression of their sentiments. Pray oblige me, my dear Viscount, by an answer on this subject, for while expecting it, we shall remain in an unpleasant state of inaction."

Lord Palmerston replied within a few hours: "My dear ambassador, I am still at the council; we are busy in examining witnesses on the attempt of yesterday. I fear we shall not rise before five o'clock, and I must then hasten to the House of Commons. I will write to-morrow morning to fix the hour at which I shall be able to receive you."

On the following day, the 12th of June, I had an interview with him at six o'clock, and after our conversation, I dispatched, on the same evening, the subjoined note to all the members of the diplomatic body.

"I saw Lord Palmerston at six o'clock; he thanked me for the request I had forwarded to him in compliance with the desire of a great many members of the diplomatic body. He told me that after consulting competent authorities and referring to precedents, especially as to what took place when attempts were made to assassinate George III, George IV, and

William IV, the cabinet recognized the fact that the sovereign had never, under similar circumstances, received the diplomatic corps as a body. But he added that the request would be placed before the Queen who, he could assure me, would be deeply affected by it."

Under my first impression I had not sufficiently estimated the sound sense of the English nation, government and people, judges and jurymen. When Edward Oxford, on the 9th of July, was arraigned at the assizes, the prosecution and the papers found at his lodgings placed beyond doubt the political character of his fanaticism. He belonged to a society called *Young England*, a petty imitation of the great secret associations of the continent. "Two things are quite certain," said those who were instructed to inquire into the matter; "he is not mad, and he is not alone." But at the same time everything indicated that the society was limited in number, without defined object, and that the contagion it had excited was neither enthusiastic nor extensive. There was a general and instinctive desire not to attach either to the incident or to the individual more importance or notoriety than in reality belonged to them. After the examination of witnesses, and a short charge delivered by the Chief Justice, Lord Denman, with scrupulous equity, when the definitive question as to the culpability of Edward Oxford was put, the jury replied, "Guilty, but of unsound mind." "Or rather," said Baron Alderson, one of the judges, "not guilty, seeing that he is of unsound mind."

"Yes, my lord," replied the foreman of the jury, "that is our meaning." "In that case," said the attorney-ge-

neral, "I respectfully demand from your lordships the application to the accused of the act passed by Parliament in the 40th year of King George the IIIrd, which decrees that all persons acquitted on the ground of insanity, shall remain in prison during the sovereign's pleasure." Such was the legal issue of the trial, and Edward Oxford, punished and placed beyond the power of doing farther mischief without being made of too much consequence, was speedily forgotten.

During the honeymoon of my embassy, or I should say, while the Eastern question had not ostensibly disunited the two countries, I was obliged, on two occasions, to appear and speak before the English public, and before audiences of a very opposite character. I was popular in London; since Sully and Ruvigny, I was the first French protestant ambassador who had been seen there; my historical pursuits had won for me the consideration of literary men; politically I was recognized as both a liberal and a conservative; the Whigs favoured me for my attachment to the principles of free government; the Tories for my resistance to anarchical tendencies. It was to my personal labours that I owed what I had acquired in position and reputation. Different classes and opposite parties treated me with the same complaisance. The Lord Mayor of London, Sir Chapman Marshall, invited me to the grand municipal banquet on the 20th of April. There I found myself surrounded by the burgesses of London, who took pleasure in displaying the wealth and opinions of the city. It was a remarkable feature of the assembly that no member of the Whig cabinet attended. On the last

occasion they had been ill received and almost hissed. Lord Melbourne extricated himself very adroitly, but neither he nor his colleagues were disposed to repeat the experiment. Lord Palmerston to whom I mentioned on the same morning that I was going, told me that the ministers would not be present and the reason why. Their absence was remarked, but without surprise, and their healths were drank with respectful coldness. All the tokens of attention and favour were reserved for me. When the Lord Mayor proposed my health with that of the other foreign ministers, I replied in English, in a short speech which was received with cordial and loud applause.* In all the following toasts, every speaker felt himself called upon to pay me a compliment in the form of friendly thanks. "A strange spectacle this," I wrote to Paris on the following day; "a dinner in the fashion of three centuries ago! The ceremonies, the costumes, the *loving cup*, and the basin of rose water, the one passing from lip to lip, the other from hand to hand, all were amusing and interesting. But men ever attract me infinitely beyond things, and I forget all the sights in the world for eyes which lighten up while they regard, and for serious, unpresuming countenances which speak to me with kindly emotion."

A few days later, on the 2nd of May, I was present at a very different meeting; the annual dinner of the Royal Academy for the encouragement of the fine arts, on the opening of their exhibition. Here there was no characteristic of old times or traditions. The Royal Academy was of recent origin, founded in 1768 by

* See Historic Documents, No. VI.

King George III; Sir Joshua Reynolds was its first president, and the building appropriated to it in Trafalgar Square, was built in 1834. All was new, the institution, the edifice, as also the public taste. The company bore no closer resemblance to the dinner at the Mansion House than did the manners or the locality. They represented the aristocracy of England rather than the citizens of London; the aristocracy of all parties, and the philosophers, scholars and artists, receiving and received by them in the Palace of the Arts, with reciprocating dignity. The diplomatic body, according to custom, received invitations to this dinner, and it fell to me to reply, in their name, to the toast proposed in honour of their presence. On this subject I had been variously counselled. Lord Granville suggested from Paris that it would be preferable if I spoke in English. My own impression was different. Besides that French was much easier to me, I thought that a French ambassador should use his own language wherever he was likely to be understood, and this was probable at the meeting of the Royal Academy, at least with regard to a majority of the guests. At the dinner in the City I should have been unintelligible to nearly all. Moreover, in the city, they recognized in my indifferent English, only my good will; at the Royal Academy they would have glaringly detected my defective accent. I therefore replied in French when the health of the foreign ambassadors was given. "The diplomatic body, gentlemen, is sensibly moved by your noble and generous hospitality, and I feel happy in having the honour of being, at this moment, the organ of its sentiments of

gratitude and sympathy. Nowhere can they be more natural or appropriate than within these walls, and on the occasion of this meeting. Many centuries ago when the Emperor Vespasian conceived the design of assembling in one place all the master-pieces of art which conquest had accumulated in Rome, he selected the Temple of Peace. He wished that all nations, forgetting their ancient animosities, should enjoy in common that magnificent exhibition. Nothing accords better than peace and the arts. There is a natural and powerful harmony between them. Let any one who doubts this cast his eyes upon what has taken place in Europe within the last twenty-five years. He might not be able to say that these years have constituted an epoch of great and original creation for the arts, or that they have produced many of those new and surpassing specimens of genius which render an age illustrious amongst ages. Nevertheless, knowledge and taste in the arts have expanded and penetrated in places and amongst men who until then were unacquainted with them. In traversing Germany, and France, and undoubtedly England also, we see on all sides, in the provinces as in the capitals, the constant creation of a host of monuments, great or small, ambitious or unpretending. The statues of distinguished men people the public squares. If any exhibition analogous to this is opened in any quarter, crowds hasten to it. Painting, sculpture, and music, all the arts infuse themselves into national manners and tastes, and become almost a portion of the public. This, gentlemen, is a great blessing at the present epoch and in the existing state of modern society. What

could you do, what could we do, in our respective countries, with those millions of men who advance incessantly in civilization, in influence, and in liberty, if they were exclusively given up to the thirst of a material prosperity, and to political passions, if they thought only of increasing their riches or of discussing their rights? They require other interests, other sentiments, and other enjoyments. Not to detach them from the improvement of their condition or the advancement of their liberties; not to make them less active and elevated in social life, but to render them capable and worthy of their more exalted position, capable and worthy of carrying still higher, in their turn, the civilization towards which they press onwards in crowds. And also to satisfy those longings and instincts of our nature which require something beyond material prosperity, or even the labours and manifestations of political liberty. In common with literature and science the arts possess this virtue; they open a wide and attractive career to the activity and enjoyments of men. They diffuse brilliant and peaceful pleasures. They animate and soothe at the same time. They soften manners without enervating them.

They draw together and unite in one common gratification, men otherwise very opposite in position, habits, opinions, and pursuits. It is not, therefore, for yourselves, gentlemen, for your personal enjoyment that you cultivate and encourage the arts. The Royal Academy, its institution, its exhibitions, embrace a more expansive range, a merit essentially social. We congratulate ourselves on being invited to-day to their cele-

bration. We sympathize with their labours and hopes. At such a meeting, in presence of these master-pieces, under the empire of the sentiment they inspire, we are your guests, gentlemen, but here there are no strangers."

The reception given to these words assured me that they were understood and approved.

CHAPTER IV.

ENGLISH SOCIETY IN 1840.

HOW AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE CAN ASSIST EACH OTHER IN ENGLAND.—SOCIAL PREPONDERANCE OF THE WHIGS IN 1840.—MY HABITUAL CONNEXION WITH THEM.—HOLLAND HOUSE.—LORD HOLLAND.—LADY HOLLAND.—LANSDOWNE HOUSE AND LORD LANSDOWNE.—LORD GREY.—I MEET DANIEL O'CONNELL AT DINNER AT MRS. STANLEY'S.—DR. ARNOLD.—MR. HALLAM.—MR., AFTERWARDS LORD MACAULAY.—MY VISIT WITH HIM TO WESTMINSTER ABBEY.—THE REV. SIDNEY SMITH.—LORD JEFFREY.—MISS BERRY.—MY ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE TORIES.—LADY JERSEY.—LORD LYNDHURST, LORD ELLENBOROUGH, AND SIR STRATFORD CANNING.—MR. CROKER.—THE RADICALS IN 1840.—MR. AND MRS. GROTE.—THE ENGLISH CHURCH.—FALSE IDEAS PREVALENT IN FRANCE ON THIS SUBJECT.—REAL STATE OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH.—MY VISIT TO ST. PAUL'S.—THE ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.—THE DISSENTERS.—MRS. FRY.—WHY I DO NOT SPEAK OF THE ENGLISH COURT.—MY SOLITUDE AND LEISURE.—MY WALKS IN LONDON AND THE NEIGHBOURHOOD.—THE REGENT'S PARK.—SION HOUSE.—CHISWICK.—POPULAR SCHOOL AT NORWOOD.—ETON COLLEGE.—ACTUAL CHARACTER AND MORAL PROGRESS OF ENGLISH SOCIETY.

It is the characteristic and peculiar charm of diplomacy that the enjoyments of society combine in it with the interests of political life, and superficial relaxations with serious labours. Not only does the representative of a state, in a foreign land, find himself placed from the outset in the highest society of the country in which

he resides, but he is naturally incited and led to hold that society in great estimation. To render it agreeable to himself and to win success there, he must learn to please ; he must establish in the bosom of that indifferent world, relations and habits approaching to intimacy, he must gain a personal importance which may become a power in his mission. For him, cares apparently frivolous are a necessary pre-occupation. He commits an error if, in the drawing-rooms and in the midst of festivals, the thought of business is not present to his mind. A passing conversation may serve him as much as an official interview, and the impressions he leaves on the world through which he passes are scarcely less important to him than the arguments he developes in a ministerial tête-à-tête.

In no place is this mingling of social and political life, and this art of making them mutually aid each other, more important than in England ; for no where does there exist, by the side of the government, a society so exalted, independent, and attentive to public affairs, and whose opinion, whether in approval or condemnation possesses so much weight and effect. It is not that a foreign minister would have, in England, the slightest chance of success, were he to attempt an appeal to that society, or to use it in opposition to its own government. In no country is the slightest appearance of foreign influence so suspiciously watched. All classes of the nation, whether aristocratic or popular, are jealously susceptible on this point, and not in the least disposed to submit to the opinions of any stranger whatever, the reputation or strength of the power that governs them.

The English, also, are very attentive observers, singularly vigilant and acute without the air of being so. A foreign minister would lose himself, if on this point he were to wound in the slightest degree the national sentiment. But still he has a means of exercising, without seeking it, an important influence in English society; he may acquire high personal consideration, and some steady friends. The opinion which is formed of the character and mind of an individual exercises much power and wins effective esteem. If, amongst men, respected and influential, he establishes friends who attach themselves to him with warmth and confidence, that confidence diffuses itself amongst the public, and secures for him substantial credit. This indirect, distant, and patient influence, entirely derived from the worth and position of the man himself, is the utmost that a foreign ambassador can hope to attain in England; but if used with prudence and with no attempt to exceed its natural scope, it may, with time for exercise, at a given moment, prove of the highest value.

On this condition, and within these limits, social life in England assists diplomacy. It then becomes a means of observation and information, the more important that there is scarcely any other. Publicity and conversation in the world, the journals and the drawing-rooms, are the only two channels through which a foreign minister, can in London, ascertain facts and indices, and estimate the intentions, or foresee the resolutions of the cabinet. Any other process of inquiry would be at once compromising and futile. The policy of the English government is essentially public. What cannot

be ascertained or gleaned from the papers or fashionable parties, is not worth the trouble of seeking for, and any appearance of effort or intrigue in that research would injure far more than it would serve what might be expected to be discovered.

When I arrived in London, the predominance of the Whigs in the government, at the court, and in public opinion was still firmly established. In vain had they successively lost, since 1830, at first some of their important allies, Lord Stanley and Sir James Graham, and soon after their most distinguished leader, Lord Grey; in vain, towards the close of 1834, had Sir Robert Peel endeavoured to form a Tory cabinet; that attempt had failed, and despite their losses, the Whigs remained, in 1840, in full possession of power. In France, and before my embassy, I had been more connected with them than with the Tories. In general, the Whigs visited the continent oftener and remained there longer than the Tories. They had more taste for foreign ideas and manners, especially for French ideas and manners. They had contracted with the government of King Louis Philippe an undisguised alliance. It was with them that I found myself, on reaching England, already in mutual and somewhat intimate relations. They all received me with marked kindness, those who were strangers to me before, and those whom I had known in France, the Duke of Devonshire and Lord Clarendon, as well as Lord Holland and the Marquess of Lansdowne. The English excel in combining favour with a certain reserve, and in displaying the extreme of courtesy without over-acted anxiety.

Lord Holland was not the leader of the Whigs; but Holland House was always their centre, their favourite resort, the *home* of the party. They met there their traditions, their most glorious reminiscences, hereditary hospitality, and perfect freedom of mind and conversation. Lord and Lady Holland did not take up their residence at Kensington until the approach of spring, and on the evening of the 12th of April, I visited them for the first time. I can scarcely describe the extent to which that house impressed and pleased me. I found in it an aspect essentially historical and social, through I know not how many generations. I have a horror of oblivion, of what passes away quickly. Nothing pleases me so much as that which has the air of durability and lasting memory. I can taste the agreeable incidents of the moment, which fly and leave no trace; but the pleasure they give me is little and fugitive as themselves. I require my enjoyments to be in accordance with my more serious instincts, to inspire me with the sentiment of greatness and perpetuation. I cannot slake my thirst, and thoroughly refresh myself, except at deep springs. That antique and half Gothic abode, that staircase covered with maps and engravings, and its solid and sombre balusters of carved oak, that library filled with books written in all languages, and collected from every country in the world—a dépôt of so much intellectual curiosity and activity—that long series of portraits, painted, drawn, and engraved—portraits of the dead and living—so much importance so long and so faithfully attached by the owners of the place to the spirit, the glory, and the remembrances of friendship;

all—deeply interested and moved me, and even to this day, I retain the full impression.

The proprietors, Lord Holland particularly, were at once in harmony and in contrast with their dwelling-house. In some of his ideas, and in his political and philosophical sympathies, in his tastes and in the turn of his conversation, Lord Holland inclined to the continent and to France, almost as much as he did to England; and he would have been at least as well placed in Paris, in a drawing-room of the eighteenth century, as at Holland House in his own. In the union of his position and manners, in his aristocratic traditions and habits, in his selected circle and hereditary popularity, he was extremely English, and the admirably suited possessor and inhabitant of that thoroughly English and noble mansion, in which he exercised such splendid hospitality. He was at the same time an English Whig and a French Liberal. That mixture of national and continental spirit, that European intelligence under its Saxon physiognomy, added greatly to the charm of his person and of his society. He had travelled much, and had often lived on the continent. He was perfectly master of the languages and literature of France, Italy, and Spain, and equally familiar with the authors of his own country, from whom he quoted with delightful readiness the most celebrated passages.

I happened to dine one day at Holland House with a very small party; I can only recollect two of the guests—Lord Clarendon, and an old gentleman, Mr. Luttrell, both constant visitors and intimates. We talked for a long time of the great French writers and orators, La

Bruyère, Pascal, Madame de Sévigné, Bossuet, Fénelon ; I forget by what transition we passed from France of the seventeenth century to modern England. Lord Holland began to speak of some of his celebrated contemporaries, of his uncle Mr. Fox, of Sheridan, Grattan, Curran ; not only to speak of them, but to retrace their manners, their language, and to imitate, in order to paint them more correctly. He excelled in this mimicry without caricature. His corpulent, gouty body, which moved with great difficulty, and was rolled into the room in his arm-chair, his fat face gaily animated, the heavy eyebrows, which overshadowed his sparkling eyes, all became supple, agile, and graceful, with an air of refined and good-natured mockery ; and I amused myself almost as much in looking at, as in listening to him.

This very original countenance was open to singular resemblances. We were dining at Lord Clarendon's, who had just received from Madrid a painting which he highly valued. He ordered it to be brought into the drawing-room ; a monk was introduced into it who really bore a strong resemblance to Lord Holland ; so much so that at Madrid, on seeing the picture, General Charles Fox had remarked it vehemently. Lady Holland expressed her anger, at first loudly, and then in a more subdued tone ; " I am provoked, really provoked," she said to Lord Clarendon ; " make them take away the picture ; such an ugly and disgusting monk !" There was something of sincerity in this conjugal wrath, but still more of imperious caprice than of truth. It was necessary to comply with Lady Holland's wish, and that this little cause of annoyance should be removed from her. Lord

Clarendon defended himself stoutly, surprised at first, and then a little obstinate in his turn. Lady Holland persisted, but skilfully, mingling entreaty with displeasure, and in a gentle voice, although with highly animated looks. Lord Clarendon yielded at last, without retreating entirely, and the quarrel ended by a compromise; the picture remained in the room, but turned towards the wall.

Lady Holland was much more purely English than her husband. Sharing with him the philosophic ideas of the eighteenth French century, in politics she was a thoroughly aristocratic whig without the slightest radical tendency, proudly liberal, and as strongly attached to social hierarchy, as faithful to her party and her friends. She possessed greatness and strength of mind, with an air of authority natural and acquired; she was often imperious, sometimes affable, dignified even in her caprice, well-informed without pretension, and though sufficiently egotistical in fact, capable of attachment, above all of that careful and delicate attention which renders so easy and agreeable the familiar details of life. She conceived a favourable impression of me, and evinced it not only in her kind reception, but in rendering me, unperceived, various good offices, and in giving me, occasionally, useful hints. She lent me books which might be either useful or amusing. She was anxious that I should not commit too many errors in speaking English, and corrected me with friendly solicitude. I happened once to repeat a popular proverb, *Hell is paved with good intentions*; she inclined towards me and whispered,

"Pardon my impertinence ; we never use the word *hell* here, unless in quoting from Milton ; high poetry is the only excuse." Like many others in England, she was an epicure, and alive to the merits of a good dinner. Soon after I had established myself in London, whither I had brought an excellent cook, long in the service of M. de Talleyrand, Lady Holland wrote to Paris : "M. Guizot pleases all the world here, including the Queen. The public augurs well from his having placed the celebrated Louis at the head of his kitchen ; few things contribute more to popularity in London than good cheer."

A few weeks later, Lady Holland came to dine with me ; she had eaten no breakfast that morning, and was impatient to go to table ; Lord Palmerston did not arrive until half-past eight. Lady Holland began to lose her temper, proceeding to real vexation, and finally to exhaustion. When dinner was at last announced, she called Lord Duncannon, and committed herself to his care ; "for I am not sure," she said, "that I can go so far without being ill." The dinner, which pleased her, dissipated both the ill-humour and faintness ; but I am by no means certain that she did not always retain a slight grudge against me for having, on that day, waited for Lord and Lady Palmerston.

This person, so decidedly incredulous, was accessible, for her friends and for herself, to fears childishly superstitious. She had been slightly ill, was better, and admitted it. "Do not speak of this," she said to me, "it is unlucky." She told me that in 1827, Mr. Canning, then ill, mentioned to her that he was

going for change and repose to Chiswick, a country seat of the Duke of Devonshire. She said to him, "Do not go there; if I were your wife I would not allow you to do so." "Why not?" asked Mr. Canning. "Mr. Fox died there." Mr. Canning smiled; and an hour after, on leaving Holland House, he returned to Lady Holland, and said to her in a low tone, "Do not speak of this to any one; it might disturb them."—"And he died at Chiswick," concluded Lady Holland, with emotion.

During the whole course of my embassy, and on the Eastern question in particular, I ever found at Holland House the same sympathetic desire, the same anxiety that England should act in conjunction with France rather than with Russia. When the English cabinet took a step out of this path, Lord Holland was visibly vexed and disturbed; he wished that France and her ambassador should always have cause to be satisfied with England, and on these occasions his complaisance towards me increased. Lady Holland, less gentle, vented her displeasure alternately against the journalists who supported the policy she disliked, against Russia, and against the Baron de Brünnow, towards whom, in general, she evinced little favour. I frequently passed the evening at Holland House. If any unpleasant incident in my negotiation had occurred during the morning, or the day before, Lord and Lady Holland carefully avoided any topic which might lead to it, and drew the conversation to totally different subjects. They were sincerely anxious to avoid a rupture with France, and to preserve the enjoyment of their private

society. One of their constant guests, a devoted friend of Lord Palmerston, said to me one day, "Take care; Lord Holland is very amiable; but he talks too much for a minister, and before foreigners who are not sufficiently well acquainted with our internal government to distinguish correctly between the actual importance of his words, and that which he attaches to them himself. To hear his gossip, one would suppose there are great divisions of opinion in the cabinet; it is not easy to consider all that sort of thing as mere conversational talk, of no importance in real business." The observation was well founded. Lord Holland's apprehended dissensions were more sincere than serious.

Next to Holland House, the principle Whig centre of attraction was Lansdowne House, and without exercising a preponderating influence, the Marquis of Lansdowne held more importance in the cabinet than did Lord Holland. He did not lead; but those who did, felt that they could not dispense with his support. Amongst the Whigs, I never knew any great nobleman more respected, more enlightened, more generously and judiciously liberal than Lord Lansdowne. Birth, fortune, complete education, knowledge, a character full of loyalty and honour; nothing was withheld from him. But he was always more anxious to enjoy these advantages than eager to render them available in a career of ambition and power. He sought to be honoured and esteemed, rather than to act and rule. I might say there was some resemblance between him and his London residence, capacious, imposing, well-furnished, but somewhat cold in the nature of its ornaments.

The dining-room and gallery beyond were filled with antique statues, which his father, Lord Shelburne, had purchased in Italy; a magnificent decoration, more suited to public edifices than to balls, routs, or concerts. I have often been at these great assemblies at Lansdowne House; amongst others, at a ball which, on the 2nd of April, Lord Lansdowne gave to the Queen. Singular was the effect produced by those eight or nine hundred persons, overflowing with life and brilliancy, surrounded by sixty or eighty marble statues, cold and motionless in the midst of all that movement, those dances, and those floods of music and light. Independently of these grand festivals, in the habitual course of life, in the select dinner parties, half political, and half literary, which he constantly gave, intercourse with Lord Lansdowne was equally agreeable and safe. He invariably expressed to me, both for the friendly relations of his country with mine, and for myself personally, a reserved but sincere good-will.

The attitude of Lord Grey, and my relations with him, were quite of another character. This great Whig leader, who after having for forty-four years given the example of staunch fidelity to his principles, had met with the rare fortune of accomplishing the work to which he had devoted himself, parliamentary reform, and of thus reaching the object of his life. Lord Grey, in 1840, could not reconcile himself to becoming old, and lived almost out of the world, in melancholy and weariness; ever treated with marked distinction when he reappeared, and receiving testimonies of respect with a singular mixture of dignity and discontent. He was

dining with me one day with the principal Whigs, amongst others, several members of the cabinet, Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Lord Clarendon. Being one of the first arrivals, Lord Grey was seated near the fire-place, and the other guests, as they came in succession, hastened to salute him. I still see that noble old man, with his lofty figure and handsome face, rising with difficulty from his arm-chair, and answering only by a proud and melancholy inclination of the head to the homage tendered to him. He was fully sensible of the respectful attention I evinced towards him on all occasions. I often called upon him and he was evidently gratified by my visits. One morning, I found him quite alone. He bade me remark this ; “ Formerly,” he said, “ when I was young, scarcely any one passed my door, men or women, without calling to see me. To-day, from that window, I observe them all go by, as formerly, but they enter no more.” Another day, it was in the evening, he was alone with his wife, Lady Grey, who was reading to him. She touched me by her anxiety for her husband ; she blamed him, before me, for no longer going to the House of Lords, for not speaking, or caring for anything. With frankness full of simplicity and almost of confidence, as if she had known me long, she requested me to call frequently upon them, to assist her in combatting Lord Grey’s tendency. I seconded her desire, I humoured his disease. I incline naturally towards exalted minds when somewhat enfeebled. Their noble nature pleases me, and it seems as if I console their weakness.

I felt surprised at never meeting in this Whig circle,

a man with whom the party had long been connected, and whose support was indispensable to them ; the celebrated Irishman, Daniel O'Connell. I expressed this one day to Mrs. Stanley, now Lady Stanley of Alderley, daughter to Lord Dillon, an estimable lady with whom I had become acquainted through family associations, and whose husband was at that time, *whipper in* for the Whigs in the House of Commons ; which office consisted in rallying the members of the party on all important occasions and in superintending their presence. Mrs. Stanley was herself an active partizan in the government interest. Lord Palmerston called her "the head of our staff." "Do you wish to know Mr. O'Connell?" said she to me. "Yes, certainly." "Well, I will arrange that." Accordingly she invited me to meet him at dinner on the 4th of April, with five or six persons only, amongst whom were Lord John Russell and Lord Duncannon. I found Mr. O'Connell exactly the sort of man I had pictured to myself. There was something perhaps in this, but it is always much to answer expectation. He was tall, bulky, robust, animated, his head a little sunk between the shoulders, with an air of strength and shrewdness ; strength everywhere, shrewdness in the quick glance, slightly indirect although not indicating duplicity ; he was neither elegant nor vulgar, his manner a little embarrassed yet firm, with even a tincture of suppressed arrogance. His politeness towards the Englishmen of condition he met there was mingled slightly with humility and pride : it was apparent that they had once been his masters and that now he exercised power over them ; he had submitted to their rule

and he accepted their attentions. He was evidently flattered at having been invited to meet me. On our introduction, I said to him, "You and I, Sir, are here two great evidences of the progress of justice and good sense; you a Catholic, are a member of the English House of Commons; I, a Protestant, am the ambassador of France." This opening remark pleased him, and during dinner, we conversed together almost like old acquaintances. During the morning, Mrs. Stanley had hesitated about an evening party; nevertheless she had decided for it, and after dinner, I saw arrive, Lord and Lady Palmerston, Lord Normanby, Lord Clarendon, the Bishop of Norwich, Lady William Russell, and several others. On leaving the dinner-table, a fit of social modesty seized Mr. O'Connell, he wished to take his departure. "You have company," said he, to Mr. Stanley. "Yes, but pray remain, we expect you to do so." "No, no, I must go." "Stay, I entreat you." He stayed, with visible satisfaction not unmingled with pride. "That then is Mr. O'Connell?" said Lady William Russell to me, who probably had never seen him before. "Yes," I replied, "and I am come from Paris to tell you so." "You thought perhaps that we passed our lives with him?" "No, I see evidently that you do not." All appeared glad of the opportunity to make themselves agreeable to him, and he seemed equally inclined to profit by it. He spoke much; he detailed the progress of temperance in Ireland; the drunkards were disappearing by thousands, the taste for regular habits and more refined manners advanced in proportion as inebriety receded. No one expressed the slight-

est doubt. I asked him whether this was a mere puff of popular humour or a lasting reform. He replied gravely, "It will last ; we are a persevering race, as all are who have suffered much." He took pleasure in addressing himself to me, in calling me to witness the improved fortune of his country, and his personal triumph. I retired towards midnight and was the first to go, leaving Mr. O'Connell surrounded by four cabinet ministers and five or six ladies of rank who listened to him with a mixture, somewhat comic, of curiosity and pride, of deference and disdain.

I also became acquainted, a few days later, with another individual, much less celebrated and important in the political sphere, but invested, in England, with a degree of influence and public favour equally original and personal. The Duchess of Sutherland, at that time mistress of the robes to the Queen, and one of the noblest ornaments of the Whig party, both in goodness and beauty, wrote one morning to say that Dr. Arnold was anxious to see me, and would pass a day at her house with that intention. Nine years before, without the slightest previous intercourse between us, he had sent me an edition of Thucydides he had recently published, with evidences of sympathy neither superficial nor common-place. He came to London on the 10th of April, and afforded me a day of unusual enjoyment, both intellectual and moral. Dr. Arnold had been for a long time at the head of the college of Rugby, a great public educational establishment, founded in Warwickshire, under the reign of Queen Elizabeth ; and without the slightest quackery, by his personal

merit, had carried it to the highest degree of prosperity and popularity. I found in him a man of a singularly elevated mind, animated, open, expansive, exempt from prejudices and routine, seeking after progress, and at the same time steady, practical, without vague or whimsical fantasies, faithfully attached to all the solid bases of moral and social order. I never met a soul more powerfully sympathetic, more commanding and more human. In classic literature, in history, in the sciences, his knowledge was equally solid and varied; and his ideas and methods, without striking novelty, in education and instruction, were peculiarly his own, and applied with communicative and effective inspiration. He relied much on conversation, mind to mind, and could draw advantage from freedom of thought as much as from authority. Never perhaps did any head of a similar establishment exercise over the generations that passed through his hands, a more intimate influence, or leave on their minds and limits a more profound remembrance.

The Whigs had at that time the good fortune to reckon within their ranks, whether in the bosom of affairs, or on the skirts of active policy, several eminent men who, by their writings, exercised much sway over the public; and I was also fortunate enough to contract with some amongst them ties of great good-will or even of close friendship. All are now dead, some before feeling the attacks of age, in the vigour as in the maturity of their talent; others, after having run their full course, and gained, by honourable toil, a just renown and a dignified repose. I cannot deny myself the melan-

choly pleasure of in these pages reviving their memories, the impressions they left upon me, and the bonds by which we were united.

It was with Mr. Hallam that I became most intimate. From the commencement of our acquaintance, and in proportion as it advanced, his character and mind equally attracted and attached me. Before 1830, his beautiful historic works, especially his *Constitutional History of England*, had led to pleasing communications between us. In the preface to the last named, he had spoken of me and of my *History of the English Revolution* in terms by which I felt highly honoured and moved. After 1830, I met him in Paris ; we entered into correspondence ; he conveyed to me several times his opinions on what was passing in England ; amongst other events, on the parliamentary reform of 1831 ; and I was struck by the independence and judicious sagacity of his general ideas and appreciations of contemporary measures and incidents. I never knew a man more sincerely and thoroughly liberal, and at the same time more divested of national prejudice and party spirit ; no one more exclusively anxious to discover truth and to render justice to all, without any thought of pleasing or displeasing adversaries or friends. The natural rectitude of his judgment, his vast and accurate knowledge, the generous devotion of his soul and his perfect disinterestedness made him inflexibly just, and a stranger, even in the cause he held most at heart, that of religious and political liberty, to every kind of idle speculation or fanaticism. He received me in London in 1840, with friendly eagerness. He loved society, conversation, the

familiar discussion of reminiscences or ideas, and often collected at his table the most distinguished men of his country, literary by profession or taste, Mr. Macaulay, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Mahon, Sir Francis Palgrave, Mr. Milman, all delighted to find themselves together and round him. In 1848, after the Revolution of February, Mr. Hallam proved himself my most sincere and indefatigable friend. There were no possible acts of kindness that he did not seek to render me, no daily cares or attention that he did not incessantly bestow on my children and myself, with that affectionate cordiality which renders everything easy and agreeable to the obliged party, for it takes as much pleasure in what it does for them, as they can themselves derive from its exercise. I have heard it said, that in the early period of his life, Mr. Hallam had been a little bitter and imperious ; but he had gone through great domestic trials ; he had lost his wife and several of his children, including his eldest son Arthur, a young man of rare mark, to whose memory his friend, the poet Tennyson, has dedicated one of his most beautiful works of moral poetry, called, *In memoriam*. Instead of rendering Mr. Hallam gloomy and morose, age and calamity had softened and calmed him ; no one recognized in him even a lingering trace of harshness ; he preserved all his intellectual spirit, all his literary and social tastes, and seemed to enjoy life as a man who still finds it sweet, and seeks to render it equally so to those who surround him, but who has also known its heavy sorrows, and, at the bottom of his heart, and for himself alone, has ceased to take much interest in it. After my return to France, Mr. Hallam

came, in 1853, with Sir John Boileau, to pass some days at Val-Richer. I found him still unchanged, his mind as animated, and his heart as warm as ever; but shortly after, he was seized by an attack of apoplexy which left him helpless and almost extinct. During my visit to England, in 1858, I went to see him in the country, at Penshurst, near London, when he lived in retirement with his daughter, Mrs. Cator. I found him reclining in his arm-chair, near a table still covered with books, some of which were open, holding in his hand the *Times* of the day, which he let fall as I entered; he could scarcely walk, he spoke with difficulty, and cast upon me languid and sorrowful looks through which gleamed an affectionate remembrance, and the pleasure he felt at seeing me once more, although unable to express it in words. I abridged my visit which fatigued him as much as it saddened myself. He died a few months after. An uncommon man, as modest as he was uncommon, and who wanted only more display in his talent and a more fervid thirst for success, to exercise as much of power over the public as he won of esteem and friendship from all who were best acquainted with him.

I lived less intimately with Lord Macaulay (Mr. Macaulay in 1840), and even after much intercourse I knew the historian better than the man. Before we met, I admired his skilful and brilliant art of collecting facts, of grouping them together, of animating and transforming recital into dramatic action, and of scattering through the scenes and actors of the drama, the observations and opinions of the spectator. He excelled

in shedding over the past, streams of light and colour, and in bringing it into contrast with the ideas and manners of the present day. When I personally knew Lord Macaulay, I still more enjoyed my disposition to admire him. The harmony was perfect between the man and the artist, the talker and the writer. Nothing bore a closer resemblance to Lord Macaulay's works than his conversation. There was the same richness and readiness of memory, the same unaffected ardour in the thought, the same vivacity of imagination, the same clearness of language, the same natural and pointed turn in the reflections. There was as much pleasure and almost as much instruction in listening to as in reading him. And when after so many remarkable and charming *Essays*, he published his great work, *The History of England from the Accession of James the Second*, the same qualities developed themselves therein with even increased abundance and effect. I know no history in which the past and the historian who relates it live so intimately or familiarly together. Lord Macaulay paints the facts and men of the seventeenth century with as many details, and in as living colours as if they were his contemporaries. A plan full of power and attraction, but verging on a danger which Lord Macaulay has not always escaped. On reading him, I often feel the regret of meeting in history, the spirit of party politics. I neither think nor speak ill of parties; they form the necessary elements of free government. I have passed many years of my life in that arena, and I know how necessary it is to a successful struggle, either to govern or resist effectually, to be surrounded by a

compact, well-disciplined, and permanent party. The Whigs and Tories have represented for two centuries, in England, the force of power and liberty. But parties and the spirit of party can only be correctly estimated in active and existing politics. When we look back into the past, when we re-open tombs, we owe to the dead we draw from thence, complete and scrupulous justice. In bringing them again upon the stage, we ought to revive the ideas and sentiments they exhibited there. In assigning their respective parts, we should equitably distinguish their personal interests and rights, and not mix up with their ashes the living coals of our own hearth. Lord Macaulay has not always obeyed this law of historical equity and truth. He has sometimes carried into his recitals, and above all into his estimates of acts and men, the passions and prejudices of the Whigs engaged in ancient or recent struggles. I have reason to believe that he was aware of this himself; of which I can name two decisive proofs, one drawn from his great work, the other from our personal intercourse. While advancing in his labour, he became more disenthralled from his early impressions. The justice of the historian surmounted the habits of the politician; he is much more impartial in his history of the reign of William the Third, than in that of James the Second, or above all, than in the summary of those of Charles the First and Charles the Second. He judges the Whigs of 1692 more severely than the Republicans of 1648; and if I am correctly informed, his new-born impartiality won for him from several interested or ardent Whigs, animated reproaches. My personal evidence is not less conclusive. During

the spring of 1848, I was anxious that my son William should resume in London his classic studies forcibly interrupted in Paris. I hesitated between two great establishments, the *College of the London University*, founded through the influence of the Whigs, with the University itself, under the reign of William the Fourth, and *King's College*, established at nearly the same time, under the patronage of the Church of England. I consulted Mr. Macaulay on the selection. "You ask me as a father," he said; "I will not reply to you as a man of party; I concurred with my friends the Whigs in the foundation of the London University and its College; send your son to *King's College*, it is the best of the two." I thanked him for his sincerity, and followed his advice, with which my son had reason to be satisfied.

In 1840, during the leisures of my embassy, I experienced a striking proof of the extent and charm of his knowledge. He offered to act as *cicerone* to me in a visit to Westminster Abbey, that celebrated receptacle of the dead, dispersed or piled together without distinction, throughout all parts of the building; kings, queens, warriors, politicians, magistrates, orators, authors, simple individuals, some celebrated, placed there by public admiration and gratitude, others obscure, consecrated by domestic piety, affection, or vanity. Elizabeth and Mary Stuart, Buckingham and Monk, Lord Chatham and Lord Mansfield, Pitt and Fox, Shakespeare, Milton, Newton, Gray, Addison, Watts,—the most opposite destinies and natures placed side by side; the peace of Heaven between men after the hatreds.

and rivalries of earth. I was not shocked, as many appear to have been, by the great number of obscure dead. How can that affect the illustrious deceased? They are not the less apparent nor the less alone. There is no crowd there; the tombs do not jostle or hide each other. You pause only before such as inclose the immortalities. But really shocking, hideous, and barbarous, are those waxen figures placed in closets, Queen Elizabeth, Queen Anne, William III. and Mary, Nelson and Chatham, erect, with open eyes, in their appropriate vestments. This assumed reality, this marriage of apparent life and death produce a revolting effect in the midst of those tombs and statues, pure symbols which proclaim death while perpetuating memory, and transmit the name to the respect of posterity without surrendering the person to the curiosity of its glances. During three or four hours I wandered with Mr. Macaulay through that monumental gallery of England and her families; I stopped him or he stopped me at every step; at one time in reply to my questions, at another anticipating them, he explained an allegorical monument, reminded me of a long forgotten fact, related an anecdote little known, or recited some beautiful passage from the writers or orators whose names we encountered. We passed before the statue of Lord Chatham, standing with his head elevated, and his arm advanced as if enforcing a burst of eloquence; before him, at his feet, was inscribed on a simple stone, the name of his son, William Pitt, placed there until the completion and substitution of the monument dedicated to his memory. "Might one not say," observed Mr. Macaulay, "that the father rises, and

there publicly delivers the funeral oration of his son?" And at this thought some of the most beautiful speeches of Lord Chatham thronged on his memory, from which he quoted select passages. The monuments of the great writers, whether in prose or verse, called forth the same abundant display, the same inspiration of memory. Milton and Addison were favourites with him, and he detained me several minutes before their names, gratifying himself by recalling incidents of their lives or passages from their works, almost as much as he excited my delight in listening to him. A bas-relief which commemorated an incident in the great war between England and her American colonies struggling for their independence, stood before us: "Look at that figure without a head," observed Mr. Macaulay; "it is Washington; some zealous English patriot, hiding himself, no doubt, by night, and still enraged against that rebel leader, gratified his spleen by breaking off his head; it was restored; some time after it was broken off again; no farther attempt has been made to replace it. It is thus that the patriots of a country understand and treat those of a rival state." This entire visit filled me with delight and interest. As the illustrious dead of Italy issued from their tombs on the passing of Dante, so did the great celebrities of English history and literature rise up before me at the voice of a worthy representative.

Holland House was not alone the habitual rendezvous of the Whigs engaged in political life; it was also the favourite drawing-room, the adopted *home* of liberal men of letters, unconnected with public affairs, but devoted to the same principles, and to the redress

of old social injustices. It was there that I met for the first time the Rev. Sidney Smith and Lord Jeffrey, both founders of the *Edinburgh Review* in 1801, and the two men of that time who, out of Parliament, had contributed most to the success of the Whig party and the progress of liberty. Both, in 1840, had long survived the powerful impulses of their youth and enthusiasm; but Mr. Sidney Smith preserved at sixty-nine the same vivid originality of imagination and wit, the same startling and agreeable fancy which displayed themselves on all occasions, in familiar life as in crowded saloons, and probably in communion with himself as he sat alone in his study. After our first interview, in a letter to Paris, I said: "I conversed last evening with Mr. Sidney Smith who really overflows with wit. But everybody expects this, and prepares you for it. It is his condition to be witty, as it is that of Lady Seymour to be beautiful. All look to Mr. Sidney Smith for wit as all go to a coach-maker for a carriage. People laugh too much at his jokes. They laugh before, during, and after them; and he jokes a little too freely upon all subjects, even upon bishops. This, however, does not prevent his having respect even to timidity for his cloth. He objects to dine out on Sunday, and dares not say this to Lady Holland, who invites him on that day to perplex him."

Here indeed was Mr. Sidney Smith's weak point. The turn of his mind and language was not in harmony with his position; he had not entered the church from taste and his own free choice; in so doing, he had obeyed the urgent wishes of his father; and however scrupulously he endeavoured to fulfil the duties of his post,

he could not change his nature, or always confine within severe proprieties his inexhaustible and sometimes exuberant gaiety. In all other respects he was the best of men, as gentle as courageous, filled with Christian charity as with liberal sincerity, an eloquent preacher in his pulpit, and an eminent critic in the *Edinburgh Review*, whose sermons, collected after his death, are fully worth his articles, and amply cover every little extravagance in his sallies of mirth and humour. He called upon me one day at the embassy, and his conversation formed a delightful mixture of serious reflections and spirited sketches. He spoke much of Lord John Russell, to whom he was strongly attached, and who he looked upon as the soul of the cabinet. "Lord Melbourne," he said, "is a man of spirit, a fine fellow rather than a politician, and much less careless than he appears to be." He was very anxious not to be taken for a Radical.

"The Radicals," he observed, "are going down in the House of Commons, discouraged, and no longer sanguine of their future. They had persuaded themselves that they should change everything. The sound common sense of the public paralyzes them. The greater portion will melt into Whigs." I did not ask him whether the Whigs would not meet them half way. I heard without arguing. They are persons who like to be interrogated; others who prefer being listened to. We soon distinguish them. Mr. Sidney Smith was accustomed not only to be listened to, but waited for.

Notwithstanding the early union of their ideas and labours, Lord Jeffrey, at the period when I became acquainted with him bore no resemblance to the Reve-

rend Sidney Smith. The English ecclesiastic, at sixty-nine, was as animated, as gay, as kind-hearted, and as confident in human nature and the future of human society, as he could have been in his youth. The Scotch critic at sixty-seven, bore the impress of the trials and mistakes of life. Profoundly thoughtful and sagacious, his mind had more activity and firmness than inclination to indulge in brilliant and distant hopes. Sincerely attached to the principles he had maintained and the party he had served with ardour, he had some misgivings as to their evil tendencies and chances. He had exercised literary criticism with as much integrity and independence as penetration and judgment; but he was tired of criticising, and scarcely found anything left to admire. He liked conversation, argument, the exchange and encounter of ideas; he was fertile, ingenious, vigorously sound without pedantry; but his social tastes were counteracted and cooled by his increasing preference for his small country house near Edinburgh, for domestic life and quiet meditation in the bosom of attractive natural scenery. After the adoption of parliamentary reform, he had entered the House of Commons, but he obtained in that new field neither oratorical success nor political importance proportioned to his previous celebrity in the world of letters. He left Parliament without regret, though with some depression, having accepted a Judgeship in the High Court of Session in Scotland, and only visiting London at rare intervals for a few days. We had a long conversation, one morning, at my house, on the existing state of ideas and manners, of societies and governments. I was

struck by the firm independence and long forecast of his thought. This valiant champion of liberal ideas strongly apprehended the exclusive rule of democracy, as much for human dignity and political liberty as for the security of different rights and the strong constitution of States. But he expressed to me these judicious sentiments with that shade of discouragement and discontent which gives an air of age to the intellect; and age sits as ungracefully on the mind as on the body.

On leaving Holland or Lansdowne House, I sometimes finished my evening in an unpretending drawing-room, at the residence of two old ladies, Miss Berry and her sister Agnes, who I had often seen in Paris. After living long on the continent as in England, in the elegant and lettered world, they fixed their residence in London, at the respective ages of seventy-eight and seventy-four, remaining at home every evening, and receiving old friends and intelligent acquaintances, delighted to find them and to become members of their circle. They had for faithful companion Lady Charlotte Lindsay, daughter of Lord North, also an accomplished woman, replete with anecdotes of the court and history of England during the ministry of her father, which she delighted in retailing. The eldest of the two sisters, Miss Berry, had been handsome, and the object of the particular attentions of Horace Walpole, who it was said, she refused to marry, all fine gentleman and wit as he was, considering him too old. She loved France and the French society she had seen under very different times and conditions, and willingly recalled that at the court of Louis XVI, and by special favour

of Queen Marie Antoinette, she had been, for the first time in her life, invited to a grand ball. In 1815 she published a collection of the *Letters of Lady Russell*, preceded by a *Bibliographical Essay* written with intelligence and feeling; and in 1840, I carried back to the editor some portion of the profound and tender interest with which the memoir of that rare person, an admirable example of passion in virtue, had from that time inspired me. I found, moreover, in the little drawing-room at Miss Berry's, not only the tastes but the habits of French conversation and society, with more ease, variety, and ^{courteous} complaisant sympathy than in the greater part of the English circles; a lively movement of literary spirit and liberal sentiments divested of political prejudices. For me, this was a delightful relaxation, resembling a momentary return towards ^{to} my youth in the saloons of Madame Suard or Madame d'Houdetot.

Although I held myself quite unbiassed by politics in my personal acquaintances, I saw less of the Tories than of the Whigs, not only because I had not to treat with them, but that they had in London fewer centres of reunion and intimate conversation. I have already named the courteous attention exhibited towards me on my arrival by some of the most influential amongst them, particularly Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen. As early as the 7th of March, 1840, Sir Robert Peel invited me to a dinner with his most intimate friends. Lord Aberdeen complained of not seeing me more frequently. But it was chiefly at the house of Lady Jersey that I met the leaders of the party, and of the various shades of the party. She was extremely loyal in their

cause, and took great pains to draw them around her and to render her assemblies attractive to them. I there became acquainted with Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Ellenborough, and Sir Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The first, already old, impressed me by the vigour, precision, and perspicuity of his ideas and language, and ten years later I found the same qualities in him, almost in an equal degree. Sir Stratford Canning had not then displayed, in the embassy to Constantinople, his prevailing and indomitable energy ; but the manly frankness of his character and the tempered elevation of his manners possessed with me, from the first, a charm which diplomatic disagreements have never effaced. Lord Mahon, ^{now} ~~to-day~~ Earl Stanhope, distinguished alike by his historic labours and political intelligence, frequently invited to breakfast at his house the liberals and literary men of the party, the adherents of Sir Robert Peel, those who from that time were called and designated themselves *Conservatives* rather than Tories. Taken as a whole, this party ruled in the House of Lords, approached and sometimes reached a majority in the House of Commons, and numbered amongst its leaders men of talent and character, and possessing the esteem of the country. But it was undergoing, shall I call it, a process of decomposition or internal transformation, which paralyzed its strength and left power in the hands of its adversaries.

I wrote to one of my friends on the 20th of May, 1840, thus : “ I witness here a strange spectacle, the spectacle of an extremely strong and well organized Opposition and yet which dares not, cannot, by its own avowal,

become a government. The old Tories, the Tories of Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh, are at once the main body and difficulty, the nerve and burden of the party. If all the Conservatives were like Sir Robert Peel they would be the masters. We may be well assured, that although there has not been recently here, as with us, a revolution, there are here, as with us, resistances and arrogances of class which the country will no longer endure. There are reforms made, or in perspective, which all the world must accept, and which will exclude from power those who do not accept them seriously and sincerely. Two things equally impress me in England, the spirit of conservatism, and the spirit of reform. Despite the violence of words, and the tenacity of party engagements, this is the country of ultimate good sense, of slow but continued progress. It will only recover a strong government when all parties, without abdicating their characteristic maxims and tendencies, shall decide to exercise that moderate and equitable policy towards which, whether openly or silently, all minds converge.

It was from that time predicted with certainty that Sir Robert Peel would before long reach office through this path. I wrote on the 23rd of May, on the eve of a check sustained by the Whigs, "Until now, I thought that the Conservatives, the most sagacious amongst them at least, had no real intention of throwing out the cabinet. I begin to doubt. One of them said to me yesterday, 'We ought to dissolve Parliament. The dissolution would give us a majority of thirty votes. The problem of the moment is to obtain from the House of Lords the necessary reforms in Ireland and else-

where. Peel only can manage that chamber, and urge it to a step in advance. Peel is not a great man, but he will do what great men could not do."

Sir Robert Peel did what was expected from him. It remains now to be seen how what he destroyed will be replaced. Great social reforms have been accomplished. Will the great political parties necessary to the power and long duration of free governments be able to re-organize themselves? England is now feeling her way in the solution of this new problem.

Amongst all the champions of the old English Toryism with whom I came in contact, it was from an individual entirely disconnected with the high aristocracy and the court, a literary man in the third rank of political importance, Mr. John Wilson Croker, that I derived the most complete and comprehensive knowledge of his party. He had been for many years a member of the House of Commons, and Secretary to the Admiralty, but after the passing of the Reform Bill, which he had energetically opposed, he left parliament and office, and entirely devoted himself to political and literary criticism. Into this avocation he carried all the maxims, traditions, and passions of a servant of the cabinet of Lord Liverpool, and Lord Castlereagh. Ever an ardent adversary at home of the Whigs, even while admitting the necessity of certain reforms, and abroad of the French Revolution, republican or imperial, although without hatred or jealousy of France, and even warmly admiring and appreciating French genius, as an intelligent spectator admires a distinguished actor. He was a man of

unusual information, of a sagacious, inquiring, vigorous, and judicious mind ; but an incarnation of party spirit, intractable, and resolved to defend everything rather than suffer the slightest encroachment on the general system to which he belonged. He occupied apartments in Kensington Palace, which King George IV had given to him for life, and exercised his polemics in the *Quarterly Review*. I had met him in Paris before 1840 ; I saw him again in London during my embassy ; and when I returned to England in 1848, he bestowed on me tokens of kind and active interest. We argued without restraint, but we understood each other even when we ceased to agree, and I learned much from his conversation, of the state of English society and of the history of his time.

The Radicals made little stir in London in 1840. In England, as elsewhere, and more than in most places, this party comprehends two very opposite elements—the revolutionary and reforming radicals. The one, frantic enemies of established order, and burning to overthrow it ; the other, systematic innovators, struggling to establish their theories in the national institutions and through those institutions themselves, without changing the great foundations. The Parliamentary reform of 1832 had, for a time, reduced these two sections, the first to impotence, the second to patient hope. The chartists no longer attempted popular manifestations, and the constitutional democrats were labouring to imbue the Parliament, as well as the public, with their projects of reform. “I dined yesterday, at Mr. Grote’s with five or six Radicals,” I wrote to Paris

on the 19th March ; “ tranquil spirits notwithstanding their extreme radicalism. Mr. Grote speaks to me of the chartists, much as Lord John Russell does, and Lord John Russell in the style of Lord Aberdeen. There is much that is factitious in the political classification of men, and they differ less than they believe. But such is representative government ; by continual publicity and discussion it aggravates discordancies, and excites struggles. Political life is bought at this price.” Beyond Parliament, and in social intercourse, the Whigs made strong efforts to conciliate the radical reformers and to draw them within their ranks. On the 30th of April I wrote : “ Mrs. Grote is become a person of importance. Lady Palmerston has invited her to an evening party. The day before yesterday, I heard Lady Holland arranging a little plot for her dining at Holland House next week, and begged Lord John Russell not on any account to be absent, and to make himself agreeable to Mrs. Grote. There will be no cordiality on either side. She is ambitious and wants position. They will scarcely make enough of her. Aristocratic complaisance will not reach the level of citizen pride. There ought to be, there may be, between the two classes, real and profitable association ; necessity, good sense, the spirit of justice and foresight, suggest this ; but it will be political, not social harmony. They may act together in Parliament ; they will never intermingle cordially in the saloons. The vote of Mr. Grote will not be won as Don Juan obtains the money of M. Dimanche. All that is factitious, superficial, and momentary in the relations of

worldly life, produces no effect, even if it does not injure rather than advance cordiality."

In my quality of Protestant, I became an object of solicitous and friendly attention to the different religious sections in England, whether of the Established Church, or Dissenters. Soon after my arrival, the Bishop of London, Dr. Blomfield, a learned Hellenist, invited me to meet at dinner the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Llandaff, two canons of Westminster, and several zealous laymen. He asked me to go with him in his carriage, on a Sunday, to the service at St. Paul's. He wished to receive me officially there, and to make a little display, in his cathedral, of a Protestant French ambassador. I declined the proposal. I have no taste for show in such a place. I went indeed to St. Paul's, but quite privately, entering simply with the bishop, and sitting by his side. Amongst the English prelates with whom I became acquainted, the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Whately, a correspondent of our Institute, both interested and surprised me. His mind appeared to me original, and well cultivated; startling and ingenious rather than profound in philosophic and social science; a most excellent man, thoroughly disinterested, tolerant, and liberal, and in the midst of his unwearying activity and exhaustless flow of conversation, strangely absent, familiar, confused, eccentric, amiable and engaging, no matter what impoliteness he might commit, or what propriety he might forget. He was to speak on the 13th of April, in the House of Lords, in reply to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Bishop of Exeter, on the question of the Clergy reserves in Canada. "I am not sure," said

Lord Holland to me, "that in his indiscreet sincerity he may not say he sees no good reason why there should be a bench of bishops in the House of Peers." He did not speak, for the debate was adjourned, but on that occasion, as on all others, he would certainly not have sacrificed to the interests of his order, the smallest particle of what he regarded either as true, or for the public good.

Much has been said, and is still saying, particularly in France, on the Anglican Church; a subject, as I think, little known, and ill understood. It is reproached with having taken rise, not in public conviction, but in the capricious tyranny of Henry VIII; with having, at its origin, scandalously wavered in its professions of faith; with having appropriated the spoils of the Catholic Church; with having in its turn, oppressed the dissenters, and maltreated the inferior clergy; finally, with having forfeited independence in accepting for head of the Church, the laical head of the State. There is much truth in these reproaches, and I shall not endeavour to extenuate them by discussing the extent to which they may be exaggerated. I shall not even ask of what human establishments could we sound the origin, without meeting the violences and vices which the hand of man sows in all places when it assumes the honours of creation. A special fact presents itself in the history of the Anglican church. In growing to maturity, it has singularly separated and enfranchized itself from its cradle. It is rich; rich in personal property. It exercises a powerful influence over the mass of the English population; it sits in the House of Lords; by

its origin and position it seems essentially engaged in politics; it was so at first, intimately and almost subserviently; and yet to-day it has no political pretensions whatever; it confines itself within its religious mission. It has never happened that a church so well endowed, so highly placed, and invested with such powerful moral action, should content itself with its spiritual duties, and seek so little to interfere in the civil government of the country. Does this arise from want of independence in its proper domain, and from complete submission to the laical power, the supremacy of which it acknowledges? Not so; and those essentially deceive themselves who judge, in this matter, according to logical inductions, and the first appearances of history. When the Reformation of the sixteenth century sprang up, one of its principal causes was the ardent efforts of the laics, princes and people, not only to free the state from the domination of the church, but also to assume, in the government of the church itself, their place and portion. Such had been the progress of civilization and the movement of minds, that in a great part of Christian Europe, laical society was no longer disposed, even in the question of religious discipline, to yield to the absolute and unparticipated power of ecclesiastical courts. Following the struggles excited by this social fermentation, three systems were found in presence. First, the Catholic system, or the independent autonomy of the Church religiously governed by the clergy alone. Secondly, the mixed system, or the independent autonomy of the Church religiously governed by ecclesiastics and laics, mixed in various degrees, and under different

forms. Thirdly; Erastianism, or the abolition of the autonomy of the church, and its government passing into the hands of the laical sovereign of the State.

I do not propose here to compare these separate systems; I merely wish to enumerate and characterize them. The two last, although very opposite, since one maintains and the other abolishes the independent autonomy of the Church, derived their source equally from the increasing influence of laical society, and its desire to escape from the absolute power of the clergy. Erastianism prevailed in England, in the national Church, while the system of mixed government prevailed, on the same soil, in the greater part of the dissenting sects, the Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, &c. But although submitted, in principle, to the laical government of the State, and at first its docile and even servile instrument, the Anglican Church speedily became, in fact, extremely free in spiritual order. In some of its fundamental maxims, in its aristocratic organization, in its special interests, it has remained the natural and useful ally of the civil power; but for a long time the Crown and Parliament scarcely interfere in its personal and internal concerns, as the Church abstains from all interference in affairs of State. The national Church has its share, in England, in the general liberty of the country; the complete establishment of the free system has had this salutary consequence, that the temporal and spiritual power, although nominally united in the same hands, are practically separated one from the other, and mutually respected. The instinct of justice, and sound sense have prevailed to this point, that the State and

the Church, confounded in appearance, are distinct in reality, and confine themselves habitually within their natural domains.

And while the general state of English society thus enabled the Anglican Church to recover a portion of the independence which it wants in principle, that Church lived in presence of dissenting sects long persecuted, never annihilated, or entirely despoiled of their national liberties, and always in possession of their religious autonomy. This perpetual competition prevented the Church from falling permanently into indifference, apathy, remissness, worldly habits, and servile complaisance towards power. In the midst of its weaknesses, apathies, and lapses, it has constantly had before its eyes examples of animated faith, pious fervour, and steady independence. Through all their wanderings and extravagancies, these merits have never, in England, been wanting to the dissenting sects, and their example and rivalry have operated on the Established Church as a spur in its sides. It has constantly been provoked and compelled to reanimation, and to fortify itself in Christian faith and practise. Undoubtedly it is not at present exempt from the doubts, deviations, and hostile fermentations which affect all Christendom. In common with the Catholic Church, the dissenting sects of England, and Continental Protestantism, it has its unbelievers, sceptics, and critics; but he betrays either a great ignorance of facts, or a remarkable blindness of passion who believes that therefore it is in a state of decomposition and decline. Even in the midst of the general crisis to which Christendom is subjected, the

English Church has become and is daily becoming, more warmly and effectively Christian. The essential points of Christianity, grave manners, pious sentiments, faith, zeal, and charity, are indisputably progressing; edifices dedicated to its worship multiply rapidly; congregations are more numerous and anxious; works of piety at home and abroad, extend and prosper. When I came to London in 1840, when I saw the Church of England closely, and in exercise, I was struck by the productive religious activity which it displayed; and since that time, the facts I have heard or witnessed, convince me, that in the bosom of that Church, and in spite of opposing movements, the action of Christian revival has not ceased to develop itself.

I observed, amongst the dissenting sects, a movement, not similar, but corresponding, and equally salutary in its effects. In these small, persecuted communions, religious power had always been strong; but violent and harsh sentiments prevailed with them; hatred seemed to be revenge for injustice, and men consoled themselves for their calamities by detesting the authors of them. When a liberal policy terminated, in England, the oppressive and offensive restrictions which weighed on the dissenters, when they saw the Anglican Church become at once more zealous in religious life, and more kindly disposed towards themselves, they in turn became softened and appeased. Legal isolation ceased, and voluntary reconciliation commenced. At first, moral more than intellectual progress; the religious ideas of several of the English dissenting sects remain still, upon many points, narrow and exclusive; but bitter sentiments and

malevolent prejudices are singularly effaced. The hearts are more Christian than the understandings.

I was present one day at a remarkable example of this progress. I had met several times in Paris, in 1838 and 1839, a woman already celebrated by her pious labours in the prisons, Mrs. Elizabeth Fry, of the sect of Quakers, if the word *sect* can with propriety be employed in reference to a person whose heart was so open to every human sympathy. The name which the Quakers give themselves, the *Society of Friends*, was more suitable to her. Wherever she had travelled, in France and Germany as in England, Mrs. Fry had left a strong impression on all who had seen her, on the great as on the disinherited of the earth, on the ornaments and the outcasts of society, by her ardour, and by her Christian and philanthropic power. I saw her again in London in 1840, and she invited me to dine at her house on the 5th of July, with her numerous family and intimate friends. I found there, with the Quakers—Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Independents, and probably other dissenters, all maintaining their individual creeds and characteristics, and still united in a common sentiment of liberal and kindly piety. Amongst Mrs. Fry's children several had ceased to be Quakers and had rejoined the Church of England; they were not the less esteemed or at ease in their own family. It was evident that respect for religious freedom and sincere faith had sufficiently penetrated all their hearts to maintain good will and peace in the bosom of differences in opinion.

I find, in Mrs. Fry's *Memoirs* of her own life, published

by two of her daughters, an allusion to this dinner, which I quote textually, as strongly marking the original character of the person and the party.

“Upton Lane, the seventh day of the seventh month. “Yesterday we had the French ambasssdor at dinner, and a numerous company. These are serious occasions for me. I ask myself whether it is right to give a dinner that costs so much, whether any good can result from it, and if, on the approach of death, we should thus employ our time. On the other hand, after the extreme kindness evinced towards us in France, even by the government, we truly owe the French some token of attention. Moreover it is just and christianlike to show hospitality to strangers, and I do not think it can be wrong to receive them, in a certain degree, as they are accustomed to live. My dread is that I did not sufficiently employ this time to advance the important subjects with which we ought always to be occupied. I tried to do so a little, but not, I fear, sufficiently.”

Mrs. Fry might have satisfied herself. She did not neglect this opportunity for religious and moral conversation. It is true also that she took some pleasure in causing to be brought into the drawing-room a large portfolio, and in showing me the portraits and letters of important persons, elevated in rank or intellect, with whom she had been in communication. A strong-minded and excellent woman, born to convert, console, and command, for she had much Christian charity, feminine sympathy, natural authority, and a slight infusion of vanity.

After my reminiscences of English society, such as I

saw it in 1840, it was my intention to speak also of the Court of England at that epoch. I shall abstain from doing so at present. I saw the commencement of that rare regal happiness which the death of Prince Albert has recently destroyed before its time, if it is permitted to us to assign any particular time as more suitable to death than another. How could I at this moment revert to the assemblies and festivals of that young and happy royalty, equally charmed with its domestic life and its throne, and respecting which England delighted to indulge in those brilliant hopes of domestic virtue and political wisdom which have been so worthily realized? The most respectful expressions would fail to satisfy myself, and I could not venture to indulge that liberty of observation, which the most sincere respect does not interdict. Hereafter, when time has passed on, if I am permitted to bring these *Memoirs* to their end, I shall find an opportunity of returning to Buckingham Palace and Windsor, and of recalling the impressions I received and the memories I have preserved.

At home and abroad, between business and society, my time was much occupied. I cannot say that it was entirely filled. I have seldom felt more strongly the voids that may exist in days which seem quite appropriated. My political position suited me; I had great interests to negotiate. What I can feel of curiosity and personal gratification was satisfied. I am not insensible to these minor enjoyments; even when I find them trifling, when I appear to be more interested by them than I really am. I can defend myself from their weariness; I do not become impatient; impatience dis-

pleases and humiliates me ; I require to believe that I wish what I do, and I willingly accept the necessity, to escape from the appearance of constraint. But neither the labours of political nor the pleasures of worldly life have ever satisfied me. These are but superficial enjoyments, no matter how potent or agreeable they may be.

Far below the surface, within the depths of the soul, there are long and close intimacies, affectionate regards, words of confidence, total unreserve, the tranquillity and warmth of the domestic hearth ; these are what open and truly fill the heart. Solomon said too much when he exclaimed, “vanity of vanities, all is vanity !” Political activity, social importance, power, the world, the success of ambition and self-love, all these are something, and, even at this hour, I do not disdain them. But I have never felt satisfied with and resting on them, as we feel satisfied with and resting on internal happiness. Why then dedicate so large a portion of life, and with so much labour to that which brings so little in return ? It is that we belong to our vocation much more than to ourselves ; we obey our nature rather than our will. I have given myself up to public affairs, as water rolls, as flame ascends. When I saw the occasion, when the event called upon me, I neither deliberated nor selected ; I betook myself to my post. We are instruments in the hands of a superior power which applies us, according to or against our inclination, to the use for which it has made us.

When I was wearied with diplomatic conversations, dispatches, visits, and the solitude of my house, I walked

alone in the parks of London, or at a greater distance, in the environs of the city. Regent's Park particularly pleased me. It is separated from the crowded districts ; the space is immense, the verdure fresh, the waters clear, the clumps of trees still young. I found there two qualities combined which rarely associate, extent and grace. I seldom encountered or recognized any one. In complete solitude and in presence of nature, we forget isolation.

On Sundays, Regent's Park was more animated ; there were many promenaders, generally all silent ; open air preachers, surrounded by thirty or forty listeners, expounding a text of the Bible, or a precept from the Gospel, and mingling with their commentaries familiar recitals or strange metaphysical dissertations, but always with a practical object, and to regulate thought and life. I paused one day before two of these groups. In one, the preacher held a book in his hand, *Travels in Africa*, from which he read an account of a missionary who had cured himself from a long illness by living soberly and drinking water : " You see plainly from that," concluded he, " that drinking water cannot be injurious to health." The other orator, a rigid Calvinist, maintained, against an opponent who argued with him, that man is not a free agent, and has no free will ; " Look at this tree," said he, " you would like to think that it is a house ; you cannot think so ; you have therefore no free judgment." The common sense of his auditors was confounded, but they still continued to listen attentively. These do not include, by a great number, all the people of London, and all their re-

creations ; but amongst them there are many families who have no other.

Beyond the metropolis, in the vallies and on the hills which surround it, at Richmond, Hampstead, and Norwood, nature is charming, as much so as she can be rendered by her own attractions, well trained and cultivated by the hand of man. She wants grandeur of outline and brilliancy of light ; she pleases and attracts without exciting emotion or astonishment. Country seats, parks, villas, and cottages are so thickly sprinkled throughout this country that nature seems to be placed there at the service of man and for his sole enjoyment. I visited the most important of these residences. Two in particular made an impression on me ; Sion House, which belongs to the Duke of Northumberland, and Chiswick, the property of the Duke of Devonshire. Sion House recalls the abodes of royalty. Its conservatories have long been considered the richest in England. The dining hall is supported by twelve columns of verd antique, the finest, they say, in existence, and found about a century ago, in the Tiber. The grandfather of the present Duke of Northumberland bought and transported them to England. Superb cows were pasturing in a lovely meadow under the windows of the hall adorned by these columns, and into the room the Duke himself was rolled in his arm-chair, gouty and helpless. Chiswick bears no resemblance to Sion House. It is a delightful Italian villa, without the sun, without the Brenta, without all that warm and glowing nature which animates and embellishes, in Italy, the most minute architecture. At the foot of the staircase, in a corner,

is a statue by Palladio, seated, which has the air of shivering. Chiswick is too much ornamented, too pretty. The pretty only suits the South. The women of Spain or of Provence deck themselves in ribands of all colours, in trinkets of gold and silver of every kind. This suits their light and airy carriage, the vivacity of their movements, and their habits of mind and body. Lady Clanricarde was at Chiswick entirely enveloped in white muslin, with a single jewel in the centre of her forehead. She was beautiful and in harmony with her country. Houses are like persons; either in point of art or for the usages of life they should accord with their climate. The park of Chiswick presents a type of England. Nowhere else have I seen such thick, even and delicate green-sward. It resembles elastic velvet.

In my excursions round London, I made two visits, not to country seats, but to public establishments, which warmly interested me. I examined two great schools, dedicated, the one to the most humble and destitute of the social classes, the other to the most elevated and influential. There was then, and is still, no doubt, at Norwood, a popular school, containing nearly a thousand poor children, born in the work shops, or picked up in the streets of London. The first object which struck my view on entering the vast court of the house, was a large ship, with its masts, sails, and rigging. The court represented the deck of the vessel, from whence rose the masts and equipment. From eighty to a hundred small boys, between seven and twelve years of age were in the court, commanded by an old sailor.

At a signal from him, I saw all these youngsters spring upon the vessel, and clamber up the masts, yards, and ropes. In two minutes, a diminutive urchin of nine years old, was seated at the head of the main-mast, one hundred and twenty feet above the ground, and from that pinnacle, proudly moved with his foot the principal flag. All the rest were scattered around, some stationary, others in motion. It was an organized struggle of boldness, skill, self-possession, and natural activity. The greater part of these boys were destined for sailors. They were also trained to other avocations. In the various compartments of the school, juvenile carpenters, tailors, shoemakers, and grooms, as also laundresses, were at work, some occupied in their manual apprenticeship, others collected in the reading or singing rooms. Many amongst them had a mean and sickly aspect, a sad indication of their origin; but they were evidently living under a system of healthy exercise, of humane discipline, and in training for an honest future. A little hump-backed boy, twelve years of age, directed the singing class with intelligence and authority.

Six weeks after my visit to the school at Norwood, on the 4th of June, I found myself at Eton College. I traversed with the worthy and learned principal, which that great seminary has lately lost, Dr. Hawtrey, the halls of study, refectory, and library, in which are educated the eight or nine hundred future members of parliament, judges, generals, admirals, and bishops of England. Everything in that building has a substantial and elevated air, an air of strength, regularity, and liberty. Erect, in the centre of the court, stands the

statue of Henry VI, that imbecile monarch, scarcely a king in his own time, but who, nevertheless, still presides after the lapse of four centuries, in the establishment he founded for the education of his country. Surrounding the house are the most splendid meadows, and in them the finest trees that can be looked upon. In front, Windsor, that royal castle, which has preserved all the appearances of a strong fortress, and perpetuates in the bosom of modern pacific civilization, the image of the old royalty. There is nothing but the Thames between Windsor and Eton, between the kings and the scholars, and the Thames on that day was covered with long, light, and handsome boats, filled with young lads in blue and white jackets, with small sailor's hats, pulling with all their might to win the prize of the rowing match. Both sides of the river were covered with spectators on foot, on horseback, and in carriages, participating with animated though silent interest, in the rivalry of the boats. And in the midst of this agitation, this crowd, three magnificent swans, astonished and scared, took shelter in the huge rushes of the banks, to escape from the usurpers of their empire. It was a delightful spectacle which finished by an immense dinner of boys under a huge tent, surrounded, as royal banquets formerly were, by the crowd of lookers on. I found nothing to blame, but the somewhat excessive supply of champagne, which elevated these youths to a pitch of gaiety, rather too exuberant even for a fête in the open air.

If I had visited England sixty or eighty years ago, this little incident would probably not have struck me.

At that epoch, there were still, even in the elevated classes of English society, many vestiges of coarse and disorderly manners. Precisely because England has been for ages, a land of liberty, the most opposite results of liberty have there developed themselves with all their contrasts. Puritanical severity has maintained itself by the side of the corruption of the courts of Charles the Second, and the first Georges. Habits almost barbarous continued in the midst of the progress of civilization; the effect of power and wealth failed to banish from the high regions the excesses of vulgar intemperance; even elevation of ideas and talents did not engender delicacy of tastes, and the same Sheridan has been picked up drunk in the streets, who the night before had captivated Parliament by his eloquence. In our days, these repulsive clashings in the state of manners in England have disappeared, and English society has become as polished as free; a condition in which coarse habits are compelled to reform or hide themselves, and wherein civilization shows itself from day to day more general and harmonious. Two points of progress, which rarely march together, have been accomplished and developed themselves within the last half century in England. Moral laws are strengthened, while manners have become softened, less mingled with violent excesses, and I may truly add more elegant. And it is not only in the high or middle circles, it is also in the popular classes that this double progress manifests itself. Domestic, laborious and regular life extends its empire over the latter; they understand, seek after, and enjoy, more honest and more delicate recreations than brutal

quarrelling and drunkenness. The improvement is, undoubtedly, very incomplete; gross passions and disorderly habits, ever ferment in the bosom of obscure and idle misery, and there are always in London, Manchester, or Glasgow, ample materials for the most revolting descriptions. But taken altogether, civilization and liberty have, in England, in the course of the nineteenth century, tended to good rather than to evil. Religious faith, christian charity, the intelligent and indefatigable activity of the educated orders, the good sense scattered amongst all classes have struggled, and are still struggling effectively against the vices of society and the evil tendencies of human nature. When we have lived for some time in England, we feel ourselves in a cold but wholesome air, in which moral and social health is stronger than moral and social disease, although the latter is still abundant.

When I say that in England the air is cold, in society as in the climate, I do not mean to say that the English people are cold; observation and my own experience have taught me the contrary. We not only meet amongst them lofty sentiments and ardent passions; they are also very capable of profound affections, which once entering into their hearts, become often as tender as they are deeply seated. What they want is instinctive, prompt, universal sympathy; the disposition which, without special notice or tie, knows how to comprehend the ideas and sentiments of others, to humour, or even to mingle with them, and thus to render the relations of life easy and agreeable. It is not that the English estimate social intercourse lightly, and are not extremely curious as to

what others think or do ; but their curiosity always requires to accommodate itself to their dignity and timidity. Through awkwardness or shyness, as much as through pride, they seldom exhibit what they really feel. Hence results, in their external relations and manners, a deficiency of grace and warmth, which chills and occasionally repulses. Even amongst themselves they are little frank and cordial ; they have almost always an air of disdainful and caustic reserve which breathes and inspires a secret and trivial discontent. In the main, they feel a great need of, and a strong desire for intellectual movement and recreation ; they are fond of conversation, and when offered to them under varied and animated features, they enjoy it much ; but of themselves, and with a few brilliant exceptions, they seldom display enthusiasm or take the initiative. They know not how to do what pleases them, or to enjoy at ease their own intelligences. The fire is there, but covered up ; the spark to kindle it must come from without.

During the solitary leisure which the affairs of the embassy and the necessary obligations of society often afforded me, I studied with deep interest this great society so strongly constituted and at the same time so free, in which so many contrasts destroy the harmony of the whole, and in which human nature so liberally develops itself, although restrained by curbs and counterpoises which prevent its pretensions and extravagances from proceeding to the last excesses. I learned much in this moral and social study which opened to me, at every step, new horizons, without making me forget my domestic solitude. The English are right in

attaching the highest value to their internal life, to their *home*, and above all to the closeness of the conjugal tie. They would not find, in their country, in public life, that movement, variety and facility, that harmony of all the relations which elsewhere, and for many people, almost supply the place of happiness. A foreigner, a man of intelligence, who had lived much in England, remarked to me; "If one were in good health, happy at home, and rich, it would be well to be an Englishman." The terms are too exacting, and there are in England, at least as much as elsewhere, many happy lives within more moderate conditions. But it is certain that to enjoy English society we must cling to domestic and serious gratifications rather than give ourselves up to the lighter employments of the world and the current of events.

CHAPTER V.

THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY, 1840.

ARRIVAL OF CHEKIB EFFENDI IN LONDON.—NOTE ADDRESSED BY HIM ON THE 31ST. OF MAY TO THE FIVE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE ENGLISH CABINET AND PUBLIC.—INSTRUCTIONS OF M. THIERS.—UNEASINESS OF THE AUSTRIAN, RUSSIAN, AND PRUSSIAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.—THEIR DESIRE FOR A PROMPT SETTLEMENT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.—DISPOSITION OF LORD PALMERSTON TO WAIT AND PROTRACT.—QUESTION ADDRESSED BY ME TO M. THIERS ON THE ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE TO MEHEMET ALI, EGYPT HEREDITARILY AND SYRIA FOR LIFE.—HIS ANSWER.—MY PRESENTIMENT OF THE TREATY OF FOUR.—FALL OF KHOSREW PACHA AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—JOY OF MEHEMET ALI AT THAT NEWS—HIS MEASURE AT CONSTANTINOPLE, AND HIS CONFIDENCE IN A DIRECT ARRANGEMENT WITH THE SULTAN.—ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH CABINET IN THIS RESPECT.—EFFECT OF THE INTELLIGENCE IN LONDON.—LORD PALMERSTON PRESSES THE SOLUTION OF THE AFFAIR.—SUCCESSIVE COUNCILS OF THE ENGLISH CABINET.—I REPORT THIS POSITION AND ITS DANGERS TO M. THIERS.—I ALSO INFORM THE DUKE OF BROGLIE AND GENERAL BAUDRAND.—LORD PALMERSTON CALLS ME TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMUNICATES TO ME THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF THE 15TH JULY BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS.—MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO FRANCE.—MY OBSERVATIONS.—THE FRENCH CABINET IS JUSTLY OFFENDED AT NOT HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY INFORMED OF THIS DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION, AND ASKED TO EXPRESS ITS OWN.—CAUSES FOR THIS CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH CABINET.—ANSWER OF THE FRENCH CABINET TO THE ENGLISH MEMORANDUM.—MY INTERVIEW WITH LORD PALMERSTON WHEN COMMUNICATING IT TO HIM.—TRUE MOTIVES OF THE HURRIED AND CONCEALED CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY.—ESSENTIAL CHARACTERS OF THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH POLICY AT THIS CRISIS.—A REPORT IS SPREAD IN PARIS THAT I HAD NOT FORESEEN IT, OR APPRISED THE

CABINET.—MY REFUTATIONS OF THAT REPORT.—STATE OF MINDS IN FRANCE.—MY ATTITUDE IN LONDON.—THE KING CALLS ME, WITH M. THIERS, TO THE CHATEAU D'EU.—I LEAVE LONDON ON THE SIXTH OF AUGUST.

I TAKE up the Eastern Question at the point where I left it, at the arrival in England of the new Turkish ambassador, Chekib Effendi, who was expected there before the negotiations could be actively resumed. M. Thiers announced to me on the 11th of May that he had reached Paris; "Chekib Effendi is here," he said; "he seems able and intelligent; one can talk with him. He brings the absurd demands of the Porte, but, in fact, he considers them absurd. I have given him the best advice I could, but that goes for little; he will repeat to you the follies of the seraglio without approving of them. Besides, the question in London will never rest with the Turkish plenipotentiary."

It was not, in fact, with the Porte that the decision rested, and Chekib Effendi knew this well. He called on me on his arrival. I held the same language to him that I did to all the world; "The Ottoman Empire is going; if a war is excited there, no matter of what kind, it will go more rapidly. The immobility of the East and the general accord of the West are the only conditions on which the Porte can last. If either fails, if we divide here or they fight in Asia, it is the beginning of the end." With the reserve which his position commanded, Chekib Effendi agreed with me; but the more he did so, the more he seemed anxious that the five powers should unite; and admitting this necessity we resumed our embarrassment. The French

cabinet had not only rejected the overtures of the ministers of Austria and Prussia that Mehemet Ali in obtaining hereditary possession of Egypt should retain Syria for life ; it had also repulsed the concession which Lord Palmerston had offered us for the Pacha, of the greater portion of the pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre and of that fortress itself. "We find the partition of Syria unacceptable by the Pacha," wrote M. Thiers to me on the same day on which he announced the speedy arrival in London of Chekib Effendi ; "we are certain, from his latest known dispositions, that he will not agree to it. Fancy that at present he renews his claim upon Adana, seems no longer disposed to yield it, threatens to pass the Taurus, and to set everything in a blaze. Judge then how he will listen to the project of cutting Syria in two." And a few weeks later, on the 10th of June : "I have replied before hand to the proposition of cutting Syria in two. It is inadmissible, not from the point of view of our individual interest in the question, but from the most important of all—*possibility*. The Pacha of Egypt will never concede what is there required of him. We might certainly wrest from him Candia and the Holy Cities, and perhaps Adana, but never any portion of Syria. We shall never therefore lend ourselves, as co-operators, to a senseless project, without chance of success, and which can only be executed by force. Now, we neither desire force, nor believe in its effect."

I thus found myself, on resuming the negotiation, incapable of making a step ; I had nothing to offer and

could accept nothing; I was as immovable as Chekib Effendi was powerless.

On the 31st of May I received a note which Chekib Effendi addressed to the plenipotentiaries of the five powers, and in which, while reminding them that on the 27th of July 1839, they had promised the Porte their accord and support, he complained of the undecided state in which the question still rested, exposed the daily increasing evil resulting therefrom to the Ottoman Empire, and demanded without delay a definitive solution and a prompt action.* I immediately transmitted this note to M. Thiers; "If your Excellency," said I, "judges it of a nature to require new instructions, I beg you to forward them at once. I have not yet spoken with any one; but evidently the matter is about to receive an impulse, which, without perhaps leading to a definitive result, will for some days, at least, be strong and pressing. All the world is now convinced that there is, for the Ottoman Empire, danger in delay; all the world holds the same language on this subject. For my own part, in applying myself constantly to prove that a violent solution would add to the danger, I express my astonishment that the necessity of a moderate and pacific arrangement is not strongly felt.

"There is much agitation in the cabinet. I do not hesitate to say that, with the exception of Lord John Russell, whose ideas I am not thoroughly acquainted with, the greater portion of its members, as well those who seldom busy themselves in questions of foreign policy as the others who make them their study, disap-

* See Historic Documents, No. VII.

prove in reality of the policy of Lord Palmerston, are disquieted by and would prefer emerging from rather than engaging in it more deeply. I do not speak only of Lord Holland and Lord Clarendon, whose opinions have long been formed; I believe that the conviction of a serious danger, in any line of conduct that might rekindle civil war in the East, and which would not be conjointly adopted by the five powers, is strongly established in the minds of Lord Melbourne and Lord Lansdowne, and at this moment governs their words and wishes: 'All that we do together will be good,' Lord Melbourne said to me last Sunday; 'anything that we might do separately would be bad and dangerous.'

"I know that within the last few days there has been an animated debate in the cabinet, in the course of which many objections were raised to Lord Palmerston's ideas, and serious efforts were made to adopt other views.

"Around the cabinet, in the ministerial party there is a similar movement. The dissenters do not yet separate; they avoid even speaking openly, for they fear to shake the cabinet already tottering, and to which they are sincerely attached. But amongst themselves and in their more intimate conversations, the greater portion do not hesitate to say that they will not follow Lord Palmerston, and that, if he persists in risking everything to take Syria from the Pacha, he will encounter more opposition than he expects.

"They reckon, for the success of their opposition, on the necessity in which Lord Palmerston would be placed

of asking supplies for coercive measures. They think the debate would be very warm, that many friends of the cabinet would signify their disapprobation, and that probably the sums required would not be voted.

“I have reason to believe, without however being fully assured of it, that Lord Grey’s small party in the House of Commons would, in that case, renew the disagreement which had sprung up on the introduction of Lord Stanley’s bill for Ireland.

“The Tory opposition stands on considerable reserve. Some of its members were, I believe, inclined to bestow little censure on Lord Palmerston’s policy and his disposition to conciliate the court of Russia. If I am not mistaken, they now pause in that bias ; and the party, as well as its principal leaders, particularly in the House of Commons, would eagerly seize this occasion, or any other, to attack the ministry with some chance of success.

“As to the public in general, I believe its disposition becomes more and more opposed to any measure which might compromise the peace of Europe, and more favourable to union with France and moderation towards the Pacha.

“Such appears to me, at this moment, the state of opinion here. But on the other hand, Lord Palmerston’s designs seem to be always the same. He thinks, that in giving up the fortress of St. Jean d’Acre to the Pacha, he has yielded to us an important and difficult concession. His self-love is materially compromised. Finally, such is the construction of his mind, that, when once certain ideas are established there they

ill and occupy it so strongly that opposite notions which are brought before him may obtain passing attention but no permanent entry. And, at the same time, I am very far from feeling assured that, amongst his colleagues, those who differ from him, and are disturbed by that difference, are resolved to oppose him strongly, either to change or arrest his policy at the moment of execution."

M. Thiers replied on the 11th of June: "The information contained in your last dispatches on the present aspect of the Eastern question in London, has engaged the entire attention of the King's government. The communication of the new Ottoman ambassador, a manifestation so expressive of the dangers to which the prolongation of the *statu quo* would expose the Porte, does not, however, alter the position; and although it calls, on our part, for an answer somewhat more developed than that which you gave to the preceding ambassador, it is evident that you cannot place yourself upon another ground. We certainly do not intend to ignore the step of the 27th of July 1839, of which the Porte ceases not to avail itself; but we are called upon to remark that the bearing of it is entirely misconstrued because they lose sight of the circumstances under which it was made. The powers, before the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, before the battle of Nezib and the defection of the Turkish fleet, had no other object than to prevent a collision between the Porte and the Pacha, and to reconcile them by an interposition exclusively pacific. How then can we believe that at the moment when the Porte, by a concurrence of circum-

stances owing in a great measure to its own imprudent provocations, found itself so heavily compromised, the same powers should suddenly change their policy, and engage themselves to obtain for the Porte, even by force, what it had in view in attacking Mehemet Ali in despite of their representations? Evidently, such could not have been their intention. What they proposed was, to afford the Porte a moral aid which might raise its courage and save it from the complete yoke of its powerful vassal. That end has been attained. This is the real state of the question. For the rest, I leave entirely to you the measure and terms of the answer you will have to give to the Ottoman Ambassador. I see, in the consent now yielded by the cabinet of London to an arrangement which would leave the Viceroy in possession of the town of St. Jean d'Acre, a real progress towards ideas of conciliation. On this ground alone I approve of it, for it does not depend on me to see in this single concession the practical basis of an arrangement."

To these instructions M. Thiers added the following information: "I believe they are opening their eyes at Constantinople and returning to more rational ideas. I send, to convince you of this, the last dispatches from Pera and Alexandria. You will see that in Egypt they feel their increasing power daily, and are less disposed than ever to give up Adana. All that Europe gains by these delays is to render the Porte weaker and the Pacha more exacting."

Analogous intelligence reached London, and the diplomatic body began to feel uneasy. They dreaded some

new and unexpected incident, a brisk attack by Mehemet Ali beyond the Taurus, a sudden act of weakness at Constantinople. The plenipotentiaries of the three great Northern powers participated in these alarms. On the 11th of June, I happened to be in the waiting-room at the Foreign Office. Baron de Brünnow entered; "I recognized your carriage at the door," he said, "and I came up. I am delighted to meet and chat a little with you." He at once alluded to the note of Chekib Effendi, the deplorable state of the Ottoman Empire, the internal disorganization which resulted from the very reforms attempted for its improvement, the danger of prolonged suspense, the necessity, the urgent necessity of effecting an arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha which should put an end to this ever augmenting evil, and prevent an explosion, a confusion by which we should all be seriously embarrassed.

"I have received on this subject from St. Petersburg," said he, "the most positive and pressing instructions. Never has the moderation, I ought rather to say the magnanimity of the Emperor displayed itself more signally. He is acquainted with the progress of the evil, he sees the Ottoman Empire menaced with ruin; and far from wishing to take advantage of it, he desires only the re-establishment of peace, of a peace which shall restore that Empire. He orders me to urge this strongly on the British cabinet. Let France and England then understand each other; all depends on their accord; there is nothing determined, nothing exclusive to prevent this concert. Do you, on your side, yield to such an arrangement as Lord Palmerston can adopt;

make some concessions. I protest to you that if Lord Palmerston were present, I should hold the same language. The Emperor has no other wish than to see this dangerous question settled in common accord between the five powers, and peace restored in the East."

I listened to Baron de Brünnow, interposing only to remind him that we had invariably desired peace in the East, and an amicable arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha—the only means of re-establishing a solid peace. He repeated to me several times in the name of the Emperor Nicholas, that it was necessary France should agree with England, and that all should be regulated in concert.

On the following day, the 12th of June, Baron de Neumann called upon me, as much troubled as M. de Brünnow by the news which had reached him from Vienna on the subject of Constantinople, and quite as urgent for a prompt and definitive arrangement. We deplored the obstinacy of Lord Palmerston. He attributed it to Lord Ponsonby, "who never ceases," he said, "to insist on the adoption of coercive measures, and who has sent his secretary home to threaten his resignation unless his advice is followed. I shall speak of this to Lord Palmerston," added M. de Neumann, "and if requisite to Lord Melbourne; I shall insist strongly on the necessity of a final settlement. If Mehemet Ali must have Syria, let him have it. Not hereditarily; no, that cannot be; it will be too much opposed to the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, Mehemet Ali must give up the district of Adana; the Porte requires it for its safety. But let

us finish this business. I suspect that Lord Palmerston wants to wait, to delay ; that he expects, at some later period, at another moment, to conclude the affair in a manner more conformable to his views. Meanwhile the mischief increases, the danger presses ; it is now clear that prolonged doubt injures the Sultan more than the Pacha, and all threatens a crisis which nobody desires. I hope the English cabinet will understand this, and I shall spare no pains to bring it to our opinion."

I accepted the reciprocation of sentiments which M. de Neumann proffered. I told him that the intelligence I had received from Paris on the internal state of the Ottoman Empire and the danger of delay coincided with his. For the rest, I confined myself, as to the bases of the arrangement, to the ground prescribed to me, adding only that the Pacha had become more exacting, and in particular, less disposed to cede the district of Adana.

On the same day I had an interview with Lord Palmerston, and after speaking with him of various matters specially notified to me, I resumed the Eastern question. I wished to ascertain whether he would express the same anxiety to terminate it which M. de Brünnow and M. de Neumann had done, or if, as the latter had said, he was for the moment inclined to procrastinate.

I saw without difficulty that he was in a dilatory frame of mind, as if expecting some incident which he did not name. He raised doubts on my details relative to the increasing distress and disorganization of the

Ottoman Empire. "They are much exaggerated," he said, "and I hear contrary accounts."

"Pardon me, my lord ; if these statements differing from ours, come from Lord Ponsonby, we cannot attach much weight to them. Lord Ponsonby has so often and so seriously deceived himself on the state of Turkey, that we have a right to suspect his observations as much as his judgment." "It is not from Lord Ponsonby alone ; several of our consuls transmit to me the same facts ; precise facts which prove that the *hatti-scheriff* of Redschid Pacha is neither so impotent nor so powerless as people please to say. Three pachas, amongst others, who oppressed the people and robbed the Sultan, have been recently dismissed, one on the side of Erzeroum, unless I am mistaken. In those provinces, at least, the people are contented, and the money returns to the public treasury."

I persisted in my doubts ; I explained our reasons for thinking that hesitation and delay had no other effect than that of rendering the Porte weaker and the Pacha more exacting ; I urged the dangers of a sudden crisis. Lord Palmerston listened and allowed the conversation to languish. "We have not yet received any answer," he said, "to the arrangement proposed by M. de Neumann, and to which I consented." He spoke of giving up to Mehemet Ali a large portion of the pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre, including the fortress. "There has been no formal proposition," I replied. "No, but it is an idea, a basis of arrangement on which I wish to know the positive opinion of the French government. I ask it from you."

This request of Lord Palmerston was evidently, on his part, a mere pretext for delay while appearing to act. I had not left him in ignorance that the French government, convinced that Mehemet Ali would not accept the partition of Syria, did not look upon that proposition "as the practical basis of an arrangement." I instantly informed M. Thiers of Lord Palmerston's adherence to the cession of St. Jean d'Acre. "Has your Excellency," said I, "transmitted to Alexandria the idea of M. de Neumann. Has the Pacha replied? Can I, in conversation, treat this idea as rejected by a formal resolution of the Pacha, and not merely by our conjectures as to his probable answer? Your Excellency knows that we have always spoken of ourselves as nearly indifferent, on our own account, to any particular territorial arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha, and ready to acknowledge as good any concessions that could be obtained from the latter. I think we ought to hold scrupulously to this ground. Neither the refusal, nor the advice to refuse, should, as it appears to me, be imputable to us."

I reverted at the same time to another idea, more plausible in itself, and which seemed to me to present more chances of success for a settlement. On the 24th of June I wrote to M. Thiers :

"I said to you on the 15th of June ; ' M. de Neumann and M. de Bulow are again ready to leave Egypt to the Pacha hereditarily, and Syria for life, provided that he restores Adana and Candia. They have made a step further ; they declare themselves disposed to announce this to Lord Palmerston and to demand his

formal accession; they believe that M. de Brünnow would join with them in this sense.' You answered me on the 19th, 'Certainly, if it were agreed to yield Syria, (*a comma*) and Egypt hereditarily to the Pacha, the five powers would then act reasonably and we should make great efforts to succeed. But the Pacha's head is inflated, and we are sure of nothing with him. Under any circumstances, such a resolution would be a great conquest for us and we should change our attitude immediately.' I think you remembered, in answering me, what I had said to you; that your reply referred to an arrangement which would give Egypt to the Pacha *hereditarily* and Syria for *life*, and that your comma after *Syria*, while there is none between *Egypt* and the word *hereditarily*, clearly bears this interpretation. Nevertheless, I require to know positively and I beg you to tell me. We touch perhaps on the crisis of this affair. This *step farther* which I named to you, and which consists, on the part of Austria and Russia, in declaring to Lord Palmerston that he must content himself to leave Syria to the Pacha for life and yield this important concession to France,—this step, I say, is, if I mistake not, being taken at this moment. The colleagues of Lord Palmerston on the one hand, the Ministers of Austria and Prussia on the other, are pressing him I believe, while I write, to make his decision. If they succeed, all will feel that they have gained a great victory and have arrived at reasonable propositions for an arrangement. It is therefore of the utmost importance that I should know your intentions on this subject; for on my language, no matter how reserved it may be,

may depend, either the prompt adoption of a settlement on these bases, or a veering about, through which Lord Palmerston, profiting by the disappointed hopes and discontent of his colleagues and the other plenipotentiaries, might suddenly re-engage them in his system, and induce them to adopt, as *four*, his project for withdrawing Syria from the Pacha, and the employment, if necessary, of coercive means. *Much, very much* will be tried in the cabinet and amongst the plenipotentiaries to act as *five*, in concert with us, and without coercion. I do not undertake to promise that all will be done, and that a conclusion as *four* is absolutely impossible. We may be, from one moment to another, placed in this alternative; either to give Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life to the Pacha, in return for the cession of the Holy Cities, of Candia and Adana, and by an arrangement of five; or to take Syria from the Pacha by an arrangement of four, and by means of coercion, if necessary. I do not say for certain that, the first arrangement failing, the second will be carried out; but I mention it as possible. Our chief strength at present lies in the common efforts of nearly all the members of the cabinet, and of the ministers of Austria and Prussia to induce Lord Palmerston to give up Syria. If after having succeeded in this labour they do not reap the fruit of a definitive and unanimous settlement, I cannot answer, I repeat, for what they may do. Let me have, I beg of you, under this hypothesis, your precise views and instructions."

M. Thiers replied to me on the 30th of June: "My comma meant nothing. When I spoke to you of a great

conquest which would change our attitude, I alluded to Egypt hereditarily and Syria hereditarily. Nevertheless, I have consulted the cabinet; they deliberate, they incline a little towards a concession. Meanwhile, we shall see. Delay explaining yourself. We must wait for a short time. Nothing is decided."

While under the empire of the sentiments which prevailed in the Chambers and with the public, the French government confined itself within this purely critical and expectant policy, an event occurred at Constantinople which impressed on the Egyptian question a new and decisive impulse. The grand vizier Khosrew Pacha, a clever Turk of the old school, energetic and corrupt, long an intimate adviser of the Sultan Mahmoud and the inveterate enemy of Mehemet Ali, was suddenly dismissed. In reporting his fall on the 17th of May to the French cabinet, the ambassador of France at Constantinople, the Count de Pontois added; "This important event has not, however, the significance and bearing which may be attributed to it in Europe; it indicates no change in the policy of the Divan nor any intention of being reconciled to Mehemet Ali. It is to be attributed, they say, to the discovery of secret understandings between Khosrew and Russia, and even more, as I believe, to the ambition of Redschild Pacha, and his desire to rid himself successively of all who might balance his influence or excite his suspicions. Be that as it may, Redschild Pacha is to-day master of the ground. May he comprehend that the first use he ought to make of his power should be to restore peace to his country, by taking advantage of the favourable

opportunity offered to him by the fall of Khosrew, who was looked upon by public opinion as the most important obstacle to an accommodation with Mehemet Ali.

At the same time that M. de Pontois announced in Paris the dismissal of Khosrew Pacha, he hastened to transmit the same news to M. Cochelet, Consul-General for France, at Alexandria. "Immediately on the receipt of this dispatch," M. Cochelet wrote on the 26th of May to M. Thiers; "I repaired, although much indisposed, to the country house inhabited by Mehemet Ali since the plague has raged so intensely and some of his servants have died of it. Before acquainting him with the contents of the letter of M. de Pontois, I asked what news he had received from Constantinople. He mentioned the dismissal of the seraskier Halil Pacha, but I saw clearly that he knew nothing of the disgrace of the grand vizier. I told him I had important intelligence to communicate, but that before announcing it I required him to pledge his word that he would incline to my advice and be moderate in his pretensions. He made the promise, as far as it might coincide with his interests. I then informed him that Khosrew Pacha was on the point of being dismissed. Mehemet Ali sprang up on his divan; his face assumed an expression of extraordinary joy, and tears even came into his eyes. I told him I was happy to be the first to bring him this good news, and on that ground considered myself entitled to advise him. I then read to him the letter of M. de Pontois, and urged him vehemently to show himself respectful and devoted to the Sultan, moderate and conciliating towards the Porte. I was

going to tell him to commence by sending back the Turkish fleet, when Mehemet Ali jumped down from his divan, and after walking up and down at a rapid pace, and reflecting for some minutes, came up to me, clapped me on the breast with his open palm, squeezed both my hands with emotion, and said, 'As soon as I receive official notice of the dismissal of the grand vizier, I shall send my first secretary, Sami Bey, to Constantinople to offer to the Sultan the homage of my respect and devotion; I shall request his Highness's permission to send back the Ottoman fleet under the command of Moustouch Pacha, the Egyptian Admiral. I shall beg him to permit my son Saïd Bey to accompany the fleet, to prostrate himself before him. I shall write to Ahmed Fethi Pacha,* and as soon as a good understanding and friendly relations are restored, I shall arrange matters with the Porte.' 'Such conduct,' I said, 'is worthy of you; this will restore you to the good graces of the Sultan, and dispose the allied powers favourably. Evince moderation now in your pretensions, for I forewarn you, that in spite of all we have attempted, they will never consent to abandon Adana to you.' 'Leave me to act,' replied the Pacha; 'we shall agree, beyond all doubt.'"

This was precisely what the French cabinet desired, and the end towards which it constantly verged, in spite of the fetters imposed on it by the engagement for concerted action settled between the five powers by the note of the 27th of July and the subsequent negotiation

* Successor to Khosrew Pacha as grand vizier, and formerly ambassador in France.

in London carried on in virtue of that engagement. Immediately after his accession to the ministry, on the 21st of March, 1840, M. Thiers had written to me: "Could we operate at Constantinople or at Cairo by recommending the two parties to come to a direct understanding? We have done this, while confining ourselves to very pressing advice. But to open a special negotiation, which might be imputed to us, would produce no better effect, and would expose us, as regards England, to the reproach of duplicity, for she would say we temporize in London, to act at Cairo or at Constantinople. And some weeks later, on the 28th of April he added, "I have recommended our agents at Cairo and Constantinople, not to push on a direct negotiation between the Sultan and the Pacha, lest England should accuse us of playing a double game, and of temporizing in London while we act at Cairo and Constantinople. I urge MM. de Pontois and Cochelet to encourage a disposition to make sacrifices; I convey to the Porte that it will never be rescued in London by an agreement between the five powers; I cause the Pacha to be told that we shall not risk the great interests of France and of the world to gratify unreasonable demands. I hold the cable at both ends to reconcile the two parties, but I do not open any negotiation, to avoid all reproach founded on duplicity." And when I communicated to M. Thiers the note addressed on the 31st of May, by Chekib Effendi to the five plenipotentiaries, demanding from them prompt and effective concert, he answered: "I see but one course to follow, to answer this note as you did that of Nouri Effendi. Acknowledge

its reception, and say that France is ready, as ever, to listen to the proposals for settlement that may be made, and to take the part in them, to which she is, in some measure, compelled by the friendly interest she has ever evinced towards the Porte. We must not seem to abjure the note of the 27th of July, 1839; for a revulsion of policy, the open abandonment of our earlier contract must be carefully avoided. But say nothing whatever of this deplorable engagement to terminate the Eastern question by a concerted action between the five powers."

On the 30th of June, 1840, a telegraphic dispatch reached Paris, forwarded from Alexandria on the 16th of June by M. Cochelet. It ran thus: "On learning the dismissal of the grand vizier, Khosrew Pacha, Mehemet Ali ordered his first secretary, Sami Bey, to repair to Constantinople to offer the Sultan the homage of his devotion, and to request his orders for the return of the Turkish fleet. Mehemet Ali has no doubt that this spontaneous measure on his part will lead to a direct and amicable settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question."

In transmitting this dispatch to me without delay, M. Thiers wrote; "We must appear to infer from this intelligence, and without drawing too much attention to it, that a spontaneous arrangement between the sovereign and the vassal would be the best of all solutions. The Pacha thinks that the impulse of feeling to which he yields will be reciprocated, and that a treaty will follow immediately. He believes, according to intelligence which he considers certain, that the hereditary

rule over Egypt and Syria will be granted to him ; he says nothing with respect to Candia, Adana, and the Holy Cities, and when told that he must make sacrifices to obtain an immediate and direct settlement, he replies : ‘ Be at your ease, everything will be arranged.’ I know not on what his confidence reposes, but it is great, whether proceeding from his own satisfaction, or from trustworthy communications. So, at Constantinople, it was thought at the date of the latest news, that the restoration of the fleet would produce a great effect upon the Divan, and that liberal concessions might ensue . . . Such a state of affairs ought to suggest many arguments against any conclusive decision in London. At least, if anything, no matter what, should be proposed to you, you might reply that the two parties were on the point of agreeing between themselves, and that before settling terms on their account, it is much more natural to wait and see what they are going to propose to each other. Any opinion delivered now as to what might or might not be acceptable in Cairo, would be extremely rash ; the joy of the Pacha on the one hand, and the satisfaction of the Sultan on learning the restoration of his fleet on the other, may signally alter the conditions. For myself, I am far from considering the direct arrangement as concluded, or even probable ; but I look upon the new state of things as a powerful argument against any immediate decision in London. I have written to Alexandria, and to Constantinople, recommending moderation on both sides ; but I have given advice only, and have been careful to restrain our agents from any participation on their own responsibility, and as

a French undertaking, in a treaty having for its object this direct arrangement. Should such an attempt be imputed to us, you might deny it. Young Eugène Périer has been sent to Alexandria to remonstrate most urgently with the Pacha, in case he should incline to pause, and after having offered the fleet, to retract his word, and become unaccommodating in the general conditions of the treaty. I have even gone so far as to counsel his acceptance of Egypt *hereditarily*, and Syria *for life*."

But while the fall of Khosrew Pacha, and the conciliatory step of Mehemet Ali, created lively satisfaction in Paris, and excited a hope that European intervention between the Sultan and the Pacha would be set aside, this news produced in London a totally opposite effect. Lord Palmerston, who, for some time, had appeared little anxious for a solution, suddenly resumed his active policy, called the cabinet together, communicated to it the intelligence recently conveyed to him from Constantinople by Count Pisani, private secretary to Lord Ponsonby, and pressed his colleagues to debate and adopt the plan of conduct he now proposed to them. I immediately apprised M. Thiers of this new turn which the matter had taken. I informed him on the 6th and 9th of July, that on the 4th and 8th, cabinet councils had been held, that the last had been a long one, that on the same evening, Prince Dolgorouki had gone post to St. Petersburg; and on the 11th of July, I forwarded to the French ministry, in a despatch which I here copy textually, a detailed account of the position, of the in-

quiries I had made, and of the results they led me to anticipate :

“London, July 11, 1840.

“To the President of the Council,

“Sir,—Since the proposition of dividing Syria, by leaving to Mehemet Ali the fortress and a portion of the pachalic of St. Jean d’Acre was thrown aside, Lord Palmerston has seemed to avoid conversation on the affairs of the East. I have resumed it once or twice, rather to establish thoroughly the policy of the King’s government, than to attempt, by direct discussion, a new step in the question. Lord Palmerston replied to me with the tone of a man who maintains his own views, but does not consider the moment propitious for action and wishes to gain time.

“In fact, for several weeks, as I have already informed your Excellency, he neither named the affairs of the East to the cabinet, nor even communicated to his colleagues the last note of Chekib Effendi.

“Meanwhile, the efforts of several members of the government, and of the diplomatic body, were still progressing in favour of an arrangement based upon the concession of Egypt to the Pacha hereditarily, and Syria for life. I watched this procedure without taking any part in it. Conformally to the instructions of your Excellency, I have neither adopted this idea, nor discouraged, by any preliminary or absolute declaration, those who are anxious for its success

“In this state of the question and of minds, the news arrived here of the dismissal of Khosrew Pacha, and of

the direct overture of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan. I felt no surprise at the latter; your Excellency had already communicated to me a dispatch from M. Cochelet, of the 26th of May, announcing the Pacha's intention. I had treated this dispatch as entirely secret, but I ascertained subsequently that a letter from Count Apponi, dated, if I am correctly informed, the 16th of June, had announced the prediction of M. Cochelet to Baron de Neumann. The telegraphic despatch, by which the former acquainted your Excellency with the step taken by Mehemet Ali, was also of the 16th of June. Thus it happened, by a singular coincidence, that on the same day, M. Cochelet forwarded from Alexandria, as an accomplished fact, what Count Apponi communicated from Paris, on the faith of a dispatch from M. Cochelet, as a probable and approaching event.

“ When the fact itself reached London, Lord Palmerston and the three other plenipotentiaries were scarcely more surprised at it than I was myself. They see in it nothing more, or, at least, they determine that they have a right to see in it, nothing more than an act long concerted between the Pacha and France, who, at Constantinople and Alexandria had laboured to mature it.

“ The effect of the act has thence experienced an important change. Not only has it lost something of the importance which spontaneity and novelty should otherwise have secured to it, but the dispositions of Lord Palmerston, and the three other plenipotentiaries, are visibly modified in consequence. They look upon the step of Mehemet Ali and its success,—first, as the ruin of the note of the 27th of July, 1839, and of the com-

mon action of the five powers; and secondly, as the complete and personal triumph of France at Alexandria and Constantinople.

“From that time, those who, in the hope of obtaining the common action of the five powers, promoted a settlement founded on the concession of Egypt in hereditary sovereignty, and Syria for life, have paused in their endeavours, and seem to have renounced them entirely.

“On his part, Lord Palmerston appeared thoroughly disposed to act, and in two consecutive councils, held on the 5th and 8th of this month, he laid before the cabinet with obstinate ardour, his ideas and plan of proceeding under the hypothesis of a combination of four powers.

“Nothing has been settled. The cabinet is divided in opinion. The adversaries of Lord Palmerston’s plan insist on the necessity of waiting advices from Constantinople. The question is adjourned to a future council. But Lord Palmerston is urgent; the powers, he says, are pledged in honour to regulate by their intervention, and in the most favourable manner for the Porte, the affairs of the East. They have promised this to the Sultan. They have promised it amongst themselves. The step taken by Mehemet Ali ought not to turn them from it. It is an act of little significance, in reality, which promises, on the part of the Pacha, no important concession, will change neither the position nor the policy of the Porte, will not lead to the pacification hoped for, and will only produce the effect, if not carefully watched, of trammelling the negotiations between the powers, and of preventing them from reaching the end proposed. Meanwhile, the opportunity for acting

is favourable. The insurrection in Syria against Mehemet Ali is serious. An indifferent spectator, Lord Francis Egerton, who has very recently traversed Syria while returning from Jerusalem towards Asia Minor, writes that the insurgents are numerous and animated, that the administration of Ibrahim Pacha is violent, oppressive, and detested. Lord Palmerston draws much advantage from this intelligence. He urges, at the same time, the views of France for aggrandizement and dominion in the Mediterranean. The support given by France to the Pacha of Egypt, has, according to him, no other motive. He speaks of Algeria, and the extension of our African establishment. Finally, he addresses himself to the national susceptibility and jealousy, particularly with regard to the Tories, and to insure some degree of favour with a portion of the opposition.

“Whenever the opportunity presents itself, and in all quarters where I can converse with any of the parties who influence the question, I eagerly dispute these ideas. I repeat all the considerations I have relied on, and profited by, for four months, and with the repetition of which I shall not now weary your Excellency. I express my astonishment at the interpretation endeavoured to be given to the step Mehemet Ali has just taken. What was more natural, more easily foreseen, more inevitable, than this measure? For nearly a year the powers endeavour to regulate the affairs of the East, and fail in their efforts. The Pacha on his side has declared that the presence of Khosrew in power was his chief obstacle to a trustful and decisive return to the Sultan. Khosrew is dismissed: where lies the necessity of sup-

posing a long preparation, a process of diplomacy, to explain what the Pacha has done? He has acted as he said he would, and according to the simple dictates of common sense. France, it is true, has offered, and still offers advice at Alexandria; but advice founded on moderation and concession, and comprising no object beyond the re-establishment of peace in the East, and of good intelligence and amity within the bosom of the Ottoman Empire,—the only pledge of strength and tranquillity. It would be strange indeed to see the powers oppose this re-establishment, to see them wish for no peace unless brought by their own hands, and to throw themselves a second time between the sovereign and the vassal, to separate them anew at the moment of reconciliation. A year has elapsed since this intervention was conceived; it might have been dreaded that the Porte, exhausted and beaten down by its past defeats, would surrender itself, bound hand and foot, to the Pacha, and accept conditions fraught with peril for the future. But to-day, after the events of a whole year, when the Porte has recovered aid, and when the Pacha himself, with earnest moderation, assumes the initiative of reconciliation, what motive, what pretext could be alleged for opposing or retarding it for a single day? This would be an inconceivable spectacle. It is impossible that Europe can furnish it. It is impossible that Europe, which, for an entire year, speaks of the peace of the East as its only wish, can impede a peace which commences amongst the Eastern nations themselves, and of their own voluntary movement.

“ This language impresses those in general to whom

I address it ; but I cannot hold it as openly or as frequently as I could wish, for Lord Palmerston labours to diminish my opportunities. He acts particularly within the cabinet ; he says that since France has attempted a separate and personal policy, the other powers may readily follow the same course ; he promises to his colleagues the positive adhesion of Austria. He gives them, finally, to understand that if his plans were rejected, he could no longer remain in the cabinet, and thus places them between the adoption of his policy, and the fear of a ministerial shock.

“The affair is, therefore, at this moment, in a state of crisis. Nothing, I repeat, is decided ; the disagreement and agitation in the cabinet are great ; those of the ministers who do not accord with the views of Lord Palmerston strongly insist on waiting for intelligence from Constantinople ; those whose opinion is floating incline to this delay ; all, whatever may be their bias, exhibit hesitation and uneasiness. There are many chances of their not yet reaching definitive and effectual resolutions. While continuing to maintain a tranquil and reserved attitude, I shall neglect nothing that may operate upon these divided and unsettled spirits. But while things are in suspense at London, it is much to be desired that the step of Mehemet Ali may obtain the expected success at Constantinople ; for it cannot be concealed that the plan of an arrangement with four powers has received a marked impulse, and is progressing at this moment.

“P.S. I have reason to believe, from a communication authentically derived, that the only point which

has been almost decided in the councils of the 4th and 8th, is, that the *four* powers should reply to the last note of Chekib Effendi by a corresponding note, in which would be repeated, if not textually, at least in substance, the intentions and promises of the note of the 27th of July, 1839. Will this new note be collective from the four, or individual, but similar for each? What terms will it include? What propositions of arrangement will be annexed to it, and communicated at the same time to France with a request for her adhesion? None of these questions are yet determined. They will probably be resumed at the council to be held to-day. Couriers have been despatched within the last few days to Vienna and St. Petersburg."

I did not confine myself to directly pointing out to my own government the flagrant crisis. I am naturally disposed to optimism, and the act must be ready to burst forth before I renounce hope. At this moment, however, I did not deceive myself as to the impending danger; and to prevent the French cabinet from doing so, I gave the alarm loudly to the two persons who might communicate it with the greatest efficacy. On the 12th of July, the day after I had forwarded to M. Thiers the dispatch quoted above, I wrote thus to the Duke of Broglie:

"For some days, I have been much occupied with the East. The affair was sleeping. The Pacha has wakened it up. If he succeeds, nothing can be better; we shall succeed with him; the difficulty of an arrangement with five will have been demonstrated; the direct settlement will result therefrom. This is all we can

desire, and the time gained during several months will have been well gained. But if the Pacha miscarries, our embarrassment will be great. This step is considered here as a stroke of policy on the part of France, who, not wishing an arrangement by the five powers, has attempted one alone, by the hands of the Pacha. If the stroke fails, the arrangement with four only remains, and we weigh much less either to prevent it or bring back an arrangement with five. Lord Palmerston has resumed action; the three others follow him. I wait with impatience news from Constantinople. For the moment the matter rests as I tell you."

And on the same day I wrote to General Baudrand :

"The Eastern affair has occupied me much for several days. It was languishing. The step taken by Mehemet Ali with the Sultan, after the fall of Khosrew Pacha, has reanimated it. This is looked upon as the work of France alone, and has led to much ill-humour. They say here, 'since France has her separate policy, and follows it, let us do the same?' The four powers have begun to stir, and Lord Palmerston labours to bring about an arrangement by four, always founded on this double basis—No Syria for the Pacha; coercive measures if necessary.—I do not consider this arrangement as settled. If the step taken by Mehemet Ali at Constantinople succeeds, and leads to a direct reconciliation between the Sultan and himself, all will be for the best; they must resign themselves to it here. But if nothing is settled at Constantinople, we must not be deceived as to the fact that our influence with the other four powers will thereby be weakened, and that an arrange-

ment between them, without us, will have many chances of success."

Finally, on the 14th of July, when giving M. Thiers some new details on the position, I said to him; "I believe, without being positively certain, that the plan of a collective note by the four, in reply to the note of Chekib Effendi, has been adopted in the council of Saturday the 11th. Extreme reserve has been practised for some days; but I know that Chekib Effendi has had several long interviews with Lord Palmerston, particularly one on Sunday. Propositions are preparing, both as to the settlement of the affair and the mode of action, which will be communicated to us when all is arranged (should all be arranged) to obtain either our adhesion or refusal."

"My dear colleague," M. Thiers replied to me on the 16th of July; "I consider the news you have forwarded to me as most important; but we must not be disturbed, and must hold our course steadily. The English are engaging in a dangerous attempt; to separate from France will be more fertile in consequences for them than they imagine. But we must not suffer ourselves to be intimidated, and you must wait with all the coolness you know so well how to maintain, in your aspect, as in the depth of your soul. You and I have never traversed a more perilous defile; but we cannot do otherwise. At the beginning, we might have adopted a different course; but after the note of the 29th of July, 1839, the time had passed by."

On the 17th of July, an hour after noon, I received a note from Lord Palmerston, expressing his de-

sire to converse with me towards the close of the morning. I repaired to the Foreign Office. He told me that the cabinet, pressed by events, had finally come to a resolution on the affairs of the East, that he had a communication to make to me on that subject, and that to be sure of expressing his thought exactly and completely, he had reduced it to writing. He then read to me the following document, entitled :

Memorandum of a communication made to the Ambassador of France, by the principal secretary of Her Britannic Majesty.

“The French government has received throughout the whole course of the negotiations which commenced in the autumn of the last year, the most reiterated, manifest, and indisputable proofs, not only of the desire of the courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to arrive at a perfect understanding with the French government on the arrangements necessary to effect the pacification of the Levant, but also of the great importance which those courts have never failed to attach to the moral effect accruing from the union and concurrence of the five powers in a matter of such serious interest, and so intimately connected with the maintenance of peace in Europe.

“The four courts have seen, with the deepest regret, that all their efforts to attain the desired end have proved fruitless; and although very recently they have proposed to France to associate with them for the execution of a settlement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, founded upon ideas suggested towards the close of the last year by the French ambassador

in London, nevertheless the French government has not thought it right to participate in that settlement, and has made its concurrence with the other powers depend on circumstances which those powers have judged to be incompatible with the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and with the future repose of Europe.

“In this state of things, the four powers had no other choice than to abandon to the chances of the future the great affairs they had undertaken to arrange, and thus to admit their incapability, and to yield over the peace of Europe to dangers continually increasing; or rather to adopt the resolution of proceeding onwards without the co-operation of France, and to effect, by means of their united efforts, a solution of the complications of the Levant, conformable to the engagements which these four courts have contracted with the Sultan, and calculated to secure peace for the future.

“Placed between these two selections, and impressed with the urgency of an immediate solution, and also with regard to the weighty interests involved in the question, the four powers have felt it their duty to decide for the last of the two alternatives, and they have, in consequence, concluded with the Sultan, a convention intended to solve in a satisfactory manner the existing complications in the Levant.

“The four courts, in signing this convention, cannot fail to experience the most lively regret at thus finding themselves, for the moment, separated from France in a matter essentially European; but this regret is diminished by the repeated declarations made to them by the French

government that it would have nothing to object to the arrangements which the four powers desire to induce Mehemet Ali to accept, provided the Pacha consents to them; that, in any case, France will not oppose the measures which the four courts, in concert with the Sultan shall judge necessary to obtain the consent of the Pacha of Egypt; and that the sole motive which prevents France from associating with the other powers, on this occasion, is drawn from considerations of various natures, which would render it impossible for the French government to take part in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

“The four courts, therefore, entertain a well-founded hope that their separation from France on this subject will be but of short duration, and will in no degree interfere with the relations of sincere friendship which they so anxiously desire to preserve with France; and, moreover, they urgently appeal to the French government with a view of obtaining, at least, its moral support, although not permitted to expect its material co-operation.

“The influence of the French government is powerful at Alexandria; may not therefore the four courts expect and even ask from the friendship of the French government, that this influence should be exercised on Mehemet Ali, with the object of inducing the Pacha to consent to the arrangements about to be proposed to him by the Sultan?

“If the French government could, in this manner, contribute effectually to placing a term to the complications of the Levant, that government would acquire

an additional title to the gratitude and esteem of all the friends of peace.”

I listened to Lord Palmerston to the end, without interrupting him, and then taking the paper from his hands, “My lord,” I said, “on the object of the resolution you now communicate to me, I shall add nothing at this moment, to what I have so often had the honour of observing to you; neither do I feel inclined, on a first hasty reading, to discuss all that the document I have listened to contains; but certain points strike me, on which I shall at once remark. They are these:”

I commenced by repeating this passage, “‘Although very recently the four powers have proposed to France to associate with them for the execution of a settlement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, founded upon ideas suggested towards the close of the last year by the French ambassador in London, nevertheless the French government has not thought it right to participate in that settlement, &c., &c.’”

“Without doubt, you allude here, my lord,” I said, “to the arrangement based upon the surrender to the Pacha of a portion of the pachalic of St. Jean d’Acre, comprising the fortress; and it would result from this paragraph that the French government after suggesting their ideas through its ambassador, had afterwards found that it could not accept them. I cannot admit, my lord, on the part of the King’s government the reproach of such inconsistency. The ideas in question were never, to my knowledge, suggested in the name of the King’s government by the ambassador of

France; never by me, most certainly, neither, as I think, by General Sebastiani, my predecessor. They may have been introduced in conversation, with many other hypotheses; they have never been presented under a form or with a character which authorizes it to be said, or even furnishes ground to believe that the King's government has first proposed and then rejected them.

"Here," I continued, "is a second observation. You say, 'that the French government has several times declared that it has nothing to object to the arrangements which the four powers desire to induce Mehemet Ali to accept, provided the Pacha consents to them, and that, in any case, France will not oppose the measures which the four powers, in concert with the Sultan, shall judge necessary to obtain the consent of the Pacha of Egypt.' I cannot accept, my Lord, this expression, *in any case*, and I am confident of never having said anything which authorizes it. The King's government, assuredly, does not set itself up as the armed champion of any one, and will never compromise, for the single interests of the Pacha of Egypt, the peace and interests of France. But if the measures adopted against the Pacha by the four powers should assume, in the eyes of the King's government, the character and consequences by which the existing balance of Europe might be affected, the King's government could never consent to this; it would then deliberate how to act, and on that point will always maintain its full liberty."

I made, in addition, some observations of little importance on certain expressions of the *memorandum*; and without renewing the discussion minutely, added:

“ My Lord, the King’s government has always thought that the question of deciding whether two or three pachalics of Syria should belong to the Sultan or the Pacha, was of far less importance than the chances which the employment of force and the renewal of war in the East might entail on Europe. You have decided differently. I hope you are not deceiving yourself. If you are, we have no share in the responsibility. We shall use our utmost efforts to maintain peace, and our general alliances ; and to surmount, in the interest of all concerned, the difficulties, and dangers which the new position on which you are entering may produce.”

Lord Palmerston combated my observations feebly, and indulged in protestations of sincere and firm friendship, notwithstanding our partial and momentary estrangement. He again requested the good offices of France and her influence at Alexandria to induce the Pacha to accept the propositions about to be made to him. He then explained the propositions themselves, and the course intended to be pursued with the view of carrying them out. “ The Sultan,” he said, “ will begin by proposing to the Pacha to concede to him, always under the title of vassal, Egypt in hereditary succession, and that portion already offered of the Pachalic of St. Jean d’Acre, including the fortress, for his own life only. He will give him ten days to accept this proposition. If the Pacha refuses, the Sultan will then make a new proposal which will comprehend Egypt alone, always hereditarily. If after a second delay of ten days, the Pacha still declines, then the Sultan will appeal to

the four powers who engage, for him and for themselves, to compel the vassal to return to his obedience."

Lord Palmerston gave me no details as to the means which the four powers would employ to this effect; he concluded by telling me that a secretary of Chekib Effendi had left London the preceding eve to carry this arrangement to Constantinople; that the first proposition of the Sultan would reach the Pacha within thirty or thirty-four days; that Mehemet Ali would reply ten days after; and that his answer would be known in London twenty or twenty-five days subsequent to that date; that is to say, within about two months and a half from the period of our interview.

I immediately transmitted to M. Thiers the communication I had just received, with all the particulars of the subsequent conversation, and added; "The direct step of Mehemet Ali with the Porte and the insurrection in Syria against him are evidently the two causes which have precipitated this resolution. Lord Palmerston mentioned the Syrian insurrection to me with much confidence, and as his language implied measures projected or already ordered to prevent the Pacha from sending reinforcements to Syria capable of putting down the insurgents, I asked him a positive and direct question on this subject. He replied, that in fact, nothing would be neglected to arrest promptly the effusion of blood in Syria. 'I have no wish to conceal this from you,' he said.—'For that reason I have asked you, my lord.'—Orders are probably already issued to this effect to the English fleet, and sums of money and ammunition for

the insurgents have undoubtedly been placed at the disposal of the Sultan.

“The fear of a ministerial crisis is the real motive which has led to Lord Palmerston’s success with the cabinet. The moment for positive and effectual action in the East is still remote, and Parliament rises in fifteen days.”

On receiving this intelligence, the French cabinet felt not only discontented and vexed, but surprised and wounded. Lord Palmerston had justified these sentiments. It was thought in Paris, and I adopted the idea in London, that no definitive resolution would be determined on and signed between the four powers without previously acquainting us, and asking also, for our definitive resolve. I repeat the concluding paragraph of my last letter to M. Thiers which I have just quoted; “propositions are preparing, both for the settlement of the affair and the mode of action, which will be communicated to us as soon as everything is arranged, “(if everything should be arranged) to obtain our adhesion or refusal.” Lord Palmerston, without any risk to his policy, might have made this communication to us before the signature of the four powers, for we should assuredly not have associated ourselves with a convention which refused to Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession of Syria, and which settled the means of coercion to be employed against him in case he rejected the offers of the Sultan. We should then have found ourselves isolated with full knowledge of the cause, by our own will, and after every process of conciliation had been exhausted towards us. But Lord Palmerston

is a politician personally susceptible and exceptious, who becomes obstinate in his game when he sees himself in danger of losing, and who then precipitates his resolutions and blows, caring little for modes of acting or consequences, and seeking the gratification of revenge at least as much as success. A direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha appeared to him imminent; he looked upon the French government as the secret promoter of this solution of the question; he now thought only of preventing it and of substituting in all haste the European solution of which he had rendered himself the author. One of the secondary members of the diplomatic body in London, a spectator of the event equally impartial and intelligent said to me one day, "When we seek amongst ourselves for the causes of this untoward imbroglio, we find, in the first place, an intractable disposition in London, and in the next, illusions both in London and Paris. In London, a gratuitous or real ignorance of the dispositions of France; in Paris, incredulity as to the wishes or power of Lord Palmerston. In addition, it is also said that France sought to play a cunning game, that she wished and believed she could filch away an arrangement by hastening its conclusion in a secret and abrupt manner between the two parties. They add that the alarm was originally imparted to London from St. Petersburg; that the same alarm came subsequently through other channels, and that this has not only excited the treaty but the concealment of its being in operation. It is thus that we explain the matter."

But whatever might be the explanation, the French

government was justly offended at the proceeding. "Your last dispatch," M. Thiers wrote on the 24th of July, "has greatly surprised me. According to your previous intelligence, the government expected that the agitation which for several days had manifested itself in the English cabinet, would end in a proposition, nearly similar to that which M. de Neumann had prepared you for, and which consists in giving Egypt to Mehemet Ali hereditarily, and Syria for life, leaving to France the choice of associating herself or not with such a proposition. The step taken by the powers of acting by force, without leaving to France the option of concurrence in the common act, is a very natural proceeding on the part of the cabinets which have not lived in close friendship with us for ten years; but extremely strange and inexplicable by satisfactory reasons as regards England, who has professed, since 1830, to be our faithful ally. To complain is unworthy of a government holding such an exalted position as that of France; but we are bound to take note of this conduct, and to show that it enlightens us as to the views of England, and the course which France will have to adopt for the future. Henceforward, she is free to select her friends and enemies, following the interest of the moment and the advice of circumstances. We must without noise or display announce this independence of relations which France undoubtedly has never abandoned, but which hitherto she has subordinated to the advantage of her alliance with England. To-day she is not called upon to consult other conveniences than her own. Neither Europe nor England in particular, will have

gained anything by her isolation. However, I repeat to you, make no display ; confine yourself to the coldness which you tell me you have already exhibited, and which I entirely approve. This coldness must be maintained. The four powers who have recently ratified such a singular alliance with regard to the Eastern question, cannot long remain in accord ; France, then taking a fit opportunity for declaring her predilections, will make Europe feel the full weight of her influence."

M. Thiers subsequently furnished me with detailed instructions as to the attitude and language to be held with Lord Palmerston, explained to me his conjectures on the probable consequences of the act lately accomplished in London, announced the measures of precaution by sea and land, which, in the interest of French dignity, the cabinet felt called upon to adopt, and finally forwarded to me, in reply to the *memorandum* which Lord Palmerston had handed to me on the 17th of July, the following note :—

" Paris, July 21, 1840.

" France has ever desired, in the affair of the East, to move in accordance with Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. She has never been actuated in her conduct but by the interest of peace ; she has invariably judged the propositions made to her from a general point of view, and never from that of her individual advantage, for no power can be more disinterested than she is in the East.

" Judging from the point avowed, she has considered as ill conceived all the projects which had for their object

to wrest from Mehemet Ali, by force of arms, the portions of the Turkish Empire, which he actually holds. France does not consider this course advantageous to the Sultan, for it would tend to give him what he could neither administer nor preserve. Neither does she think it profitable for Turkey in general, and for the maintenance of the European balance, for without strengthening the sovereign, a vassal would thus be weakened who might aid powerfully in the common defence of the Empire. However, this is but a question of system, on which many different opinions may exist. But France has, above all, ever decided against any project, the adoption of which would entail the employment of force, for she could not distinctly perceive the means that the five powers might employ. These means either appeared to her insufficient, or more baneful than the state of things proposed to be remedied.

“What France has hitherto thought on this subject she thinks still, and has some reason to believe that this opinion is not exclusively her own. Besides which, under these latter circumstances, no positive proposition has been addressed to her, on which she could explain herself. The determination which England now conveys to her, undoubtedly in the name of the four powers, cannot therefore be imputed to refusals which she has had no opportunity of tendering. But moreover, without dwelling on the question as to what can have given rise to this mode of proceeding with regard to her, France repeats once more that she considers as unreflecting and imprudent, a line of conduct which consists in forming resolutions without the means of executing

them, or of executing them by insufficient and dangerous attempts.

The insurrection of some populations of the Libanus, has, without doubt, furnished the opportunity of finding means of execution, which until now have not appeared. Is it a very avowable mode, and, above all, is it profitable to the Turkish Empire to act in this manner against the Viceroy? It is wished to re-establish some degree of order and obedience in all parts of the Turkish dominions, and insurrections are fomented there! New disorders are thus added to the general confusion, which all the powers deplore in the interests of peace! And will these populations be reduced to submit to the Porte, after having been excited to rebellion against the Viceroy?

“These questions have certainly not been solved; but if this insurrection should be suppressed, if the Viceroy should again become the assured possessor of Syria, if he only becomes more irritated, more difficult to persuade, and replies to demands by positive refusals, what are the means of the four powers?

“Undoubtedly, after having wasted a year in seeking for them, they have not been discovered recently, and a new danger will be voluntarily created, and the most serious of all. The Viceroy, excited by the measures adopted against him, the Viceroy whom France had endeavoured to restrain, may pass the Taurus, and once more threaten Constantinople.

“How then will the four powers act in this contingency? What will be their mode of penetrating into the Empire to succour the Sultan? France thinks that a

more serious peril is thus prepared for the Ottoman Empire, and for the general peace, than that with which they were threatened by the ambition of the Viceroy.

“If all these eventualities, consequent upon the conduct about to be adopted have not been foreseen, then the four powers will have embarked in a very obscure and dangerous path. If, on the contrary, they have been foreseen, and if the means of confronting them have been calculated, then the four powers are bound to make Europe acquainted with them, and especially France, whose moral co-operation they still demand and whose influence at Alexandria they invoke.

“The moral co-operation of France, in a common line of conduct, was an obligation on her part; it ceases to be one in the new position in which the powers seem disposed to place themselves. France, henceforward, can be only moved by what she owes to peace and to herself. The conduct she will pursue under the weighty circumstances in which the four powers are placing Europe, must depend on the solution that will be given to all the questions she now refers to.

“She will ever have in view peace, and the maintenance of the existing equilibrium between the States of Europe. All her resources will be devoted to this double end.”

I repaired on Fridáy, the 24th of July, to the Foreign Office, and read to Lord Palmerston the note I have here reproduced. At the phrase, “besides which, under these latter circumstances, no positive proposition has been addressed to France on which she could ex-

plain herself," Lord Palmerston made a movement as if surprised and wishing to remonstrate. "Permit me, my lord, to finish," I said, "I will return to this point;" and my reading being concluded, I immediately took up the question, and repeated the phrase which had struck him. "This paragraph, my lord, astonishes you; the fact which it expresses has even more astonished the King's government, and myself in the first instance. When you communicated to me on Friday last the *memorandum* to which I am now replying,—on learning that, without our knowledge, without anything having been definitely said or required of us, a final resolution had been taken by the four powers, a convention signed, and its execution perhaps commenced, I felt deeply surprised, I ought to say wounded. This impression I have restrained within myself to the present moment. I did not wish you to think that if I appeared to be offended, it was on my own account, and from a personal motive. But this impression, my lord, the King's government has experienced on reading your *memorandum*, and it is in its name, and according to its instructions, that I now explain to you the extent to which it is surprised at the proceedings adopted. It had signed the note of the 27th of July, 1839; it has constantly repeated, since that epoch, that it was ready to debate all points; it has, in fact, listened to and discussed very opposite propositions. When the last act of this negotiation approached, assuredly it ought to have been apprised of it; it ought to have been told, "We have hitherto been unable to act as five; we can delay no longer; we are determined to settle the affair.

Here are the bases and means prepared. Will you join us? This is all we wish to know. If decidedly you will not, we shall be compelled to act as four, upon the bases and with the means we now indicate. This was the natural course; a contrary one has been selected; without our knowledge, and in concealment, it has been determined to act without us. This, my lord, is not the proceeding of an old and close ally, and the King's government has every right to feel offended by it."

Lord Palmerston listened to me with displeasure, mingled with surprise. It was evident that he was not prepared for this, and had not at first comprehended the full sense of the phrase by which it was indicated. He tried two or three times to interrupt me, but I persisted. When I ceased to speak, "Nothing," said he, "could have been further from our intentions than to be wanting towards the King's government in every consideration due to it. We have tried to obtain your concurrence by various propositions. Yours appeared to us inadmissible. You have rejected ours. With respect to the last, in particular, which consisted in leaving to Mehemet Ali the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, with a portion of the pachalic, you assigned, as the peremptory reason for your refusal, that the Pacha would never consent to any partition of Syria. From that time we looked upon your resolution as final, and have only occupied ourselves with our own. We should have found some inconvenience in declaring this to you before it was taken, and as a sort of summons. In acting thus we have only followed what took place in 1832, in the Belgian question. In that also, coercive measures

were proposed against the King of Holland. Amongst the five powers engaged in the conference on the affairs of Belgium, three refused to concur in them. They had declared this. France and England, who were for coercion, settled the matter between themselves, signed a convention, and only announced it to the other powers after the signature. We should be greatly distressed if in the Eastern question you could discover anything offensive in what has been done quite naturally, without any such intention on our part, and in accordance with what took place under analogous circumstances."

I persisted in the sentiment I had expressed. I denied all similarity with the Belgian affair, which had been always so treated in general and official conferences that nothing was for a moment doubtful or unknown to any of the powers. "Not only has nothing been said to us of the measures decided on," added I; "not only have they been concealed from us, but I know that certain persons have boasted of the manner in which the secret has been kept. Is it thus, my lord, that affairs are transacted between old and intimate allies? Is it thus that alliances are maintained and strengthened? The alliance of France and England has given ten years of peace to Europe. The Whig Ministry, allow me to say, was born under its flag, and has drawn from thence for ten years some portion of its strength. I much fear that this alliance may now receive a serious shock, and that what has just taken place may not impart to your cabinet as much power, or to Europe the same security for peace."

Lord Palmerston protested vehemently. "We do not

alter our general policy ; we do not change our alliances ; we entertain, and shall continue to entertain, towards France, the same sentiments. We differ, it is true ; we even separate upon a question, important certainly, but special and limited. I return to the instance I have just named. This is precisely what occurred in the Belgian affair. We thought with you as to the necessity of constraining the King of Holland to execute the treaty of the twenty-four articles ; to act with you, we separated ourselves from the three other powers ; but we did not quarrel with them ; the peace of Europe was not disturbed. We hope sincerely it will not be shaken now, and shall use our utmost efforts to that end. If France remains isolated in this question, as she has herself desired, as M. Thiers, in your tribune, predicted the possibility, it will not be a general or permanent isolation ; our two countries will remain united in other respects by the most powerful ties of opinions, sentiments, and interests, and our alliance will not perish, neither will the peace of Europe be endangered."

"I hope so, my lord ; I doubt not the sincerity of your intentions ; but you cannot dispose of events, nor of the opinion that may be attached to them, nor of the course that may be impressed on them. Throughout Europe, what is now taking place will be looked upon as a wide breach, which may open still wider ones. Some may rejoice, others may feel uneasy, but all will adopt this interpretation, which your words can never destroy. Then will follow the incidents which the policy on which you are entering must necessarily entrain in the East. Then will occur difficulties, complications, natural suspi-

cions, and probably conflicts. Who can foretell or prevent their effects? You expose us, my lord, to a position we have not sought, and which for ten years we have laboured to avoid. Mr. Canning, if I mistake not, was your friend, and the leader of your political party. Mr. Canning, in a very beautiful and memorable speech, once represented England as holding within her hands the bag of tempests, and in possession of the key; France also has such a key, and perhaps hers is the larger of the two. She has never wished to use it. Do not render that policy more difficult and less certain. Do not give to national passions in France, serious motives and a formidable impulse. This is not what you and Europe owe to us for the moderation and prudence we have displayed for ten years."

Lord Palmerston repeated with increased vehemence his protestations and assurances. They were sincere; he promised himself to accomplish what he had undertaken, without really breaking with France, or seriously disturbing the peace of Europe. He believed that he had found an excellent opportunity of strengthening the Ottoman Empire, by checking the Pacha of Egypt, and of withdrawing the Porte from the yoke of Russia, by placing the affairs of Turkey, with the consent of Russia herself, under the control of European concert. This conferred on England, power in the East, and on Lord Palmerston himself, glory in England. He neither believed in the actual force, nor in the persevering resistance of Mehemet Ali. The Syrian insurrection was, in his eyes, a new proof of the weakness of the Pacha, and a new mode of attacking him. And at the

moment when these combined circumstances seemed to him a certain pledge of success, he saw spring up, between the Sultan and the Pacha, the chance of a direct arrangement concluded under the influence of France, and which would have overthrown his hopes of credit and power, for his country in the East, and for himself at home. In presence of this danger, every other consideration, forethought, and general policy, disappeared from his mind; and to escape from it, he concluded in all haste the treaty of the 15th of July. Neither in our conversations of the 24th of July, nor in any of those which preceded or followed it, could I catch a glimpse of any design or combination proceeding from another source, or embracing a wider range.

I endeavoured to shake Lord Palmerston's confidence in his success, and to make him perceive a future much more serious and complicated than he hoped for. When the conversation began to slacken, "But finally, my lord," I said, "if the Pacha rejects, as I think he will, your propositions, what do you intend to do? What measures have you concerted? How will you exercise your constraint upon Mehemet Ali? You still ask France for her moral co-operation; she has a right to demand in her turn by what measures and within what limits you propose to act."

"You have that right," replied Lord Palmerston, "and I am bound to tell you. The employment of naval forces to intercept all communications between Egypt and Syria, to stop the fleets of the Pacha, to enable the Sultan to transport to all points of his empire the necessary means for re-establishing his authority;—in this

our chief action will consist, and this is the principal object of our convention."

"And if the Pacha passes the Taurus, if Constantinople is again threatened?"

"That will not happen. Ibrahim Pacha will have too much to do in Syria."

"But yet if it should happen?"

"The Sultan is going to establish at Isnik-Mid, (the ancient Nicomedia) a corps of Turkish troops, which, combined with the presence of a certain number of gunboats on the coast of Asia, will, I think, suffice to protect Constantinople."

"And if that should not suffice—if the Turkish troops are beaten?"

It cost Lord Palmerston an effort to tell me expressly that the entrance of a Russian auxiliary army into Constantinople, combined with that of an English fleet in the sea of Marmara, was a settled condition. He admitted this nevertheless, reminding me that when debating the means of acting by the several powers, France herself had not considered this fact as absolutely inadmissible, and had discussed the *quo modo* of the entrance and presence of her own ships in the sea of Marmara. And he hastened to add, "Beyond this, nothing is calculated, nothing settled; we have merely agreed to concert again should it become necessary. But the matter will not go so far."

Lord Palmerston then reverted to the immense advantage that would accrue to Europe at large, from putting an end to the exclusive protectorate of Russia over the Porte. I, on my side, returned to the novelty and

grave nature of the position on which we were all about to enter. "We wash our hands of this future," I said; "with respect to it France will conduct herself with perfect liberty, having always in view, as is named in the answer I have the honour of remitting to you, peace, the maintenance of the existing balance in Europe, and the care of her own dignity and personal interests."

We parted, I with cold civility, Lord Palmerston with a degree of politeness almost amounting to friendship.

On the day of this conversation with Lord Palmerston, I received the subjoined letter from M. de Rémusat, the member of the French cabinet who, next to M. Thiers, followed with most interest the course of the negotiation, and to whom I spoke of it with the greatest confidence:

"We are deeply preoccupied with your last dispatch, the developments and ulterior commentaries of which I await with great curiosity. I cannot believe that all this is the result of a long intrigue carried on with perseverance and dissimulation; still less that the rest of Europe was in the secret. I suppose that the disturbances in the Libanus, the importance of which has been exaggerated, and the restoration of the Turkish fleet by the Pacha, which is interpreted as weakness, are the two incidental causes of this sudden determination. The two general motives are a belief that the Viceroy has only an apparent power, and that France has no ground for objection. I hope that events may falsify this conviction on both points. The proceeding, such as it is, even reduced to a sudden resolve, is

intolerable; and the only mode of not being humiliated by it is to show that we are offended."

I replied to M. de Rémusat:* "You have a thousand times reason to disbelieve any long intrigue or European premeditation. Four months ago we proposed an arrangement—Egypt and Syria in hereditary possession to the Pacha; Candia, Arabia, and Adana to be restored to the Porte; but we declined our sanction to coercive measures. Lord Palmerston yielded to us the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre; we said it was not enough. They then hinted at Egypt in hereditary succession, and Syria for life; still we declined. In the midst of all these abortive propositions, the news arrived of the overture made by the Pacha to the Sultan. M. Apponi had announced it here three weeks before. This was the triumph of France, and the *mystification* of the four other powers. Such was the expression used amongst themselves when giving vent to their ill-humour. While this discontent was in progress, the insurrection in Syria inspired hope, animated hope. Lord Palmerston grasped it. In the East, he promised easy success, and in London threatened a dissolution of the cabinet. He had a convention in readiness, and means of coercion all prepared, good or bad. They decided in a hurry. They sent off couriers in a hurry. They determined on secrecy in revenge for the mystification of Alexandria, and to institute the first measures without noise. And so they signed the convention.

"It is thus that what is done has been done. The

* On the 24th July, 1840.

hope is in a prompt success, which will cut short the difficult position in which they have placed themselves with us. They begin to have a strong feeling of this difficulty; our attitude explicitly taken and openly declared; the visible antipathy of the English public to any chance of rupture or war with France on a question which excites no English passion, already strikes and intimidates. They do not avow what has taken place. They only defend themselves by smiling, or eluding, or by promising that it will lead to nothing. This occurs with the press as in parliament. They are gentle and conciliating with us. They labour to anticipate the consequences of what has taken place. If the success proves to be rapid and easy, they will also have been right in what they have done, and we shall be compelled to admit that, or think so. But if the prompt success does not exhibit itself, if the question protracts and aggravates, if complications explode, if great efforts are necessary, the situation of Lord Palmerston will become very critical, and ours extremely strong. If we are only moderately careful not to irritate English passions, we shall have on one side, English interests, liberal inclinations, the prudence of all parties, and we shall perhaps emerge with advantage from the trial on which we are entering."

We were in fact on the verge of the crisis: the English and French politicians having failed to understand each other, were each at the foot of the wall, ready to jostle. The French policy in the East was anxiously preoccupied with various interests and with a great and distant future; we wished at the same

time to preserve the Ottoman Empire, and to aid the foundation of the new states which were endeavouring to establish themselves from its ruins; we defended alternately the Turks against the Russians, and the Christians against the Turks; we supported in Syria the ambition of Mehemet Ali, which we opposed in Arabia and on the frontiers of Asia Minor. The English policy was more simple, and more exclusively directed towards a single object and an approaching future; it thought only of the permanence of the Ottoman Empire, and of sustaining it, whether in Europe or Asia, against foreign ambition and domestic convulsions. Which of the two governments was best acquainted, in the Egyptian question, with the true state of facts, and appreciated most correctly the relative forces and chances? Were we, as recently in Greece, in presence of a persevering insurrection, and of a reviving Christian nation? Or were we only dealing with a personal and precarious power, more ambitious than strong, as subservient as ambitious, and as capable of resigning itself to a great reverse as of attempting a lofty enterprise? Herein lay the question. I placed it clearly before the French cabinet, myself being filled with doubt and disquietude, but fully resolved to support it firmly in London in its difficult position, and not to take a single step or utter a word which might weaken or embarrass it.

Two or three days later, I was informed from Paris that it was reported there that I had not foreseen the possibility of the arrangement between the four powers without us, and that I had failed to apprise my govern-

ment. I wrote instantly to M. de Rémusat :* “My dear friend, I am perhaps taking a very useless precaution, but I wish to take it nevertheless. I send you a copy of some passages from my official dispatches and private letters, which prove that from the 17th of March to the 14th of July, I have never ceased to speak of the chance of an arrangement by four, and to represent it as either possible, or probable, or imminent. I add copies of passages from other private letters to the Duke of Broglie and General Baudrand, which prove that I have also taken pains to communicate my anticipations through indirect channels. Finally, I have successively instructed MM. de Bourqueney, de Chabot, and Mallac, to express on this subject, in their conversations, either with the King or the ministers, my opinions and apprehensions; and they have written to me that they did so. You will not, of course, make use of this, my dear friend, unless there is good reason for so doing, and only in suitable and necessary quarters. I leave the matter in your hands. But I was anxious that you should be completely edified yourself on this subject, and in a position to enlighten all whom it may concern.”

I had reason to notice these reports, being told they were spread abroad more and more, and on the 31st of July I again wrote to M. de Rémusat: “My dear friend, my precaution was well-founded, and has not sufficed. I read in the *Siècle* of Wednesday the 29th of July, which has reached me this morning, an article copied from the *Augsburgh Gazette*, which I cannot pass

* On the 28th July, 1840.

over. I send it to you. It commences by, "M. Guizot, who had persuaded himself," &c. &c.—After the extracts from my correspondence which you hold in your hands, I need not tell you that despite the mixture of truth and falsehood, of praise and blame contained in this article, it is essentially untrue and inadmissible by me. 1st. I have not been wanting in foresight, for since the 17th of March I warned M. Thiers that what has just happened was 'the probable issue of the affair, an issue to be looked for, and for which he ought to be prepared.' And, from the 9th to the 14th of July, I enabled him to follow step by step the progress of the arrangement of four, in the crisis which has ended in that result; a result which between these two epochs (from the 17th of March to the 14th of July) I had several times predicted. 2nd. I never persuaded myself that I should bring Lord Palmerston round to my opinion. On the contrary, I have constantly named his obstinacy as the decisive obstacle, and I have always said that if he threatened to retire, I did not believe that his colleagues could resist him. See, amongst others, an extract from my dispatch of the 1st of June, in your possession. There are ten of the same kind. 3rd. Finally, I instructed Bourqueney in April, Chabot in June, and Mallac in July, to repeat what I had written as to the probability of the arrangement by four, which I knew was not believed; and during the last crisis, I was very minutely informed of the course and fluctuations of the arrangement. It has been concealed from us, and this is the unfair proceeding by which we have a just right to be offended. But we were not

ignorant that the treaty was in progress, and I have transmitted almost a daily account of what was passing.

This then, my dear friend, is what I demand, for I find it absolutely necessary. Copy into the *Constitutionnel* the article from the *Augsburgh Gazette*, adding: The *Augsburgh Gazette* is incorrectly informed. Foresight was neither wanting to M. Thiers in Paris nor to M. Guizot in London. M. Guizot never persuaded himself that he could bring Lord Palmerston round to his opinion. On the contrary, he has invariably spoken of the persistence of the English minister in his own policy, and he informed the French government exactly of what was passing and in preparation."

The cabinet did justice to my desire. The *Constitutionnel* of the 3rd of August published the rectification I required,* and the truth was established, without ceasing, as it always happens, to be still frequently disputed.

About eight days elapsed before the resolutions adopted on the 15th of July by the four powers became public. The treaty itself was not to be officially proclaimed until all the ratifications reached London; and meanwhile, it was only on the 23rd of July that the English press announced positively the conclusion and its bases. Every communication that reached me from Paris during this interval, showed me to what extent the emotion, or I may rather say, the irritation was animated and general. It had its source as much in the unfriendly proceeding of the English cabinet as in the favour of the public for Mehemet Ali; and the

* See Historic Documents, No. VIII.

French offence turned to the profit of the Egyptian cause. "The public spirit is incredibly warlike," M. de Lavergne wrote to me on the 30th of July; "the coolest heads, the most timid dispositions are carried away by the general movement; all the deputies I meet declare without exception for a great development of our forces; the most pacific are tired of this question of war perpetually postponed and re-appearing; we must, they say, bring things to an end. This disposition has re-acted upon our anniversaries of this month; on the 28th, there were from sixty to eighty thousand men under arms, and all the world rejoiced to see so many bayonets together. Yesterday, when the King appeared at the balcony of the Tuileries, he was saluted by really animated acclamations, and when the band played the *Marseillaise*, the enthusiasm was genuine."

The French cabinet, although much moved by this public impression, did not yield to it without moderation and forethought. When recommending me, on the 21st. of July, "to mark my attitude distinctly, and to penetrate the designs of England," M. Thiers added, "I need not tell you with what restriction to accomplish this. Take care, in manifesting our just displeasure, to do nothing at present peremptory. I know not what the Eastern question may produce. They are foolish and insane who pretend to divine it. But, under any circumstances, we must choose the moment of action to throw ourselves into a cleft and to break up the coalition. To speak out to-day would be irrational and motiveless. And the more so, that we are perhaps in presence of a great English blunder. Mean-

while, we must assume our position and watch events with coolness. The King is perfectly calm ; we too are the same. Without any stir we intend to make preparations, solid rather than apparent. We shall render them apparent if the situation requires, and if respect for public opinion makes it desirable to do so."

On all occasions, with the leading men of every country and party, I assumed and carefully supported this attitude. My assiduous efforts were directed to disturb my questioners, seriously though tranquilly ; to maintain that, for extremely trifling motives, a situation replete with danger was created ; that we were sincerely anxious for peace and alliance ; but that in the isolation in which they had placed us, we should employ, according to events, our full liberty. " The affair will be long and difficult. France knows not yet exactly what she may do, but she will do something. England and Europe cannot tell what may happen, but something will happen. We are all plunging into darkness." People, in fact, began to be uneasy ; they asked each other with a mixture of curiosity and anxiety, what does France intend to do ? " The four powers will cruise upon the coast of Syria, they will cut off all communication between Syria and Egypt, blockade the ports, disembark, to aid the Syrian insurrection against Mehemet Ali, arms, ammunition, and perhaps soldiers, Turks, or so named Turks. What will France do on the coast of Syria ? the four powers will blockade Alexandria, and may perhaps land Turkish troops in Egypt itself. What will France do at Alexandria and in Egypt ? If the Pacha invades Asia Minor and threatens Constanti-

nople, Russian troops will probably arrive there ; English men-of-war will enter the sea of Marmara. What will France do in the Dardanelles?" All these chances were argued ; people followed the course of events, step by step ; they endeavoured to foretell how France would act at every instant, in every place, and under every phase of the affair. I listened to all these questions ; I said there were many others not anticipated, and I abstained from any approach to an answer.

The day following that on which the treaty was secretly signed, the Dutch minister, M. Dedel, asked me : "Is there anything new?" "Yes, I believe there is." "What is it?" "The five powers undertook, last year, to settle matters between the Sultan and the Pacha, and to re-establish peace in the East. They have not yet succeeded. Just now affairs were going to be arranged and peace to re-establish itself. Four powers combine together to prevent this."

Some days after, I met Sir Robert Peel. I knew that the old Tories were disposed to compliment Lord Palmerston and to support him against us. I explained thoroughly to Sir Robert Peel the policy of France in the East, "The only policy," I said to him, "which can maintain, in Europe as in the East, the peace and alliance of our two countries." He listened to me like a man who had not formed his opinion. He had thought little on the question, and had formed no clear idea respecting it ; but he sincerely wished to preserve good relations with France, and to maintain peace, in common with all moderate Tories of whom he was the representative and leader. He said to me in conclusion ;

“ We shall remain silent, we shall leave the whole responsibility to the cabinet. Like France in the East, we shall continue attentive and motionless, waiting events.” I told him that events would find France ready and decided to accept nothing that would injure her own interests or shake the balance of states. I left him well disposed towards us, and anxious for the future.

On the 28th of July, I had a long interview with Lord Melbourne and Lord John Russell. I found them disturbed, Lord Melbourne in particular, who was ever liberal and prudent. He allowed me to perceive and almost avowed to me his inmost thoughts: “ Lord Palmerston affirms that success will be prompt and easy. The enterprise is attempted in this reliance. If his confidence should be falsified, we shall not push matters to extremity. The Pacha is not a madman and France will be there. France had proposed an arrangement, Egypt and Syria in hereditary succession to the Pacha, Candia, Arabia, and Adana restored to the Sultan; the Pacha will perhaps renew this proposition. Why does he not now renew it in answer to the propositions of the Porte? And if rejected at present, why should he not repeat it in the course of events, when he has tried resistance, and the confidence of Lord Palmerston begins to be baffled? England has no wish to quarrel with France or to unsettle Europe. Austria too has no such desire. This affair is unlucky and might become extremely serious; but we can arrest it, and wish to do so. And France who has refused to

assist the four powers in their advance may help them to halt."

All this contained no formal proposition on the part of Lord Melbourne, no positive abandonment of Lord Palmerston, but merely a door of safety imperfectly revealed and half opened for the future.

The Baron de Bülow held the same language with me: "Austria and Prussia are unwilling to separate from England. The English cabinet does not wish to separate from Lord Palmerston. They reckon on an easy success. All their confidence springs from thence. But they are already taking measures in a contrary hypothesis."

I transmitted to M. Thiers an exact and daily account of this state of minds and of all these incidental conversations. When writing to him on the 29th of July, I added to my details; "I wish also to speak of the newspapers. It is very important that they should show themselves animated and unanimous; but they ought not to chafe and ridicule the English journals. I am told this morning that the *Times* pauses in its attack on Lord Palmerston, as the French reprisal seems to be quite as much and as fiercely directed against England as against her foreign minister. I comprehend all your difficulties, and amongst them that of urging and restraining at the same time,—the greatest of all. But I show you the side that I see myself and with which I have to deal. You will appreciate its bearing. There is no ardour in this country for the enterprise in which Lord Palmerston engages, but ardour might spring up from wounded pride or from a public

danger, and it is most important to us, that this should not occur."

M. Thiers replied on the 31st of July: "I have not written to you for several days because I have not had a moment to myself. The resolutions to be taken, the orders to be given, the correspondence I have to carry on with all the courts, have completely absorbed me. I have received all your excellent letters. I have only a single word to say in reply; *stand fast*. Be cold and reserved, except with those who are our friends. I see nothing to change in your conduct, unless to render it firmer still, if possible, without exciting against us the self love of those who may be able to change the resolutions of England. The King is going to Eu for twenty days. I invite you, on his part, to meet me there on Friday the 7th of August. If you wish for a large steamer, the *Vélocé* shall call for you at Brighton."

Nothing was more desirable to me than this rendezvous. In proportion as the position became animated, correspondence failed to satisfy me, either in communicating all I had to say, or in teaching me all I desired to know. Nothing entirely supplies personal intercourse; and at a distance, there is no clear and complete insight into the bottom of hearts and affairs. I requested that the first secretary of the embassy, the Baron de Bourqueney who was absent on leave in Paris, should immediately return to England and become chargé-d'affaires during my absence. He was fully versed in the Eastern question, was well acquainted with the different parties with whom we were treating,

and I had perfect confidence in him. He arrived in London on the 5th of August, and on the 6th I left for the Château d'Eu, determined to return to England as soon as I had obtained, in conversation with the King and M. Thiers, the lights of which I was in search.

CHAPTER VI.

EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY, 1840.

DISEMBARKATION OF PRINCE LOUIS NAPOLEON AT BOULOGNE.—MY WARNINGS ON THIS SUBJECT.—FORESIGHT OF THE FRENCH CABINET.—MY RESIDENCE AT THE CHATEAU D'EU.—MY CONVERSATIONS WITH KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE AND M. THIERS.—STATE OF MINDS AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC BODY IN LONDON.—PLAN OF THE KING OF THE BELGIANS FOR A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE FOUR SUBSCRIBING POWERS TO THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY.—INSTRUCTIONS I RECEIVE ON LEAVING THE CHATEAU D'EU.—MY RETURN TO LONDON.—CONVERSATION WITH BARON DE BÜLOW.—MY VISIT TO WINDSOR CASTLE.—MY CONVERSATIONS WITH KING LEOPOLD AND LORD PALMERSTON.—NEW MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED ON THE 31ST OF AUGUST BY LORD PALMERSTON TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.—OPINION OF M. THIERS THEREUPON.—I URGE THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS ANSWER.—TWO INCIDENTS: 1. CONFERENCE ON THE RENEWAL AND EXTENSION OF THE CONVENTIONS OF 1831 AND 1833, FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE; 2. RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON FOR A TREATY OF COMMERCE.—COMPLAINTS OF LORD PALMERSTON ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH AGENTS AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—ANSWER OF M. THIERS.—THE COMPLAINTS ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION.—EVENTS HURRY ON IN THE EAST.—THE PORTE RATIFIES THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY, AND SENDS RIFAT BEY TO ALEXANDRIA TO SUMMON MEHEMET ALI TO CONFORM TO IT.—ATTITUDE OF MEHEMET ALI.—ADMIRAL NAPIER BEFORE BEYROUT.—OUR COMPLAINTS ON THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY BEFORE THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS.—RESERVED PROTOCOL OF THE 15TH OF JULY.—EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS AND OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION OF THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY.—COUNT WALEWSKI AT ALEXANDRIA.—M. THIERS ANNOUNCES TO ME THE CONCESSIONS OF MEHEMET ALI.—MY INTERVIEW WITH LORD PALMERSTON ON THIS SUBJECT.—HIS SUSPICIONS OF THE ACTION EXERCISED BY COUNT WALEWSKI

AT ALEXANDRIA.—M. THIERS COMMISSIONS ME TO DENY THEM FORMALLY.
 —LORD PALMERSTON ACKNOWLEDGES HIS ERROR.—CABINET COUNCILS
 IN LONDON ON THE PROPOSITIONS OF MEHEMET ALI.—THEY LEAD TO NO
 RESULT.—MILITARY EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY.
 —BOMBARDMENT OF BEYROUT.—THE SULTAN DECREES THE FORFEITURE
 OF MEHEMET ALI AS PACHA OF EGYPT.—HOW LORD PALMERSTON EXPLAINS
 AND EXTENUATES THIS MEASURE.—DISPATCHES OF M. THIERS OF THE
 3RD AND 8TH OF OCTOBER IN REPLY TO THE ENGLISH MEMORANDUM OF
 THE 31ST AUGUST, AND ON THE FORFEITURE PRONOUNCED AGAINST
 MEHEMET ALI.—STATE OF MINDS IN FRANCE.—RESOLUTIONS AND MILI-
 TARY PREPARATIONS OF THE FRENCH CABINET.—FORTIFICATIONS OF
 PARIS.—CONVOCATION OF THE CHAMBERS.—THE FRENCH SQUADRON IS
 RECALLED TO TOULON.—MOTIVES AND EFFECTS OF THIS MEASURE.—
 SITUATION OF THE FRENCH CABINET AND ITS CAUSES.

ON the day when I left London to repair to the Château d'Eu, the 6th of August, Prince Louis Napoleon, towards four o'clock in the morning, disembarked near Boulogne, and with his name alone for an army, attempted for the second time the conquest of France. What would be the astonishment to-day of any rational man, who, having slept since that date, the sleep of Epimenides, should see, on waking, that Prince upon the throne of France and invested with supreme power? I cannot read again without some embarrassment what was said by all the world in 1840, and what I wrote myself with reference to what we all called, "a mad and ridiculous adventure," and to its hero. Even if I could do so with full liberty, I should refrain, on personal convictions, from reproducing at present the language which was then held in all quarters. Providence seems sometimes to delight in confounding the judgments and conjectures of men. Yet there is nothing in the strange contrast between the incident of 1840 and the Empire of to-day,

beyond what is natural and clear. No event ever shook the confidence of Prince Louis Napoleon in himself and his destiny ; in despite of the success of others and of his own reverses, he remained a stranger to doubt and discouragement. Twice, vainly and wrongfully, he sought the accomplishment of his fortune. He never ceased to reckon on it, and waited the propitious opportunity. It came at last, and found him confident and ready to attempt everything. An eminent example of the power which preserves, in the dark shadows of the future, persevering faith, and a great lesson to all who doubt and bend easily under the blows of fortune.

It has been often said that the government of King Louis-Philippe, in 1840, committed the error, both in Paris and London, of paying no attention to Bonapartist intrigues, and of neglecting to acquire intelligence. This is a mistake. Neither M. de Rémusat as Minister of the Interior, nor myself as ambassador in England, had been guilty of such carelessness. As early as the 2nd of April I had written to M. de Rémusat ; “ You ought to know well that I have no police resources whatever, and that I can neither hear nor learn anything either as to the Bonapartists or the refugees of April. If you have any direct agent who corresponds with you, let me know it. If you have not, consider what it might be necessary to do.” M. de Rémusat replied on the 15th of May ; “ I think it not unlikely that Prince Louis Bonaparte may inflame his head and attempt some adventure. I am sufficiently well informed as to what concerns him. Nevertheless I commend him to your notice, and I beg you to apprise me, if neces-

sary, of what you may suspect." And again on the 8th of June; "Bonapartism is becoming active. Once more I recommend His Imperial Highness to you." I replied on the 30th of June: "You ask me to watch the Bonapartist faction. It is not easy to do so. The party is demonstrative and parades itself with much show. Prince Louis is constantly in the park and at the opera. When he enters his box, his aides-de-camp remain standing behind him. They talk much and loudly; they talk of their projects and correspondence. The display of their hopes is pompous. But when we seek to look a little closer and to distinguish what is real and active under this noise of words, we discover next to nothing. On leaving the park or the opera, the prince and his party return to a sufficiently obscure and idle life. Nevertheless I know that it is in agitation to equip a man of war, and to attack at sea, on its return from St. Helena, the frigate bearing the remains of Napoleon, and to carry them off as a property of the family; or rather to follow the French frigate and enter Hâvre with her at all risks." When thanking me for these informations, M. de Rémusat added on the 12th of July; "The illusions of emigrants are mad, and I cannot entirely reject, on the score of extravagance, the projects attributed to His Imperial Highness. The various accounts that reach me represent his court in Paris and his court in London as persuaded that the moment of action approaches, and that they ought not to wait the epoch of the translation of the remains of the Emperor. Their desire would be to operate upon two points at once. Metz seems to be that where they

are most at work. Lisle is also stirred up. But their action confines itself within a very narrow circle, and they find the mass of the people and the army inaccessible. Nevertheless I believe in an attempt."

The King's government therefore could not be taxed with improvidence on this occasion, and was fully justified in what it said in the *Moniteur* of the 8th of August 1840; "The Government knew for a considerable time that Louis Bonaparte and his agents had formed a project of anticipating the epoch of the translation of the remains of the Emperor Napoleon, by attracting public attention to themselves through some unexpected attempt. Emissaries had passed incessantly from Paris to London, and from London to our fortresses, to study the spirit of the garrisons, and to practice those manœuvres, as vain as they are culpable, which form the pastime of certain minds. For several days there was no room for doubting that the moment of action had arrived. Orders and notices had been issued in consequence to all the towns indicated by the chimerical hopes of the frequenters of Carlton Gardens, and upon all points of the coast and frontier. It was at Boulogne that Louis Bonaparte, surrounded by nearly all his partizans, attempted the *coup-de-main* which has failed in such a prompt and definitive manner."

At the first moment, and in the embarrassment of finding an explanation of this singular attempt, a suspicion ran through Paris that the English cabinet in its pique against the French government, must have been privy to it. This suspicion was without the slightest foundation. Baron de Bourqueney, chargé-d'affaires in

London during my absence, wrote thus on the 7th of August to M. Thiers :

“ The great incident of yesterday is the news of the disembarkation of Louis Napoleon at Boulogne. The accounts came by an express to the *Morning Post*, which published a third edition. The first impression was that of incredulity in the folly of such an attempt, and every one I met treated it as an Exchange hoax. This evening the details have arrived ; I have myself received, by courier, the official telegraphic dispatches from the sub-prefect of Boulogne to the Minister of the Interior, and all the journals contain a recital, more or less exact, of the facts which followed the disembarkation of Louis Bonaparte. One must have lived long in England to be persuaded that an enterprise of this nature could be prepared and accomplished in the port of London, without the slightest official notification reaching the English government. This is nevertheless the truth, and I feel convinced that Lord Normanby,* I will not say upon a formal announcement, but even upon a simple suspicion, would not have lost a moment in informing the French government through the organ of its embassy in London. The ministerial paper of this evening, the *Globe*, contains an official denial of the visit said to have been made by Lord Palmerston to Louis Napoleon, or that he received one from him.” And on the day following, the 8th of August, M. de Bourqueney added ; “ Lord Palmerston, who had replied yesterday to my note of the morning by publishing in the *Globe* an official denial of his pretended visit to Louis Napoleon, begged me to call

* At that time Home Secretary in London.

upon him in the evening; and there, in terms more explicit than the short denial in the ministerial journal admitted of, he gave me his word of honour that for more than two years neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set eyes on Louis Napoleon. "I speak thus to you," he said, "assuredly not to repudiate even the appearance of any initiation into the projects of that madman; I would not admit defence on that ground." "The attack," I replied, "is at least quite as far from my idea." "But," continued Lord Palmerston, "the facts require to be well established. You know the freedom of English official habits, and you are aware that my colleagues, or I, might have given an interview to Louis Napoleon; we might have met him by chance at a third house, or might have had some relations with him of chance or society. Well, there has been nothing of the kind. I repeat to you, upon honour, that we have not seen the face of Louis Napoleon nor of one of the adventurers who accompanied him. It is evident to me that the report of a visit made or received has been invented here, and transmitted to the French papers, either to accredit the falsehood of an indirect support, or to embitter and compromise the relations of our two governments."

When I reached the Château d'Eu, on the 7th of August, I found the King, M. Thiers, and everyone about them very animated, and also perfectly calm as to what had just occurred; they saw in it at the same time the explosion and end of the Bonapartist plots; they were astonished and laughed at them. "What a ridiculous sight!" they exclaimed; "Louis Napoleon swimming to regain a miserable boat, under a fire of musketry

from the National Guard at Boulogne, while the King's son and two French frigates traverse the ocean to seek at St. Helena what remains of the Emperor Napoleon !” Our rendezvous to converse on the affairs of the East was a little deranged by this incident. The King and M. Thiers left Eu on the 8th of August, in the evening, to hold a council in Paris, and to convoke the Chamber of Peers for the trial of Prince Louis and his companions. I profited by this to obtain the pleasure of seeing at Trouville my children and my mother, who received me, the first with the delightful transports of their young tenderness, and my mother with that mixture of meridional vivacity and piously impassioned gravity, which formed the charm and power of her nature. While walking with them on the beach and hills of Trouville, I reposed for a moment from Egypt, London, and Paris. Returning to the Château d’Eu on the 11th of August, I found the King and M. Thiers there, and we occupied two days in close and continued conversation on the affairs of the East, the news from Syria and Egypt, the European complications, the intentions, ideas and strength of the actors, and on the conduct to be pursued by France under the various chances of the future. There was much accordance at that moment in the language, and I may almost say in the ideas of King Louis-Philippe and his minister ; but it was easy, on close observation, to perceive a difference between them. The King, more animated in words, promised himself that, in the end, the peace of Europe would not be disturbed ; and M. Thiers, while desiring also the maintenance of peace, was much pre-occupied with the

chance of war, and the means of meeting it, if events should drive us to that alternative. Both wished to be in harmony with the warlike susceptibility which was exploding in the country, uneasy meanwhile in their inward souls, the one at the thought of having some day to resist, and the other of being compelled to promote it. But they escaped for the moment from this inquietude, being both convinced that the resolute resistance of Mehemet Ali, and the embarrassments accruing therefrom to the four allied powers, would furnish France with an opportunity of resuming, in the Eastern question, without war, her place and influence. "They deceive themselves in London in the course they have adopted, and this will speedily appear. The Pacha will not yield, and will commit no extravagance. The maritime coercion will lead to nothing. No compulsory measures by land will be attempted." This was repeated incessantly. Lord Palmerston had often said to me in London, "I cannot understand why your Government does not agree with me." King Louis-Philippe and M. Thiers adopted the same language in regard to Lord Palmerston. It is seldom indeed that even the most distinguished minds thoroughly listen to and understand each other; each incloses himself within his own view, as in a prison into which no light penetrates, and from the depth of which each acts. The obstinate diversity of inquiries and estimates on the state of facts in the East, formed in 1840, between Paris and London, the true knot of the position, and the determining cause of the resolutions.

While the King, M. Thiers, and I, were debating at

the Château d'Eu on the various chances of the future, people were warmly pre-occupied in London with the attitude of France, the tone of our journals, the accounts of the public sentiment, and the military preparations, of which so much was said without well understanding their nature or extent. Whenever they met the Baron de Bourqueney, the ministers of Austria and Prussia evinced to him their solicitude and desire that they could find a convenient mode of inducing the French government to return to the negotiation from which, erroneously perhaps, although without offensive design, the treaty of the 15th of July had excluded it. "When do you announce to the Pacha your first propositions?" inquired M. de Bourqueney of the Baron de Bülow. "Immediately; the courier to Constantinople departed, I believe, two days before the signature of the treaty." "How? You do not stay the execution until the ratifications are exchanged?" said M. de Bourqueney, in a tone of surprise; and M. de Bülow, astonished in his turn, replied with some embarrassment, "In fact, the first summons of the Porte to the Pacha ought to precede the ratification; but it is not we who make a proposal to the Pacha, it is the Porte." The Baron de Neumann was equally conciliating in his language. "It is impossible," he said to M. de Bourqueney, "that after ten years of prudence, all the governments of Europe should not join hands in a common effort for the pacific winding up of the existing crisis. For ourselves, we shall gladly give you a proof of the purity of our intentions; we shall not enlist a soldier, we shall not purchase a horse; we shall not cast a cannon; and it will be the same in

Prussia. Before advancing a single fresh pace in the career in which all steps engage and carry away so rapidly, let your government wait the first words of Prince Metternich. You know his personal respect for your sovereign ; you know his absolute devotion to the repose of Europe. M. de St. Aulaire has returned to his post. Let us wait patiently in Paris the arrival of the first dispatches."

On the 11th of August, Queen Victoria prorogued in person the session of parliament. M. de Bourqueney had been told that the speech from the throne would contain a special and formal expression of the most friendly sentiments towards France, and that a paragraph to that effect had been discussed in the council. It was not in the speech publicly delivered ; the Queen confined herself to recalling (with an emphasis on the word *friendly*) the friendly mediation of France in the difference between England and the King of Naples ; and in expressing her anxious wishes for the maintenance of the general peace, she abstained from all allusion to the events which might, at a later period, render the intervention of parliament necessary. It was feared, they said to M. de Bourqueney, that advances too marked might be ill received in France by the press, and furnish fresh food to the newspaper war between the two countries. But at the assemblies, whether of the court or the fashionable world, which followed the closing of the session, respect for France and her representatives was more and more marked. "Yesterday, at the Palace," M. de Bourqueney wrote on the 11th of August to M. Thiers ; "the Duke of Wellington addressed me ; he

thought he was speaking in a low tone, but his deafness prevents him from estimating the extent of his voice, and all who were present in the Queen's drawing-room heard him say to me: 'I have an old political notion, very simple but very decided; it is, that nothing can be done pacifically in the world without France. All that takes place without her compromises peace. Now we want peace. We must therefore arrange with France.'"

The King of the Belgians was then in England, and amongst those who felt the necessity of a good understanding with France, none were more deeply impressed than himself. He was, at the same time, interested and impartial in the question; the security of his new state and throne required European peace; he was bound to France and England by ties of almost equal intimacy, and was not engaged, by any direct object or personal act, in their Eastern difference. To the natural lights of this position he added those of an acute and rational mind, full of resources in its judicious foresight. He had conceived and endeavoured to impress in London, an idea which seemed to him well calculated to cut short the dangers of the future, and the embarrassments of the present: "The disastrous effects of the convention of the 15th of July," he said, "upon public opinion in France, will only be really abolished when that treaty is replaced by another between the five powers, the avowed object of which shall be the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Such a treaty, and such a solution of the European question, will give France the opportunity and means of emerging from the isolation in which she has been placed by the affair of Egypt." He

wrote upon this theme, first to King Louis-Philippe, and then to M. Thiers, and while I was at the Château d'Eu, his proposition formed the subject of our last conversations. We all, with one accord, considered it extremely acceptable, provided that on guaranteeing, in its actual *statu quo*, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the new treaty between the five powers applied equally to the Pacha and the Sultan, decided the Egyptian as well as the European question, and took the place of the treaty of July, concluded only between four. "But if, on the contrary," said M. Thiers, "the object of the treaty of five should not be to guarantee the *statu quo* for all the world; if, for instance, it contained the guarantee of the existence of the Turkish Empire by allowing the execution of the treaty of four recently stipulated, what would be done would have no meaning. While they executed the Viceroy of Egypt before our faces, and contrary to our interests and desires, we should sign, with the five executioners, a treaty of five against the future dangers of the Ottoman Empire, solely for the pleasure of doing something by five. We should resemble fractious children, who cry and make a noise to have a door opened which has been shut against them. In this there would be neither sense nor dignity."

On leaving the Château d'Eu to return to London, on the 14th of August, I received confidential instructions to the following effect :

"Two projects :

1. The *statu quo* guaranteed.
2. The mediation of France.

“*First Project.* The five powers to guarantee the existing state of the Ottoman possessions, on the basis of the treaty of Kutaieh. The Pacha to have no hereditary rights. If the Pacha, or any one else, should invade the states of the Sultan, the five powers, including France, would employ their forces against the invader. The advantage of this project is, that it requires no recourse to the Pacha.

“*Second Project.* The Pacha to empower France to treat for him. France to negotiate for the Pacha, and the four powers to treat anew with her. Egypt in hereditary succession, and Syria for life, would be the basis of the arrangement. This project has the inconvenience of depending on a contingency foreign to our wishes, namely, that the Pacha should request France to negotiate for him.

“This second project not to be proposed unless there is a probability of its being accepted, so that the dignity of France shall not be compromised by her expressing any desire to re-enter into a negotiation from which she has been excluded.”

When I embarked at Calais, on the 15th of August, the wind was violent, the sea heavy; the captain of the packet, *The Courier*, considered that it would be difficult to enter the port of Dover, and we therefore steered for Ramsgate. I was not expected there; but the arrangement of the flags, and two cannon shots fired on board the vessel, announced the presence of the Ambassador of France, and as we entered the harbour under the usual salutes, I found myself surrounded on the pier, not only by the local authorities, but by nearly the

entire population, who received me with enthusiastic *huzzas*. Free nations, well informed as to their affairs, associate themselves with the policy of their government, and seize with ready instinct, opportunities of seconding it. At Ramsgate they wished to show me that England had friendly feelings towards France, and that they fully expected that the momentary misunderstanding on a special question would not interfere with their good relations. I found, on arriving in London, an invitation from Queen Victoria to Windsor Castle, for Tuesday the 18th of August, and the three following days. The King and Queen of the Belgians were to pass those days there, and the whole court would be assembled, as well as several of the ministers, particularly Lords Melbourne and Palmerston. Without disavowing the policy of their cabinet in the Egyptian question, the sovereign and her people, Windsor and Ramsgate were equally anxious to evince that this incident changed nothing, as to general feeling, in their sentiments and designs.

During the two days that I passed in London, previous to the Queen's invitation, all the members of the diplomatic body who were still there, called upon me, curious and anxious to learn the intelligence I brought from the Château d'Eu. I neither informed nor calmed them; it suited us to encourage their apprehensions by silence. With the Baron de Bülow alone I held a long and serious conversation. He was on the point of leaving for Berlin: the death of King Frederick William III. recalled him. It was said that the new sovereign, Frederick William IV. intended to appoint

him Minister for Foreign Affairs, and when this was named to him he did not contradict it. I knew that his court had ratified the treaty of the 15th of July, and that he had received his instructions on the subject. On this ground he volunteered the conversation. "People are surprised," he said, "that we have ratified this treaty; they are angry with us for so doing. Could we have acted otherwise? By the note of the 27th of July, 1839, we had pledged ourselves to do something. Something has been done. I had received only a general instruction, to do as Austria did. I have signed the treaty; it is ratified. But my court, as you well know, is perfectly disinterested in, and almost a stranger to the question; it has only entered into and continued in it to conciliate, to aid measures, to prevent hostile shocks, and to maintain peace."

"What we precisely complain of," I replied to him, "what I reproach you with, allow me to use the expression, is, that you have not done this; that neither you nor Austria have assumed your proper place, and played your suitable part in this affair. Yes, you are the natural conciliators; you desire pacific acts and solutions. Why then have you allowed yourselves to be drawn into other paths? Why have you associated yourselves with extreme resolutions, measures of coercion, and the chances of war? It was easy for you to have arrested all that; you had only to decline participation. But instead of enforcing your own policy, you have followed in the wake of a policy which is not your own. Do not be offended at my words; you have acted, not as moderating, but as secondary powers; you could

and ought to have been mediators; you have reduced yourselves to satellites.

"I know not what they say of this in Germany, but in France, whence I have just returned, rational people, the friends of peace, cannot comprehend you. And it was so easy for you to have acted otherwise! A little passive resistance without the least danger!"

"There may be some truth in what you say," replied M. de Bülow, evidently embarrassed by the reproach; "but even if it were all true, the basis of our intentions and our position subsists still, and we have no intention of emerging from it. We are always moderators. The ratifications of the treaty have not the importance attributed to them."

"I know not exactly what importance the ratifications may have; but I do know that every new act which confirms or develops the convention of the 15th of July, every fresh step in that path redoubles the sentiment of offence and irritation it has excited in France. My friends, the French conservatives, are struggling for ten years, with indefatigable constancy, against anarchical and warlike passions. For ten years they have defended in Europe, and for all Europe, established order and peace; they have made great efforts, painful sacrifices; they have supported difficult measures, strong laws; and at the end of ten years they learn, one fine morning, that without the concurrence of France, and in concealment from her, resolutions are taken, which for a very trifling, remote, and problematical motive, endanger that pacific policy, and those peaceful alliances which have been so laboriously and successfully sustained.

They are wounded; they find that gratitude and consideration have been wanting to their country, their King, and themselves, together with prudence on the true bearing of affairs; and they feel both irritated and anxious."

"I do not comprehend," rejoined M. de Bülow quickly, "nor can I accept this reproach of resolutions taken against you, and in concealment. You knew beforehand all that was thought of, all that was desired. Let us be just; has not France endeavoured to carry out her own political views without us? Has she not sought to effect a direct arrangement between Constantinople and Alexandria? that is to say, precisely what by the note of the 27th of July, 1839, we all engaged, you as well as us, to prevent the Sultan from doing? France also signed that note? How we should have been laughed at had this direct arrangement taken place! How they would have exclaimed, and with reason, that France alone, and according to her own will, had settled the Eastern question! But all that is over; no one has anything more to do with it, or anything to gain by the discussion. Let us speak of the present which concerns us all."

"France knows nothing of the present position; she has not made it; she has been laid aside; she therefore stands aloof, and acts only on her own account."

"This is exactly what must come to an end; France must re-engage in the affairs of the East; means must be sought to effect this. We have thought of a second *memorandum*, by which, after the ratifications are exchanged, the four powers would give to France, on the

motives, signification, and bearing of the convention of the 15th of July, the most complete and re-assuring explanations, and would even pledge themselves never to seek in the Ottoman Empire any territorial acquisition or exclusive advantage. There is reason to believe that even M. de Brünnow would sign this engagement without difficulty. But let us turn to something more direct, more practical; let us consider what coming events are likely to produce. Mehemet Ali will either accept or refuse the propositions addressed to him by the Porte. If he accepts, all is settled, for you as well as for us. If he refuses, then we must take the matter again into consideration, and endeavour to re-engage you in it. You are aware of King Leopold's idea;—a great European measure, a treaty between the five leading powers, which would guarantee the existing state of the possessions of the Porte, and the *statu quo* of the East."

"That would do well," I replied, "if the *statu quo* were guaranteed for the whole East, and for all the Eastern world; that is to say, if the question of the relations of the Porte with Egypt, could be regulated at the same time with that of the relations of the Porte with Europe, and by the same treaty of the five great powers. But a general treaty which should leave in existence provisional treaties, amongst others the convention of the 15th of July, and that of Unkiar-Skelessi, would be vain and almost ludicrous. Let all partial treaties be abolished; let a general treaty place under the guarantee of the five powers, for all and against all, the existing state of the possessions of the Porte. Then indeed

a great service will be rendered to Europe, and we shall hold ourselves ready to concur in it."

"I understand you; on that condition alone can we hope to terminate the actual state of things. But the difficulty of thus ending will be very great in London, with Lord Palmerston; and while we are struggling in our present rut, we must not only re-engage you in the matter, but we must shift our ground, and take it elsewhere. When the Pacha delivers his answer, should he refuse, there is more than one way of approaching you. We have asked your moral co-operation, your influence at Alexandria; we can resume that path. I have also heard it said that M. Thiers, without explaining himself, spoke to Lord Granville of a hypothesis, (but I know little about it) in which the Pacha for his only answer should refer to France. Be that as it may, or through whatever mode you are re-involved in the question, when it again returns to be treated by the five powers, believe me, it is not in London, but at Vienna that the conferences should be held. Prince Metternich is not pledged like Lord Palmerston. Lord Palmerston will concede to him what he will refuse to M. Thiers. Vienna is nearer to the East, more in the centre of Europe. Pacific views, the true policy of the transaction, will prevail more easily at Vienna than in London. Prince Metternich for some time has held himself much apart; but be assured that if the solution of the Eastern affair could become his political testament, he would be delighted at it, and would strive earnestly for its success. This is the idea that has occurred to me, and I think it practical. I am going to write on the subject to my court."

Without pledging myself to anything, and while listening with polite but not eager attention, I acknowledged that this idea might prove useful, and that it would be well to observe the course which events might permit it to take.

An hour after my arrival at Windsor Castle, on the 18th of August, I had my first conversation with King Leopold. "I interest myself much in our affairs," he said to me, "and I think I have already gained ground. I found the Duke of Wellington here in the most reasonable disposition, and he has been very useful to me. He has no great liking for the Pacha, who he thinks ought not to possess St. Jean d'Acre; but the maintenance of peace, and the necessity of a good understanding with France, are in his eyes the leading points to which all others ought to be subordinated. He blames the proceeding of the English cabinet towards your's, and the entire manner in which the affair has been conducted. He accuses Lord Palmerston of having done all the mischief. I induced him to hold a long interview with Lord Melbourne, in which he told him all this, and concluded by saying that some arrangement ought to be sought for which might restore France to the question and secure peace. I am certain that this interview has made a profound impression upon Lord Melbourne, and that he has spoken of it to Lord Palmerston, who is himself doubtful and uneasy. Both are strongly disposed to entertain my idea of a great European measure, and of a treaty between the five powers to guarantee, against all enemies and dangers, the existing state of the possessions of the Porte. This is the only mode of really

concluding the affair ; without this, the actual position, or something analogous to it, will be perpetually recurring, and we shall be, as regards the East, in a permanent crisis."

"Your Majesty is quite right," I replied to the King ; "nothing can be more desirable than a definitive measure which may place the existing state of the Ottoman Empire under the guarantee of the five powers, and prevent the return of these almost periodical convulsions we are now enduring. But, Sire, it must be really the existing state of the Ottoman Empire which is thus guaranteed, in all its parts, for all the world, and against all the world. The *statu quo* and the guarantee must apply to the Pacha of Egypt equally with the Sultan, and the general treaty of the five powers must abolish all partial treaties by which, without success, attempts have been made to solve this great question, which can only be settled in its entirety and by general concert. Let the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, on the one hand, and that of the 15th of July last on the other, be replaced by a European convention, which shall guarantee and impose at once, on all the elements of the Ottoman Empire, peace and the *statu quo* ; Europe will thus really execute an act of wisdom in the East, and her security will be established."

"Yes, undoubtedly," replied King Leopold, "this is the end to be obtained. I have not yet spoken to Lord Palmerston of the necessity that the *statu quo* should apply to all, to the Pacha as well as the Sultan, and that the treaty of the 15th of July must fall before the general treaty. This will be the point of difficulty. To-morrow

I shall open a conversation with him on this subject."

"I trust your Majesty will be kind enough to let me know exactly how you proceed, and what Lord Palmerston may say in reply. In the position in which France has been placed, my attitude is necessarily immovable and expectant. I have nothing to ask, nothing to propose. We are pushed aside; we remain aside, until it is discovered that this produces general and serious inconvenience, and until a suitable gate is re-opened to us."

On the following morning, the 19th, after breakfast, King Leopold expressed a wish to see me again before his conversation with Lord Palmerston, "Let us understand each other thoroughly," he said, "and be perfectly clear as to what we desire to do. It is the system of the *statu quo* guaranteed by the five powers, and the advantage of all as also against all, that I am going to propose and recommend."

"Yes, Sire, and the advantages are so great, so evident, that if nothing is compromised, all the world, I venture to say, would eagerly adopt it. This system at once settles all questions, that of Alexandria as well as of Constantinople; it dissipates the perils of the present, and prevents those of the future; it neither places Europe at the mercy of the Sultan, nor of the Pacha. The five powers treat together, and they neither demand nor expect anything from anybody to put their resolutions in vigour. It cannot be said that this system is too favourable to Mehemet Ali; for on the one hand, it refuses him both in Egypt and Syria the heirship which

is the avowed object of his ambition, and on the other, interdicts to him all new ambition, all territorial aggrandisement, by associating France with the measure of coercion which might in that case be taken against him. Assuredly there is no policy which can offer better guarantees for the repose of Europe, or evince greater disinterestedness on the part of the powers who determine to adopt it."

"That is true, perfectly true," rejoined King Leopold, "but the question is not complete; objections and difficulties will be raised. There is yet another system which you desired to name to me."

"Yes, Sire, and this is it. In case the Pacha, appointed by the Porte, should request France to treat for him, or if the four powers, on their part, should manifest, on this demand of the Pacha, a desire of resuming negotiation with France, Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life, might form, in the opinion of the King's government, the basis of the arrangement. But I must repeat to your Majesty, that with regard to this second system as well as the first, the idea of which your Majesty has suggested, France has nothing to ask or offer, and her dignity does not permit her to re-appear in a question, the solution of which has been attempted without her, until the necessity of her presence shall be acknowledged. I add that the second system has the serious inconvenience of requiring recourse to the Pacha; and if the Pacha refuses assent, he may, by passing the Taurus and threatening Constantinople, plunge Europe into that extreme confusion which we are all anxious to avoid."

King Leopold agreed : " But," said he, " in case, for the adoption of the plan of the *statu quo* guaranteed for the general benefit, they should require from Mehemet Ali some concession, that of the district of Adana for instance, so that the *statu quo* might not be exactly, as regards the Pacha, that of the treaty of Kutaieh, what do you then think possible ?"

I replied that in that contingency, I had no instructions.

During the morning, King Leopold held a conversation of more than two hours with Lord Palmerston ; and in the evening when I approached to take leave of him, for I was to depart from Windsor the day following, he took me aside ; " I have opened the breach," he said ; " a strong sentiment prevails of the importance of the situation, but the obstinacy is great ; there is wounded self-love and restless personality ; individual names are mingled with arguments, and recriminations with reasons. Lord Palmerston persists continually in saying that Mehemet Ali will give in, either on the demand of the Porte or on the first employment of coercive measures. There is however an important step established ; the idea of a treaty between the five powers to guarantee the Ottoman Empire is well received ; the necessity of inducing France to resume the question is strongly felt. I shall remain here still for several days. I shall persevere ; we must have patience and advance by degrees."

It was evident to me that King Leopold had not gained much ground with Lord Palmerston, and I doubted much whether he would gain more by prolong-

ing his stay at Windsor ; for I knew that Lord Palmerston intended to return the same day to London, and to go from thence to Tiverton on the 22nd of August, where a meeting was announced which would supply him with an occasion for speaking on the state of affairs. During my stay at Windsor, I neither exchanged with Lord Palmerston nor Lord Melbourne a single word on politics ; they addressed none to me ; I neither uttered nor courted any. Lord Palmerston seemed a little subdued ; Lord Melbourne, contrary to his habit, had a thoughtful air ; both displayed towards me their usual courtesy ; the Queen and Prince Albert treated me with condescending kindness which might have, without expressing it, a political significance ; but I left Windsor, on the 20th of August, convinced that in reality nothing was changed in the position, and that events would follow the extremely obscure course which the treaty of the 15th of July had impressed on them.

My observations on returning to London, whether as to the government or the public confirmed me in this conviction. My silent attitude was much commented on ; I was asked what had taken place at Eu, at Windsor, and if there was anything new. My answer direct or indirect was always, " Nothing ; France has not changed her sentiments or intentions ; she is always anxious for peace, ever a stranger to ambitious views ; but she remains in the position that has been made for her, and prepares herself for the events that have been sown." The solitude of London at that epoch and the reserve I practised rendered my opportunities and means of information sufficiently rare ; nevertheless it appeared

certain to me that the cabinet became from day to-day more seriously pre-occupied with what it had done; perhaps it regretted it, and would act differently could it be recalled; but still there was no idea of retracing its steps, and something beyond arguments and conversations was necessary to produce that result. It was announced that the insurrection in Syria against the Pacha had been promptly suppressed by his son Ibrahim. Analogous miscalculations, the persevering refusals of Mehemet Ali, the ill success of the first attempts at coercion, the incidents, in a word, which might occur on the one hand, to aggravate the weight of the position upon its authors, and on the other, to open some new door for the re-entrance of France into the question;—these were, in my opinion, the only causes sufficient to detach the English cabinet from the course on which it had entered.

As to the English public, the vivacity of the French manifestation had at first surprised and even rallied them round their government; but, on my return to London, I fancied that I saw a desire for peace and a feeling of mistrust towards the policy of Lord Palmerston resuming by degrees their empire. Interests were more seriously alarmed; dangers rose above the horizon and became apparent to all eyes. The Tories seemed less disposed to accept what the cabinet had done. The Duke of Wellington repeated in London what he had said to King Leopold at Windsor; according to him it was a bad business; they had taken a very injurious course; they ought to find some means of coming to an understanding with France. Lord Lyndhurst protested

against any intervention of Russian troops at Constantinople or in Asia. Altogether, the movement of minds was not favourable to the policy which had been acted on in England, and doubt began to penetrate the bosom of that policy itself. "But while I detail these symptoms to your Excellency," I wrote to M. Thiers on the 21st of August, "I have no wish to exaggerate their importance. I do not yet perceive here, either with the public or the different parties, those decided sentiments, those strong and active impressions which create or arrest events."

At Windsor, on Wednesday, the 19th of August, Lady Palmerston, who was returning to London, engaged me to dine with her on the Friday following. I went accordingly. We were a very small company. After dinner, "I wish much to speak a moment with you this evening," said Lord Palmerston; and a quarter of an hour afterwards, passing with me into a small cabinet adjoining the drawing-room, he began: "I wanted to talk with you of our affairs, at Windsor, but in those royal houses we can seldom do as we wish; time and liberty are both wanting."

"For myself, my lord, if I said nothing to you there, it was because I had nothing to say; there has been no change with us since my last interview with you; we are not mixed up with the passing events; we expect them, and while waiting, we act according to our foresight."

"I return to-morrow to Windsor; I come back on the day after, in the evening; on Monday, I shall take Lady Palmerston to the Isle of Wight; I shall have to

go from thence to Tiverton to meet my constituents and to attend our local races. I shall not return to London until the commencement of the following week ; I think by that time we shall hear something from Alexandria."

"Have you heard nothing yet respecting the propositions of the Porte to the Pacha?"

"No, there has been some delay with the couriers ; the Pacha ought to have received the propositions, or he is about to receive them at this moment."

"They were then made before the exchange of the ratifications?"

"Yes."

"And have all the ratifications arrived?"

"Yes ; those of Russia came the day before yesterday, none are wanting but those of the Porte itself."

I did not continue the conversation, and there was a moment of silence. Lord Palmerston went on ; "M. Thiers on his return from the Château d'Eu, spoke to Lord Granville of the instructions given to your admirals ; I know that they are very moderate, very prudent, and that you prescribe to them to avoid carefully all misunderstanding or collision."

"The instructions of the King's government are strictly conformable to its policy. It desires that peace may not be disturbed. It will not anticipate perils that it has not created ; it will apply itself, on the contrary, to ward them off."

"Admiral Stopford will remain at his post, although his term of service has expired, and according to rule, he might be recalled. He is a very prudent man, and has always preserved a good understanding with the French admirals."

"The same, I think, may be said of Admiral Hugon."

The conversation again languished for a moment; "King Leopold has mentioned his idea to me," said Lord Palmerston; "a treaty between the five powers which might guarantee the *statu quo* of the Ottoman Empire."

"You and I, my lord, have already spoken more than once, and beyond a few casual words, of that solution; it is simple and effective. It secures to the Porte an undisputed protectorate. It does not give the Pacha what he demands, neither does it take from him by force what he actually possesses. It maintains peace for the present and guarantees it for the future. It unites the five powers in a common action as well as in a combined intention. But it is clear that such a general treaty could not be concluded, unless by abolishing and replacing all partial treaties that may have preceded it."

"That is true, but impossible at present. A treaty has been concluded between four powers, not with a general and permanent object, as would be that of which we are speaking, but with a special and momentary view. This incidental treaty must follow its course, and when accomplished, the general treaty may well take its place. To-day we must wait events."

"Yes, my lord; but we foresee these events otherwise than as you do; we look upon as extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, what appears to you easy, and as fraught with peril what seems to you without danger. And while your partial treaty is following its course, the

peace of the East, the balance of Europe, and the peace of Europe may be compromised for ever."

"I know that you think so. We shall see. If events prove that you are right, events must take their course. After all, you and we have the same general and permanent policy in the East. If it should become necessary to bring Russian armies to Asia, England would probably not be more disposed to that measure than France. We should then look for other means, and what may not be practicable to-day, might perhaps become so then. Meanwhile, we must try what has been agreed on—maritime efforts."

"My lord, what are your fleets really going to do?"

"They will intercept all communication between Egypt and Syria, and will supply the Sultan with the means of transport he may require. We shall not establish any blockade. We find ourselves in the same position here, in which we lately were, in conjunction with you, on the coasts of Spain. Mehemet Ali is not more a sovereign than Don Carlos was; as regards him we have no belligerent rights; the Sultan only would have the privilege of blockade. He will do what he can with his own forces. We shall not place ourselves in collision with commercial interests or the rights of neutrals. We cannot do this."

I detained and prolonged the conversation on this point. I repeated in detail all that had passed with regard to Spain, the difficulties which England and France had equally acknowledged, the principles we had mu-

tually respected. Lord Palmerston agreed with all, and repeated these words at several intervals, "No commercial blockade."

"Is it true, my lord, that you have added several ships to your fleet?"

"Yes, we shall increase it to sixteen. Yours, at this moment, amounts to eighteen. You are even preparing five more in addition, which would give you a preponderance that we could not admit. I know not exactly when your five ships may be ready; but if this announced addition takes place, we should be obliged either to convoke Parliament, to ask more powerful means, or to invite a portion of the Russian fleet to join us in the Mediterranean, which we should do with great reluctance, for we have no desire to add, in that quarter, to the appearances of intimacy."

I made no answer. The conversation continued for some time, returning to hackneyed facts or topics, to the question as to whether Mehemet Ali would accede to the propositions of the Porte; to the true meaning of the note of the 27th of July, 1839; to the attempt at a direct arrangement between the Porte and the Pacha, and to part taken in it by France. On this point, Lord Palmerston used the same language with Baron de Bülow. "Your cabinet did that without our knowledge, and to settle the affair without us. We should have been finely laughed at had it succeeded." I replied by a peremptory recrimination, the convention of the 15th of July concluded in concealment from us, and that we separated without taking a step towards reconciliation, but also without animosity, leaving to coming

events the conduct to be adopted henceforward on both sides.

All these interviews and plans, these attempts at conciliation led to a new diplomatic document which, on the 24th of August I announced to M. Thiers in these terms : “ King Leopold and Lord Melbourne have, with some difficulty, prevailed on Lord Palmerston to forward a dispatch to Lord Granville, which will be communicated to you, and will contain,—First, fresh explanations on the bearing of the convention of the 15th of July last, and the special intentions of England in that act. There is not the most remote idea of hostility or negligence towards France. No view of aggrandizement in the East. The pure, simple, and practical adhesion to the note of the 27th of July, 1839, conceived with the sole design of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The object of this part is to reply to the susceptibilities, doubts, and sinister presentiments of France. Then will follow an indication, that notwithstanding the convention of the 15th of July last, and even on the supposition of its success, the East will still be far from being settled. The general position of the Ottoman Empire, and its relations with Europe will remain undetermined. Also an allusion to the convenience and necessity of a great treaty between the five powers to guarantee, towards all, and against all, the existing state of the possessions of the Porte, with an overture to France to re-engage thus in the affair.

“ ‘ Well,’ said Lord Palmerston, ‘ *I’ll move the first.*’

“ According to Lord Melbourne’s idea, King Leopold

told me, the convention of the 15th of July last would be absorbed and abolished by the general treaty, should that be concluded. Lord Palmerston does not yet go that length.

“I give you this as I have received it, without undertaking to reconcile and combine these two treaties, the one special, the other general, and yet not settling what the special treaty has settled; the one in execution while the other is in negotiation; the great treaty intended to supplant the small one if it succeeds, and to replace it if it fails. I see throughout a mode of inviting us back, and an initiative indirectly taken with that object.

“Lord Palmerston’s dispatch to Lord Granville will contain no demand for explanations as to the French armaments. It is hoped that, in your answer you will yourself characterize those armaments, and the whole policy as well as the actual measures of France, so as to exclude all idea of menace or warlike ambition. King Leopold considers this as important, particularly as regards the continental cabinets.

“On this point, I said at once that in removing from our preparations all idea of menace or warlike ambition, you would not, assuredly, convey any impression that should in the slightest degree diminish their importance or effect, or change in any respect the attitude which France might think it necessary to assume and maintain. My remark was thoroughly understood and well received.

“So much for the projected dispatch, which, however, was not drawn up yesterday. Lord Palmerston was employed on it.”

Terminated on the 31st of August and forwarded to

Paris on the 1st of September, Lord Palmerston's dispatch was communicated on the 3rd to the French cabinet by Sir Henry Bulwer, the English chargé d'affaires in the absence of Lord Granville. It found M. Thiers in a disposition little favourable; the news he had received from St. Petersburg described to him the lively satisfaction imparted to the Emperor Nicholas by the treaty of the 15th July. "Since his accession," M. Thiers wrote to me on the 23rd of August, "he has not been more elated. He rejoices, not at the prospect of a journey to the East, but at having embroiled France and England. He holds this result as immense, and makes no attempt to conceal the hopes he derives from it. He considers it hard to be called upon continually to act in the East, for he is less prepared than he wishes to appear; but he will nevertheless do all that can be done to widen the breach between France and England to the uttermost extent. He has declared that he would carry out the convention of the 15th of July alone, if necessary."

The news from Alexandria preoccupied M. Thiers no less than that from St. Petersburg. "If the English, as I fear," he said, "are going to make any attempt on the coasts of Syria, I suspect that will suffice for the Pacha, for he is capable, on a blockade, or on any act whatever, of setting every thing in a blaze. As a proof I send you a dispatch from Cochelet. You will see, whether it is easy to carry a point with such a man! You will see when I named to you, two months since, the difficulty of *Syria for life and Egypt hereditarily*, whether I judged rightly, and well understood this singular personage! Hold it for certain that if any serious attempt

is made on Alexandria, or on any part of the country in insurrection or insurrectionable, Mehemet Ali will pass the Taurus, bring down the Russians, and blow up Europe along with himself. People who are sensible to the dangers of war ought to be impressed with this conviction. We expect the new *memorandum*. The answer will not much embarrass me; it will be suited to the request."

When Lord Palmerston's new *memorandum* arrived, it was far from producing on the French cabinet the effect anticipated, I will not say, by the minister who had written, but by those who had suggested it to him. "The famous note settles nothing," M. Thiers wrote on the 4th of September; "it would aggravate rather than ameliorate the position, if we were disposed to be susceptible. This is exactly the *memorandum* of the 17th of July, augmented by recriminations upon the past, asking a second time for our moral influence, and offering, after the execution of the treaty of the 15th of July, to include us again in the number of the five powers to guarantee the Turkish Empire against the dangers with which it might be eventually menaced. This, correctly interpreted, means that after having accepted the Russian alliance against Mehemet Ali, England would do us the honour of accepting the French alliance against the Russians. In truth, they are not more accommodating than this, and we should have strong reason to complain. It would be better to rest on the *memorandum* of the 17th of July. Meanwhile, we must not take this angrily. We must be cold and indifferent, we must say that this note would add to the offensive proceeding if we were inclined

to take matters in bad part; for when the treaty of the 15th July had so keenly wounded us, to tell us that after its execution they would concert with us, is to redouble the injury. But this must be named incidentally, without urging it, without reducing it to to an official answer, in a confidential form, so that it may be known that we are not satisfied. We must avoid making this step a fresh cause for disagreement between the two courts, but we must also be careful not to tell the English that they have given us satisfaction. The official reply will be made with calmness, moderation, and much respect for England; but it will maintain our opinions and our rights. It will not be very pressing."

The impression of M. Thiers was well founded: in drawing up his note of the 31st of August, Lord Palmerston was thinking much more of himself than of his French readers; and without any desire of fomenting the misunderstanding between the two countries, he endeavoured to show that in the origin and progress of the affair, England had done no wrong and committed no fault, but had rather sought to dissipate the prejudices and appease the irritation of France. His is a mind essentially argumentative, which displays and enjoys itself in discussion to the extent of his losing sight of the definitive and practical end. I replied to M. Thiers on the 9th of September: "I think with you, that Lord Palmerston's new dispatch is nearly a second edition of the *memorandum* of the 17th of July, and is worth less than the first. It is with politics as theologians deal with controversy when possessed by the mania of being always in the right.

Lord Palmerston had no idea of this dispatch. It has been pressed on him ; they wanted it to be a step, an advance ; he had no wish for this, and has therefore written an essay. He attaches however to this essay a certain importance. His friends speak of it as a master-piece. If published, it would produce some effect upon the English people. Your answer, in turn, will have importance ; and it is very desirable that when it becomes known it also should contain its effects. Be assured that the public here require to be informed and enlightened. Their disposition is friendly, their desire for peace sincere ; but they are in much anxiety of spirit ; they do not see clearly how their government is in error, nor why France complains and seeks to separate. Their ideas are neither prompt nor prolific. They do not grasp spontaneously, and at once, all that is comprised in a question or position. They look for facts, allegations, and reciprocal reasons. There are inquiries, and debates at the tail of inquiries ; and this is so much a custom that is become in some degree the rule, and almost the nature of their minds. You must therefore give them something to examine, compare, debate, and refute. Even the most favourably disposed, the most declared friends, require information and evidence, for they do not supply either by the activity of their own thoughts, and if not furnished with what they expect, they remain uncertain and inactive. I know how difficult it is, in such matters, to satisfy temperaments like these ; but it is necessary that you should know this, and give it full consideration."

Two unexpected incidents occurred at this period

which deserve to be recalled : one, on account of its consequences, which I shall return to hereafter ; the other, as a symptom of the state of feeling amongst the men who at Constantinople, Alexandria, Paris, and London, concurred or assisted diplomatically in the execution of the decree of the 15th of July.

On the 25th of July, Lord Palmerston invited me to meet, at his residence, on the following day, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to resume, in concert with them, the negotiation commenced by my predecessor, General Sebastiani, for a treaty between the five powers on the subject of the slave trade. The leading object of this treaty was to induce Austria, Prussia, and Russia to enter into the system of repression prescribed by the treaty and already adopted by France and England, in virtue of the conventions of the 30th of November, 1831 and the 22nd of March, 1833. For convenience solely, and to place the five powers on the same footing, instead of demanding from three amongst them a simple adhesion to the measures already settled between the other two, it had been agreed that a new treaty should be drawn up in which the five powers would equally concur. And as it had been admitted that some modifications were necessary in the measures agreed on for several years between France and England, to assure their efficacy, Lord Palmerston had introduced these modifications into the project of the new treaty, of which, on the same day, he transmitted a copy to each of the five plenipotentiaries. The principal modifications related to fixing the limits within which the mutual right of search, as adopted and practised by France and Eng-

land, should henceforward be exercised by the five powers. M. de Brünnow, by order of his court, objected to the new limits proposed by Lord Palmerston, as also to the character of perpetuity attached to the treaty. Lord Palmerston supported the condition of perpetuity, while inclined to make, in the new limits he proposed for the exercise of the right of mutual search, alterations calculated to remove the objections of Baron de Brünnow; but as the Russian minister declared that he was not authorized to accept these new propositions, it was agreed that he should transmit them to his court, and that in the meantime the negotiations should be suspended.

Towards the end of August, I was informed that Baron de Brünnow had received authority from St. Petersburg to consent to the new limits indicated for the mutual right of search, as well as to all the other provisions, and to the political character of the treaty. The plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia were furnished with similar powers. I learned at the same time that Mr. Porter, intrusted by his government with the commercial treaty then pending between France and England, was on the point of starting for Paris, having definitive instructions for the conclusion of the projected treaty. Our friends in London said to me, "Although we may have no right to expect from France a very friendly reception for Mr. Porter, it is nevertheless highly important that he should return there as an index of good feeling, and what is more, as representing a very decided opinion against the existing policy of Lord Palmerston." They therefore requested me to recommend him warmly to the French

cabinet. At the same time I expected daily to receive an invitation from Lord Palmerston to meet the other four plenipotentiaries for the definitive signature of the new treaty relative to the suppression of the slave trade. On the 2nd of September, I requested M. Thiers to furnish me with the necessary instructions and powers on this subject. "It would seem strange," I said to him, "if I alone should be unprovided with these powers, and if at the moment when Austria, Prussia, and Russia consent, after long hesitation, to the system for the repression of the slave trade, which France and England for a long time have exercised in concert, France alone should speak of delay. You know the importance attached here to this question. If we should conclude at the same time, with England, a treaty upon material interests, a treaty of commerce, and a treaty upon a great moral question, the abolition of the slave trade, we should establish an important and advantageous effect with the English public. As is natural, it is the effect *here* with which I am impressed and of which I speak to you. Its importance is great. You will estimate it accordingly."

As was natural also, M. Thiers thought more of the effect in Paris than of the effect in London. He replied to me,* respecting the commercial treaty; "I shall receive Mr. Porter courteously. It is a serious matter to consent to a treaty of commerce under present circumstances. I fear taking any of its importance from this position. However, I comprehend the objections to a refusal." And on the new treaty for the abolition of the slave

* On the 26th of August, 1840.

trade.* “I am going to consult on the question of the slave trade. I hesitate to conclude treaty upon treaty with parties who have behaved so ill to us.” The two negotiations remained thus in suspense.

On the 5th of September, Lord Palmerston, returning from his second visit to Windsor, wrote to say that he wished to communicate to me two important reports from Constantinople. I repaired at once to his house. He gave me two dispatches to read, one from Lord Ponsonby to himself, the other from Baron de Stürmer, Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, addressed to Prince Metternich. Both contained an account of a conversation between M. de Pontois and Redschid Pacha, which Redschid Pacha, in much agitation, had communicated through his dragoman to Lord Ponsonby and M. de Stürmer. M. de Pontois, it was said, had declared to Redschid Pacha that France would not allow, in the East, the execution of the treaty of the 15th of July, nor the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali; that she would support the Pacha, by force, in his resistance, and would unite with him to *revolutionize* all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. I confined myself to saying calmly to Lord Palmerston that there was something in this I could not understand, from want of information doubtless, and to asking from him a copy of the two dispatches. “My lord,” I added, “you recollect the language I used when receiving from your hands your *memorandum* of the 17th of last July; it contained this phrase: ‘That France in any case, would not oppose the measures which the four courts, in concert with the Sultan, might judge necessary to obtain the

* On the 8th of September, 1840.

consent of the Pacha of Egypt.' I refused to admit the expression *in any case*. I added that I was certain of having said nothing to authorize it; that the King's government, assuredly, would not set itself up as the armed champion of anyone, and would never compromise for the sole interests of the Pacha of Egypt, the peace and interests of France; but that, if the measures adopted by the four powers against the Pacha, should assume, in the eyes of the King's government, such a character and consequence, that the existing balance of the European states might be thereby altered, it could not consent to them. That it would then consider how to act, and would preserve, on this point, the fullest liberty. What I had the honour of saying to you, my lord, on the 17th of July, I repeat to-day; and all that I have seen, heard, or received, since the 17th of July, gives me reason to think that such are in fact the intentions of the King's government."

"That is quite true," replied Lord Palmerston; "such is the language you have always held; but how explain that of M. de Pontois? It would amount to war. Has there been a wish, by frightening the Turks, to prevent them from ratifying the treaty?" "I cannot tell, my lord; I can say nothing on what I am unacquainted with. Be so kind as to send me a copy of these two documents. I shall transmit them immediately to the King's government." I then retired.

Without waiting for the copy of the two dispatches, I informed the French cabinet of the communication which Lord Palmerston had just made to me. M. Thiers replied immediately; "M. de Saint Aulaire has received

at Königswarth, from Prince Metternich, a similar notification. The reproaches applied to M. de Pontois, from Vienna, were precisely the same as those you have received. He had announced immediate war under any circumstances, whatever might take place in Syria; he had declared that we were going to join Mehemet Ali to raise Asia Minor in insurrection, and to throw the Ottoman Empire into confusion. I need not tell you that there is not a word of truth in all this. You may say so in my name. I received yesterday a long dispatch from M. de Pontois which makes no allusion to it, and prevents all supposition of anything of the kind. The instructions at Constantinople were conformable to those given to the other agents, and M. de Pontois is not a man to exceed them. I can readily believe he has used strong language, that he has complained vehemently to the Porte of its infidelity to our ancient alliance, that he may have qualified the conduct of Redschid Pacha as culpable and imprudent, that he may have told him that Mehemet Ali would stir up the whole Ottoman Empire to rebellion; but I affirm that he has not said all attributed to him by Redschid Pacha. It is, moreover, not true that any attempt has been made to prevent the ratification of the treaty of the 15th of July. M. de Pontois could not have thought of anything so impossible. But he wished to excite fear in a general manner; he has succeeded, and Redschid Pacha has revenged himself by denouncing him to the four courts. This is all. We must now deny, without weakening the effect produced by M. de Pontois. We must confine ourselves to denial of a single point, the announce-

ment of our co-operation with Mehemet Ali in exciting rebellion in Asia Minor. We must use this simple phrase ; ‘ My lord, we have too much condemned what has taken place in Syria to imitate it in Asia Minor. Such an event might readily happen, but not through our fault or suggestions. As to menacing language, we cannot answer for the style of agents, or the fidelity of translators. M. de Pontois has spoken the truth if he has said that under certain circumstances France would not remain an inactive spectator of what might take place in the East.’ I do not pretend to dictate what you are to say ; you are more skilled in such matters than I am ; but this, I think, is the right tone to adopt.”

Some days after, not before the 11th of September, Lord Palmerston forwarded to me copies of the two dispatches which he had communicated to me. He had added a note from himself, dated on the 9th, to which, in transmitting it, I called the attention of the King’s government. “ If I am not mistaken,” I wrote to M. Thiers on the 12th of September, “ this note has for its object to attenuate the language used by the King’s government to the English cabinet, whether in Paris, and through your Excellency’s organ in his communications with Lord Granville, or in London through me in my relations with Lord Palmerston. This language has invariably been impressed with extreme moderation, and an animated desire that the peace of Europe should not be disturbed ; but at the same time we have always declared the opinion formed by the King’s government of the convention of the 15th of July, and of its possible

consequences, and have reserved for it, for the future, the fullest liberty of conduct. If this character were removed from it, the policy of the King's government might lose a portion of its dignity, and experience some day a degree of embarrassment and impediment. It is, I think, important, that no word or silence may justly be attributed to it, tending to place its foresight or independence in question. Your Excellency will remember the English *memorandum* of the 17th of July, and the attempt to establish that France had pledged herself not to oppose, *in any case*, any of the measures which the five powers might adopt with reference to the Pacha of Egypt. The new note which I have now the honour of transmitting to your Excellency, appears to me to be conceived, at the bottom, in the same idea. The complaints raised against the language of M. de Pontois, would thus become a means of enervating, from this day, what the King's government has been able to say, and of obstructing hereafter what it might consider prudent and profitable to do. The most simple and effectual mode, as it appears to me, of preventing this inconvenience, is to replace under the eyes of the British cabinet the language which the King's government has held, both in Paris and London, since the convention of the 15th of July was announced. This is what I endeavoured to do in the project of the note I had the honour of transmitting to your Excellency. I have not wished to take upon myself to reply thus to the note which Lord Palmerston has just addressed to me. But if the King's government finds it difficult to leave this note unanswered, which has not been written

without an object, it will perhaps consider it convenient to reply, as I suggest, in the same words which were addressed in its name to the British cabinet, at first when the *memorandum* of the 17th of July last was communicated to us, and subsequently in the *counter-memorandum* of your Excellency, dated the 24th of July, and at the moment of my placing it in Lord Palmerston's hands.

“I beg your Excellency to give me your instructions on this subject.”

M. Thiers replied on the 18th of September: “The King's government gives its entire approbation to the draught of a note which you have forwarded to me, in reply to the note handed to you by Lord Palmerston on the subject of the language imputed by Redschid Pacha to the Count de Pontois. The skilful drawing up of that draught is well calculated to counteract the intention which the British minister may have had in recording in such an inaccurate and exaggerated manner our anterior declarations. I therefore recommend you not to delay the transmission of a document calculated to place the question on its true ground, above all arbitrary or interested interpretations. It is perfectly true besides, that M. de Pontois has not used the strange language attributed to him. He has confined himself to declaring that France, justly dissatisfied with the proceeding of the Porte and its allies, reserved to herself entire liberty of action; and to calling the serious attention of Redschid Pacha to the dangers of the path in which his government had entered, particularly as to the insurrections which it would be easy for Mehemet Ali to excite

amongst the peoples subjugated to the authority of the Sultan.”*

While in Paris and London we thus revolved in the same circle, making resolves and taking precautions for a future which seemed to us to increase in uncertainty, events hurried on in the East, and decided the questions we never ceased to discuss. The news of the conclusion of the treaty of the 15th of July, had reached Constantinople, and despite some dissensions in the interior of the Divan, and some objections by his mother the Sultana Validé, the Sultan, always under the influence of Redschild Pacha, hastened to accept it, and forwarded the ratifications to London, instructing Rifat Bey to carry to Alexandria the successive summonses which in the terms of the treaty the Porte was to address to the Pacha. Rifat Bey arrived at Alexandria on the 11th of August, but found no Mehemet Ali there. He had been for some days on a tour in Lower Egypt, under the pretext of visiting the canals of the Nile, but in reality to gain time, and prepare his means of defence. Having returned to Alexandria on the 14th, he received Rifat Bey on the 16th, and without entering into discussion with him, scarcely giving him time to speak, he rejected the first summons prescribed by the treaty. On the following day, the 17th, the consuls of the four subscribing powers asked an audience of the Pacha, and remonstrated with him on his refusal. He repulsed them sharply, cut short Colonel Hodges, the English consul, and persevered in his resistance, saying, “I shall only yield to the sabre what I won by the

* See Historic Documents, No. IX.

sabre." He made no attempt to conceal his agitation, but without appearing to be apprehensive or intimidated, and some of those present might believe that the gravity of the circumstances were, for this adventurous spirit, a cause of satisfaction rather than a subject of displeasure. Others, more clear-sighted or sceptical, saw in the attitude and language of the Pacha, no definitive resolution, and said that as soon as the danger became imminent, he would be more prudent than daring, and would resign himself, not to compromise all, to the sacrifices demanded.

Nearly at the same moment when Rifat Bey arrived at Alexandria and before he was admitted to an audience with Mehemet Ali, Admiral Napier with four line of battle ships and several vessels of an inferior class detached from the squadron of Admiral Stopford, appeared on the 14th of August before Beyrout, summoned Soliman Pacha* who commanded there for Mehemet Ali, to evacuate the town and Syria, issued a proclamation to the Syrians calling upon them to throw off the Egyptian yoke and to return under the rule of the Sultan, declared that in case of refusal he should adopt the most decisive measures against Beyrout and the garrison, and immediately seized the small Egyptian vessels within his reach. At the same time, Admiral Stopford himself, with the remainder of his squadron arrived in the road of Alexandria and took up his station there,

* Octavius Joseph Sèves, a lieutenant in the French army in 1814, and who in 1816 had emigrated to Egypt, where, by his merit and services he rose high in the favour of the Pacha, and became major-general of the Egyptian army.

waiting until Mehemet Ali should reply to the summons of the Sultan.

The intelligence of these first acts of the execution of the treaty of the 15th of July reached Paris on the 5th of September, and M. Thiers wrote to me on the 8th; "Ask how it happens that before the ratifications, before even the expiration of the stipulated delays, they have begun to operate in Syria against Beyrout. Truly this is neither becoming nor legal as regards the law of nations. But adieu to coercive measures! Syria stirs not; the Emir Beschir remains faithful to Mehemet Ali; Ibrahim Pacha with all his forces returns to crush the adventurers who may be tempted to disembark. Nothing will remain, should things happen thus, but to give the English public the gratifying spectacle of Russian intervention." I had not waited these instructions to act in London as was now prescribed to me. On the 9th of September, I wrote to M. Thiers: "This morning, on reading the proclamations of Admiral Napier and the detail of his first operations, I considered how I should immediately express my surprise and compel the cabinet to some explanations. There was no minister in London; Lord Palmerston at Broadlands, Lord Melbourne and Lord John Russell at Windsor. People sleep quite at ease with the ocean behind them. I called on Lord Clarendon who was not at home. He came to my house an hour after. 'My lord,' I said to him, 'you are the only member of the cabinet I can find; be, I pray you, Lord Palmerston for a moment, and tell me how it happens that war is begun against the Pacha in Syria before he has been told in Egypt what is

required of him.' Lord Clarendon, as a matter of course, gave me no explanation. But he will repeat what I said to him. I spoke in the same sense, and warmly, to several members of the diplomatic body. Lord Palmerston returns to London to-morrow. I shall convey to him my astonishment. All that I can learn gives me reason to expect some sudden and vigorous attack by the English fleet on the coast of Syria, probably on St. Jean d'Acre. If such a stroke should succeed, the effect would be great. I scarcely believe in its success. But undoubtedly something of the kind has been prepared and is looked for here; some bold enterprise to bring matters to issue."

Lord Palmerston had an answer to our complaints against the precipitate execution of the treaty of the 15th of July, founded on a document which at that epoch had not been published. To the text of that treaty a reserved protocol was attached, signed in London, on the same day, by the plenipotentiaries of Turkey and the five powers, to the following effect:

"Considering that owing to the distance which separates the capitals of the respective courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the exchange of the ratifications of the above named convention can take place, and the orders founded on this act can be put in execution;

"And the said plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the conviction that in the existing state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity as well as the serious considerations of European policy which form the object of the common solicitude of the sub-

scribing powers to the convention of this date, call upon them imperiously to avoid, as much as possible, any delay in the accomplishment of the peace which the said transaction is intended to attain ;

“The said plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed that the preliminary measures named in Article II. of the present convention shall be put in execution forthwith, without waiting the exchange of ratifications. The respective plenipotentiaries formally attest by the present act the consent of their courts to the immediate execution of these measures.”

This protocol did not annul the violence and injustice to be exercised towards Mehemet Ali by the treaty of the 15th of July, before making him acquainted with the terms prescribed by that treaty, and calling upon him to accept or reject its conditions. It merely effaced the diplomatic irregularity which we had a right to notice before the exchange of the ratifications.

On the 16th of September, when all the ratifications had arrived and been exchanged in London, Lord Palmerston at length made known to us officially and textually the treaty of the 15th of July, and two days after, he communicated to me a protocol dated the 17th of September, by which “the plenipotentiaries of the courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, with a view of placing in its true light the disinterestedness which had governed their course in the conclusion of the treaty of the 15th of July, formally declared that in the execution of the engagements entailed by the said treaty on the contracting powers, those powers would not seek any augmentation of territory or exclu-

sive influence, or any commercial advantage for their subjects, beyond those which other nations might equally obtain.”*

On the same day on which Lord Palmerston made this communication to me, I received the following dispatch from M. Thiers, dated the 17th of September :

“ Mehemet Ali yielding to our urgent remonstrances, has determined on a great concession. He consents to restore at once to the Sultan, Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, thus confining his pretensions to the hereditary investiture of Egypt, and the possession of Syria for life. I cannot believe but that such reasonable conditions will be accepted. To reject them, would be evidently to reduce the Pacha to the necessity of defending his political existence by arms, and I feel convinced that he would not hesitate to do so. I must say that it is not the King’s government that would call upon him to add fresh sacrifices to those he now offers. The powers would find themselves, beyond all doubt, compelled to have recourse to extreme measures to surmount the resistance of Mehemet Ali ; and amongst them there might be some that would lead to obstacles on our part ; there are others that we should most certainly oppose ; let there be no illusion on this point. It is therefore important that these extremely conciliating propositions of Mehemet Ali should obtain the consent of the Porte and its allies. I shall add that this consent could not be too prompt, the position of affairs being such that, from one moment to another, what is now practicable and even easy, may become absolutely impossible.

* See Historic Documents, No. X.

Under these circumstances, the King's government, sacrificing to the interests of peace susceptibilities at the same time too well justified, does not hesitate to appeal to the prudence of the allied courts. I have written thus to Vienna, Berlin, and Constantinople. Have the goodness to convey the same to the cabinet of London. I leave you to choose your own mode of making the communication.

“Some have thought, both at Alexandria and Constantinople, that the Porte might prefer to the proposed stipulations, another arrangement, which giving to Mehemet Ali, Egypt alone and the pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre, would confer on his son Ibrahim Pacha the investiture of the other three Syrian pachaliks. We also think this plan might be accepted.”

To these official instructions, M. Thiers added the following private information: “Seeing that it was necessary to place resistance where we placed it, and learning by an envoy dispatched after our interview at Eu, that our point was *Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life*, the Viceroy has yielded the concessions we required from him, and has confined his pretensions to Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life. But beyond this no concessions are to be expected, for he will only yield those which we force from him, and we shall demand nothing more. Look upon this as infallible. He has made this concession to obtain our support and to engage us entirely in his cause. This is his evident object. Now, after having driven him to this, we are under a sort of moral engagement to lend him our aid,

when he confines himself, at our request, within the limits of reason and moderation.”

“Perhaps it may be concluded from what he has said to the consuls that he is about to yield every thing; this is an illusion which must be dissipated. He has declared that he accepted the hereditary succession of Egypt, and that for the rest, he relied on the magnanimity of the Sultan. But this is what he meant, and how he has explained it to Rifat Bey: he means that in the first instance he takes the hereditary right over Egypt, and contents himself with the life possession of Syria, Candia, and Adana. It is on our remonstrances that he consents to understand by these words, the hereditary possession of Egypt, and the possession of Syria for life. You are now made aware of the last possible concession.”

The influence of France was, in fact, if not the sole, at least one of the principal causes of these concessions on the part of Mehemet Ali. The day after that on which Rifat Bey landed in Egypt, as bearer of the demands from the Sultan to the Pacha, Count Walewski had also arrived at Alexandria, commissioned by M. Thiers to restrain the Pacha, if he should be disposed to give way to passion, and to offer him the best advice in accomplishing an arrangement with the Sultan. On the arrival of Count Walewski, the consuls of the four powers hastened to assure him that Mehemet Ali would submit to the conditions of France, if she distinctly declared that he was not to rely upon her support. “The acceptance or refusal of the Pacha,” said Colonel Hodges, “depends on the mission of Count Walewski.” Being

thus apprised of the delicate position prepared for him, the French envoy abstained from seeing the Pacha until after he had given audience to Rifat Bey, and rejected the *ultimatum* of the Porte. He found Mehemet Ali much excited. "I did not allow the messenger of the Porte to speak," he repeated several times. He then explained complacently his plans and means of resistance. According to him, the English had not enough troops at disposal for disembarkation to venture into the interior of Egypt; it was impossible for the Russians to traverse Asia Minor with more than twenty thousand men, for they would not find provisions for a larger force; he did not care for twenty thousand Russians. He was burning to measure himself against the Austrians. If there were not more than twelve English men-of-war before Alexandria, he was determined to order his fleet to engage them. All this was said without any apparent boasting, with great ironical humility, and at the same time with a confidence in his star, which forty years of successful chances could alone explain.

Count Walewski represented to the Pacha that he could not hope to contend with the four powers who had signed the convention of London. A defensive attitude, expectant and menacing, was, he said, the only measure suitable to his position, and from which he might look for favourable results. He could moor his fleet at Alexandria, broadside on, while taking precautions against the enemy's bombs, and station troops in sufficient number to oppose a disembarkation. In Syria he had only to concentrate a sufficient number of regular regi-

ments to repress the new attempts at insurrection that might be excited against him. At the foot of the Taurus, at Marash, he might assemble a considerable army and threaten Turkey from that side. But he ought not to risk a single vessel at sea, or send a man into Asia Minor. If he passed the Taurus, he provoked an earthquake which would at once swallow up Constantinople and Cairo. Mehemet Ali adopted, without much opposition, the defensive system, saying, however; "If the English blockade my commerce, I must order my son Ibrahim to march." Count Walewski pointed out to him that a blockade was not complete hostility. The Pacha agreed; he had no wish to reject the counsels of the French envoy, and he constantly implied that he held in his hand European peace or war. Count Walewski, upon reporting these conversations to M. Thiers, on the 18th of August, ended by saying: "If the English confine themselves to a blockade; if they neither attempt to burn the fleet, to make a descent, nor to bombard Alexandria, we may perhaps prevent Mehemet Ali from ordering his army to pass the Taurus; but if an English fleet resolves to burn his city, his palace, his magazines, his arsenals, and finally his fleet, he can only prevent all this by ordering his ships to sail out, and in their present state, that would be to certain destruction. If Turkish and Austrian troops are disembarked in Syria, if the insurrection there, which is merely restrained, should be kindled again, it can only be opposed by condemning the force under Soliman Pacha to almost certain ruin. Under all these hypotheses, therefore, there is but one step for the Pacha to

take—to order his army to pass the Taurus ; there, new and flattering chances present themselves to him, and he understands them too well, should the exigency so require, not to risk his fortune on the only card that might turn up in his favour.”

Time pressed ; I repaired on the 19th of September to the Foreign Office, and opened the conversation with Lord Palmerston, by explaining to him the facts which M. Thiers had just made known to me, the concessions of Mehemet Ali, the efforts of the French agents which had induced him to make them, and the recent departure of Count Walewski who had left Alexandria at the beginning of September for Constantinople, to urge the Sultan to accept the Pacha's propositions. “Here then,” I said to Lord Palmerston, “is a chance of an arrangement. The Pacha is not intractable. Will the Porte be so? To judge by the language of Rifat Bey, it is not so disposed. There is nothing to impede its entrance into the paths now opened. The propositions made to the Pacha form no part of the convention concluded with the four powers. They form a separate act, emanating from the Porte alone, and which the Porte can modify without interfering with the treaty of the 15th of July. The modifications required by Mehemet Ali seem to have been suggested by Rifat Bey himself. The three pachalicks of Syria for life to a son of the Pacha ;—is this buying too dearly the end of a position, serious for the Porte, serious for Europe, and which may become still more so?”

“I am very glad,” replied Lord Palmerston, “that Mehemet Ali has adopted this course ; it augurs well.

Do not reckon on the value of what Rifat Bey may have said. He is a poor creature, terrified at the mission in which he is engaged, and eager only to escape from it. He would not have asked better than to have been at once the bearer of the Pacha's propositions to Constantinople. He wanted to go after the expiration of the first delay of ten days. The consuls had some difficulty in preventing him. I know the position is serious. I do not fear the responsibility, and it will not be aggravated by any act of ours. We do not wish to make war; we shall not make war with France. We shall do nothing that can justify war. We merely pursue an avowed and legitimate object. The note I addressed to you when communicating the convention of the 15th of July, the protocol of the 17th of that month, contained our entire project. We have not a thought, we shall not make a step beyond. France is full of respect for justice and the rights of nations. She has not considered it suitable, as we have, to lend her co-operation to the Porte; but she is no enemy to the Porte; she will not make war on the Porte to support the subject against the sovereign. She will not declare war against friendly powers who do nothing to provoke it."

"Certainly, my lord, France is full of respect for justice and the rights of nations; France does not desire war, and will neither provoke nor suffer herself to be provoked to it. But there are positions, and most serious ones, in which war may spring up of itself, without the wish, contrary to the wish of all, through that force of situation and those unforeseen incidents from which we cannot escape by deploring them. In 1831

also, France had no wish for war, of which she gave eminent proofs ; but when Austria, coming to the aid of the Papal Government, entered the Legations, France could not admit this foreign intervention, this armed presence in an independent state, this rupture of the balance in Italy ; in her turn, France thought it right to interfere, and went to Ancona. Thanks to the prudence of Europe, thanks to the well appreciated loyalty of France, no war ensued from that act. But war might have ensued, yet France did not hesitate. Analogous circumstances might lead, under very different forms, to resolutions and acts equally replete with the chances of war which we all repudiate. And the more the position which might give rise to such acts is prolonged, the more we advance towards the limit where these chances may be encountered. Let us hasten, my lord, to put a term to this position, while there is yet time, and the means are offered to us.

“The positions are very different. There were great outcries in 1831, against the proceedings of France at Ancona. For myself, I was amongst those who thought that France did not commit the wrong implied to her, and that she had strong reasons for acting as she did. Austria had entered the Legations alone ; the Papal government was supported by the power whose protection appeared to the other states, the most suspicious and dangerous. This is precisely the situation in which the Porte would be to-day, if she had Russia for her sole protectress, in virtue of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. We have justly, in concurrence with you, rejected this exclusive protectorate of Russia ; in fact, we could not

submit to it any more than you could. Austria, moreover, in 1831, did not invite France to join her in protecting the Pope, to enter the Legations with her. To-day, here are four powers with extremely opposite interests, and some of whom have interests similar to those of France, who unite to protect the Porte; and these four powers have constantly pressed France to join them, to act with them, and to prosecute the same object. Here are, undoubtedly, considerable differences in the situation, and France could not have to-day the same motives for acting in the East as she acted in Italy in 1831.

“My lord, these differences signify little when the analogy lies at the bottom of the affair. Why do we fear what the four powers are now undertaking in the East? Because we believe that instead of internal pacification, civil war with all its shocks and chances will thereby be introduced into the Ottoman Empire, and that, if four powers are mixed up with the treaty of the 15th of July, one alone will definitively profit by it. This is the result we repudiate. We desire in the East, peace and the balance of the European States. We think that both peace and that balance will be compromised by the treaty you are now executing. A state of the first order, such as France, cannot and will not be found wanting, in such a contingency, to her duty and her rank.”

“She will be quite right, and we should be very sorry were she to act otherwise. Believe me, my dear ambassador, we have no wish to prevent you from exercising in the East the influence that belongs to you,

We know how necessary it is; and be assured that if the preponderance of another power should threaten there, you would see us at your side to repress it. But nothing of the kind is to be feared at present; what is acting in the East, will, on the contrary, destroy all isolated pretension, all exclusive protectorate. We should have infinitely preferred your taking part with us. You would not do so. We also, in 1823, when you interfered in Spain, declined joining you. It was proposed and asked at Verona. We thought such a step unsuited to our domestic and foreign policy. Did we go to war in consequence? For a long while, however, we dreaded the influence of France in Spain. You entered that country alone. You remained there a considerable time. You occupied Cadiz for five or six years, a most important point in our eyes. We maintained peace, and we think that neither Europe nor England were losers thereby."

I did not prolong this discussion on lame and practically unimportant comparisons; I brought the conversation back to its serious object, the propositions of the Pacha; "The King's government," I said, "apprehends that illusions may be indulged in, in London, on this point. It feels convinced that nothing more will be obtained at Alexandria. It considers these propositions moderate and reasonable; it thinks that it ought not and cannot urge the Pacha to greater sacrifices; in fine, it sees, beyond these terms, a position of increasing extremity, which would urge us daily and more rapidly towards the most momentous events."

"I do not believe," said Lord Palmerston, "that

these are the last terms to which the Pacha may be led. The Porte will not accept Syria entire for Ibrahim. Ibrahim is Mehemet. The district of Adana, if I mistake not, had been given in the name of Ibrahim; Mehemet disposes of it, as of all the rest. The convention of the 15th of July has an important object, to do away with the danger to which the close vicinity of Mehemet, as master of Syria, would hold the Porte incessantly exposed. The attainment of this end is indispensable."

"Am I to conclude from thence, my lord, that the Porte will admit no modification of the proposals addressed to the Pacha?"

"I do not say that; the Pacha shows wisdom; he begins to compromise. No coercive measure, however, has yet been actually tried; we shall see: a place which has defended itself well for six months, and gives reason to believe that it can still hold out effectually, is treated differently from that of which the ramparts are mined and ready to fall. There are plans that can be modified when, on reducing them to practise, we ascertain their difficulties. As to the present, Ibrahim has approached Beyrout with a body of troops, which proves that he has no intention of passing the Taurus."

"Can you tell me, my lord, what he may do when he hears that the last propositions of his father are rejected?"

"They will not be the last; the Pacha has entered on a good path; he will understand that it is more to his advantage to continue in than to leave it."

I immediately forwarded to M. Thiers a detailed

account of this interview, and beyond my official recital I added: "It was not told to me, nor would I have listened to it, but it is believed here that the Pacha in despondency had yielded much more, and that he was ready, in effect, to content himself with Egypt in hereditary succession, and in other respects confided himself to the generosity of the Sultan. MM. Cochelet and Walewski had, it is said, reproached him with having taken this step unknown to them, and had induced him to return to his first resolution, so that France alone had opposed the conclusion of the affair.

"When doubts are raised on this explanation of what has taken place at Alexandria, here is what is adopted in exchange. The Pacha, they say, has made a feint; he has evinced a disposition to yield everything, in the hope that the French agents themselves would find his concessions excessive, and counsel other propositions of which they would take the responsibility, and thus bind France to his cause. So that, in the first hypothesis, France would be more exacting, and in the second, less shrewd than the Pacha."

The first hypothesis soon became in London a widely expanded report and of a very injurious effect. I wrote on the 22nd of September to M. Thiers: "I cannot leave you in ignorance, and I had already told you yesterday, that Lord Palmerston, to retain his colleagues under his flag, will use and has already used this assertion that the Pacha had yielded or was going to yield, that the French agents alone had revived his courage and engaged him to resist. This had been conveyed to Lord

Palmerston from several quarters, and with affirmation. They say, it has also been communicated to Prince Metternich, at Vienna, who is equally convinced of it with Lord Palmerston. Lord Beauvale has written of it to London. Admiral Stopford, it is said, believes it in the same degree; and he who was well inclined to the Pacha, and in good intelligence with us, is about to change his disposition and pursue with ardour the measures of constraint, extremely vexed, on his own account, at having fired in error the cannon of reconciliation. I found Lord Holland much disturbed yesterday at all that had been said to him on this point, and dreading the effect of what might be added. They relate that M. Walewski spoke to the Pacha of 30,000 men assembling by France in her southern departments. Two of our warmest and most valuable friends came to tell me this morning of the *havoc*, I use the expression designedly, which the adversaries of a settlement could and would make in the cabinet and with the public by such allegations. For France, they say, has always declared that she was indifferent on the question of territory, and that if the Pacha chose to yield she should make no objection. I shall expect your answer with impatience."

It was not delayed; M. Thiers replied on the 24th of September: "To the false assertion that France instead of encouraging, has, on the contrary, prevented the concessions of the Viceroy, give in my name, and on that of the French government, the most solemn denial. I shall do the same to-day through an official

journal.* This is the exact truth. The Viceroy, in his conferences with Rifat Bey, had begun to soften, and to conceive from certain insinuations thrown out to him, the hope of obtaining from the Sultan better conditions than those of the treaty of the 15th of July. He then returned for answer that he accepted 'Egypt in hereditary succession, and trusted, for the rest, to the magnanimity of the Sultan.' Things were at this point when our agents saw him, and he told them what he meant by this reference to the magnanimity of the Sultan; that he should be suffered to retain Syria, Candia and Adana for life. Our agents upon this, declared to him that these were unjustifiable and impracticable pretensions. With regard to Candia, in particular, it was necessary to use repeated arguments to shake and convince him. The assertion that he was ready to yield everything is therefore a base falsehood to which I request you will give, in my name, and in that of France, the most peremptory denial. I send you a letter from M. Cochelet which you may read to all to whom the reading may be profitable."

It was profitable but unnecessary. I replied on the 26th of September to M. Thiers: "I have this moment left Lord Palmerston. I had already denied to him and every one else, the assertion relative to the conduct of the French agents at Alexandria. I have now repeated it under the authority of your letter, of M. Cochelet's dispatch, and of your official declaration. I found Lord Palmerston already satisfied and considerably embarrassed. He had received yesterday the report of Colonel Hodges, dated the 30th of August, signed by

* The *Moniteur* of the 25th of September, 1840.

the three other consuls and by Rifat Bey, and in perfect accordance with that of M. Cochelet. This report drawn up in the form of a *procès-verbal* of the conference between the Pacha, Rifat Bey, and the four consuls, proves: 1. That the Pacha, when declaring to the consuls that he accepted the hereditary succession of Egypt, and should rely, for the rest, on the Sultan's kindness, gave them, even at the first moment, to understand that he should demand and fully expected to obtain the government of Syria for life, adding subsequently that if this was refused, he should have recourse to arms. 2. That the French agents, far from persuading the Pacha from the unreserved concessions he had made at first, had, on the contrary, endeavoured, and with success, to obtain from him more extensive and precise concessions.

"This last point is not textually expressed in the report of Colonel Hodges, which only treats of what passed between the Pacha and the consuls; but it necessarily follows from it, and the dispatch of M. Cochelet is entirely confirmed. Lord Palmerston admitted this without hesitation, without attempting to extenuate the truth. I availed myself of all my advantages over him. I used the terms of strange credulity, of blind confidence in all that flattered his own ideas or wishes; I spoke of the affronts to us in which he suffered himself to be entangled, which we ought to resent, and did resent, and which would render matters much more difficult and dangerous unless there was more consideration before believing and speaking. He did not attempt any lame excuse, and you may be

assured that on this point, at this moment, he feels the conviction of an error and almost the desire of repairing it. But what is more important, he has hereby lost a great means of action upon the spirit of his colleagues, from this time to the cabinet council of next Monday, and in the council itself."

Three cabinet councils, in fact, were held on the 29th of September, and on the 1st and 2nd of October, to deliberate on the concessions of the Pacha. The friends of pacific policy maintained that they might become the basis of an arrangement, and suggested that, with this object, a fresh overture might be made to France. Lord Palmerston intrenched himself behind the difficulties of official conduct, the scruples of dignity. "The treaty," he said, "is in course of execution and will be easily carried out; how can we retract it without humiliating England and Europe?" His objections did not win over the advocates for a settlement, but they were unable to determine any thing to their own satisfaction. They sought for some measure which, without violating or formally abolishing the treaty of the 15th of July, might take its place and maintain, at once, peace and the diplomatic honour of England. They sought in vain. The probability of a split in the cabinet was, moreover, present to the mind of all its members, and rendered discussion weak and futile.

In the midst of these petty internal dissensions of the English cabinet, telegraphic intelligence reached Paris and London that on the 11th of September, the English squadron had first summoned and subsequently bombarded Beyrout, which place surrendered after a

weak resistance ; that Turkish troops, or Turkish auxiliaries had disembarked and commenced operations in Syria ; and that, during these events, the Sultan at Constantinople, immediately upon the return of Rifat Bey from Alexandria, and despite the efforts of Count Walewski to induce him to accept the propositions of the Pacha, had, after two solemn convocations of the divan, pronounced, on the 14th of September, the forfeiture of Mehemet Ali as Pacha of Egypt, and appointed Izzet Mehemet as his successor. The treaty of the 15th of July was thus executed in the East in its extreme consequences, while in the West, means were still sought for to prevent them.

When forwarding this intelligence to me, on the 2nd of October, M. Thiers added : “ You can readily imagine the state of public feeling in Paris. It is impossible for me to say what may be the result, or what the government may determine. I have assembled the cabinet this morning, and shall re-assemble it again this evening ; I will let you know our resolutions as soon as they are decided on, and it becomes necessary to communicate them to you for your conduct in London. Meanwhile, do not conceal that the position is extremely menacing. It has never been so much so.”

When I received this notification on the morning of the 4th of October, and without waiting for more, I thought that, either with the friends or adversaries of a pacific arrangement I ought not to remain inactive and silent. I therefore took measures to acquaint the first with the grave position of affairs, and requested Lord

Palmerston to receive me in the course of the day. He replied that he was then expecting me.

“My lord,” I said on entering, “I have nothing to ask you or say on the part of the King’s government; but I think it right to acquaint you instantly with the news I have received and the effect thereby produced in France.” I then read a dispatch from M. de Pontois, dated the 15th of September, relative to what had just taken place at Constantinople, and three telegraphic dispatches which M. Thiers had forwarded to me.

On M. de Pontois’ dispatch, Lord Palmerston almost instantly observed, “There is no successor named to Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The Porte has thought, that being at war with him, his legal power should be withdrawn. It has deposed him to prevent his continuing to be, in Egypt and elsewhere, the representative of the Sultan; that all the Sultan’s subjects, Egyptians as well as Syrians, may know that they no longer owe obedience to his orders. It has thought also that this measure would intimidate him, and conduce to his submission. It has not interdicted all arrangement with him as to Egypt. It has only invested Izzet Mehemet Pacha with provisional and limited authority. I have written to Lord Granville to give this explanation to your government, and to re-establish the true facts.”

“It is not the less true, my lord, that this extreme measure has been adopted against Mehemet Ali, and the convention of the 15th of July pushed to its utmost consequences at the moment when he was making concessions, and giving up a portion of his pretensions. The seventh article of the convention did not authorize the

removal of Mehemet Ali from Egypt, except as a remote contingency, on which the Sultan would consult his allies. Apparently the advice of Lord Ponsonby has been as prompt as the Sultan's resolution. Undoubtedly it is in the same spirit of promptitude, and to anticipate events, that preparations are making near Nicomedia, in Asia Minor, for an encampment of Russian troops. According to the terms of Article III of the convention of the 15th of July, it is only in case Ibrahim should pass the Taurus that these measures are named for the safety of Constantinople."

"Neither is there, at present, any foundation for the report you allude to. No preparations are making for a Russian camp at Nicomedia, and I hope that nothing of the kind will be necessary, and that Ibrahim will not pass the Taurus."

The conversation passed from Constantinople to Syria. Lord Palmerston knew nothing respecting Beyrout beyond what our telegraphic dispatches had told him. "My last accounts from Beyrout," he said, "are of the 26th of August; but the incident does not surprise me. Beyrout was an important point to occupy. It is the only port on that coast. It cuts off the Pacha's communications. It is from that quarter that the insurrection in Syria can be effectually maintained.

"Yes, the insurrection which does not exist, and will be found impossible to establish.

"It will exist as soon as it finds a resting point. Our dragoman, Mr. Wood, has traversed the Libanus; he has seen the principal chiefs, including the Emir Beschir; they have all told him that as soon as they see

the Turkish flag displayed and supported by sufficient forces, they would take arms, for they find the tyranny of the Pacha insupportable."

I spoke with bitterness of this Turkish flag floating over the ashes of Beyrout, and raised by hands not all Turkish. Lord Palmerston expressed a doubt of the nine days' bombardment, and utter destruction of Beyrout. "The Egyptians," he said, "were in a fort, in the lazaretto, I believe. This fort may have been destroyed, which probably occasioned their retreat. As to the troops disembarked, they are really Turks. There are no Austrians. Perhaps a few English marines, for a moment, as we did in Spain. But it is by Turks that Beyrout is occupied, and a second expedition of Turkish troops will speedily arrive there."

"I do not know, my lord, whether it is Beyrout itself, or only the lazaretto that has been destroyed, nor in what relative degrees the English, Austrians, and Turks may have contributed to its destruction; nor whether it is a spontaneous insurrection which springs up so late, and under the condition of being so well received. But what I do know is, that all the facts which have now reached our knowledge, and some of which are rigorous, extreme, and remote consequences of the treaty of the 15th of July, have burst forth at once, at the very outset of its execution, at the moment when the concessions of the Pacha had raised hopes of a settlement. These facts have produced a lamentable effect in France, and have led to a position the most serious that can be imagined, a position in which no one can for a moment answer for the future."

“How would a new arrangement be possible? How could we modify the conventions of the 15th of July under the blow of the menaces by which we are assailed? In the midst of such an explosion, our honour commands us to stand by what we have done, to accomplish what we have undertaken.”

“Pardon me, my lord, what is this you are saying? Of what explosion, of what menaces do you speak? Is it of the journals? You know as well as I do, what a free country is; you know equally what may be the exaggerations of thought, the violence of language. If you spoke to me of our papers, I should speak of yours. You surely would not wish to answer for them.”

“And your armaments by land and sea?”

“Our armaments, my lord, are a security for ourselves, no menace on our part. How? Since the origin of this affair, France repeats that her motive for rejecting the employment of force against the Pacha, is the fear lest by that course, questions of the most weighty nature might be excited in the East, dangerous to the Ottoman Empire and to the peace of Europe. She may be right or wrong, but this is her opinion, her presentiment. And while France thinks and anticipates thus, she sees four great powers unite to employ force in the East. She finds herself isolated, and yet she is not to take precautions! She is not to prepare for a future she has always foreseen and predicted! These preparations, my lord, these armaments have nothing in them aggressive; they do not threaten the rights of any state; they are guarantees, for ourselves, against the dangers, and for the necessities of the situation created

for us. It was easy, my lord, to foresee this consequence of the situation ; it was easy to foretell this impulse of national feeling in isolated France, and the attitude it imposed on its government. I warned you of this explosion of which you complain, and its consequences. I could never induce you to believe me."

"France isolated herself voluntarily. We ardently wished, and constantly urged you to act with us. We could not abandon what we thought right, what we were anxious to do in the sole interest of the repose of Europe, because France differed with us on the choice of means. This would have been to accept her *veto*, her dictation. We endeavoured to reassure you, to give you, as to our intentions, our mode of action, every possible guarantee. If there are still any that you require, that you can imagine, name them ; we shall go great lengths to dissipate all uneasiness. But when, after a year of negotiation, we have concluded the convention of the 15th of July, we have undertaken a serious act, to cure a serious evil in the East. We wish to do nothing more ; but this we seriously desire, as people who respect themselves, who do not exceed what they have said, or retract what they have done."

"We also, my lord, hold to what we have said ; we ask for nothing more than we have declared. We have always desired peace ; our whole policy has been directed towards the maintenance of peace. We have not made the situation in which peace may be compromised ; we do not answer, I repeat to you, for the consequences which this situation may entail."

I immediately transmitted to M. Thiers the details of

this conversation, and I communicated to him at the same time the impressions which even at that moment, and in the position so materially aggravated, I did not cease to preserve. "I consider," I said to him, "the last words addressed to me by Lord Palmerston, as the true and complete indication of his thought, and consequently of that of the cabinet in which he leads. He wishes sincerely to confine the convention of the 15th of July within the specified limits, the restoration of Syria to the Sultan; he sincerely desires to execute it within those limits. He is more than ever convinced that events will so restrain them, and that the Pacha will either extend his concessions, or be subdued without long or violent efforts."

Two days later, that the King's government might have full knowledge as to the state of feeling in London, I wrote again to M. Thiers: "I had hoped, for some time to receive your answer to Lord Palmerston's great dispatch of the 31st of August last. In my letter of the 9th September, I spoke to you of the effect it was producing in England, and of the importance of our acting, in turn, on the floating spirit of the ill-informed English public. Since that epoch, not only the dispatch of the 31st of August, but several other documents to the same effect have been published, amongst others the note addressed to me by Lord Palmerston, on the 16th of September, when communicating to me the convention of the 15th of July—that which accompanies the protocol of the 17th of September,—and the protocol itself. These publications have acted essentially on opinion in England, and also, as I am told, in Germany. Nothing

from us in reply has reached either the public or the English cabinet, which, I know, is somewhat surprised at receiving no answer to its various communications."

M. Thiers forwarded to me, on the 8th of October, his answer, dated the 3rd of that month, to the English *memorandum* of the 31st of August. It was a complete and able summary of the policy of the French government since 1839, in the affairs of the East. Its motives, its perseverance through all phases of the question, its efforts at the same time for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and for the intelligent and pacific acceptance of the facts, which, in certain quarters, attested its indisputable decline; finally, its objections to the treaty of the 15th of July, and its complaints against the abrupt execution, were therein detailed with clearness, firmness, and moderation. On the 12th of October I read this document to Lord Palmerston, who had returned the same day from the country, and gave him a copy of it.* In the course of my reading, he made a few brief and reserved observations, although his impression, or I ought to say, his contrariety was sufficiently animated. I have already said that he has a taste for polemics, and a passionate necessity not only of being, but of having always been in the right in his arguments as well as in his acts. The reading finished, he expressed his intention of drawing up a written reply to this dispatch, and of noticing all that appeared to him open to contradiction. While listening to me, he had the air of already meditating his answer.

To his dispatch of the 3rd of October, M. Thiers had

* See Historic Documents, No. XI.

added another, dated the 8th, and practically more important. It was a declaration of the attitude assumed by the King's government in consequence of the forfeiture decreed against Mehemet Ali, at Constantinople, as Pacha of Egypt.* This declaration was couched in terms as moderate as grave. The word and the precise moment of the *casus belli* were not pronounced in it; but it expressed formally "that the forfeiture of the Viceroy, carried into execution, would be, in the eyes of France, an attack upon the general balance of Europe. She might resign to the chances of war actually commenced the question of the limits which should separate, in Syria, the possessions of the Sultan and Viceroy of Egypt; but France could not abandon to such chances the existence of Mehemet Ali as a prince vassal of the Empire. Whatever may be the territorial boundary which separates them, as a consequence of the events of war, their double existence is necessary to Europe, and France could not admit the suppression of either. Disposed to take part in any acceptable arrangement, having for its basis the double guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines herself, for the present, to declaring that she could not consent to the act of forfeiture decreed at Constantinople."

I carried this dispatch to Lord Palmerston, on the 10th of October, a few hours after I had received it. He had arrived from the country, and was preparing for the council. He listened to me while I read, with silent attention: solely at the passage in which M. Thiers repeated the declaration that Lord Granville had made to him on the

* See Historic Documents, No. XII.

subject of the forfeiture decreed against the Pacha; "I doubt," said Lord Palmerston, "whether those words *comminatory measure, without effective and necessary consequence*, convey exactly my idea. I instructed Lord Granville, as I told yourself, to declare to the King's government that we considered this forfeiture, not as a definitive act to be necessarily executed, but as a measure of coercion intended to remove from the Pacha all legal power, and to act upon his mind so as to induce him to submit, but which did not exclude between the Porte and him, provided he renounced his past refusals, an arrangement which might leave him in possession of Egypt." "This, my lord, is precisely what I forwarded to the King's government," and I continued my reading. When I had finished, "I cannot," said Lord Palmerston, "give you an immediate reply; I am not the government. Neither will I undertake, at this moment, to discuss the arguments contained in this dispatch, and which may give rise to observations which probably would be better committed to writing. I shall bring the dispatch under the notice of the government." We then separated without further conversation.

Five days after, on the 15th of October, urged by the animated impression which this dispatch from the French government and the declarations it contained had made upon his colleagues and himself, Lord Palmerston addressed instructions to the English ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, to the following effect: "In order that the recent exercise of sovereign authority by the Sultan may eventuate in a prompt and satisfactory settlement of the questions at issue, her Majesty's go-

vernment thinks that it would be advisable for the representatives of the four powers at Constantinople to receive orders to wait upon the Turkish minister and inform him that according to the stipulations of Article 7 of the separate act annexed to the treaty of the 15th of July, their respective governments recommend strongly to the Sultan that in case Mehemet Ali submits quickly and engages to restore the Turkish fleet and to withdraw his troops entirely from Syria, Adana, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan, on his part, should not only re-instate Mehemet Ali as Pacha of Egypt, but also bestow on him the hereditary investiture of that pachalic, conformally to the conditions specified in the treaty of the 15th of July; and provided, as a matter of course, that neither Mehemet Ali nor his successors, under pain of forfeiture, commit any infraction of these conditions. Her Majesty's government has reason to expect that the advice suggested on her part to the Sultan will meet the concurrence of the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia; your Excellency, therefore, as soon as your colleagues shall have received corresponding instructions, will take the step pointed out in this dispatch. If the Sultan, as her Majesty's government cannot doubt, consents to act according to the advice which will thus be given to him by his four allies, it will be fitting that he should adopt immediate measures to make known to Mehemet Ali his gracious intentions; and your Excellency, in conjunction with Sir Robert Stopford, will furnish the Turkish government with all the facilities it may require to that effect."

Lord Palmerston forwarded to me immediately a copy

of this dispatch, and Lord Granville received instructions to communicate it officially to the King's government. The English cabinet hastened to assure us of the continuance of Mehemet Ali in Egypt, as Viceroy, and to remove the chance of war which the last dispatch of M. Thiers had partially disclosed.

But in the situation which the events in the East and the state of feeling in France had made for the French cabinet, this was but a trifling satisfaction and an ineffective remedy. France felt offended and thought she was threatened. She saw, in the treaty of the 15th of July, an attack upon her dignity, and the alliance of the four powers to settle, without her, the Egyptian question was, in her eyes, the presage of a new hostile coalition, in perhaps a rapidly advancing future. The enemies of the government of 1830 fomented this double sentiment, promising themselves chances for the gratification of their passions, and the success of their designs. Under the pressure of public irritation and alarm, the cabinet had adopted and was every day adopting measures as serious as they could have resorted to, had the perils which seemed approaching actually displayed themselves. Since the 29th of July, royal ordinances had called into active service all the young levies under the classes of 1836 and 1839, and opened the necessary credits for augmenting the navy by ten thousand sailors, five sail of the line, thirteen frigates, and nine steamers. Decrees of the 29th of September prescribed the formation of twelve regiments of the line, of ten battalions of light infantry, and of six regiments of cavalry. Decrees of the 5th of August

and 24th of September allotted extraordinary credits amounting to 107,829,250 francs for increasing the *matériel* of the army, and its effective strength in men and horses. On the 13th of September, the *Moniteur* announced that the great undertaking of the fortifications of Paris was determined on, and that the works would commence immediately. "We have combined the two systems," M. Thiers wrote to me, in making the announcement, "both of which are good, and better when united, and which have but one inconvenience, as I think very accessory,—that of costing dear. In France, this course is adopted, not with pleasure, but with consent. People understand that it secures our safety, and is the infallible mode of rendering a catastrophe impossible." On the 7th of October, in fact, at the very moment when the cabinet, by the note of the 8th, declared its resolution of not consenting to the deposition of Mehemet Ali as Pacha of Egypt, a royal decree convoked the Chambers for the 28th of that month, and M. Thiers wrote to me on the 9th: "The position becoming more serious from hour to hour, the armaments must be accelerated in proportion. We now stand at 489,000 men. We shall ask the Chambers for 150,000 from the class of 1841. We shall ask for them by anticipation. Our roll will then amount to 639,000 men. 'The moveable battalions of the National Guard will be organized upon paper; and if a moment arrives when the heart of the nation should no longer restrain itself before some intolerable act, before one of the hundred eventualities of the question, we shall

appeal to the Chambers and the King, and both will decide."

At the same moment, and to establish thoroughly the meaning as well as the limit of the important resolutions it adopted, the cabinet recalled from the Levant our squadron which, while watching the events in progress on the coasts of Syria, waited for instructions in the road of Salamis. It was ordered to concentrate at Toulon, within the triangle formed by the harbour of St. Fiorenzo and Algeria, ready to bear, at the first signal, upon all points of the Mediterranean, particularly upon Alexandria, in case Egypt should be attacked. The recall of this squadron was an act of political courage on the part of the French cabinet. In presence of a strong national ferment, and while adopting the extensive measures which it judged necessary to meet the great events which seemed possible, it was unwilling to leave the policy and future of France at the mercy of an accidental collision between the French and English fleets, in close vicinity to each other, far from their respective governments, and within sound of the broadsides fired by the English squadron against the popular client of France. But apparently, this measure was in contradiction with the general position and attitude of the French government; it looked like a pacific precaution in the midst of warlike anticipations. It was warmly attacked by the adversaries of the cabinet, defended with some embarrassment by its friends, and left on the public mind one of those doubtful and gloomy impressions which weaken power even when in the right.

Thus displayed themselves the consequences of the

errors which, from the origin of the Eastern question had thrown and retained the policy of France in wrong paths. We had attached a highly exaggerated importance to this affair; we had regarded the interests of France in the Mediterranean as much more bound up than they really were with the fortunes of Mehemet Ali. And at the same time, nevertheless, we had not concentrated upon Egypt and its transformation into an almost independent state, our entire wishes and efforts. We had, on the one hand, given Egypt too important a place in our general policy; and, on the other, we were not eager to seize the opportunity, and to secure, with the consent of Europe, the consolidation, under our influence, of this new dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In supporting all the pretensions of Mehemet Ali to Syria, we had yielded too much to his ambition, and had thought too little of his permanent establishment on the banks of the Nile, which was of far superior value to France. In rejecting the various concessions proposed for the Pacha, we had ourselves aided the efforts of the Emperor Nicholas to embroil us with England and isolate us in Europe. We had pursued this conduct in the double conviction that Mehemet Ali would vigorously defend his conquests, and that to wrest them from him, the four powers united in the treaty of the 15th of July would be called upon for great efforts which would either prove futile or compromise the peace of Europe. These powers had scarcely begun to act, and already events falsified our estimate of forces and probabilities; already it was foreseen that Mehemet Ali would resist feebly, and

that an English squadron would suffice to subdue him. And for such a secondary question, for a client so little able to support himself, we had compromised our position in Europe ; we had separated from England ; we had disturbed Austria and Prussia in their peaceful indifference ; we had yielded up these three powers to the hostile influence of Russia. And we now found ourselves alone, confronted by an alliance which neither was nor desired to become towards us an aggressive coalition ; which feared for itself more than it thought of threatening us, but which awakened in our minds the still burning reminiscences of our struggles against the great European combination, and excited throughout all France a fermentation replete with anger and alarm.

The errors which had brought on this position were those of no particular section or person. They were public, national errors, universally expanded and sustained, in the Chambers as in the country, in the opposition as in the government, in the bosom of the most divided parties. All had placed the Egyptian question higher than the interests of France required ; all had rejected the settlements proposed ; all had considered Mehemet Ali stronger, and the enterprise of the four powers more difficult than it was found to be. The hour for reckoning up mistakes had arrived, and the cabinet presided over by M. Thiers was doomed to bear its weight.

CHAPTER VII.

ACCESSION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE 29th OCTOBER, 1840.

PARLIAMENTARY POSITION OF THE CABINET OF M. THIERS AT THE OPENING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE SESSION OF 1840.—DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE SECRET SUPPLIES IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.—PROPOSITION FOR PARLIAMENTARY REFORM BY M. DE REMILLY.—ITS RESULT.—DISPOSITION OF THE KING TOWARDS THE CABINET.—STATE OF THE CABINET AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION.—VARIOUS EFFECTS OF THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY, 1840, ON THE POSITION OF THE CABINET.—PROSPECTS OF WAR.—UNEASINESS AND FERMENTATION THEY EXCITE.—I WRITE TO THE DUKE OF BROGLIE ON THE 23RD SEPTEMBER ON THIS SUBJECT.—HIS REPLY.—EFFECT OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF BEYROUT, AND OF THE DECREE OF PORFEITURE PRONOUNCED AGAINST MEHEMET ALI UPON THE POSITION OF THE CABINET.—TWO OPPOSING CURRENTS ARE MANIFESTED BY THE PUBLIC.—REVOLUTIONARY AND PACIFIC SPIRIT.—THE CABINET OFFERS ITS RESIGNATION TO THE KING WHO REFUSES TO ACCEPT IT.—PRECARIOUS CHARACTER OF THE UNDERSTANDING RE-ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE KING AND THE CABINET.—WARNINGS WHICH REACH ME IN LONDON.—MY SITUATION AND REPLY.—OPINION OF M. DUCHATEL.—THE SESSION OF THE CHAMBERS IS CONVOKED, AND I ASK LEAVE OF ABSENCE TO ATTEND IT.—WHAT I THINK OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS, AND WHAT I WRITE ON THE SUBJECT TO THE DUKE OF BROGLIE ON THE 13TH OF OCTOBER.—THE CABINET PROPOSES TO APPOINT M. ODILON BARROT TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.—MY OPINION AND RESOLUTION ON THIS POINT.—ATTEMPT OF DARMES ON THE KING'S LIFE.—THE CABINET PROPOSES TO THE KING THE DRAUGHT OF A SPEECH FOR THE OPENING OF THE SESSION.—THE KING REJECTS IT.—DISMISSAL OF THE CABINET.—THE KING RECALLS ME TO PARIS.—FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 29TH OF OCTOBER.

I HAVE stated the reasons which determined me, when

the cabinet of M. Thiers was formed, to continue ambassador in London, the limits I assigned, from the beginning, to my adhesion, and the assurances given to me that the cabinet would not exceed them: "It is formed," M. de Rémusat wrote to me, "on this idea; no electoral reform, no dissolution." The greater part of my political friends, particularly in the Chamber of Deputies, trusted little to these assurances; the cabinet evidently estranged itself from the centre of that assembly; its seat and leader were in the left centre; the left offered its support. On the first day when the new ministers opened their saloons, the members of the old opposition hastened there in crowds. The leaders held moderate language; but while restraining its exigences, the new party manifested its hopes; it raised the questions which the cabinet had promised to avoid; it spoke more or less openly of parliamentary and electoral reform, even of the dissolution of the Chamber in case it should refuse what was determined to be asked for. "We have only," they said, "to reach the end of the session, and what can be more simple? Let us only abstain from frightening the conservatives, even though we should flatter and caress them a little, so as to ensure a sufficient number for a tolerable majority with which we may pass the secret supplies, the budget, and two other bills of extreme urgency; after which, the close. We shall then be masters of the ground; we shall purge the ministry, if necessary, and call for a dissolution. There can be no doubt of the result of elections carried through under our administrative power and the

influence of our press. Thus our victory will become indisputable and undisputed."

These expressions and plans being overheard or foreseen by the conservatives, filled them with discontent and suspicion; they called to mind the dangers the country had incurred, and the struggles which, since the ministry of M. Casimir Périer they had maintained in its defence; the bitter feelings excited by the coalition were still recent and warm. The moderate party closed its ranks, proclaimed its fears, and pledged itself to resist firmly any deviation from the policy it had caused to triumph for nine years. "The position," my friends wrote to me, "is more serious than you can imagine, not being present in the theatre of events. A ministry publicly and ardently sustained by the left, supported by the journals of that colour, in the name of the ideas we oppose, is not a trifling fact, and without importance for the future. Nothing less is in question than a complete displacement of power, and the movement will advance rapidly if not checked." The Duke of Broglie himself, who had considered the entry of M. Thiers into office as necessary, and who had assisted to form his cabinet, saw clearly this state of spirits and parties. "The disputes of the journals," he wrote to me, "have much envenomed the position and have complicated difficulties. For my own part, I think the ministry will pass through the defile of the secret supplies; but I much doubt whether it will reach the approaching session. It will issue from the present one, if it issues at all, so wounded, bruised, and weakened, that M. Thiers will be compelled to look for aid. And as, in

such cases, it is much more difficult to find than to require it, the probabilities are that he will not open the next session. I wish much your mission in London may have succeeded well enough to enable you to return to office. You alone could at present conduct foreign affairs advantageously for the country, and operate upon the King's mind without wounding his personal pride."

The cabinet passed happily through the defile of the secret supplies; M. Thiers not only carried away the honours of the debate, but a success on the division which exceeded his hopes. An amendment proposed by M. d'Angeville, a staunch conservative member, to reduce by 100,000 francs the sum demanded by the government, was rejected by 246 votes against 158 who adopted it. One of my most judicious and faithful friends, M. Dumon, wrote to me on the following day, the 27th of March: "Our minority consists of some votes in the left centre, of a majority of the 229 who supported M. Molé against the coalition, and of the doctrinarians. The alliance with the left being offered to the cabinet and accepted, we felt it impossible to give our adhesion to this new majority, and have laboured to re-constitute the right centre. As far as we can judge of a position the day after it has been indicated, this, I think, is how we stand. Our 158 votes are not entirely homogeneous; but by reducing them to 140, we have the exact total of conservatives determined to prevent alliance with the left, either in power or in opposition. About forty votes in the ministerial majority have the same tendency, but not the same resolution. The conservative party is therefore in a minority in the

Chamber at present. It can only recover a majority by its alliances, or by the mistakes of the cabinet. This appears to dictate the conduct we ought to pursue. No opportunity seems likely to present itself, before the end of the session, of giving a political vote; this would establish permanently the division between us and the portion of the new majority the most inclining towards us. An expectant attitude, on the contrary, will leave us ready for either of the two events which time must hasten on. If M. Thiers is moderate, the left will soon desert him, and he will require us, on our own conditions. If, elated by success, he asks for a dissolution to consolidate his majority, we are in a condition to call over to us the most reasonable of his friends, and to form with them a majority and a ministry. In either hypothesis, parliamentary war could do us no good, and we can only gain by peace."

I fully agreed with M. Dumon. At the moment when the cabinet was formed, I had recommended to my friends the moderate and expectant conduct he now indicated. New incidents rapidly occurred which rendered this difficult, without shaking my conviction that it was the only judicious and suitable course. A conservative member, M. de Rémilly, a man of unsteady mind, and greedy for popularity, introduced a motion to interdict to the deputies throughout the whole duration of their legislative duties, with a few exceptions, the acceptance of any salaried function, and any advance in their career. This was a first step in parliamentary and electoral reform. The cabinet endeavoured, secretly, to set this motion aside; but when the Chamber was called on

to debate it, the left, faithful to its antecedents, the ministers, from respect for their new allies, and the conservatives, from malice towards the cabinet, and to embarrass it, voted that it should be taken into consideration ; and a committee was appointed to make a report on the question, with a view to a definitive resolution. If rejected, in spite of the support of the ministry, the motion involved its fall ; if adopted, it rendered the dissolution of the Chamber inevitable. I wrote on the 6th of May to the Duke of Broglie : “ I become every day more uneasy. When the cabinet was formed, I was distinctly told that it was formed on this idea, ‘ no electoral reform, no dissolution ;’ and yet from day to day it glides into reform and dissolution. If M. Rémilly’s motion is not thrown out in committee, if it is reported and debated, the dissolution of the Chamber will follow, and under a cabinet more and more engaged with the left ; that is to say, they will do in 1840, against the body of the conservative party, of that party with which from 1830 to 1836, we saved the country and our own honour, exactly what M. Molé did in 1837, against the head of the same party, against the doctrinarians. That the situation may be forced, that the conservatives may have driven the cabinet to it, that for three months they may have wanted prudence and patience, signifies little to-day ; to complain of it is morality, but not policy. Politically, the actual and imminent fact is a new dissolution against our old army, following two recent dissolutions against ourselves. And at the end of these three dissolutions will follow the abandonment of the policy

we have preserved since 1830, of the only judicious and honourable policy for the country.

“The motion of M. Rémilly must be thrown out in committee. It must not be reported and debated. On this condition only can time be gained, time to cure the wounds we have suffered, time to bring back power towards the centre, and the centre towards power. But this cannot be done without time; and if the motion of M. Rémilly is debated, we shall not obtain it; we shall be fatally hurried into a fatal course.

“There is, I am aware, very little true passion, very little energy in the parties of the left or right, conquerors or conquered, and they are capable of lingering long in shortsighted and miserable hesitations. But there is also much thoughtlessness and improvidence, very faint resistance to evil, and a slight gust of wind will suffice to scatter these blades of straw. If the party which, since 1830, has commenced in France the true foundations of free government, is definitively beaten and dissolved, God knows what may happen. God knows what time and what events may be required to re-establish a resting point!

“Think well of this, I pray you. See what you can do, to what point you can influence the cabinet. Exert your full power; force them to exert theirs, that they may not be reduced to this extremity. I am much pre-occupied with this myself; pre-occupied with infinite displeasure. I cannot forget what decided me, two months ago, to remain in the post I now fill; these were the words; ‘No electoral reform, no dissolution.’”

The extremity I dreaded was not resorted to; when

the committee made its report, the debate on parliamentary reform proposed by M. de Rémilly was adjourned until after the vote on the budget. This was to postpone it to another session, and the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies ceased to be inevitable. The cabinet then sought to keep off all decisive measures, all definitive classification; it hoped that by gaining time it might be able to recruit amongst the old conservatives, or from the old opposition, the elements of a new majority, and a support for a policy also somewhat new, at least sufficient to satisfy the left hand side without alienating the centre. But in a government of free and public discussion, a balance between parties is a position of very short duration, for it condemns power to an immobility which annuls, or to a game of see-saw which deteriorates it; and no dexterity of conduct or of speech can suffice to restrain long, without combating them, the passions not intended to be gratified, or to produce the necessary transformations. In spite of M. Thiers' efforts, in spite even of his success and that of his colleagues, and although their ministerial existence was not threatened, their difficulties increased instead of disappearing. It was in vain that the left concealed, or postponed their pretensions, the suspicions of the centre became daily stronger; the entry of M. Odilon Barrot into the cabinet was spoken of, and the denials of the ministers failed to dissipate the alarms of the conservatives. The diplomatic changes, whether judicial or administrative, although sparingly and cautiously made, were noticed and commented on with restless displeasure; and although too bitterly or imprudently expressed, the uneasiness was

legitimate, for notwithstanding the hesitations and precautions of the ministry, it was evidently the disorganization of the conservative party which was producing its effect, and the future was thus preparing for the advantages of the old opposition.

King Louis-Philippe, at heart, agreed with the conservatives, and participated in their discontent; but he neither thwarted the ministry, nor threw them into any embarrassment, he accepted while he discussed the measures of detail they required from him, and strictly confined himself within his constitutional character; neither separating from his advisers, nor confounding himself with them. "The King," M. de Rémusat, wrote to me on the 15th of March, "treats us fairly, and gives us substantial support." Sometimes those who approached him, diplomatists or courtiers, found him sad and thoughtful; occasionally he evinced towards his ministers a slight degree of royal jealousy; it was remarked that on the 1st of May, 1840, at the receptions on his fête day, he showed coldness to M. Thiers, and scarcely spoke to him. But these little personal ebullitions had no effect on his general attitude, and allowed its free development to the policy of the cabinet. Men who are worthy of exercising power on their own responsibility, do not pretend that the sovereign should submit to them his private thoughts and life; they have only a claim upon his constitutional loyalty, and can expect nothing more. King Louis-Philippe moreover liked M. Thiers, relied on his attachment, and treated him with familiar confidence, even when they differed in opinion. On a single question, a question of coming crisis, the

King had formed his resolution, independently of his ministers. He had determined not to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at their instance, and to accept their resignation rather than try an election in concert with the left, and under its influence ; a determination perfectly legitimate in principle, for it is the essential prerogative of royalty when it differs in opinion from its advisers, to separate from them, and to appeal, either in the Chambers, or by a general election, to the judgment of the country. The King foresaw this chance, and communicating towards the end of April, with Marshal Soult, asked him whether, in the event of being compelled to refuse the dissolution of the Chambers to his present ministers, he could reckon on him to form a new cabinet. "I am ready, Sire," replied the marshal, "to resume the ministry of war ; and in that case should recommend the King to offer the portfolio of foreign affairs to M. Guizot. When I urged, in the preceding cabinet that the English embassy should be entrusted to him, I thought the day might arrive when the King would require him elsewhere." The King took the marshal's hand, saying, "This shall be my resource in case of any mischance."

M. Duchâtel acquainted me immediately with this interview, adding ; "Be assured that a dissolution is at the bottom of the existing state of things. Preparations are making on all sides with as much mystery as can be preserved. Articles are sent to the newspapers of the departments, which I have read, and which set forth the expected good effects of this dissolution. 'The King is resolved to refuse it ; but will he be able to do so ?

There lies the question. What do you say, as regards yourself, to the combination proposed by the marshal? I am most anxious to know your real feeling."

I replied to him on the 29th of April. "With you, I am struck by the movement towards the left. With you, I think it is very dangerous for the country and the government. But I doubt whether it will advance as quickly and uniformly as you suppose. I expect delays and hesitations. It must regulate itself upon the general fact, while taking into account the incidents which may slacken or mask it for some time. I feel also that it is most important not to fall into any error as to the moment of re-action and on the attitude to be assumed to guide it. We must not return to office unless called upon by an evident, palpable necessity. I know nothing worse than remedies too hastily applied; they fail to cure the patient, while they ruin the physician. The conservative party has failed us twice through want of foresight and weakness; in 1837, at the time of the bill of disjunction, and in 1839, at the coalition. We must not surrender ourselves without defence to the faults of our friends. When we re-engage, their danger must be sufficiently clear and pressing to induce them to engage with us, and on honourable and effective conditions. Parties only allow themselves to be saved when they believe they are lost. If that moment arrives, as I believe it will, I shall have no objection to the combination you name to me. I believe it to be a good one, and it suits me personally. But I repeat, the principal point in itself, and with me indispensable, is to do or attempt nothing in a factitious or premature manner,

through any hidden efforts, to escape from weariness or annoyance. We must have preponderating public motives. The King must have to reject measures he could not accept with safety, nor we with honour. I perceive, at present, only two such,—the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, and the admission of the left itself into the government. Either of these I recognize as sufficient motives, both for the King and for us. On these grounds, and on the basis you indicate, I shall not be wanting to my cause or to my friends.”

I was most anxious that the cabinet should be made thoroughly acquainted with my views, and requested the Duke of Broglie to explain them clearly on my account: “They tell me,” I wrote to him, “that there is some question of the entry of M. Odilon Barrot into the cabinet. I know not whether this is serious, and I am unwilling to write to any of the members until I can ascertain. I have no taste for useless declarations. But as I am equally anxious that there should be no doubt whatever, even for a moment, on any one’s mind as to how I should act in that case, I beg you, as being well aware of my intentions, to tell M. de Rémusat that I should not remain in London. The dissolution of the Chamber, or the admission of the left into the government, are with me reasons for resignation which I anticipated and indicated from the first moment.” I had, in fact, written to M. de Rémusat three weeks before: “One question continually occupies me, the motion of M. Rémilly, and the extremely false position in which, if debated and partially adopted, it would place the Chamber, the cabinet, and all concerned. A position

which, being the high road to a dissolution, would be neither acceptable to nor tenable by any of us. Provide against this. It appears to me that you have the power of doing so." M. de Rémusat undoubtedly communicated my letter to his colleagues, for, some days after, M. Thiers, when writing to me on the various negotiations I had in hand, said in conclusion, with keen irony which made me smile without restoring my confidence: "I wish you a thousand times good day, and recommend you to tranquillize yourself on the internal affairs of France. We do not want a dissolution, and shall not lose the country for you in your absence."

On the 15th of July, the day on which the four powers signed, without us, in London, their treaty on the affairs of the East, the session of the Chambers closed in Paris, leaving the ministry, not threatened but not firmly established, without aggressive rivals, but without steady friends and a clear future. No party attacked it, but no party supported it as the true and effective representative of its ideas, interests, and cause. "The session has ended tolerably for the cabinet," M. Villemain wrote to me; "there was a diminution of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, although the confidence has never been great. The essential party, the centre, was not hostile, but cold and sufficiently severe in its judgments. The left was humble, but some of them were in bad humour, and but for the newspapers would have been more so. The next session will find things in the same state, and perhaps aggravated. Individual gains will be rare and expensively paid for. It will be impossible to satisfy the left or to retain them in good humour unless they

are satisfied." The partizans of the cabinet, the men who had loudly approved of and sustained it during the session were not more confident in its future. "The session is over," M. Duvergier de Hauranne wrote to me, "and well over, let them say what they will. On some secondary points the cabinet may undoubtedly be reproached with weakness, but it has not given way on any important question, and its flag to-day is what it was on the first of March. The Chamber, moreover, has given all it demanded. I conclude from hence that, saving unforeseen events, its duration is quite safe for six months, and that difficulties will not spring up until the opening of the next session. I admit that at that epoch they may become very serious."

The difficulties were likely to be the greater that they neither proceeded from the composition nor the merits of the cabinet. Since its accession to power it had displayed much activity, address, and talent. It had an acknowledged leader and no internal dissensions. Its evil was in its position; it neither represented nor satisfied any of the great opinions and classifications of the country; it lived amongst them, devoted to a continued labour of agreement and balance; a labour sometimes necessary, but short-breathed, and in which success exhausts more than it fortifies. Power requires a wider and more settled basis to pretend to a long future.

In this situation, the treaty of the 15th of July proved, at the first moment, a stroke of luck for the French cabinet, and won for it during six weeks more strength than it excited danger. The internal question in which M. Thiers and his colleagues were struggling

with embarrassments at once grave and trifling, disappeared before the external question which seemed, from the first, serious and simple. The national sentiment was wounded, the national dignity and even its safety appeared to be compromised; all parties rallied round power, bringing to it impressions even more animated than its own, and offering their unreserved aid. The centre was as decided as the left, the King as animated as the ministry; on all sides were heard words of equal warmth; all the first measures adopted or announced by the government obtained general assent. "The force of the situation," M. de Rémusat wrote on the 29th of August, "has prevailed over the first tendencies of the ambition or vengeance of our adversaries; they hoped for a moment, during the King's absence, to find us separated from him at his return, or to render us suspicious in his eyes. They soon perceived that it was futile to expect either. The King has held, in regard to his ministry and the general position, a tone extremely firm and clear. Your latest intelligence, and that of Prince Metternich have recovered much ground for peace, and I have more confidence in the future. Meanwhile our preparations are in earnest; even were they not, as I think, precautions unlikely to be realized, it is an excellent thing to restore to France the military force she requires to support her rank."

Such was, in truth at that time, the idea and hope of the cabinet. Always persuaded that Mehemet Ali would resist energetically, that the means of coercion employed against him would be vain or alarming even for England herself, and that thus the question would

remain long in suspense and would end either by a direct arrangement between the Porte and the Pacha, or by fresh diplomatic transactions in which France, strongly prepared, would weigh effectively on embarrassed Europe, the French government, king and ministers, flattered itself that war would not result from measures which seemed to predict it, and that power would emerge from this crisis more popular and better armed.

But this confidence was not universal ; when the first excitement had calmed down, anxiety respecting war, and war without a serious or legitimate motive, re-possessioned many minds. M. Duchâtel wrote to me on the 8th of August, from Geneva : “The situation appears to me at this distance, serious and alarming. I cannot however persuade myself that war will ensue. I have an instinctive confidence in the maintenance of peace. But we are, as in 1831, on the blade of a knife, and the defile is not easily passed over. Above all, I wish to be assured that no one wishes war, and that nothing will be done to precipitate it, while at the same time the honour of the country is supported with the firmness which circumstances demand. The tattle of journalists does not suit statesmen, and through personal susceptibility we ought not to provoke justly the self-love of others. The new quadruple alliance has not in its hands the means of wresting Syria from the Pacha by force. It would not be an easy matter to an army of a hundred thousand Russians, and can England admit a Russian army, not only into Asia Minor but beyond the Taurus ? This would be a degree of madness

of which I do not think the good sense of John Bull capable. But while we show ourselves ready and determined, let us not force our neighbours to quarrel with us on a point of honour. Let us maintain our own honour and not wound that of others.

M. Villemain wrote at the same time: "Will the military demonstrations, for I cannot believe in war, effect what until now negotiations have failed to do? I doubt it much. It is certain that the energetic expressions of the press have had their weight. M. d'Apponi has written to his court that this country was more inflammable than he had supposed, and that a great movement towards war might take place. The power of this movement may be confined to itself, and to the probability of its suggesting prudence to foreigners. You can estimate this point. Only it may be supposed that after ten years of peace ably maintained, our present isolation is not a studied policy; it is a necessity which might have been foreseen, and the cause of which is more individual than national. Peace for the last ten years is strength added to the King, and by the King. The King's name and his personal action ought to assist in maintaining it still. If it happened otherwise, I should have melancholy forebodings of the sacrifices which would be imposed on the country and which would be speedily felt.

The prospect of these sacrifices soon began to show itself. Commercial and industrial affairs slackened. In the ports, the armaments became more timid and difficult. Assemblies of workmen met together in Paris and assumed a seditious character. Fermentation

and uneasiness displayed themselves together. Ardent spirits began to speak of war on the Rhine and in the Alps as the only means of anticipating the dangers with which the new coalition threatened France. Prudent minds regarded the perils of such a war as infinitely greater than those of the treaty of the 15th of July, and turned their thoughts towards the King, asking whether, for the sake of keeping all Syria for the Pacha of Egypt, he would allow the peace to vanish which for ten years he had so laboriously maintained. When it became known that the treaty of the 15th of July was in progress of execution, the excitement of the one party, and the anxiety of the other redoubled; letters which reached me from all quarters told me at once the warlike aspirations and peaceful wishes of the country. In this public perplexity, I felt a desire and I considered it my duty to sum up and convey fully to Paris my opinion on the state of the question I was commissioned to negotiate in London, and on the conduct we ought to pursue. I therefore addressed a letter to the Duke of Broglie, on the 23rd of September, which I insert here at full length :

“The situation becomes serious. I wish to tell you what I think and all I think. I am not well acquainted with the state of feeling in France. I cannot estimate what the government commands or permits. But looking upon things in themselves, I have formed an opinion, and we perhaps are on the verge of one of those occasions when it becomes an imperious duty to act according to our own convictions.

“Since the commencement of these negotiations, the

theme of our policy has been, as follows : ‘ We have but one interest, one object, in the East, the same with that of England, Austria, and Prussia. We desire the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. We reject all increase of territory or influence to the advantage of any European power. In the interior of the Ottoman Empire, amongst the Musselmans, between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, the division of territories affects us little. If the Sultan possessed Syria, we should say, ‘ Let him keep it.’ If the Pacha consents to restore it, we shall say, ‘ Be it so.’ This, as we think, is a trifling point. But if an attempt is made to settle this trifling point by force, that is to say, to drive the Pacha from Syria, important questions will immediately spring up of which the East may become the theatre. The Pacha will resist. He will resist at all hazards, at the risk of the ruin of the Ottoman Empire and of his own destruction. His resistance will bring the Christian powers, especially Russia, into the heart of the Ottoman Empire ; an imminent chance of tearing that Empire to pieces and setting Europe on fire. We do not wish to encounter this chance. This is why we desire, between the Sultan and the Pacha, an arrangement which may be accepted by both, and which may maintain peace in the East, the only pledge of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and consequently, of the peace of Europe.”

To this theme of the French policy, Lord Palmerston opposes the following :

“ Peace is not possible in the East while the Pacha

of Egypt retains Syria. He is too strong and the Sultan too weak. Syria must return to the Sultan. The integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire require this. If the Pacha will not restore Syria there is no danger in employing force to wrest it from him. At the last moment he will yield or resist feebly. Even though he continued to resist, no danger would ensue. The European powers are strong enough to drive the Pacha from Syria. None of them seek more. Even Russia abandons her old policy. She renounces the exclusive protectorate she has hitherto exercised over the Porte, and which by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi she had endeavoured to establish as a right. She consents to see it replaced by a European protectorate. Thus, Syria, is a vital question for the Ottoman Empire. For Europe, no formidable question can spring up by its side. On the one hand, there is a necessity for the employment of force; on the other, the employment of force entails no danger."

"Between these two lines of policy, many arrangements have been attempted: 1. *The French proposal.* Egypt and Syria shall belong hereditarily to the Pacha. Arabia, Candia, and the district of Adana shall be restored to the Sultan. 2. *English proposal.* The Pacha shall retain Egypt hereditarily, and the greater portion of the Pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre, including the fortress, for life. He shall surrender all the rest. 3. *Austrian overture.* The Pacha shall hold Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life. Arabia, Candia, and Adana to be restored to the Porte.

"All these attempts have failed: 1. Because France,

faithful to her theme, has always refused to give, under any of these arrangements, her formal consent to the employment of coercion in case the Pacha should refuse: 2. Because Lord Palmerston, faithful to his theme, has always refused to leave Syria to the Pacha.

“To have any chance of success, the Austrian overture would require, in the first instance to be vigorously urged by Austria and Prussia on the one hand, and by France on the other; and finally to be sanctioned by unanimous coercion, in case the Pacha should refuse. Both these conditions have failed.

“During the progress of these attempts at arrangement, a double work was going on: 1. In the East, by France, to bring about, without the co-operation of the other powers, a direct settlement between the Sultan and the Pacha; 2. In London, by Lord Palmerston, to effect, by leaving France aside, an arrangement of four powers, to secure, by force, the restoration of Syria to the Sultan.

“The explosion of the attempt at direct settlement between the Sultan and the Pacha, coincident with the insurrection in Syria against the Pacha, decided the conclusion of the arrangement between the four powers and the signature of the convention of the 15th of July.

“The convention of the 15th of July is nothing more or less than Lord Palmerston's theme reduced to practice. There is in it no general and permanent coalition against France, her revolution, or her government. It is not the resurrection of the Holy Alliance. There is no reconciliation or concert between recently rival

ambitions. It is not a preface to the partition of the Ottoman Empire.

“Not only is there nothing of this in the convention of the 15th of July, but no shadow of it in intention; and if, in the existing state of things, one of the four powers should attempt to introduce or cause such a result to emanate from it, the alliance would be dissolved.

“The convention of the 15th of July embraces :

“*For England*: 1. The weakening of the Pacha of Egypt, too strong a vassal of the Porte, and too powerful a friend of France. 2. The abolition of the exclusive protectorate of Russia over the Porte; or in other words, the Porte strengthened, Russia and France restrained.

“*For Austria and Prussia*: The same results, as for England; in addition, an alliance between these two powers and England, which may in some degree weaken Russia.

“*Finally, for Russia*: The postponement of her ambition and the sacrifice of her dignity in the East; but in return; 1. The separation of France and England; 2. The termination of the perillous engagements she had contracted by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi; 3. And this without really sacrificing the position and future of Russia as to the Porte, probably even with a general weakening of the Musselmans.

“The convention of the 15th of July thus correctly interpreted in its relations to the four contracting powers, what does it contain as regards France, either in itself, or in the mode in which it has been concluded?

“It contains offence and danger. To conclude the convention, France was kept in the dark. This has been justified by saying that France also concealed from the four powers her attempt to bring about a direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha. That proceeding was wrong, but the real offence does not lie therein. It consists in the slight consideration in which England held the French alliance. She has risked and sacrificed it for a very secondary interest, the immediate redemption of Syria from the Pacha. France proposed the *statu quo*. The French alliance was surely worth the adjournment of Lord Palmerston’s plans on the East until the death of the Pacha

“The dangers of the treaty are those which France, since the commencement of the negotiations, has not failed to point out. 1. The obstinate resistance of the Pacha: 2. The shaking, perhaps the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire; 3. The four powers may be carried beyond their object by the nature of the means they will be compelled to employ; and all the great questions and events to which their armed intervention in the Ottoman Empire will lead, may spring up suddenly from the trifling question of Syria. This is what concerns us in the treaty of the 15th of July. These are the motives which have determined our attitude and preparations. Motives, undoubtedly, sufficient and legitimate. Our friendship has been very lightly renounced. Formidable contingencies have been very lightly opened in Europe. We have resented the affront and prepared for the danger. The convention is now executing, seriously, and with its avowed object. What

line of conduct is prescribed to France, by the national interest, and by the policy she has constantly declared and maintained through the course of this affair?

“Ought France to go war, to preserve Syria to the Pacha of Egypt?

“Evidently this is not a question of sufficient interest to become a case of war. France, who did not go to war to liberate Poland from Russia, or Italy from Austria, cannot reasonably make war that Syria may remain in the hands of the Pacha and not of the Sultan.

“The war would be either Eastern and maritime, or continental and general. Maritime, the inequality of forces, of damage and danger, is indisputable. Continental and general, France could only sustain the war by making it revolutionary, that is to say, by abandoning the honest, judicious, and profitable policy she has followed since 1830, and by herself transforming the alliance of the four powers into a hostile coalition.

“The interest of France, therefore, does not counsel her to make the Syrian question a case of war.

“The policy hitherto declared and maintained by France, as regards the East, does not permit this. We have openly and continually said that the distribution of territories between the Sultan and the Pacha, was of slight moment with us; that if the Pacha wished to restore Syria to the Sultan, we should make no objection; that the expectation of his refusal, of his resistance, and of the dangers that might accrue therefrom to the Ottoman Empire, and the peace of Europe, were the motives of our opposition to coercive measures. By making war to preserve Syria for the Pacha, we should

give a glaring contradiction to ourselves, and one of those contradictions which weaken while they depreciate.

“Is it then to be concluded that France has nothing to do, but to look on, with arms in her hands, at the execution of the treaty of the 15th of July, and that her language, attitude, and preparations ought not, in any case, to exceed a simple demonstration?”

“Certainly not.

“If the Pacha resists, if the coercive measures employed by the four powers should become complicated and prolonged, then what France has predicted may realise itself. The question of Syria may excite others. War may spring up spontaneously, necessarily, through some unforeseen incident, in the midst of a perilous and stubborn situation.

“If war springs up thus, not by the will or act of France, but as the consequence of a position which France has not created, France ought to accept war. From this time forward, she ought to hold herself ready to accept it.

“It may also happen, and this, according to my opinion, is the most probable of all the chances, that, in the course of the coercive measures attempted in virtue of the treaty of the 15th of July, the four powers may be led to interfere in the Ottoman Empire in a manner which may oblige France to appear there also, not to make war on the Porte, or the four powers, but to take securities and guarantees for herself, in the interest of her own dignity and of the future. If European armies were to enter Asia, if European forces were to establish themselves on any given point or points of the Ottoman

Empire, either on the coast or in the interior; if Russian troops should occupy Constantinople, and English and Russian fleets the sea of Marmara;—in these cases, or in any other that cannot be determined beforehand, France could and ought to interfere, in her turn, on the theatre of events, and testify her presence and her power. In what should her acts consist? We cannot and ought not to say beforehand, neither can we designate the contingencies to which they would correspond. All that can be said is, that France ought to be decided and ready to accomplish them. War might ensue from these acts; it would then be inevitable and legitimate. I incline to think that it would not so arise, and that the four powers, in their turn, would bear much from France rather than commence war with her when she had given proof, at the same time, of moderation and vigour.

“Such, my dear friend, after mature reflection, is the only line of conduct that appears to me prudent, consistent, and worthy; I shall add, loyal. I was on the point of writing this to M. Thiers. I have given up the idea. I do not wish him to suppose that I presume to dictate his policy, or that I have any premeditated idea of separation. But, on the one hand, I wish him to know exactly what I think; and, on the other, I want to know myself what he intends, and whether he proposes to march in that road, for, as regards myself, I could not follow any other. I address myself to you for information on this subject, being well convinced that you will understand the importance I attach to it. You may make what use you please of my letter, either by showing it,

or by keeping it to yourself, as you may think best. I trust to you to communicate, as may be most suitable, the truth I now utter, and to send me in return, that which I am asking for."

I was so disturbed by the situation, and so eager to know what they were doing in Paris, that on the 2nd of October, not having yet received an answer from the Duke of Broglie, who had recently returned from Coppet, I wrote to him again: "I am impatiently expecting your reply. All that I hear induces me to dread that the rejection of the propositions of Mehemet Ali is considered in Paris as a case of war, and that if war is not deliberately commenced, it may be accidentally begun, as is always possible. I do not repeat to you on the real merits of the question, what I said some days ago: I know that you are of my opinion, and the more I reflect, the more I am confirmed in that opinion. I am ignorant of the state of feeling in France. I do not believe that it demands war for Syria. And if the state of public feeling does not require war, the state of affairs does not call for it either. We must therefore try to avoid it, and if we cannot succeed, we must conduct ourselves with that view. No one must deceive himself. The more experience I have of falsehoods, the more I feel convinced that in the end, in great affairs, people only believe in the truth, and conclude by finding out the truth. I take little heed of idle gossip; I do not meet it half way. I make allowance for intrigues; but every day the wind brings me these words, "If Syria for life is refused, there will be war." This may be nothing, or may be only premeditated language to

produce a certain effect ; but it may also be something, and that something of great importance, and quite different from what appears to me sound policy. I look on the question very closely, and I pray you to tell me, as soon as possible, what you see."

Almost at the same moment, the Duke of Broglie, having returned to Paris, wrote to me : " I have received your letter of the 23rd of September. I thought that it would be well to communicate it *in extenso* to M. Thiers, and M. de Rémusat. I therefore sent it to both. I now give you a summary of the two or three long conversations we have recently had on the subject of this letter.

" It is henceforth universally affirmed, and even Lord Palmerston admits, that the mission of M. Walewski had for its object to obtain concessions from the Pacha, and not to urge him to a blind and obstinate resistance. It is universally affirmed that the result of our intervention at Alexandria has been not to reduce, but to augment these concessions. The limit is reached, as far as regards France and her efforts. She will not again take the initiative in demanding from the Pacha new sacrifices ; she finds the ground taken, according to her advice, wise and conciliatory. Provided that the Pacha restrains himself, provided that he is careful not to make a point beyond the Taurus, provided that he confines himself to the concentration of his troops on the coast of Syria, and to the defence of his actual position, he may reckon on the approbation and good offices of France, without prejudice to the ulterior determinations to which certain eventualities might incline her, in her own interest, but without any direct or indirect engagement under

any contingency whatever. This is the substance of a dispatch forwarded to M. Cochelet. The same declaration has been made to the ambassadors. Its object is, in case the Pacha should feel disposed to yield entirely, to leave the responsibility with him. I consider this reasonable and becoming. It is, moreover, consistent; we have refused our moral support to the treaty of the 15th of July, while reserving to ourselves the right of acting as might seem to us judicious and suitable. To require from the Pacha more than he concedes to-day, would be to call upon him to subscribe to the treaty of the 15th of July. Let him do so, if he feels inclined; but it is not for us to urge him.

“This being settled, what remains to be done? Three things, according to my idea.

“1. To retard, as much as possible, the convocation of the Chambers; to avoid, as much as possible being driven, whether we will or no, into contests in the tribune; to gain time.

2. To receive without pride, without ill-humour, but also without duplicity, any overtures that may be made to us, consequently upon the propositions of the Pacha, let them come from what quarter they may; to discuss them according to their value, and only to repulse peremptorily any proposals, direct or indirect, to accede to the treaty of the 15th of July. There is, unfortunately, at present, and until the importance of that treaty shall have been demonstrated by facts, very little to expect from these overtures; supposing, which is doubtful, that any should be made to us. Between the treaty and the propositions of the Pacha there is no real mar-

gin, no truly intermediate course. We cannot accede to the treaty. Austria and Prussia might perhaps accept the propositions, but neither the one nor the other have really a vote in the chapter. The haughty presumption of the person who controls as a master the English cabinet, will not permit him to yield; and Russia, who loses all political position if France and England are reconciled, who has sacrificed all to produce the rupture, risked all upon this stake, Russia will probably lend herself to nothing. Be that as it may, there is still a stroke left; to wait, and to reject nothing without discussion, to show neither anger nor vexation, and if a means of treating offers, to seize the occasion.

3. Finally, to continue with ardour and perseverance our arming preparations; to make no display of them, but to suspend and neglect nothing, as to men, within legal limits, and as to material of war and fortifications, within possible accomplishment. To be in a position, when the moment arrives, of not asking more from the Chambers than the number of men necessary to fill up the skeletons of regiments already formed, and the ratification of what has been done without them. This is of the last importance. Whatever may be the issue, France must draw from present circumstances a complete armament, which the improvidence of the representative government does not permit her to obtain except in moments of urgency and apprehension.

“What will finally happen?”

“No one can predict; but we may at least, according to the plan which mathematicians call the exhaustive

method, lay down a certain number of alternatives, between which a solution must necessarily be found.

“Will the Pacha make a point against Constantinople, and thereby bring on a *casus fæderis*, which in all probability would degenerate into a *casus belli*? This seems very unlikely; whether the concessions wrung from him result from his weakness or discretion, they banish this apprehension, at least for the present.

“Will he give up all?

“M. Thiers has no fear of this. I confess that it would not astonish me. If this happens we cannot interfere. The precaution taken by the dispatch I named to you at the beginning of this letter is our only safeguard; but it is clear that we shall not go to war to reconquer for him what he chooses to abandon.

“Will he resist with advantage? Will he succeed in keeping Syria, in protecting the coast, in driving into the sea whoever may disembark?

“This is our winning card; the card on which we have staked in the lottery. If our number comes up, all will go well. If the treaty is convicted of impotence, and the allies are driven to another, which decidedly yields up Turkey to Russia, we have a fine game to play, either at Berlin or Vienna, or even with the English cabinet, to prevent its adoption.

“Finally, there remains the chance, and unfortunately this is the most likely hypothesis, that the Pacha may resist with much difficulty, and that a prolonged struggle may ensue between him and the allies, threatening to end in his ruin.

“If this happens, logically we should be bound to look

on as indifferent spectators ; practically it is probable that the position might become untenable, and that honour and the influence of opinion would call upon us to interfere.

“ Under what form, in what sense, in what measure, and as a result of what circumstances, should this intervention occur ? It is impossible to say beforehand. But it is important to hold our present position as long as we possibly can, and to do nothing which may compromise it *a priori*, or by premeditated design.

“ Thus, for instance, we ought to keep our fleet together, not to scatter it ; to keep it at a sufficient distance from the theatre of hostilities, to abstain from all half measures, from all those interventions of detail which produce no decisive fruit, and involve without rescuing.

“ The advantage of an isolated position, in the midst of its difficulties, is that you depend on no one, you can act as you please, neither more nor less, and at the last moment can choose your course. The peculiar advantage of France in her existing position is, that if it results in war, she will make it, it will not be made on her. We must not lose either of these advantages by placing ourselves at the mercy of accidents and admirals. Thus, as our first plan of conduct, we must not send our fleet to the theatre of hostilities, except with positive instructions, to do or to interdict something distinct and defined ; and by this plan to reserve ourselves for the commencement of intervention when we please ; to commence it by a summons to Prussia and Austria, and by threatening their frontiers, should that measure appear eligible. In a word, to remain in armed but immovable

expectation up to the moment when it is considered necessary to emerge from it by some energetic and preconcerted act: such is the course which prudence seems to dictate.

“And not only is this conduct prudent, but it is honest. The question is, whether or not we are to engage in a terrible struggle on which the fate of the country may depend; in such a case, it is just and honest that we should be able to choose.

“The King and the country must not wake up some fine morning and find themselves at war with Europe, in consequence of a misunderstanding, a thoughtless blunder, or a bravado. When the moment comes, if come it must, the King and the country must deliberate. If they find that the cabinet is wrong in thinking the honour of France compromised by a longer inaction, the cabinet will retire, and others will adopt the policy they consider right. If the King and the country agree in opinion with the cabinet, then, and then only, the ministry must act. To attempt such a struggle without having the King and the country with them, heartily and enthusiastically, would be madness.

“Such, my dear friend, is the result of our conversations. I forward it to you, well knowing that events regulate minds and wills, and that what appears best, may be disproved on trial.”

Two days after writing this letter, which had not been posted immediately, the Duke of Broglie added a postscript dated the 3rd of October:

“The above was a faithful summary up to the point we had reached the evening before yesterday. Yester-

day morning, the news of the bombardment of Beyrout arrived. This was nothing more than might have been expected ; but the agitation is great, and God grant that it may not urge on precipitate resolutions. I shall do my best to restrain them. To-day there was a council, which ended in nothing. They spoke of convoking the Chambers, of sending our fleet to protect Alexandria by its presence, and of leaving the rest to its natural course. Opinions were divided, and already, the second telegraphic dispatch being more tranquil than the first, there is a halt. I shall keep you informed of all that happens."

Being immediately promulgated, this intelligence produced two contrary effects upon the public ; blindly or advisedly, minds surrendered themselves to two opposite currents : " Things will turn towards war," M. de Lavergne wrote to me, on the 17th of August, " as long as all the world believes peace to be immovable, and they will return towards peace when all the world looks upon war as imminent." When the bombardment of Beyrout, and the forfeiture of Mehemet Ali declared at Constantinople, became known, the first general movement was for war, without any clear notion as to where or within what limits ; people wished to escape from the annoyance of the position, and to return blow for blow to the powers who had, they said, found and seized upon, in the East, an opportunity of reviving, against France, the coalition of 1815. But hostile passions and factions soon attempted to give this movement its extreme bearing ; from warlike, they soon rendered it revolutionary ; public European law and the French

monarchy, the frontiers of states, the organization and future of Europe were eagerly mixed up with the question; the republican press resumed its violence, the secret societies their plots, the popular assemblies their boastings and demands. From day to day, from hour to hour, 1840 resembled more completely 1831; the same excesses prepared the same dangers, and provoked the same resistance; the spirit of legal order and peace reappeared, at first embarrassed and timid, but speedily animated and strengthened by the extent of its alarms, less noisy than the revolutionary spirit, but resolute for the struggle, and seeking on all sides a resting point and firm defenders for the policy it had triumphantly carried through for nine years.

Evidently the cabinet presided over by M. Thiers was not well suited to this task. On its formation, it had leaned towards the left, and without yielding entirely had glided into that bias. The conservative party, which had seen the ministry installed, with ill-humour, did not attack, but bore towards it neither confidence nor devotion. In the East, events were falsifying its anticipations; according, on that point, with the public sentiment, it had constituted itself the protector of the Egyptian cause and power; but that power, when brought to trial, was found to be much below what was expected; and to obtain any chance of success, that cause had imposed on France sacrifices and risks much above its real importance. The cabinet had no desire for war, but it prepared for war ardently, believing it possible and perhaps approaching, and wished at least to impress that apprehension on Europe. By

the turn which events were now taking, its military preparations lost their significance, and in presence of the warlike excitement ready to transform itself into revolutionary fermentation, the spirit of resistance and peace regained its empire. When on the news of the easy execution of the treaty of the 15th of July, this embarrassed and false position of the cabinet displayed itself; "Here," said M. Rossi, "is a fine opportunity for M. Thiers to resign."

M. Thiers and his colleagues did not deceive themselves, and from the commencement of October, perhaps even a little earlier, they tendered their resignation to the King, who at first seemed dissatisfied and refused to accept it. I have already had occasion to say, it was the disposition of this monarch to associate himself warmly with patriotic emotions, but without suffering them to control his judgment and resolutions. He sympathized strongly with and inclined to indulge the national sentiment, yet still maintaining his independence; capable to-day of participating in its enthusiasm and of estimating to-morrow its error and accompanying danger. In the Egyptian question, and on the treaty of the 15th of July, he had thought and felt with the public, and had even manifested his sentiment with more impetuosity than foresight, preserving, meanwhile, in his inmost soul, some degree of uneasiness, and making prudent reserves in conversation, suggested to him by the vivacity of his imagination, but without leading him to premeditate any change of conduct or counsellors. He had sincerely acceded to all the measures proposed to him by the cabinet, reckoning always

that the four powers would not drive matters to extremity, that Mehemet Ali would resist effectively, that an arrangement would intervene, that under any circumstances the peace of Europe would not be disturbed, and well pleased, that while waiting a favourable solution, the military condition of France should be restored, both for the security of the country and the strength of his own government. When the true state of things manifested itself, when the chances of a war without serious motive and national interest seemed urgent, King Louis-Philippe paused upon the declivity, caring little for having followed it thus far, and fully determined to go no further. "Since England and the allies declare to us that they will limit their hostile measures to the necessary development for the evacuation of Syria, and that they will not attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt, I do not see," he said, "that this constitutes for us a *casus belli*. France has not guaranteed the possession of Syria to Ibrahim Pacha; and although she may be far from approving the aggression of the powers, and still less inclined to lend them any aid, either moral or material, I do not think she is engaged in honour to plunge into a war in which she would stand alone against the world, solely to maintain Ibrahim in Syria. It is objected that the allies intend to attack Egypt. In that case we shall consider how to act. But as long as the powers assure us they have no such intention, I cannot see that the *casus belli* has arrived, and in the existing state of things, we have only to wait and watch." It was in this disposition that the King on the 7th of October decreed the convocation of the Chambers, and

accepted the diplomatic note of the 8th by which M. Thiers confined himself to declaring that the forfeiture of Mehemet Ali in Egypt, carried into execution, would be an attack on the general balance of Europe which France could not acknowledge. On these terms a momentary harmony was restored between the King and the cabinet.

From all quarters and almost daily it was written to me that this harmony would not last, that the cabinet could not confront the position, and that of this the King and the ministers were equally convinced. I was urged to act, to manifest openly my opinion and intention, and at the same time I was assailed by all the doubts, hesitations, and incoherent anxieties by which my friends as well as the public were pre-occupied, believing alternately in peace and war, to-day in the strengthening, to-morrow in the fall of the cabinet and ; if it fell, in the extreme difficulty, perhaps in the impossibility of replacing it.

To these warnings, and multiplied incitements, my answer was ever the same ; " If the cabinet must succumb," I wrote, " I wish to have nothing to do with its fall or with the reverses that will produce it. I am determined to persevere in my own line of conduct, and to hold myself ready if events should seek me. I do not wish to create these events, nor to allow it to be supposed that I had any desire to create them. I can only be strong in a difficult situation inasmuch as I shall have done nothing to lead to it. Be careful, moreover ; you lend yourselves too readily to the vicissitudes of language and position ; every day produces a change

of impression, words, anxieties, or hopes ; people are sour or gentle, they believe in peace or war, according to the interest or fancy of the moment. A trifling interest, a fleeting fancy, but which nevertheless says white to-day, black to-morrow. And the position itself vibrates much ; it ascends, descends, inclining to the right or to the left. We must not suffer our minds and conduct to be tossed about according to the tattle of men or the undulations of things. There is a culminating point in all situations, a true and definitive bias of events. On this we must cast anchor and to this we must hold, and take part from thence in the war of words and the fluctuation of daily incidents."

No one, amongst my friends understood the position better, or gave me more correct information than M. Duchâtel. Absent from Paris at the moment, he observed facts and weighed chances with that steady and acute sagacity, always directed towards the essential point of questions and affairs, which is one of the eminent qualities of his mind. He wrote to me on the 1st of October from Mirambeau ; " We are in one of the most formidable crises which a new government can have to pass through. The agitation is extreme ; no one wishes to believe in war, and the principal reason of this confidence is, the fear that war inspires. Alone against all, we can defend ourselves at home if unjustly attacked ; but we cannot hope to make our opinions prevail in the world. You can judge by the fluctuations of the Exchange what our credit would be in case of a general ; war our finances are admirable for a time of peace ; but the government is still too recently estab-

lished, and parties too much animated, for war not to destroy the confidence of the great capitalists by making them fear a legislative change, and in its train, bankruptcy. All this is extremely alarming. We must nevertheless think of our honour, for honour before everything ; but we must also listen to prudence. I am completely of your opinion. If war breaks out, its necessity must be thrice evident ; without that we should encounter terrible risks." And some days later, pre-occupying himself with my personal position, he added ; "The country does not want war. No one admits that to preserve a moiety of Syria for Mehemet Ali we should expose ourselves to much greater perils than those we declined to risk in 1830, when there was a question with us of resuming our natural frontiers. I have no advice to give you ; you know better than I do the main point of things ; but in your own interest and in that of the country, never was a situation more delicate than yours ; your responsibility is immense. At the point we have now reached, if a general war does not appear to you inevitable, you ought to oppose your *veto* to war. If you think, being as you are, thoroughly acquainted with this formidable affair, that the last word ought to be pronounced, concur in pronouncing it ; but do not let it be uttered by others if it should be your opinion that France is not condemned to have recourse to such a grave extremity."

I had, on my own part, the same sentiment. All that I saw of the difficulties, becoming daily more animated of the external question, all that I ascertained of the increasing dangers of the revolutionary ferment inter-

nally, added, in my eyes to the weight of my personal responsibility, and forced me to meditate anxiously on what I ought to do to relieve myself from it. "I do not believe in war," I wrote to my most intimate friends, "but I am quite as uneasy as if I did. My foresight has no power over my disposition. All, absolutely all that concerns me is involved in this question ; my dearest personal interests, the most important political interests of my country, and of myself with my country. And all this is in course of decision without me, far from me—in Syria by the cannon of Napier, in Paris by the councils of a cabinet of which I am not a member. My reason persists in its confidence ; I do not believe in war, but my mind is full of anxiety. I have never been so disturbed."

When I learned that the Chambers were convoked, and would meet on the 28th of October, I escaped from my most pressing trouble ; I was thus naturally called to resume my place in the assembly and in the debates in which all the questions that weighed upon me were about to be disposed of. I wrote immediately to M. Thiers :—

"To his Excellency, the President of the Council.

"The convocation of the Chambers for the 28th of this month inforces upon me the necessity of being present at the first debates of the session. I beg your Excellency to be so kind as to ask from the King, on my part, the favour of a leave of absence. I believe that, within the next fortnight, my temporary departure will produce no inconvenience. Very probably the situation will be for some time stationary, and I shall leave the affairs

with which his Majesty has done me the honour to entrust me, in the hands of the Baron de Bourqueney, who has followed them from their origin, is thoroughly acquainted with their history, and fully impressed with the spirit which has pervaded the negotiations, and inspires the English government, both by his character and capacity, with esteem and confidence. I shall moreover hold myself ready, as soon as I have performed the first duties of the session, to resume my post here, according to the King's intentions, and the instructions of your Excellency."

On the same day, the 13th of October, in order that my disposition should be well known to and understood by my friends, and also by the ministers, with whom I could not explain myself directly and without reserve, I wrote to the Duke of Broglie :

"My dear friend, I am disturbed, and more by our internal than by our foreign transactions. We are returning towards 1834, towards the revolutionary spirit taking advantage of the national enthusiasm, and urging on to war without legitimate motive or reasonable cause of success, with the sole object, and in the sole hope of revolutions.

"I say without legitimate motive. The question of Syria is not a legitimate case for war. I consider that revolution.

"Until now, no other question has been raised, in principle, by the treaty of the 15th of July ; in fact, by its execution. No great French interest has been attacked ; neither her independence, government, institutions, ideas, free activity, nor wealth.

“What they are attempting in the East may bring on different results from those they look for. Questions may spring up there, events may arise to which France could not remain indifferent. This is a reason for arming, for being ready. But it is not a reason for raising, of ourselves, in the West, questions and events more serious still, and which do not occur naturally.

“The friendship of France has been treated lightly. She is offended by this, and justly. This is a reason for coldness, isolation, and a perfectly independent and purely personal policy. But it is not a case of war. The offence is not amongst those which command and legalize war. They have neither wished to insult, defy, nor deceive France. Her co-operation has been asked. She has refused it on the terms proposed. They have gone beyond this with little consideration. There have been carelessness and a wrong mode of proceeding, but no direct insult.

“After the motives, I look to the chances.

“We must not deceive ourselves here; springing up in this manner, and under this impulse, the war would be general. Through honour as well as interest the four powers would combine. The anti-Egypt coalition would become an anti-French coalition. France herself would urge it in that course. A general and revolutionary war is the only one that those desire who wish for war, the sole war in which they can dream of success.

“In France, to-day, I believe in the revolutionary violence of factions. I do not believe in the revolutionary bias of the nation.

“Externally, we have no great cause to defend; neither

national security, nor national independence are threatened. Internally we have no great conquest to achieve ; the country lives under the system it desired.

“ Anarchical passions in some men, or even in a portion of the multitude, do not amount to the revolutionary impulse of a nation. Political factions would conspire. Personal passions would burst forth. The country would not rise.

“ Anarchy can effect no more in France than noise and mischief. Its hopes are illusions, like its strength.

“ In Europe, a revolutionary war would not find, amongst peoples, all the assistance it promises itself.

“ In 1830, on many points, a great trial was made, after many small ones attempted from 1814 to 1830. Almost everywhere the revolutionary forces were found insufficient ; revolutionary hopes were falsified.

“ There are people who forget ; there are others who remember, and experience weakens those which she does not change.

“ The spirit of nationality and gradual amelioration under national government, has gained more ground in Europe than the spirit of revolution.

“ The spirit of nationality would predominate in Germany.

“ Spain is torn to pieces, Italy enervated, Poland crushed. I do not say that these countries count for nothing ; but what considerable or durable strength could we expect from them ?

“ And at what price ? At the price of our honour. We have proclaimed for ten years that it is the honour of our government to have become a government the

day after a revolution ; to have sustained our rights without any appeal to passions ; to have created itself by resistance, and to have maintained itself by order and peace. Shall we cease to say this ? Shall we suddenly change our maxims, our language, our attitude, and our conduct ?

“This is not possible ; the attempt would be disgraceful and fatal. For her honour, as well as for her own security, France is devoted to-day to the cause of peace. War for the greatest, the most pressing national interests ; necessary, inevitable, clearly inevitable and defensive war can alone become her. If France is attacked, let her repulse the attack. If her dignity requires in any quarter, in the East, as at Antwerp, as at Ancona, as in Mexico, any act of presence and force, let her accomplish it, and say to Europe, in its accomplishment, ‘Come and seek me at home.’ Such is, for us, the only safe, consistent, and becoming line of conduct.

“You know, you think all this, as I do, my dear friend ; I am confident of it. I therefore repeat it to you for myself. I am at a distance. I see the movement, the enthusiasm from a distance. I can do nothing to oppose it. I am resolved not to mix myself up with it. I wrote to you three weeks ago ; I am unable to judge of the state of minds in France, or to estimate what it permits or prescribes to the government. It is possible that war, the war I have spoken of, a general, revolutionary, and aggressive war, which does not seem to me authorized by the state of things, may be rendered inevitable by the state of public ideas and sentiments.

If this were to happen, I should no longer associate myself with a policy, full as I think of error and danger. I should keep aloof.

“ I have confidence in the Chambers. I have always seen, in critical moments, the sentiment of the danger, of duty, and of responsibility, take possession of the Chambers, and give them lights, courage, and strength, which would have failed them, as it does all the world, in tranquil times. This is what happened in 1831. We have often said to ourselves ; without the Chambers, without their presence, co-operation, and debates, without that legal explosion, that organized struggle of public passions and public reason, the government of 1830 would never have resisted the warlike and revolutionary enthusiasm, at that epoch so lively and natural. Never did the country find in itself so much wisdom and energy in support of its government. Are we on the eve of another trial ? Can we expect a second triumph ? My anxiety is great ; but my confidence keeps pace with it. It is by the Chambers, by their support, by their complete and sincere internal discussion, that we can enlighten the country, and turn away the peril, if it is to be turned away.

“ My dear friend, recommend, support, and carry this policy, for once more I am sure it is also your own. It will have, either here in London, or in the Chambers at Paris, everywhere and under all forms, my most active and devoted concurrence. I shall be in Paris, I cannot precisely name the day, but certainly in time for the opening debates of the session. I cannot forego being

present, at any cost. I owe this to myself. I have asked this day for leave of absence, which I expect will be granted without difficulty."

The leave was immediately conceded. M. Thiers notified it to me on the 15th of October. But at the same time a question arose, which furnished my immediate friends with an occasion for disagreement. The cabinet announced its intention of proposing M. Odilon Barrot for the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. I had no ill feeling towards M. Odilon Barrot; since 1831 we had differed in opinion on the system of government, at home and abroad; in the tribune we had habitually contested, but without violence or personal acrimony. I respected his character, and I felt convinced that he would preside over the Chamber with equity and dignity. But he had been for nine years the leader of the opposition to the policy which for nine years I had maintained; the coalition which had temporarily brought us together in 1839, had failed in the design of effacing our differences, and of uniting ourselves in the government; perhaps if, at that epoch, we had stood alone, face to face with each other, we might have come to an understanding. But our parties had always been, and continued to be profoundly opposed and divided. I did not hesitate to think and declare, that I would never give my adhesion to this proposal, and I wrote on the 17th of October to the Duke of Broglie :

"I hear it said that M. Barrot is to be proposed for the presidency. I have some difficulty in believing this. According to what I learn from many quarters,

according to the suggestions of my own reason, it is a very dangerous candidateship. They will not succeed ; and if they fail how will they support the check ?

“ But here is a reason, as I think, even more important, a reason drawn from the very essence of things. What is the weak side, the inherent evil of the position ? It is to have proclaimed war without intending it, to have urged towards war while aiming at peace. They were naturally placed on this declivity ; they were obliged to have recourse to excitement from without, to persuade people that war was possible, to assume a serious attitude, language, and preparations. But evidently the object has been overleaped, without being reached. Not by the government itself and the official policy ; but round the government, in its party, in the atmosphere which gives it its physiognomy and colour, the attitude, language, and demonstrations have assumed a character of exaggeration and violence, of declamatory and revolutionary menaces ; a character which, at home and internally, restores hope to revolutionary passions, and which externally, in Europe, irritates without awing, and diffuses, not a wholesome but a mischievous agitation.

“ The position of the government has suffered from this. Doubts have alternately arisen as to its pacific assurances, and warlike announcements. Its intentions have not been clear. It has neither excited sufficient confidence nor sufficient apprehension.

“ But whence especially does the evil proceed ? From the contact and influence of the left ? From that wearied and not transformed left, which has neither

evil intentions nor the courage of good ones ; which speaks, writes, and acts, no longer from revolutionary passions but from revolutionary complaisance and habit ; which promises, at home, more than it can or would perform ; threatens abroad more than it can or would attempt ; and which thus imprints on the cabinet it sustains, and the situation it controls, all the appearances and dangers of a policy which it has neither the design nor the power of carrying into execution.

“ And it is the leader of this party that the government would give to the Chamber, and adopt for its standard bearer ! The government would loudly proclaim this influence, when it is from this source that it derives all that is false, embarrassing, and most dangerous in its own situation !

“ For myself, I should look upon the official adoption and success of this candidateship as an aggravation of an evil already too serious. In itself it would signify little, but it would declare and augment the influence of the left in public affairs. It possesses too much already for the security and dignity of our policy.”

On the main point of the question, nearly all my friends coincided with me ; but was I called upon to declare my opinion so openly ? Why should I be eager to arrive before the opening of the session, and before the vote upon the presidency of the Chamber ? By coming a few days later I could escape this embarrassment. It was more serious than I anticipated from a distance. “ The adversaries of the cabinet,” a letter informed me, “ wait your arrival as the signal of attack ; nothing is more easy than its overthrow, and it will be well satisfied

to retire ; the greater portion of the ministers find the burden too heavy, and M. Thiers will be delighted to consign it to others, while retaining his own popularity. If you are here, your presence alone will hasten the fall, and your future liberty of action will be much impeded thereby. Prudence recommends to you to let the opening of the session pass over, and if you must be called for, to wait for the call " M. Rossi, in particular, urged me strongly to follow this prudential advice.

These objections failed to persuade me. I wrote on the 20th of October to the Duke of Broglie: " I have reflected deliberately. I shall leave London on the 25th. I shall take my mother and children to Normandy, and shall be in Paris on the 28th, in the evening, or on the 29th. I have nothing to wait for in London. I have nothing to seek in Paris. I am concerned in no intrigue, either here or there. I shall neither say nor do anything except in perfect harmony with what I have said and done here for the last eight months. I promised the cabinet my support without binding myself to it. This is what I have done and mean to do. I have said that I should keep my position and my friends, without espousing their humours. I shall continue to act as I have hitherto done. On the first day, I made reserves which appeared to me reasonable in themselves, and suitable to my own case. I have nothing to add to, or subtract from them, to-day. Why then should I allow my conduct to assume appearances of hesitation and constraint? Nothing compels me to this, either in the past or the future, in my actions or intentions. I wish to take my position simply, openly,

and entirely, without eluding any of its natural difficulties, without adding to it any factitious or extraneous difficulty. I was a deputy before being an ambassador. I think more of what I am as a deputy than of what I am as an ambassador. I have asked leave of absence for the opening of the session. It has been granted. I shall employ it seriously by repairing to the Chamber where there are serious matters in hand. I shall not postpone my presence until it is of no consequence. I shall act as a deputy, according to my convictions, my antecedents, and my honour. I shall speak as an ambassador, according to what I have thought, written, done, or accepted since I filled that post. I think all this can be easily reconciled. As regards myself, I am totally divested of embarrassment. If there were discrepancies here, I should be the first to discover them."

Events spared me the embarrassment which my friends anticipated. On the 15th of October, about six in the evening, the King was returning from St. Cloud with the Queen and Madame Adelaide; on the quay of the Tuileries, near the bridge of Louis the Sixteenth, a loud explosion was heard; a man near the quarter called that of the Lion, crouching down at the foot of a street lamp-post had fired at the king; two footmen and one of the mounted National guards of the escort were wounded; no one in the carriage was struck. Arrested on the instant, the perpetrator of the crime made no attempt to escape.—"I am not going to fly."—"Your name?"—"A conspirator."—"Your profession?"—"Exterminator of tyrants. Cursed carbine! and yet I aimed directly. But it was overloaded." He called himself

Marius Darmès, born at Marseilles, and a floor cleaner in Paris, by avocation. An ignorant and coarse fanatic, who lived in an atmosphere of hatred against kings in general, against King Louis-Philippe in particular, and who looked upon murder as the natural privilege of hatred.

The effect of this attempt was very great, much greater, perhaps, than on any similar occasion. It burst forth in the midst of a public already highly roused and disturbed by the general position. People saw in it a detestable result and a fearful symptom of the reviving and daily fomenting revolutionary excitement. They were astonished, indignant, irritated, and alarmed; they gave way to sinister predictions on the prospects of society and authority. I find in a letter written on the 19th of October, after I received the news, the impression made on me in London, both by the fact, and the effect it had produced in France. "This new attempt at assassination has not surprised me. It is a rough enterprise to re-establish order in the world. To-day all the wicked are mad and all the madmen are ready to become wicked. And honest men commit a folly in their turn; they accept madness as an excuse for crime. There is a madness which extenuates, but not that of Darmès and the like. We dare not look the evil in the face, and we say these men are mad to tranquillise ourselves. And while some resume confidence timidly, others lapse into terror with equal cowardice: "All is lost!" they cry; "it is the end of the world." The world has seen, under other names and aspects, many similar evils and perils, equal to these, at least, if

not exceeding them. We require, at present, a degree of justice, happiness, and security in happiness, of which formerly human associations had not even an idea. They existed for centuries, very differently assailed by sufferings, crimes, and terrors. They prospered, notwithstanding, and expanded with the progress of those ages. We forget all this. We expect that at once, and for us, all the progress yet to be made should be accomplished. Certainly all is not yet complete; much, indeed, is wanting; neither, on the other hand, is all lost. For myself, experience, which has taught me much, has not terrified me. I pass for a severe judge of my own time, and I believe its evil to be greater than I say; but I say also, that by the side of this evil good abounds, and that at no epoch, have we ever lived, in the most obscure village, as also in Paris, in the midst of more justice, prosperity, and security."

In difficult and already tottering situations, all incidents are important. The crime of Darmès inflicted a severe blow on the cabinet. M. Duchâtel on his return to Paris, wrote to me on the 19th of October: "I arrived here the evening before yesterday. I found the state of things pretty much as I had figured them to myself, but with more resources. The peace party has gained considerably within the last ten days; the question appears to all the world to be decided on that side. The attempt of Darmès has produced a great effect; and this effect has been lamentable for the cabinet. Every one has delivered his opinion upon the general anarchy, and the sight of this anarchy excites the indignation of honest and rational people. Yester-

day evening I was at St. Cloud I conversed a long time with the King; the attempt has not disturbed him; he is firm, decided, resolved, he has the bearing you have seen in him in his best days. He began by telling me that the attempt was the fruit of the attacks of the press, that he owed it to the journals. Then, he turned the conversation to the cabinet; he told me that his ministers seemed to misunderstand each other much; that he saw clearly, all this deranged affairs, and that the first time they proposed to resign he would accept the offer. He spoke to me of you, that you were his hope, that there was but one cabinet possible, Marshal Soult, you, I, Villemain, &c.; that even M. Molé admitted this, and declared himself ready to support you. On the whole, the King feels that the cabinet cannot stand, he is determined to separate from it on the first opportunity, and looks upon you as his sheet anchor. I shall now give you my own opinion. Never were circumstances more critical, or danger more serious. There is yet a mode of saving all, but it is by no means certain that in two months safety would be attainable. For myself, although the task is not inviting, I should not hesitate. For you, the position promises admirably. All the shades of the conservative party, from M. Molé to M. Calmon call for you. These moments rarely offer themselves in men's lives, and in general pass quickly away, if not seized at the right time. I think the day has arrived for you to grapple, as minister for foreign affairs, with the grand question you have opened as ambassador. As ambassador, you have now little to do; your position before the Chambers

would no longer be tenable. M. Thiers cannot negotiate reasonably. Unless I much deceive myself, concessions would be granted to you which would be withheld from him. And supposing you are able as minister to settle the question by an arrangement in which you would preserve good appearances, this will be the greatest success a man can attain, and the most signal he can render to his country. Add to this, that the interior position serves you admirably. The dynastic left is discredited; the radical left is madder than ever. There is as much to be done, as there was in March 1831, and the danger is less: the revolutionary fever of that day, although factitious, had more reality than the trifling movement of the present. In fine, the advice I should suggest to you, with the most profound conviction, is not to retire before the opportunity, if, as I believe, it will speedily offer itself. It is not given to us every day to save our country."

The looked for crisis speedily came on. King, ministers, and public, all were either prepared for or resigned to it. On the 20th of October, the cabinet presented to the King the draught of a speech by which it proposed to him to open the session.* The language was dignified and moderate; but it was conceived with a prospect of war, and to prepare the country for it by demanding the necessary means. The King refused to place himself in the direction and on the brink of this future. The ministers tendered their resignation which he accepted, without mutual acrimony. On either side, the issue they had reached was foreseen and pro-

* See Historic Documents, No. XIII.

vided for. On the day next but one, the 22nd of October, M. Thiers wrote to me as follows: "My dear colleague, I have sent you a telegraphic dispatch, and I add to it a letter from the King which will reach you by a courier extraordinary. You will surely have divined, without explanation, the matter of which it treats. The cabinet has differed with the King on the drawing up of the speech from the throne, and we have tendered our resignation. I think our speech was moderate, and quite to the level of circumstances. But the King has thought differently, and I have no disposition to complain. The position is so serious that I can perfectly comprehend the different opinions it inspires. You are naturally one of the persons of whom the King has most thought on this occasion, and he wishes you to use the utmost speed in hastening to assist him under the heavy difficulties of the moment. Do not believe that I shall be any obstacle in your way. The country is in a state which demands from us all the greatest self-denial. Whatever may be my own opinion of all this, I am determined to create no difficulties for any one."

The King wrote to me from St. Cloud on the evening of the 21st of October, beginning by thanking me for a letter I had addressed to him on the 19th, after receiving intelligence of the attempt of Darmès: "My dear ambassador," he said, "I am deeply touched by the letter you have written to me. You worthily estimate my position, and you feel how much it is aggravated by the dangers to which the beings dearest to my heart are exposed when accompanying me. Divine protection

has hitherto saved them, as well as myself; it will give me strength to continue this tenacious resistance to the fury of the anarchy which calls for war at any cost. I hope to disconcert it, and whatever may be its attempts, I shall not bend before them. I regret to tell you that my sincerest efforts to prevent the dissolution of the cabinet have finally failed this evening, and we are now entering on a ministerial crisis! You will not be surprised that I should feel anxious to see you arrive in Paris, and to converse with you. M. Thiers is instructed to name this to you in his official capacity; but I wish to ask you myself, and to renew the assurance of all my sentiments towards you."

Having resolved, before the receipt of these two letters, to leave London on the 24th of October, that I might be present at the opening of the session of the Chambers, I had solicited from the Queen of England my audience of leave, and when granting it, she invited me to pass two days at Windsor, where she was then residing. I repaired thither on the 21st of October. Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, and Lord and Lady Clarendon, were alone invited with me. In common with the Queen and Prince Albert, they received me with marked kindness; a little, it gratifies me to think, from esteem and partiality; a little perhaps because I was returning to Paris. They evidently wished that I should carry with me friendly feelings towards England, that I should speak well of those who governed there, and that I should engage those who governed, or might some day govern in France, not to be too difficult. They saw clearly that the future, and a future closely impending, was filled

with perillous chances. They were occupied with it, not more than people are in England, with matters which do not touch England too closely, but seriously occupied notwithstanding. They did not forget that sooner or later, the weight of France in European affairs is great, and that in European estimation, her opinion reckons powerfully, if it does not decide. And I promised myself, on receiving these tokens of the disposition of England, that if I could make it well understood in France, and hold an analogous and at the same time a perfectly independent attitude, the two nations and Europe at large would be mutually benefited thereby.

During this short sojourn at Windsor, I encountered a sorrow which I should call an affliction, had not life taught me the losses for which that term should be reserved. We learned, on the 22nd of October, that, on the same morning, Lord Holland had died suddenly at Holland House. I regretted him sincerely. So good and amiable, and of that even, sympathetic, and expanded nature, so rare beyond the Channel. I felt for Lady Holland an affectionate interest. I had found her extremely clever, with an attractive seriousness, and more capable of true emotions than other women of the world less haughty and of better regulated tempers. I was shocked moreover by the coldness with which this intelligence was received by many persons who for more than thirty years had passed their lives at Holland House. I have often heard our old soldiers speak of comrades they had seen fall by their sides, under the fire of cannon; their words were more feeling, I would readily say more tender. There is, in the cold firmness

of the Anglo-Saxon race, a certain hard acceptance of the necessity, and of the blows of fate. They are, in life, like people jammed in a crowd; they do not look on those who fall; they push and pass on. It might be said that they hold it a point of dignity, let what will happen, not to exhibit either surprise or affliction. But their dignity does not cost them enough. To be invested with its full beauty, and all its charm, human nature should display itself with less reserve; and when it restrains its emotions and thoughts, we should see that it does so with an effort. The English have sometimes the air of suppressing what they do not feel.

Politically also I regretted Lord Holland; he had less influence than I could have wished, but he had more than many people admitted. The disapprobation of Holland House impeded when it did not prevent.

I left London on the 25th of October, and arrived in Paris on the 26th. I first saw M. Duchâtel, who promptly acquainted me with the dispositions of persons, and the details of the position. We came to an understanding beforehand as to the character and object of the policy to be adopted. Marshal Soult called upon me. I found him satisfied, confident, and easy on questions of government as on the arrangements of the cabinet, and asking only for the admission of M. Teste, who he required, he said, that he might have an advocate at hand to speak for him when necessary. M. Villemain, with impartial yet extremely resolute clear-sightedness, was ready to engage again in the struggle. M. Humann, to whose adhesion I attached much value, accepted, without pressing, the ministry of finance.

MM. Cunin-Gridaine, and Martin du Nord, who had supported M. Molé in the debates of the coalition, no longer retained any embarrassing recollection either for themselves or for me. Admiral Duperré resumed with satisfaction the portfolio of the navy. The King expressed to me his entire confidence, and seconded with ardour the arrangements proposed to him. The Duke of Broglie although apprehensive for the future, and determined, personally, to take no part in affairs, gave me full right to rely on his co-operation. I had interviews with M. Thiers, and M. de Rémusat, which left us in polite relations, while enabling me to foresee a decided and speedy opposition. Two days sufficed to settle the questions, and surmount the embarrassments inseparable from the formation of a new cabinet. Strong positions enable those to march quickly who do not step aside. On the evening of the 29th of October the King signed the decrees which appointed the new ministers. My mother and children arrived at the same moment from Normandy to join me, and towards midnight I re-entered with them my unpretending residence, loaded with a heavy burden, but not despairing of being able to support it.

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.

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I.

1. *Lettres de créance de M. Guizot, ambassadeur de France en Angleterre.— Le roi Louis-Philippe à la reine Victoria.*

Madame ma Sœur, n'ayant rien davantage à cœur que de maintenir et de resserrer de plus en plus l'union et la bonne harmonie qui subsistent si heureusement entre nos couronnes et nos Etats, je ne veux point différer de nommer un nouvel ambassadeur qui, connaissant parfaitement mes sentiments, sache, comme son prédécesseur, en être le fidèle interprète auprès de Votre Majesté. En conséquence j'ai fait choix du sieur François-Pierre-Guillaume Guizot, grand officier de mon ordre royal de la Légion d'honneur, membre de la Chambre des députés, et je l'ai nommé pour résider près de Votre Majesté, avec le caractère de mon ambassadeur extraordinaire. Ses talents élevés, les services éminents et multipliés qu'il a rendus à la France, son zèle et son entier dévouement pour ma personne, me persuadent qu'il ne négligera rien pour se concilier l'estime et la confiance de Votre Majesté, et mériter, par ce moyen, mon approbation. C'est dans cette conviction que je la prie d'accueillir avec bienveillance mon ambassadeur, et d'ajouter une créance entière à tout ce qu'il lui dira de ma part, et surtout lorsqu'il lui exprimera les vœux que je forme pour la prospérité de ses Etats et la gloire de son règne, ainsi que les assurances de la haute estime et de l'inaltérable amitié avec lesquelles je suis,

Madame ma Sœur,
de Votre Majesté,
le bon frère.
Signé: LOUIS-PHILIPPE.

A Paris, le 9 Février, 1840.

2. *Instructions données par M. le maréchal Soult, président du Conseil et ministre des affaires étrangères, à M. Guizot, ambassadeur à Londres.*

Paris, le 14 Février, 1840.

Monsieur, au moment où vous allez prendre la direction de l'ambassade de Londres, une question domine et, on pourrait dire, absorbe l'ensemble de nos relations avec la Grande-Bretagne. Exposer l'état actuel de cette question, la marche qu'elle a suivie jusqu'à présent et le sens dans lequel le gouvernement du Roi se propose de continuer à la diriger, ce sera donc vous indiquer tout à la fois, et le but que vous devez vous efforcer d'atteindre, et, autant qu'on peut le faire à l'avance, la ligne de conduite que vous avez à suivre pour y arriver.

Dix mois se sont à peine écoulés depuis le jour où l'imminence d'une rupture entre la Porte et le Vice-Roi d'Egypte vint avertir les grandes puissances de la nécessité de pourvoir à la conservation ou au rétablissement de la paix. La France prit, à cet égard, une honorable initiative. Deux pensées ont constamment présidé aux propositions qu'elle a successivement adressées à ses alliés : faire sortir, s'il se pouvait, de cette crise ou plutôt des moyens par lesquels on la terminerait, un état de choses qui, en plaçant la Porte sous le protectorat collectif de l'Europe, mît fin, par le fait, au protectorat exclusif consacré en faveur de la Russie par le traité d'Unkiar Skelessi ; établir entre le Sultan et son vassal des rapports tels que le droit et le fait y trouvassent une suffisante garantie, et que, par conséquent, un sentiment d'irritation déifiante ne les maintînt pas, l'un à l'égard de l'autre, dans une attitude d'hostilité toujours menaçante pour la tranquillité du monde.

De ces deux projets du gouvernement du Roi, le premier, il ne l'ignorait pas, était très-difficile à accomplir d'une manière absolue. Il était peu vraisemblable que la Russie se prêtât volontairement à abdiquer une position exceptionnelle qu'elle n'avoue pas en termes explicites, mais vers laquelle ses efforts se sont constamment dirigés ; il était également peu probable que les autres grandes puissances, dont le concours énergique eût pu seul lui imposer cette résignation, y missent l'ensemble et la vigueur nécessaires. A défaut d'un résultat aussi complet, qui d'ailleurs ne pouvait être obtenu que si on parvenait à le lier étroitement à la solution des difficultés provenant de la situation respective du Sultan et du Pacha, un autre résultat, important encore, a été atteint par l'effet des démarches et des déclarations respectives qu'ont amenées les ouvertures du gou-

vernement français ; il est devenu évident pour tout le monde que celles même des grandes puissances qui n'osaient nous prêter une assistance suffisamment efficace contre le cabinet russe, s'associaient pourtant sur ce point à notre pensée. La Russie a dû reconnaître, par conséquent, que, si elle ne voulait pas les mécontenter et les rapprocher de nous, elle devait éviter dans l'Orient toute manifestation trop éclatante de ses prétentions ambitieuses, toute affectation de prépotence et de suprématie.

Le second objet que nous avions en vue était plus pratique, plus immédiat. Après avoir suspendu les hostilités, il s'agissait d'en prévenir le renouvellement en réglant les conditions de la pacification de l'Orient. Toutes les puissances étaient d'accord sur ce point : c'est que pour donner à Méhémet-Ali une position stable et définitive, propre à la rassurer sur l'avenir de ses enfants et à lui inspirer avec la sécurité le désir du repos, il fallait lui concéder, sous la souveraineté de la Porte, l'administration héréditaire d'une portion des territoires soumis à son pouvoir en lui faisant acheter cette concession au prix de la rétrocession du surplus de ces territoires. Ce principe admis, qu'elles devaient être l'étendue de cette rétrocession et par conséquent la limite des pays abandonnés au Vice-Roi et à sa famille ? C'était là la question à résoudre.

Divers plans, vous le savez, furent indiqués à cet effet. Je me bornerai à rappeler ceux que mirent en avant les cabinets de Londres et de Paris, parce que c'est dans ces deux systèmes que tous les autres sont venus se fondre successivement.

Le gouvernement du Roi a cru et croit encore que, dans la position où se trouve Méhémet-Ali, lui offrir moins que l'hérédité l'Egypte et de la Syrie jusqu'au mont Taurus, c'est s'exposer de sa part à un refus certain qu'il appuierait au besoin par une résistance désespérée dont le contre-coup ébranlerait et peut-être renverserait l'Empire ottoman ; il croit que la Porte, rentrant en possession de l'île de Candie, du district d'Adana, de l'Arabie, et conservant sur la Syrie et l'Egypte un droit de souveraineté consacré par diverses conditions mises à la charge du Vice-Roi et de sa famille, serait replacée dans une situation plus forte, plus honorable, plus élevée qu'elle n'était peut-être en droit de s'y attendre après les imprudences du dernier Sultan.

Le cabinet de Londres au contraire se montre convaincu de l'impossibilité de rendre à l'Empire ottoman une consistance suffisante et d'imposer à l'ambition de Méhémet-Ali des barrières efficaces tant qu'on ne l'aura pas renfermé dans les limites de la seule Egypte ; il regarde comme indubitable la

prompte soumission de ce Pacha aux injonctions de l'Europe, dès qu'il aurait la certitude que les puissances sont unanimement résolues à les appuyer par des moyens de coaction.

Vous savez, monsieur, quelles ont été jusqu'à présent les suites de ce fâcheux dissentiment. A peine est-il devenu public, malgré nos efforts pour le dissimuler, que le cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg s'est empressé de saisir l'occasion qu'il a cru entrevoir de rompre l'alliance de la France avec l'Angleterre. Je ne reproduirai pas ici les détails des deux missions successivement confiées à M. de Brünnow : il me suffira de les résumer en disant que les propositions portées à Londres par ce diplomate ne recélaient au fond qu'une seule pensée, enveloppée, il est vrai de concessions apparentes et presque dérisoires aux préventions de l'Angleterre contre Méhémet-Ali et à sa jalousie de l'influence russe à Constantinople. Cette pensée, à peine déguisée, c'était celle d'amener le cabinet britannique à signer un acte que la France ne pût pas souscrire, et qui, par conséquent, proclamât la scission des deux cabinets.

Le rôle que l'Autriche et la Prusse ont joué en cette circonstance est pénible à rappeler, parce qu'il prouve qu'il est des préjugés, des préoccupations, des entraînements auxquels certains cabinets ne sauront jamais résister, lorsque l'occasion de s'y livrer se présentera à eux. Ces deux cours qui, jusqu'alors, avaient presque complètement approuvé nos vues et nos propositions sur les affaires d'Orient, ont à peine entrevu la possibilité d'une alliance formée contre nous, sur des bases toutes contraires, qu'abandonnant leurs convictions, désavouant leurs déclarations antérieures, elles se sont empressées d'adhérer par avance à la ligue qui semblait au moment de se conclure.

Heureusement, monsieur, cette combinaison a échoué, et elle ne pouvait manquer d'échouer parce que l'accord fortuit d'une animosité invétérée avec un dépit passager ne suffit pas pour concilier des incompatibilités réelles et pour rendre identiques des intérêts, non-seulement divers, mais opposés. Nous en étions certains d'avance, et c'est pour cela qu'au moment même où le langage du cabinet de Londres semblait annoncer la prochaine conclusion des arrangements dont on nous menaçait, le gouvernement du Roi s'est contenté d'opposer une attitude calme et une force d'inertie à l'agitation des autres cours. Aujourd'hui tout est arrêté, et après quelques tentatives embarrassées pour nous déguiser le véritable état des choses, lord Palmerston a fini par nous faire donner spontanément l'assurance que rien ne se ferait avant votre arrivée.

Telles sont, monsieur, les circonstances au milieu desquelles va commencer votre mission. L'œuvre que vous avez à entre-

prendre n'est pas autre que celle qui avait été recommandée à votre prédécesseur. Les dispositions du gouvernement du Roi à l'égard de la Grande-Bretagne sont aussi bienveillantes, aussi conciliantes qu'à aucune autre époque. Les modifications nombreuses que nous avons déjà apportées à nos propositions primitives, les efforts souvent heureux que nous n'avons cessé de faire pour amener le Vice-Roi d'Egypte à y adhérer, disent assez le prix que nous mettons à nous rapprocher de nos alliés, à leur faciliter les moyens de s'entendre avec nous. Au point où les choses en sont venues, nous ne nous rendons pas bien compte, je l'avoue, de ce qu'il nous serait possible d'ajouter à ces concessions successives sans altérer la base même de notre système, fondé, je le dis hautement, non pas sur des idées arbitraires, mais sur une conviction profonde, qu'il ne dépend pas de nous de changer. Cependant, nous sommes loin de prétendre qu'il ne peut pas se présenter quelque combinaison heureuse dans laquelle on trouverait un moyen de transaction. Si elle s'offrait à nous, sans nous laisser rebuter par le peu d'accueil fait à nos précédentes démarches, nous nous empresserions de la communiquer au cabinet de Londres. Dans le cas, au contraire, où elle viendrait de lui, nous l'examinerions avec loyauté, avec bienveillance, avec un sincère désir de la trouver acceptable. Vous pouvez en donner l'assurance à lord Palmerston.

Tout ce que vous ferez, monsieur, dans les limites que je viens d'indiquer, pour resserrer les liens un peu relâchés de notre alliance avec le cabinet de Londres, aura la pleine approbation du gouvernement du Roi. Je dois pourtant y mettre deux restrictions : la première, qu'il est presque superflu d'indiquer, c'est qu'à moins d'une autorisation formelle et spéciale, vous ne devez prendre part à aucun acte, apposer aucune signature dont l'effet serait d'engager la France. La seconde, c'est que vous aurez à éviter soigneusement tout ce qui tiendrait à nous faire entrer dans la voie des conférences et des protocoles ; il est trop évident, d'après ce qui s'est passé en dernier lieu, que nous aurions souvent la chance de nous y trouver isolés.

Je ne vous parle aujourd'hui que de la question d'Orient ; comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire, c'est en elle que se concentre en ce moment la nature de nos relations avec le gouvernement britannique. J'aurai soin, lorsque les conjectures le rendront nécessaire, de vous faire parvenir les directions que réclameront les autres points essentiels de la politique générale.

Agréez, monsieur, etc.,

Signé : Maréchal duc de DALMATIE.

II.

1. *Note adressée par Nouri-Efendi, ambassadeur de Turquie à Paris, en mission à Londres, à Son Excellence l'ambassadeur de France.*

Londres, le 7 Avril, 1840.

Excellence,

Le soussigné, ambassadeur plénipotentiaire de la Sublime-Porte, ayant été spécialement chargé par son Auguste Maître le Sultan de se rendre à Londres pour y réclamer l'effet de l'intérêt manifesté à Sa Hautesse par la note collective que les représentants des cours de France, d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, accrédités auprès du Grand Seigneur, ont présentée au Divan le 27 juillet 1839, s'adresse en toute confiance à messieurs les représentants desdites cours, réunis à Londres, pour concerter avec eux les moyens d'effectuer la pacification de l'Empire ottoman, dont le repos a été troublé par les projets ambitieux de Méhémet-Ali, pacha d'Egypte.

Il est généralement connu que depuis l'année 1827, l'Empire ottoman a éprouvé une série de malheurs et de désastres par terre et par mer, à la suite desquels ses moyens défensifs ont éprouvé, pour le moment, un grand affaiblissement. Méhémet-Ali, au lieu d'aider son souverain à se relever de ses pertes, a au contraire profité de l'état d'affaiblissement où se trouvait l'Empire ottoman pour donner suite aux desseins ambitieux et hostiles que depuis longtemps il méditait contre son souverain. En effet, il ne craignit pas de l'attaquer en 1832, et il lui enleva une partie de ses plus belles provinces. Les sacrifices que fit alors le Sultan devaient lui faire espérer que la paix ne serait plus troublée dans ses Etats, et que le Pacha d'Egypte, en reconnaissance de la générosité avec laquelle Sa Hautesse lui avait conféré le gouvernement de tant de belles provinces, les administrerait dans l'intérêt de son maître. Mais au contraire, l'épuisement où se trouvait l'Empire ottoman à la suite de tant de malheurs, et l'affaiblissement momentané dans lequel il languissait, furent pour Méhémet-Ali un motif de donner un nouvel essor à son ambition. C'est ainsi qu'il essaya, il y a deux ans, de se déclarer indépendant et d'obtenir à cet effet le consentement des puissances étrangères. Mais celles-ci, faisant preuve de loyauté et de bonne foi envers la Porte,

repoussèrent spontanément une prétention si incompatible avec les droits de souveraineté du Sultan. Mais cette prétention injuste ne fit que changer de forme, et bientôt après Méhémet-Ali demanda avec hauteur, pour lui et ses enfants, l'hérédité de toutes les provinces qu'il administrait au nom de Sa Hautesse. Il appuya sa demande de préparatifs hostiles, indiquant suffisamment son dessein d'en imposer par la force à son souverain.

Feu le Sultan Mahmoud se vit en conséquence obligé de se mettre en garde contre les nouveaux projets de son ambitieux vassal, et il réunit une armée pour sa défense : cependant les deux armées une fois en présence en vinrent aux prises. Il en résulta pour l'Empire ottoman de nouveaux désastres qui brisèrent le cœur du Sultan Mahmoud et contribuèrent à accélérer sa fin.

Malgré tant de malheurs qui vinrent fondre à la fois sur la Porte, un des premiers actes du Sultan Abdul-Medjid, à son avènement au trône, fut d'offrir à son vassal rebelle l'oubli du passé et l'hérédité de l'Egypte pour lui et ses enfants, à condition que le Pacha restituerait la flotte impériale et toutes les provinces ne faisant pas partie du pachalik d'Egypte. Au lieu de reconnaître la magnanimité de son souverain, Méhémet-Ali y répondit par des prétentions dures et hautaines. Néanmoins, le Sultan allait envoyer un fonctionnaire à Alexandrie pour y faire un nouvel effort afin de régler un arrangement avec son vassal, lorsque les cours de France, d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, voyant la position désastreuse dans laquelle se trouvait le Grand Seigneur, et mues par des sentiments d'amitié, de bienveillance et de générosité qu'il ne saurait assez reconnaître, firent signifier, par le moyen de leurs représentants accrédités auprès de la Sublime Porte que "l'accord sur la question d'Orient était assuré entre les cinq grandes puissances, en engageant le Sultan à suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours, et en attendant l'effet de l'intérêt qu'elles lui portaient."

Le soussigné prend la liberté de reproduire ci-jointe la copie de cette note collective.

Sa Hautesse a attendu jusqu'à présent avec confiance l'effet de l'intérêt si généreusement exprimé par cette même note. Mais placé sous le fardeau des charges extraordinaires qui pèsent sur l'Empire ottoman, et obligé de se prémunir contre l'attitude hostile et les préparatifs de guerre toujours continués de Méhémet-Ali, le Sultan se voit empêché de donner tous ses soins à la réforme des abus dans l'administration de son Empire, tandis que les ressources de tout genre qui devraient contribuer à opérer cette réforme s'épuisent tous les jours de plus en plus, et

font désirer ardemment de voir bientôt un résultat aux intentions bienveillantes des cinq cours alliées de la Porte.

Le soussigné est en conséquence chargé d'appeler la sérieuse attention de MM. les représentants des cours de France, d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie sur un état de choses aussi pénible que dangereux pour l'existence politique de l'Empire ottoman dont elles ont déclaré vouloir maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance, et de réclamer leur coopération et leur sollicitude pour faire cesser au plus tôt des maux d'une nature aussi grave.

Pour mieux atteindre à ce but, le soussigné est chargé, par ordre du Sultan son auguste maître, d'annoncer qu'il est muni de l'autorisation nécessaire pour conclure et signer une convention avec MM. les représentants desdites cours, laquelle aurait pour but d'aider le Sultan à faire exécuter l'arrangement d'après lequel Sa Hautesse avait annoncé l'intention de conférer à Méhémet-Ali et à ses enfants l'hérédité du gouvernement de l'Egypte, à condition qu'il restituerait la flotte ottomane et toutes les autres provinces situées en dehors du pachalik d'Egypte.

Le soussigné, en vertu de l'intérêt que lesdites puissances ont manifesté au Sultan et vu la position critique où se trouve aujourd'hui placé l'Empire ottoman, a l'honneur d'inviter, au nom de sa Hautesse, MM. les représentants de France, d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie à vouloir bien se joindre à lui pour conclure une convention dans le but ci-dessus énoncé, et pour y donner effet.

Le soussigné ose se flatter que MM. les représentants desdites cours voudront bien lui prêter leur assistance pour accomplir une œuvre qui devra essentiellement contribuer à rendre la paix au Levant, et servir en même temps à prévenir les complications fâcheuses qui, sans cela, pourraient en résulter pour l'Europe entière.

Le soussigné plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte prie MM. les représentants des cinq grandes puissances d'agréer l'assurance de sa plus haute considération.

Signé: NOURI.

2. Copie de la note collective adressée le 27 juillet 1839 à la Sublime Porte par les Représentants des cinq grandes puissances.

Les soussignés ont reçu ce matin, de leurs gouvernements respectifs, des instructions en vertu desquelles ils ont l'honneur d'informer la Sublime Porte que l'accord sur la question d'Orient est assuré entre les cinq grandes puissances, et de

l'engager à suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours, en attendant l'effet de l'intérêt qu'elles lui portent.

Constantinople, le 27 juillet 1839.

Lord PONSONBY, ambassadeur d'Angleterre ;
Baron ROUSSIN, ambassadeur de France ;
De BOUTENIEF, ambassadeur de Russie ;
Baron STURMER, internonce d'Autriche ;
Comte de K  NIGSMARK, ministre de Prusse.

3. *R  ponse de M. Guizot, ambassadeur de France,    la note de Nouri-Efendi du 7 avril 1840.*

Londres, 8 Avril, 1840.

Le soussign  , ambassadeur extraordinaire et pl  nipotentiaire de S. M. le roi des Fran  ais, a re  u la note que S. E. l'ambassadeur P. P. de la Sublime Porte lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du 7 avril, et il s'est empress   de porter cette pi  ce    la connaissance de son gouvernement.

Le soussign   prie Son Excellence l'ambassadeur P. P. de la Sublime Porte d'agr  er l'assurance de sa haute consid  ration.

4. *R  ponse de lord Palmerston    la note de Nouri-Efendi.*

Foreign Office, le 13 Avril, 1840.

Le soussign  , etc., etc., a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note du 7 de ce mois, par laquelle Son Exc. Nouri-Efendi, etc., a annonc   qu'il   tait muni des pouvoirs et instructions n  cessaires pour conclure, avec les pl  nipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, une convention dans le but de donner effet    la note collective qui a   t   pr  sent  e    la Porte le 27 juillet 1839 par les repr  sentants des cinq puissances    Constantinople.

En r  ponse    cette communication, le soussign   a l'honneur d'informer Son Exc. Nouri-Efendi que le soussign   est pr  t, en ce qui concerne le gouvernement de Sa Majest  ,    concerter avec Son Excellence, d'accord avec les repr  sentants d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse et de Russie, les meilleurs moyens de r  aliser les intentions amicales que les pl  nipotentiaires des cinq puissances ont manifest  es, au nom de leurs cours respectives,    l'  gard de la Porte, par la note collective susmentionn  e du 27 juillet 1839.

Le soussign  ,
PALMERSTON.

5. *Seconde réponse de M. Guizot, ambassadeur de France à la note de Nouri-Efendi.*

Londres, le 28 Avril, 1840.

Le soussigné, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français auprès de Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande-Bretagne, a l'honneur d'informer Son Excellence M. l'ambassadeur plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte que, conformément aux instructions qu'il a reçues du gouvernement du Roi, il est prêt à rechercher, avec les représentants des cours d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, les meilleurs moyens d'amener en Orient un arrangement qui mette un terme à un état de choses aussi contraire au vœu commun des cinq puissances qu'aux intérêts de la Porte ottomane.

Le soussigné prie Son Excellence M. l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte d'agréer, etc.

III.

L'ambassadeur de France à lord Palmerston, sur l'arrangement proposé par le gouvernement français entre l'Angleterre et Naples, dans l'affaire des soufres de Sicile.

Londres, le 7 Juillet, 1840.

Le soussigné, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de S. M. le Roi des Français auprès de S. M. la Reine de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, a l'honneur de transmettre à S. Ex. M. le principal secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires étrangères de S. M. Britannique, le *conclusum* proposé par le gouvernement du Roi pour mettre un terme au différend survenu entre les cours de Londres et de Naples au sujet de l'exploitation des soufres en Sicile. Le soussigné espère que S. Ex. M. le principal secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires étrangères de S. M. Britannique trouvera ledit *conclusum* satisfaisant et rédigé de manière à concilier, avec équité, les droits et les intérêts des deux cours, et voudra bien le lui renvoyer revêtu de son approbation, pour que le soussigné puisse le transmettre immédiatement à S. Ex. M. le président du Conseil, ministre des affaires étrangères de S. M. le Roi des Français.

Le soussigné a l'honneur, etc.

Le président du Conseil, ministre des affaires étrangères, à S. Ex. le comte de Granville, ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris.

Paris, le 7 Juillet, 1840.

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

Le gouvernement du Roi, mon auguste souverain, justement préoccupé des intérêts de la paix générale et animé des sentiments les plus bienveillants pour deux cours qui lui sont unies par des liens étroits, avait cru devoir offrir sa médiation dans le but de faciliter l'accommodement du différend survenu entre les cabinets de Londres et de Naples relativement à l'exploitation des soufres de Sicile. Cette médiation a été acceptée. Ce témoignage de confiance qui, de la part d'un Etat aussi puissant que la Grande-Bretagne, atteste l'honorable volonté de chercher, dans les voies de conciliation plutôt que dans un appel à la force, la satisfaction à laquelle il croit avoir droit, a vivement touché

le cœur du Roi. Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté, dans son empressement à s'acquitter de la haute mission qui lui était ainsi déferée, a examiné avec l'attention la plus scrupuleuse tous les éléments de la question. Il s'est attaché à apprécier avec une équitable impartialité les prétentions et les droits respectifs, et cette appréciation consciencieuse lui a suggéré les propositions que je vais énoncer à Votre Excellence comme les plus propres, dans notre manière de voir, à amener une transaction vraiment acceptable pour les deux parties.

Le contrat passé le 9 juillet 1838 entre le gouvernement napoléon et la compagnie Taix, pour l'exploitation des soufres de Sicile, serait résilié. Le but que S. M. Sicilienne s'était proposé en souscrivant cette convention pouvant, comme on l'a reconnu, être atteint par d'autres moyens qui concilient, avec le bien-être de ses sujets, les intérêts des étrangers établis ou trafiquant dans ses Etats, la résiliation ne fait plus une difficulté sérieuse, et il reste seulement à déterminer le moment où elle aura lieu. Nous pensons qu'elle devrait être dénoncée à Naples et en Sicile aussitôt que le gouvernement napolitain serait officiellement informé de l'approbation donnée par Votre Excellence, au nom de son gouvernement, au projet d'arrangement développé dans la présente dépêche.

Cette mesure ne saurait être interprétée comme impliquant, de la part de S. M. Sicilienne, l'abandon de son droit souverain d'imposer les soufres et d'en réglementer l'exploitation. Il est presque superflu d'ajouter que le gouvernement britannique n'entend pas souscrire d'avance à des réglemens qui violeraient les droits de ses sujets ou qui tendraient à rétablir sous une autre forme le contrat que S. M. le Roi de Naples consent aujourd'hui à révoquer.

Après avoir ainsi pourvu à l'avenir, voici ce que le gouvernement du Roi croit pouvoir proposer pour régler le passé.

S. M. Sicilienne, animée d'un sentiment d'équité bienveillante, consentirait à écouter les réclamations de ceux des sujets anglais qui prétendent avoir éprouvé des pertes par suite du privilège concédé en 1838 à la compagnie Taix. Une commission de liquidation serait immédiatement constituée à cet effet. Elle siégerait à Paris ou à Naples et serait composée de deux commissaires anglais, de deux commissaires napolitains et d'un commissaire surarbitre désigné d'avance par le gouvernement français, avec l'agrément des deux cours intéressées, pour départager, dans l'occasion, les quatre autres commissaires.

Cette commission ne pourrait accueillir que les demandes d'indemnités formées par les sujets anglais placés dans les catégories suivantes :

1. Ceux qui, avant le 9 juillet 1838, époque du marché passé avec la compagnie Taix, étant devenus propriétaires ou fermiers de mines, auraient essuyé des empêchements dans l'extraction ou l'exportation des soufres, et auraient fait, en conséquence de ces empêchements, des pertes constatées ;

2. Ceux qui, avant la même époque, ayant passé des marchés à livrer, auraient été mis dans l'impossibilité d'accomplir leurs engagements, ou privés du bénéfice convenu de leurs transactions :

3. Enfin ceux qui, ayant acheté des soufres dont l'exportation aurait été, soit interdite, soit limitée, soit soumise à des conditions plus onéreuses, auraient fait des pertes appréciables, d'une manière certaine.

La commission de liquidation une fois instituée, un délai de trois mois serait accordé aux réclamants pour produire devant elle les titres justificatifs de leurs demandes en indemnité ; un second terme de six mois serait assigné pour la conclusion de ses travaux, et les indemnités dont elle reconnaîtrait la justice seraient soldées dans l'année qui suivrait le jour de sa dissolution.

Telles sont, monsieur l'ambassadeur, les propositions que le gouvernement du Roi croit devoir présenter simultanément aux puissances qui ont accepté sa médiation. J'ai la conviction qu'elles vous paraîtront reposer sur des bases satisfaisantes, et j'attends avec confiance l'adhésion que vous vous jugerez sans doute en mesure d'y donner.

Agréez, etc.

THIERS.

Lord Palmerston à l'ambassadeur de France.

Foreign Office, 7 Juillet, 1840.

Le soussigné, principal secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. pour les affaires étrangères, a l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note, en date de ce jour, de M. Guizot, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de S. M. le roi des Français à cette cour, ainsi que de la note que M. Thiers se propose de transmettre à l'ambassadeur de S. M. à Paris, contenant un plan d'arrangement pour régler les différends survenus entre les gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de Naples.

Le soussigné, conformément à la demande contenue dans la note de M. Guizot, a l'honneur de lui renvoyer la note susdite, et en même temps de déclarer à S. Exc. que le gouvernement de S. M. est satisfait de l'arrangement contenu dans cette note, et prêt à l'accepter.

Le soussigné a l'honneur, etc.

PALMERSTON.

IV.

EXTRACT OF A DISPATCH FROM LT.-GENERAL SIR HUDSON LOWE TO EARL BATHURST, DATED ST. HELENA, 14 MAY 1821.

.. The heart which had been preserved in spirits of wine was put into a small silver vase, the stomach in another, and both placed in the coffin with the body.

Mr. Rutledge, assistant surgeon of the 20th regiment, was the person who soldered up the vases in which the heart and stomach were placed, and saw them put into the coffin, the undertakers being also present.

The body, when deposited in the coffin, was dressed in the plain uniform of a French colonel of chasseurs.

The coffin, at the particular desire of Count Montholon, was constructed as follows:

1. A plain coffin lined with tin;
2. A lead coffin;
3. A mahogany coffin.

Count Montholon wished to have the words "Napoléon, né à Ajaccio 15 août 1769, mort à Sainte-Hélène 5 mai 1821" inscribed on it. I wished the word "Bonaparte" to be inserted after "Napoleon;" to this Count Montholon objected, and therefore no inscription whatever was placed upon it.

The grave was formed in the following manner:—

A large pit was sunk, of a sufficient width all round to admit of a wall two feet thick of solid masonry being constructed on each side; thus forming an exact oblong, the hollow space within which was precisely twelve feet deep, near eight long and five wide. A bed of masonry was at the bottom. Upon this foundation supported by eight square stones, each a foot in height, there was laid a slab of white stone five inches thick; four other

EXTRAIT D'UNE DÉPÊCHE ADDRESSÉ PAR LE LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL SIR HUDSON LOWE AU COMTE BATHURST, EN DATE DE ST-HÉLÈNE, 14 MAI 1821.

.. Le cœur, qui avait été conservé dans l'esprit-de-vin, fut mis dans un petit vase en argent, l'estomac dans un autre, et tous deux furent placés dans le cercueil avec le corps.

M. Rutledge, aide-major du 20^e régiment, fut chargé de souder les vases où étaient placés le cœur et l'estomac, et les vit déposer dans le cercueil, les entrepreneurs des pompes funèbres étant aussi présents.

Le corps, lorsqu'on le déposa dans le cercueil, fut revêtu d'un uniforme de petite tenue de colonel des chasseurs de l'armée française.

Le cercueil, conformément au vœu particulier du comte Montholon, fut disposé comme suit:

1. Un cercueil ordinaire bordé d'étain;
2. Un cercueil de plomb;
3. Un cercueil d'acajou.

Le comte Montholon désira que les mots suivants fussent inscrits sur le cercueil: "Napoléon, né à Ajaccio, 15 août 1769; mort à Sainte-Hélène, 5 mai 1821." Je désirais que le mot "Bonaparte" fût inséré après celui de "Napoléon." Mais le comte Montholon y fit des objections, et en conséquence aucune inscription ne fut placée sur le cercueil.

Le tombeau fut disposé de la manière suivante:—

Une vaste fosse fut creusée, d'une largeur suffisante en tout sens pour permettre d'y construire un mur de deux pieds d'épaisseur de maçonnerie solide sur chaque côté de la fosse, formant ainsi une enceinte oblongue et régulière, à l'intérieur de laquelle était un espace vide de douze pieds de profondeur, et d'environ huit pieds de long sur cinq de large. Une couche de maçonnerie occupait le fond sur ces fondements, et sur huit supports en

slabs of the same thickness closed the sides and ends, which, being joined at the angles by Roman cement, formed a species of stone grave or sarcophagus. This was just of depth sufficient to admit the coffin being placed within it. Another large slab of white stone, which was supported on one side by two pulleys, was let down upon the grave after the coffin had been put into it, and every interstice afterwards filled with stone and Roman cement.

Above the slab of white stone which formed the cover of the stone grave, two layers of masonry strongly cemented and even cramped together, were built in, so as to unite with the two foot wall which supported the earth on each side, and the vacant space between this last work of masonry and the surface of the ground, being about eight feet in depth, was afterwards filled up with earth. The whole was then covered in, a little above the level of the ground, with another bed of flat stones whose external surface extending to the brink of the two feet wall on each side of the grave, covers a space of twelve feet long and nine feet wide.

A guard has been placed over the grave.

The spot chosen is not devoid of a certain interest. The fountain near it is the one from which General Bonaparte was supplied with water daily for his own private use, brought to him every morning in two silver bottles of his own by a Chinese servant of the house. It is one of the finest springs on the island. Two very large willow trees overshadow the tomb, and there is a grove of them at a little distance below it. The ground is the property of a Mr. Forbett, a respectable tradesman of this island, who has a little cottage close adjoining to it. He assented with great readiness to the proposition of the body being buried there. I shall cause a railing to be put round the whole of the ground, it being

pierre, carrés, et hauts chacun d'un pied, fut posée une plaque de pierre blanche, épaisse de cinq pouces; quatre autres plaques de la même épaisseur servaient de clôture sur les côtés et aux extrémités, et, jointes aux angles par du ciment romain, formaient une espèce de tombe en pierre ou de sarcophage. Ce sarcophage était d'une profondeur exactement calculée pour recevoir le cercueil qui y fut placé. Une autre grande plaque de pierre blanche, qui était soutenue d'un côté par la force de deux poulies, fut abaissée sur le sarcophage après que le cercueil y eut été placé, et tous les interstices furent ensuite comblés avec de la pierre et du ciment romain.

Par-dessus la plaque de pierre blanche qui formait le couvercle de la tombe en pierre, deux couches de maçonnerie furent construites, fortement cimentées, et même consolidées par des crampons, de manière à rejoindre le mur épais de deux pieds qui supporte de chaque côté le poids des terres; l'espace qui restait vide entre ce dernier ouvrage de maçonnerie et la surface du sol avait environ huit pieds de profondeur; il fut comblé de terre, et le tout fut recouvert d'une autre couche de pierres plates qui dépassait un peu le niveau du sol environnant et dont le bord arrive jusqu'à la face extérieure du mur épais de deux pieds, construit de chaque côté de la tombe. L'espace ainsi recouvert a douze pieds de long et neuf pieds de large.

Une sentinelle a été postée sur le tombeau.

L'emplacement choisi n'est pas dénué d'un certain intérêt. La fontaine voisine est celle qui fournissait tous les jours au général Bonaparte l'eau nécessaire à son usage personnel; cette eau lui était portée, chaque matin, dans deux bouteilles d'argent à lui appartenant, par un serviteur chinois de la maison. C'est une des plus belles sources de l'île. Deux très grands saules ombragent la tombe, et à une petite distance au-dessous de la tombe, il y a un bosquet d'arbres semblables. Le terrain appartient à un M. Forbett, respectable commerçant de cette île, qui a tout à côté une petite maison de campagne. Il a consenti avec beaucoup d'empressement au projet d'ensevelir le corps en cet

necessary even for the preservation of the willows, many sprigs from which had already began to be taken by different individuals who went down to visit the place after the corpse was interred.

endroit. Je ferai poser une grille tout autour du terrain ; cela est nécessaire pour la conservation même des saules, car différentes personnes, qui sont descendues là pour visiter l'emplacement depuis que le corps y est enterré, ont déjà commencé à prendre à ces arbres beaucoup de petites branches.

V.

Banquet donné par la ville de Southampton le 20 juin 1840 à l'occasion de la construction du chemin de fer de Paris à Rouen, et discours prononcé par M. Guizot.

La municipalité de Southampton a donné samedi, 20 juin, une grande fête pour célébrer la confection et l'ouverture du chemin de fer qui réunit les comtés du sud de l'Angleterre à la capitale, et qui, plus tard, lorsque les chemins de Rouen et du Havre seront terminés, réunira Paris et Londres.

Le corps municipal de la ville de Southampton, désirant témoigner à l'ambassadeur de France sa reconnaissance pour l'appui efficace qu'il avait accordé, auprès du cabinet français, à la compagnie anglaise du chemin de fer de Rouen, l'avait invité à cette fête.

Samedi matin, M. Guizot, accompagné de MM. Herbet et de Banneville, attachés à l'ambassade de France, se rendit à la gare du chemin de fer, située près de Vauxhall-Bridge. Il y fut reçu par M. Easthope, membre du parlement et président de la compagnie du chemin de fer. La salle d'attente était occupée par une foule nombreuse et choisie ; on y remarquait S. A. R. le duc de Sussex, la duchesse d'Inverness, lord Palmerston, le duc et la duchesse de Gordon, lord Duncan, M. Joseph Hume, M. Holmes, M. Baring, et un grand nombre d'autres membres du parlement. Un train spécial avait été préparé pour transporter les personnes invitées à la fête. A onze heures, le train a quitté la gare de Vauxhall, emportant plus de quatre cents personnes ; et en deux heures vingt minutes quinze secondes, la distance de soixante-seize milles (plus de trente lieues), qui sépare Londres de Southampton avait été franchie, en y comprenant un temps d'arrêt de neuf minutes quinze secondes.

Une population nombreuse encombrait les abords du chemin de fer. Toute la ville, tous les bâtiments à l'ancre dans le port étaient pavoisés, et le drapeau tricolore flottait de toutes parts à côté du drapeau anglais. Lorsque le duc de Sussex et l'ambassadeur de France descendirent de voiture, l'artillerie les salua de deux salves de vingt-un coups de canon : la musique des régiments, rangés en bataille sur le front de la gare du chemin de fer, commença à jouer les airs nationaux, et une foule immense fit retentir l'air de nombreux hourras.

La municipalité de Southampton, ayant le maire à sa tête, vint complimenter S. A. R. le duc de Sussex, et lui présenter

une adresse. Après cette réception, le maire invita ses illustres hôtes à se rendre au banquet qui avait été préparé sous une immense tente, dressée en face de la mer. Une voiture, ornée des armes de la ville de Southampton, pavoisée de drapeaux tricolores et traînée par quatre chevaux, avait été disposée pour l'ambassadeur de France. Venaient ensuite les équipages du duc de Sussex, de lord Palmerston, de lord Duncan, député de la ville, etc., etc. Cette longue file de voitures s'avancait lentement entre deux haies de curieux, dans des rues décorées de drapeaux et de nombreux emblèmes, et au milieu des cris de l'enthousiasme populaire. A deux heures et demie, on arriva sous la tente où étaient dressées quatre longues tables autour desquelles vinrent s'asseoir plus de six cents personnes. Le maire présidait l'assemblée, ayant à sa droite la duchesse d'Inverness, et à sa gauche le duc de Sussex. L'ambassadeur de France était placé près de Son Altesse Royale.

M. Guizot, en acceptant l'invitation du corps municipal de Southampton, lui avait annoncé qu'il ne pourrait consacrer qu'une partie de la journée à cette visite. Une invitation antérieure de sir John Hobhouse, secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires de l'Inde, l'obligeait à être revenu à Londres avant sept heures, et un train spécial avait été préparé pour effectuer son retour.

Le banquet n'était donc pas terminé, quand le maire s'est levé et s'est exprimé en ces termes :

“ Je regrette infiniment, messieurs, que notre hôte illustre, M. Guizot, soit obligé de nous quitter à l'instant même pour retourner à Londres. Je ne veux pas cependant le laisser partir sans lui avoir témoigné, au nom de la ville de Southampton, notre vive et profonde reconnaissance pour l'appui si cordial et si efficace qu'il nous a prêté auprès de son gouvernement pour l'établissement du chemin de fer de Paris à Rouen. Je vous propose donc la santé de S. Ex. l'ambassadeur du Roi des Français.”

Ce toast a été accueilli et porté avec le plus vif enthousiasme.

M. Guizot s'est levé, et, dès que le silence a été rétabli, il a prononcé le discours suivant :

“ Je vous remercie, messieurs, je le crains, dans un très-mauvais anglais, mais avec un cœur parfaitement reconnaissant pour votre bienveillance envers moi, et plus encore pour votre sympathie envers mon pays et son Roi, dont je vois, avec un profond plaisir, le nom inscrit sur le drapeau qui flotte devant nous. Nos deux pays sont unis déjà par les liens de la plus intime amitié ; mais plus ils se rapprocheront, plus ils se connaîtront ; plus leur union deviendra intime, et plus ils se feront

de bien l'un à l'autre. J'espère que tel sera le résultat de ces grands travaux entrepris dans les deux pays, et j'ai été heureux de contribuer de tout mon pouvoir à l'entreprise du chemin de fer de Paris à Rouen qui sera, sans aucun doute, continué de Rouen au Havre. Ainsi nos deux pays, qui ont chacun beaucoup à donner et beaucoup à recevoir, seront mutuellement unis, non-seulement par une amitié étroite, mais par des intérêts communs. Je veux vous remercier encore une fois des sentiments que vous venez de témoigner pour la France, pour le Roi des Français et pour moi-même."

Après ce discours, fréquemment interrompu par de vifs applaudissements, M. Guizot a pris congé de l'assemblée, et s'est retiré avec les personnes qui l'avaient accompagné. A six heures, il était à Londres, après avoir fait soixante lieues en quatre heures et demie.

Le banquet a continué après son départ.

Des toasts ont été portés à la Reine, au Prince Albert, à la Reine douairière, au duc de Sussex. Son Altesse Royale a pris la parole pour faire ressortir les avantages attachés à la construction du chemin de fer de Southampton :

"M. l'ambassadeur de France vous a tout à l'heure exposé de la manière la plus parfaite toute l'importance d'un rapprochement de plus en plus grand entre la France et l'Angleterre; ce rapprochement doit mettre les deux nations à même de se connaître mieux, et de former une union pacifique, basée non-seulement sur une amitié mutuelle, mais encore sur des intérêts communs. (*On applaudit.*) J'approuve complètement ces réflexions et je m'associe à ces sentiments. Je m'empresse même de les reproduire en l'absence de M. l'ambassadeur. Je le fais avec d'autant plus de plaisir que M. l'ambassadeur verra par là que l'impression produite par ses paroles sur mon esprit n'a nullement été affaiblie par son absence." (*On applaudit.*)

Un toast est porté à lord Palmerston. Lord Palmerston se lève et dit :

"Il est difficile, sans doute, d'ajouter quelque chose de nouveau à ce qui a été déjà, dans cette enceinte, si bien exposé par l'illustre duc de Sussex et l'hôte distingué, M. Guizot, forcé tout à l'heure de nous quitter. Cependant je dois déclarer que je ne comprends pas moins bien toute l'utilité de cette entreprise pour contribuer au maintien des relations pacifiques, si importantes sous le triple point de vue social, moral et politique. Les gouvernements peuvent conclure des traités avec d'autres pays; si ces traités ne reposent pas sur une communauté d'intérêts, sur des sympathies partagées, sur une extension des lumières rendue plus facile par des communications plus aisées

entre les peuples, il suffit du moindre souffle politique pour réduire en poudre tous ces édifices, et il n'y a pas là de base solide pour établir des relations d'amitié et de paix. (*Applaudissements.*) Il y a longtemps qu'on l'a dit: le plus grand bonheur de l'homme consiste à triompher de difficultés d'abord insurmontables en apparence. C'est ce qui est arrivé aux directeurs de cette entreprise. Lorsque le grand travail qui va être entrepris de l'autre côté du détroit (je veux parler de la communication par le chemin de fer entre Paris et le Havre), sera terminé, et que, de ce côté du détroit, d'autres dispositions seront également complétées, il est difficile de dire les immenses bénéfices pouvant en résulter pour vous."

Après le dernier toast, porté à la duchesse d'Inverness et aux dames, Son Altesse Royale et la plupart des convives ont repris le chemin de fer pour retourner à Londres. Les convois ont mis le même temps à parcourir la distance entre Londres et Southampton.

(Extrait du *Journal des Débats* du 25 juin 1840.)

VI.

Discours prononcé par M. Guizot au banquet de la Cité de Londres, le 20 avril 1840.

Mylords et Messieurs,

Je vous demande pardon de mon mauvais, très-mauvais anglais. Vous serez, j'en suis sûr, indulgents pour un étranger qui aime mieux vous mal parler votre langue qu'être mal compris de vous en parlant la sienne. Je suis heureux, messieurs, que ce soit aujourd'hui mon devoir de vous exprimer, au nom de tout le corps diplomatique comme en mon nom propre, au nom de l'Europe comme de la France, nos vifs sentiments de reconnaissance pour votre noble et amicale hospitalité. Vos ancêtres, messieurs, je pourrais dire vos pères, auraient été bien étonnés si on leur eût dit que, pendant plus de vingt-cinq ans, les ambassadeurs, les ministres, les représentants de tout les Etats, de toutes les nations de l'Europe et de l'Amérique, viendraient chaque année s'asseoir avec vous dans cette salle, pour y jouir de l'amitié du monde civilisé. Dans des temps encore bien près de nous, la guerre, une guerre tantôt générale, tantôt partielle, et sinon continuelle, du moins très-fréquente, rendait de semblables réunions toujours incomplètes et irrégulières. C'est la paix qui nous a fait ce bonheur, image et symbole du bonheur du monde. Et je vous prie de le remarquer, messieurs, cette paix n'est pas une paix indolente, stérile, comme celle qui a régné quelquefois entre des nations énervées et en décadence. C'est la paix la plus active et la plus féconde qu'on ait jamais vue; une paix amenée et maintenue, non par l'apathie et l'impuissance, mais par le pouvoir de la civilisation, du travail, de la justice et de la liberté. Messieurs, remercions la Providence souveraine qui a versé de tels bienfaits sur notre âge. Espérons que cette paix durera encore vingt-cinq années et bien des années au delà, et qu'elle ne sera jamais interrompue que pour une juste et inévitable cause. C'est le vœu sincère de mon pays comme du vôtre. Et puisse un jour, par l'influence d'une longue et heureuse paix, le genre humain tout entier être uni d'esprit et de cœur dans son passage sur la terre, comme nous sommes tous les enfants de notre Dieu qui est au ciel!"

VII.

Note adressée par S. Exc. Chékib-Efendi, envoyé extraordinaire de la Sublime Porte, à Londres, à l'ambassadeur de France.

Londres, le 31 Mai, 1840.

Le soussigné, ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte près S. M. Britannique, avait espéré, à la suite de la note présentée le 7 avril de cette année, par son prédécesseur Nouri-Efendi, aux représentants des cours de France, d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie, et en conséquence de leurs réponses à ladite note, trouver, en arrivant à Londres, l'affaire turco-égyptienne terminée ou à la veille de l'être.

C'est donc avec le plus vif regret qu'il a appris que les soins que les représentants avaient promis de donner à un objet si important pour le repos de l'Orient, étaient jusqu'à présent restés infructueux.

Le soussigné, depuis son départ de Constantinople, a reçu de nouveaux ordres qui lui enjoignent de presser la solution de cette affaire. Si par conséquent les délais apportés dans l'exécution des intentions bienveillantes de Leurs Excellences provenaient de difficultés qu'il serait dans les facultés du soussigné d'aplanir, il a l'honneur de les prévenir que de son côté il apportera toutes les facilités qui dépendront de lui pour aider à lever ces obstacles, et qu'à cet effet il est muni, comme l'ambassadeur Nouri-Efendi son prédécesseur, des pouvoirs les plus amples pour concerter avec Leurs Excellences les moyens de parvenir à conclure un arrangement, lequel serait basé sur des principes équitables et renfermerait les garanties d'une paix durable pour l'Empire ottoman. Cependant le soussigné est persuadé que l'accord qui, dès le principe, a existé entre les cinq grandes puissances relativement aux intérêts du Sultan, et la continuation de leur union à cet égard, suffiront, pour écarter toutes les difficultés, si effectivement il en existe.

En attendant, le soussigné croit de son devoir de faire observer à Leurs Excellences que l'Empire ottoman se trouve dans une position fort critique; que l'incertitude à l'égard des résultats des délibérations de Londres, propage en Turquie une inquiétude qui prend un caractère tellement grave et alarmant que rien ne saurait justifier un plus long délai de l'ajustement d'une question soumise depuis dix mois au juge-

ment et à la sagesse des cinq grandes puissances ; enfin, que la nécessité de la solution de cette question devient de jour en jour plus urgente.

En conséquence, le soussigné prie instamment M. l'ambassadeur de France de vouloir bien, de concert avec les représentants des cours d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie, redoubler ses généreux efforts pour mettre fin à un mal toujours croissant et qui menace la paix de l'Orient.

Le soussigné réitère avec une vive insistance la demande faite par son prédécesseur de donner suite le plus tôt possible à l'intérêt manifesté d'une manière si amicale et si bienveillante au Sultan par la note collective des représentants des cinq grandes puissances en date de Constantinople du 27 juillet 1839, intérêt que les représentants à Londres desdites puissances, par leur note responsive à celle du 7 avril de S. Ex. Nourî-Efendi, avaient annoncé vouloir prendre immédiatement en considération.

Le soussigné, ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte près S. M. Britannique, prie M. l'ambassadeur plénipotentiaire de France de vouer, de concert avec les représentants des autres grandes cours, une attention sérieuse à l'objet de la présente note, et profite de cette occasion pour lui assurer ses respects et sa considération la plus distinguée.

CHEKIB.

2. Note de M. Guizot, ambassadeur de France en réponse à la note de l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte.

Londres, le 21 Juin, 1840.

Le soussigné, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de S. M. le Roi des Français auprès de S. M. Britannique, a reçu la note que S. Ex. Chekib-Efendi, ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte auprès de S. M. Britannique, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser, ainsi qu'aux représentants des cours d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie, en date du 31 mai dernier.

Le soussigné pense, comme S. Ex. M. l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte, que l'Empire ottoman se trouve dans une situation fort critique ; que l'incertitude et les délais dans l'ajustement de la question d'Orient ont, en Turquie, des conséquences graves et alarmantes, et que la nécessité de la solution de cette question devient de jour en jour plus urgente.

Le soussigné se félicite d'apprendre que S. Ex. M. l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte, muni des pouvoirs les plus

amples pour concerter avec les plénipotentiaires des cinq puissances un arrangement basé sur des principes équitables et qui renferme les garanties d'une paix durable pour l'Empire ottoman, apportera toutes les facilités qui dépendront de lui pour aider à lever les obstacles qui pourraient s'opposer à la conclusion d'un tel arrangement.

Le soussigné est persuadé en outre, ainsi que S. Ex. l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte, que la continuation de l'union entre les cinq puissances est le plus sûr moyen de parvenir à un résultat si désirable.

En conséquence, le soussigné a l'honneur de répondre à S. Ex. M. l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte qu'il fera tous ses efforts de concert avec les plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie pour mettre fin, par un arrangement aussi prompt qu'il sera possible de l'obtenir, à un mal toujours croissant et qui menace la paix de l'Orient.

Le soussigné a l'honneur d'offrir à S. Ex. M. l'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte les assurances de sa haute considération.

GUIZOT.

VIII.

Sur les avertissemens donnés par M. Guizot au gouvernement du Roi, quant au traité du 15 juillet 1840.

1. *Extrait du Journal le Siècle, numéro du mercredi 29 juillet 1840.*

“ Nous trouvons dans la *Gazette d'Augsbourg* une correspondance de Paris, en date du 15 juillet, qui prouve que le ministère s'attendait à la rupture qui vient d'éclater entre la France et l'Angleterre.

“ M. Guizot, qui s'était imaginé qu'il parviendrait à amener lord Palmerston à son opinion, partage maintenant l'opinion de M. Thiers et rend justice à son esprit de prévision. Il écrit qu'il se passe depuis quelques jours à Londres certaines choses dont il ne peut se rendre un compte exact, mais qu'il voit bien que lord Palmerston, après lui avoir donné l'assurance que la question d'Orient l'ennuyait, a entamé l'affaire sans la résoudre, mais il ignore de quelle manière et dans quel sens le noble lord a agi. Toutefois M. Guizot conseille au gouvernement de se tenir sur ses gardes afin de ne pas être pris à l'improviste. Il invite le président du conseil à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour ne pas être forcé de jouer un rôle secondaire dans le drame qui peut-être ne fait que commencer. Cette prévision est digne d'éloges. En attendant, M. Thiers ne s'est pas laissé endormir comme M. Guizot. Il a toujours agi en homme qui a confiance en lui-même et qui veut suivre d'un pas ferme la voie politique dans laquelle il est une fois entré. La mission du jeune Périer dont j'ai parlé hier, et dont le but principal est de veiller à la sécurité des Français en Egypte et en Syrie, aussitôt que la lutte s'engagera sérieusement avec Méhémet-Ali, prouve que M. Thiers a dû juger les choses du véritable point de vue, en les considérant comme de nature à amener les résultats les plus graves.”

2. *Extrait du Journal le Constitutionnel, numéro du lundi 3 août 1840.*

“ La *Gazette d'Augsbourg* annonçait dernièrement que notre ambassadeur à Londres avait été pris à l'improviste par la conclusion du quadruple traité. Ce fait n'est pas exact, et nous

tenons à le démentir hautement. M. Guizot n'a pas été surpris. Il n'a jamais espéré qu'il ramènerait lord Palmerston à son avis ; il a au contraire toujours averti son gouvernement de la persistance du ministère anglais, et rien de ce qui se passait et rien de ce qui se préparait ne lui a échappé. Il ne faut pas confondre ce qui est très-différent. Le gouvernement français se plaint de n'avoir pas été prévenu officiellement ; mais il est loin d'accepter le rôle de dupe que l'orgueil de lord Palmerston serait sans doute flatté de lui attribuer. Les informations n'ont jamais manqué au gouvernement français, mais il était de son honneur de ne pas admettre qu'on pût aller jusqu'au bout sans lui en donner avis."

IX.

Sur l'attitude des agents français à Constantinople, en juillet et août 1840.

1. Lord Palmerston à M. Guizot, ambassadeur de France en Angleterre.

The undersigned, Her Majesty's principal secretary of State for foreign affairs, in accordance with what was agreed upon between himself and M. Guizot, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the King of the French at this court, in their recent interview, has the honour to transmit to M. Guizot an extract from a despatch received by Her Majesty's Government a few days ago from Lord Ponsonby, together with a copy of the inclosure therein referred to.

Her Majesty's Government was convinced, even before the undersigned had the honour of shewing these papers to M. Guizot, that the message intended to be conveyed to the Porte by M. de Pontois, must have been much altered by the person who delivered it, or else that M. de Pontois must have made such a communication entirely without instructions or authority from his own Government, and indeed in direct opposition to the spirit of the instructions which he had received; because the language used upon this occasion by M. Pontois was directly at variance with the language which has been held by the French Government to Her Majesty's ambassador at Paris, by M. Guizot to Her Majesty's Government in London, and, as far as Her Majesty's Government are informed, by the French agents at Alexandria to Mehemet Ali. For, at Paris, M. Thiers, on his return not long ago from the meeting held at the château d'Eu, assured Earl Granville that the strictest orders had been sent to the French admirals in the Levant to avoid anything which might lead to collision between French and British ships of war. In London M. Guizot, both before and after his visit to the château d'Eu, has always stated

Le soussigné, principal secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté au département des affaires étrangères, selon ce qui a été convenu entre lui et M. Guizot, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Roi des Français auprès de cette cour, lors de leur récente entrevue, a l'honneur de transmettre à M. Guizot un extrait d'une dépêche que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a reçue, il y a quelques jours, de Lord Ponsonby, avec une copie des documents auxquels cette dépêche fait allusion.

Avant même que le soussigné ait eu l'honneur de montrer ces papiers à M. Guizot, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté était convaincu que la déclaration qui devait être faite à la Porte par M. de Pontois devait avoir été fort altérée par la personne qui l'avait faite, ou bien que M. de Pontois devait avoir fait cette déclaration absolument sans instructions et sans l'autorisation de son propre Gouvernement, et véritablement en opposition directe avec l'esprit des instructions qu'il avait reçues, parce que le langage employé en cette occasion par M. de Pontois a été directement contraire au langage tenu par le Gouvernement français à l'ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Paris, au langage tenu par M. Guizot au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à Londres, et autant que peut en être informé le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, au langage tenu par les Agents français à Alexandrie à Mehemet-Ali. Car, à Paris, il n'y a pas longtemps, M. Thiers, à son retour de la réunion tenue au château d'Eu, a assuré le comte Granville que les ordres les plus stricts ont été envoyés aux amiraux français dans le Levant d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait mener à une collision entre les navires de guerre français et anglais; à Londres M. Guizot, avant comme

to the undersigned that the armaments of France are purely precautionary, and in no respect whatever aggressive; that France intends to remain for the present entirely quiet; but thinking that the measures which the four powers are about to take in the Levant may by possibility lead to events which might affect the general balance of power, or alter the state of possessions of the powers of Europe, or in some way or other bear upon the direct interests of France, the French Government had deemed it right to place himself in an attitude of observation; and at Alexandria the French agents are understood to have declared to Mehemet Ali that France has no intention whatever of taking up arms in his support. It was therefore obvious to Her Majesty's Government that M. de Pontois could not have been instructed or authorized by the French Government to hold at Constantinople a language directly the reverse of that which had been held by the French Government everywhere else, and the more especially as the language held by M. Pontois is directly at variance with all the public and official declarations made by the French Government of the principles upon which the policy of France, with regard to the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, is founded.

The undersigned has great pleasure in acknowledging that the conviction thus felt by Her Majesty's Government has been confirmed by the belief expressed to him by M. Guizot upon this matter, on which, however, M. Guizot stated that he had received no information from his own Government, and of which he knew nothing but what the undersigned had laid before him. The undersigned, therefore, in transmitting to M. Guizot the accompanying papers, in order that they may be made known to the French Government, begs to assure M. Guizot that he makes the communication not in consequence of any doubt which Her Majesty's Government entertain of the sincerity and good faith of the Government of France, but because it is fitting that, in a matter of such deep importance to the

après sa visite au château d'Eu, a toujours assuré le soussigné que les armements de la France sont de pure précaution et n'ont en aucune façon un caractère agressif; que l'intention de la France est de rester entièrement tranquille quant à présent; mais que, regardant les mesures que les quatre puissances sont au moment de prendre dans le Levant comme de nature à amener, par quelque éventualité, des faits qui pourraient affecter l'équilibre général de la puissance ou altérer l'Etat des possessions des diverses puissances en Europe, ou atteindre de manière ou d'autre les intérêts immédiats de la France, le Gouvernement français a cru bon de prendre une attitude d'observation; et à Alexandrie, il revient que les agents français ont déclaré à Méhémet-Ali que la France n'a aucune intention de prendre les armes en sa faveur. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a eu, par conséquent lieu de penser que M. de Pontois ne pouvait pas avoir reçu d'instructions ni d'autorisation du Gouvernement français pour tenir à Constantinople un langage directement opposé à celui que le Gouvernement français a tenu partout ailleurs — et cela d'autant plus particulièrement que le langage tenu par M. de Pontois est directement opposé à toutes les déclarations publiques et officielles que le Gouvernement français a faites des principes sur lesquels est fondée la politique de la France relativement aux affaires de l'Empire ottoman.

Le soussigné éprouve un grand plaisir à reconnaître que la conviction que le Gouvernement de S. M. s'est ainsi formée a été confirmée par l'opinion que M. Guizot lui a exprimée à ce sujet, sur lequel néanmoins M. Guizot a constaté n'avoir reçu aucune communication de son propre Gouvernement et duquel il ne savait que ce qui lui a été exposé par le soussigné. En conséquence, le soussigné, en transmettant à M. Guizot les papiers ci-joints, afin qu'ils puissent être portés à la connaissance du Gouvernement français, demande la permission d'assurer M. Guizot que cette communication est faite par lui, non par suite d'aucun doute conçu par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté sur la sincérité et la bonne foi du Gouvernement français, mais parce qu'il convient que, sur des matières si profondément importantes pour

peace of Europe, the French Government should know how much the language which is reported to have been used by one of his diplomatic agents differs from that which the French Government itself has held.

The undersigned has the honour to renew to M. Guizot the assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

Signed : PALMERSTON.

Foreign Office, 9th Sept. 1840.

la paix de l'Europe, le Gouvernement français sache combien le langage qui a été tenu, à ce que l'on rapporte, par un de ses agents diplomatiques, diffère du langage que le Gouvernement français a tenu lui-même.

Le soussigné a l'honneur de répéter à M. Guizot les assurances de sa considération la plus distinguée

Signé : PALMERSTON.

Foreign Office, 9 sept. 1840.

2. Extract from a despatch from Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Palmerston, No. 176, dated Therapia, August 17, 1840.

Reschid Pacha sent M. Francheschi to me this morning to communicate a message the pacha has received from the French ambassador, through M. Cor, the French dragoman.

My servant, by mistake, denied me to M. Francheschi, who went on to the internuncio and delivered his message to H. E. who came here immediately with M. Francheschi, and prepared a despatch for Prince Metternich detailing the transaction, and of which I have now the honour to enclose a copy that will save your Lordship the trouble of details from me.

M. Francheschi said that Reschid Pacha is not alarmed, though he is aware of the gravity of the situation of the affair; he said the Sultan is not alarmed and is firm.

With the concurrence of M. de Sturmer. I desired M. Francheschi to tell H. E. Reschid Pacha that the Sultan might depend upon the support of his allies.

I added that the internuncio and myself and I (*sic*) doubted not our colleagues also would be ready to give Reschid and the Ottoman ministers any aid, if any should be wanting, to confirm the Sultan in his views.

I was to a certain degree prepared for the hostility of France by what passed at a visit made by M. Titof to the French ambassador; when the

Extrait d'une dépêche du Vicomte Ponsonby à Lord Palmerston, no. 176, datée de Therapia, 17 août 1840.

Reschid-Pacha m'a envoyé ce matin M. Francheschi pour me faire part d'un message que le pacha a reçu de l'ambassadeur de France, par l'intermédiaire du drogman français M. Cor.

Mon domestique, par erreur, a refusé ma porte à M. Francheschi qui s'est alors rendu chez l'internonce et s'est acquitté de sa commission envers S. E. qui est venue ici immédiatement avec M. Francheschi, et a préparé une dépêche au prince de Metternich, contenant les détails de l'incident, et dont j'ai l'honneur de joindre ici une copie qui évitera à Votre Seigneurie l'ennui des détails que je lui donnerais.

M. Francheschi dit que Reschid-Pacha n'est pas alarmé, quoiqu'il se rende compte de la gravité de la situation des affaires; il dit que le Sultan n'est pas alarmé et est ferme.

D'accord avec M. de Sturmer, j'ai prié M. Francheschi de dire à Son Excellence Reschid-Pacha que le Sultan peut compter sur l'appui de ses alliés.

J'ai ajouté que l'internonce et moi-même et moi (*sic*) nous ne doutions pas que nos collègues ne fussent aussi prêts à donner tout leur appui à Reschid-Pacha et aux ministres ottomans, s'il en était besoin pour confirmer le Sultan dans ses vues.

J'étais jusqu'à un certain point préparé à l'hostilité de la France par ce qui s'est passé lors d'une visite faite par M. Titof à l'ambassadeur de France;

latter, in the course of conversation, said he thought war between France and England inevitable. This appeared to me to manifest either a very injurious and improper levity in the ambassador, or that he had received information from his Government that warranted what he said.

car ce dernier, dans le cours de la conversation, avait dit qu'il regardait comme inévitable la guerre entre la France et l'Angleterre; ce qui me sembla l'indice ou d'une légèreté bien peu judicieuse et bien déplacée chez l'ambassadeur, ou de communications à lui adressées par son Gouvernement et propres à confirmer ce qu'il disait.

3. *Copie d'une dépêche du baron Stürmer au prince de Metternich, en date de Constantinople, du 17 août 1840.*

M. le ministre des affaires étrangères vient d'envoyer M. Francheschi chez mes collègues d'Angleterre, de Russie, de Prusse et chez moi, pour nous faire la communication suivante :

“ M. l'ambassadeur de France a fait dire hier, le 16 de ce mois, par son drogman à Reschid-Pacha :

“ Qu'il a l'ordre de lui signifier que le gouvernement français, le Roi et la nation considèrent comme une injure faite par le plénipotentiaire ottoman à la France la conclusion du traité qu'il a signé à Londres sans le concours et à l'insu du plénipotentiaire français, et qui a pour objet une question où la France, dès le principe, a été partie intégrante ;

“ Que le gouvernement français s'opposera de tous ses moyens à toute intervention armée contre le pacha d'Egypte ;

“ Qu'il n'attend pour se décider que le résultat de démarches qu'il fait faire dans ce moment auprès des cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin, afin d'en obtenir l'annulation du traité ;

“ Que, loin d'employer, comme on le lui demandait, son influence morale auprès du pacha pour le porter à la soumission, il lui accordera toute l'assistance qui est en son pouvoir pour l'aider à résister à l'intervention étrangère ;

“ Qu'il réunira ses efforts aux siens pour soulever les populations d'Asie et d'Europe contre l'administration actuelle en Turquie dont le gouvernement français se déclare l'ennemi et qu'il considère comme celui du pays ;

“ Que M. de Pontois fera connaître au Sultan et à toute la nation musulmane que la France, loin d'avoir pris part à une convention dirigée contre les intérêts de l'islamisme, la condamne hautement et s'opposera à son exécution.

“ Reschid-Pacha a répondu que ce langage a d'autant plus lieu de le surprendre que la France avait elle-même concouru à la note collective du 27 juillet de l'année dernière. Là-dessus le drogman de France a répliqué que M. de Pontois avait prévu cette objection ; mais que d'abord le gouvernement français avait

accepté sans avoir jamais approuvé la coopération de son ambassadeur à cette démarche ; qu'au surplus il s'agit ici de mesures coercitives, dont il n'est fait aucune mention dans la note susdite et que c'est contre ces mesures que la France se prononce en ce moment.

“ Le pacha a répondu : Je suis profondément affligé de la déclaration que vous venez de me faire, car j'ai toujours considéré la France comme une des plus anciennes amies de la Porte ; il ne dépend pas de moi d'empêcher la réalisation d'un acte auquel la Porte ne s'est décidée qu'avec le concours de quatre de ses alliés ; et quels qu'en puissent être les résultats, le gouvernement ture s'y résignera.

“ M. de Pontois veut faire connaître au Sultan ce qu'il vient de lui faire dire de la part de son drogman (*sic*) ; le pacha est prêt à l'accompagner à l'audience de ce monarque, pour lequel il ne saurait avoir rien de caché.

“ Je n'ai pas besoin de dire à Votre Excellence combien Reschid-Pacha a trouvé dur et hostile le langage que le gouvernement français a chargé son ambassadeur de tenir à la Porte dans cette circonstance.

“ M. Francheschi m'a raconté que Reschid-Pacha, ayant été appelé hier chez le Sultan, Sa Hautesse lui avait donné connaissance d'une lettre que la sultane mère venait de recevoir de l'extracapitan pacha, on ne sait par quelle occasion, mais probablement par le bateau à vapeur français arrivé le 14 de ce mois. Dans cette lettre Ahmed-Fenzi-Pacha, après avoir assuré à la sultane que Méhémet-Ali était inébranlable dans sa résolution de résister, ajoute qu'il dépend de lui de révolutionner toutes les provinces d'Asie et d'Europe, et il adjure, implore et supplie la sultane d'interposer son influence auprès de son fils pour éviter à la nation les maux dont elle est menacée et peut-être la chute de l'Empire.

“ Ces notions m'ont paru assez importantes pour les porter à la connaissance de Votre Altesse par une estafette qui partira demain à l'aube du jour.

“ Agréez, etc.

“ *Signé* : STURMER.”

4. *L'ambassadeur de France en Angleterre, à lord Palmerston.*

Londres, Septembre 1840.

Le soussigné ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de S. M. le Roi des Français auprès de S. M. B., a l'honneur d'in-

former S. E. M. le principal secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. B. pour les affaires étrangères, qu'il a reçu et transmis au gouvernement du Roi les extraits que S. E. a fait au soussigné l'honneur de lui communiquer, de deux dépêches écrites de Constantinople, en date du 17 août dernier, l'une par lord Ponsonby, ambassadeur de S. M. B., l'autre par M. le baron de Sturmer, internonce de S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche à Constantinople, et relatives aux communications faites récemment à la Porte Ottomane par S. E. M. de Pontois, ambassadeur de S. M. le Roi des Français auprès de S. H. le Sultan.

Ainsi que le soussigné a déjà eu l'honneur d'en exprimer sa conviction à M. le secrétaire d'Etat des affaires étrangères les renseignements contenus dans ces dépêches, au sujet desdites communications, sont inexacts, et M. de Pontois, selon ses instructions, a tenu à Constantinople un langage conforme à celui que le gouvernement du Roi a tenu lui-même à Paris et fait tenir soit à Londres, soit ailleurs, par ses représentants. Lorsque M. le principal secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. B. pour les affaires étrangères fit au soussigné l'honneur de lui remettre le *Memorandum* du 17 juillet dernier, dans lequel on lisait que "le gouvernement français avait plusieurs fois déclaré que, dans aucun cas, la France ne s'opposerait aux mesures que les quatre cours, de concert avec le Sultan, pourraient juger nécessaires pour obtenir l'assentiment du Pacha d'Egypte" le soussigné se hâta de faire observer qu'il ne pouvait accepter cette expression *dans aucun cas*, et qu'il était certain de n'avoir jamais rien dit qui l'autorisât. "Le gouvernement du Roi, dit-il alors à M. le secrétaire d'Etat des affaires étrangères, ne se fait à coup sûr le champion armé de personne, et ne compromettra jamais, pour les seuls intérêts du Pacha d'Egypte, la paix et les intérêts de la France. Mais si les mesures adoptées contre le Pacha par les quatre puissances avaient, aux yeux du gouvernement du Roi, ce caractère ou cette conséquence que l'équilibre actuel des Etats européens en fût altéré, il ne saurait y consentir; il verrait alors ce qu'il lui conviendrait de faire, et il gardera toujours, à cet égard sa pleine liberté."

Le 24 juillet suivant, lorsque le soussigné eut l'honneur de lire et de remettre à M. le principal secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires étrangères, la réponse du gouvernement du Roi au *Memorandum* du 17 juillet, cette réponse, en faisant allusion au désir témoigné par les quatre puissances que la France continuât de leur prêter son concours moral à Alexandrie, se terminait par le paragraphe suivant :

"Le concours moral, de la France, dans une conduite commune était une obligation de sa part. Il n'en est plus une

dans la nouvelle situation où semblent vouloir se placer les Puissances. La France ne peut plus être mue désormais que par ce qu'elle doit à la paix et ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même. La conduite qu'elle tiendra, dans les graves circonstances où les quatre Puissances viennent de placer l'Europe, dépendra de la solution qui sera donnée à toutes les questions qu'elle vient d'indiquer."

Et le soussigné, en insistant de tout son pouvoir sur la gravité de la situation où l'Europe allait entrer, eut l'honneur de répéter à M. le principal secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. B. que la France y garderait sa pleine liberté, ayant toujours en vue la paix, le maintien de l'équilibre actuel entre les Etats de l'Europe, et le soin de sa dignité et de ses propres intérêts."

Le soussigné est autorisé à déclarer que les intentions du gouvernement du Roi, qu'il a manifestées au moment même où il a eu connaissance de la convention conclue par les quatre Puissances et dans sa réponse au Memorandum du 17 juillet, sont constamment les mêmes, et que ce sont les intentions dont M. de Pontois a été l'interprète auprès de la Sublime Porte, en s'efforçant, comme un ancien et sincère ami, de l'éclairer sur la situation où elle se plaçait et sur les périls qui pouvaient en résulter pour elle.

Le soussigné a l'honneur, etc., etc.

X.

Traité du 15 juillet 1840, et actes annexés.

1. *Convention conclue entre les cours de la Grande-Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre, pour la pacification du Levant, signée à Londres le 15 juillet 1840.*

Au nom de Dieu très-miséricordieux.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan ayant eu recours à Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour réclamer leur appui et leur assistance au milieu des difficultés dans lesquelles il se trouve placé par suite de la conduite hostile de Méhémet-Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, difficultés qui menacent de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman et à l'indépendance du trône du Sultan; Leursdites Majestés, mues par le sentiment d'amitié sincère qui subsiste entre elles et le Sultan, animées du désir de veiller au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire ottoman dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la paix de l'Europe, fidèles à l'engagement qu'Elles ont contracté par la note collective remise à la Porte par leurs représentants à Constantinople, le 27 juillet 1839, et désirant de plus prévenir l'effusion de sang qu'occasionnerait la continuation des hostilités qui ont récemment éclaté en Syrie entre les autorités du pacha d'Egypte et les sujets de sa Hautesse;

Leursdites Majestés et Sa Hautesse le Sultan ont résolu dans le but susdit, de conclure entre elles une convention, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, le très-honorable Henri-Jean, vicomte Palmerston, baron Temple, pair d'Irlande, conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en son conseil privé, chevalier grand-croix du très-honorable ordre du Bain, membre du Parlement, et son principal secrétaire d'Etat ayant le département des affaires étrangères :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le sieur Philippe, baron de Neumann, commandeur de l'ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré de la croix pour le mérite civil, commandeur des ordres de la Tour et l'Epée du Portugal, de la croix du Sud du Brésil, chevalier grand-croix de l'ordre de Saint Stanislas de seconde classe de Russie,

son conseiller aulique et plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le sieur Henri-Guillaume, baron de Bülow, chevalier de l'ordre de l'Aigle-Rouge de première classe de Prusse, grand-croix des ordres de Léopold d'Autriche et des Guelphes de Hanovre, chevalier grand-croix de l'ordre de Saint-Stanislas de seconde classe, et de Saint-Wladimir de quatrième classe de Russie, commandeur de l'ordre du Faucon de Saxe-Weimar, son chambellan, conseiller intime actuel, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le sieur Philippe, baron de Brünnow, chevalier de l'ordre de Sainte-Anne de première classe, de Saint-Stanislas de première classe, de Saint-Wladimir de troisième, commandeur de l'ordre de Saint-Etienne de Hongrie, chevalier de l'ordre de l'Aigle-Rouge et de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, son conseiller privé, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Sa Majesté le Très-Majestueux, Tsès-Puissant et Très-Magnifique Sultan, Abdul-Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, Chekib-Efendi, décoré du Nichan-Iftihar de première classe, Beylikdgé du Divan Impérial, conseiller honoraire du département des affaires étrangères, son ambassadeur extraordinaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Lesquels s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les articles suivants :

Article 1.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'étant entendu avec Leurs Majestés, la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême et de Hongrie, le Roi de Prusse et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, sur les conditions de l'arrangement qu'il est de l'intention de Sa Hautesse d'accorder à Méhémet-Ali—conditions lesquelles se trouvent spécifiées dans l'acte séparé ci-annexé.—Leurs Majestés s'engagent à agir dans un parfait accord, et à unir leurs efforts pour forcer Méhémet-Ali à se conformer à cet arrangement ; chacune des hautes parties contractantes se réservant de coopérer à ce but selon les moyens d'action dont chacune d'elles peut disposer.

Article 2.

Si le Pacha d'Egypte refusait d'adhérer au susdit arrangement

qui lui sera communiqué par le Sultan avec le concours de Leursdites Majestés, celles-ci s'engagent à prendre, à la réquisition du Sultan, des mesures concertées et arrêtées entre Elles afin de mettre cet arrangement à exécution. Dans l'intervalle, le Sultan ayant invité ses alliés à se joindre à lui pour l'aider à interrompre la communication par mer entre l'Egypte et la Syrie, et à empêcher l'expédition de troupes, chevaux, armes, munitions et approvisionnements de guerre de tout genre d'une de ses provinces à l'autre ; Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engagent à donner immédiatement à cet effet les ordres nécessaires aux commandants de leurs forces navales dans la Méditerranée ; Leursdites Majestés promettent en outre que les commandants de leurs escadres, selon les moyens dont ils disposent, donneront, au nom de l'alliance, tout l'appui et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir à ceux des sujets du Sultan qui manifesteront leur fidélité à leur souverain.

Article 3.

Si Mchémét-Ali, après s'être refusé de se soumettre aux conditions de l'arrangement mentionné ci-dessus, dirigeait ses forces de terre ou de mer vers Constantinople, les hautes parties contractantes, sur la réquisition expresse qui en serait faite par le Sultan à leurs représentants à Constantinople, sont convenues, le cas échéant, de se rendre à l'invitation du souverain, et de pourvoir à la défense de son trône au moyen d'une coopération concertée en commun, dans le but de mettre les deux détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la capitale de l'Empire ottoman, à l'abri de toute agression.

Il est en outre convenu que les forces qui, en vertu d'une pareille entente, recevront la destination indiquée ci-dessus, y resteront employées aussi longtemps que leur présence sera requise par le Sultan, et lorsque Sa Hautesse jugera que leur présence aura cessé d'être nécessaire, lesdites forces se retireront simultanément et rentreront respectivement dans la mer Noire et la Méditerranée.

Article 4.

Il est toutefois expressément entendu que la coopération mentionnée dans l'article précédent, et destinée à placer temporairement les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore et la capitale ottomane sous la sauvegarde des hautes parties con-

tractantes, contre toute agression de Méhémet-Ali, ne sera considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle adoptée à la demande expresse du Sultan, et uniquement pour sa défense dans le cas seul indiqué ci-dessus. Mais il est convenu que cette mesure ne dérogera en rien à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire ottoman en vertu de laquelle il a été de tout temps défendu aux bâtiments de guerre des puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Et le Sultan, d'une part, déclare par le présent acte, qu'à l'exception de l'éventualité ci-dessus mentionnée, il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir ce principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, et tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, de n'admettre aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles; d'autre part, Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

Article 5.

La présente convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de deux mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres le 15 juillet, l'an de grâce mil huit cent quarante.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON.

(L. S.) CHEKIB.

(L. S.) NEUMANN.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

2. *Acte séparé.*

Acte séparé annexé à la convention conclue à Londres, le 15 juillet 1840, entre les Cours de la Grande-Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie, d'une part et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan a l'intention d'accorder et de faire notifier à Méhémet-Ali les conditions de l'arrangement ci-dessous :

§ 1.

Sa Hautesse promet d'accorder à Méhémet-Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendants en ligne directe, l'administration du pachalik de l'Egypte; et Sa Hautesse promet en outre d'accorder à Méhémet-Ali, sa vie durant, avec le titre de pacha d'Acre et avec le commandement de la forteresse de Saint-Jean d'Acre, l'administration de la partie méridionale de la Syrie dont les limites seront déterminées par la ligne de démarcation suivante :

Cette ligne, partant du cap Ras-el-Nakhora sur les côtes de la Méditerranée, s'étendra de là directement jusqu'à l'embouchure de la rivière Seisaban, extrémité septentrionale du lac Tibérias, longera la côte occidentale dudit lac, suivra la rive droite du fleuve Jourdain et la côte occidentale de la mer Morte, se prolongera de là en droiture jusqu'à la mer Rouge, en aboutissant à la pointe septentrionale du golfe d'Akaba; et suivra de là la côte occidentale du golfe d'Akaba et la côte orientale du golfe de Suez jusqu'à Suez.

Toutefois, le Sultan, en faisant ces offres, y attache la condition que Méhémet-Ali les accepte dans l'espace de dix jours après que la communication lui en aura été faite à Alexandrie par un agent de Sa Hautesse, et qu'en même temps Méhémet-Ali dépose entre les mains de cet agent les instructions nécessaires aux commandants de terre et de mer de se retirer immédiatement de l'Arabie et de toutes les villes saintes qui s'y trouvent situées, de l'île de Candie, du district d'Adana, et de toutes les autres parties de l'Empire ottoman qui ne sont pas comprises dans les limites de l'Egypte et dans celles du pachalik d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus.

§ 2.

Si dans le délai de dix jours fixé ci-dessus, Méhémet-Ali n'acceptait point le susdit arrangement, le Sultan retirera alors l'offre de l'administration viagère du pachalik d'Acre; mais Sa Hautesse consentira encore à accorder à Méhémet-Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendants en ligne directe, l'administration du pachalik d'Egypte, pourvu que cette offre soit acceptée dans l'espace de dix jours suivants, c'est-à-dire dans un délai de vingt jours à compter du jour où la communication lui aura été faite, et pourvu qu'il dépose entre les mains de l'agent du Sultan les instructions nécessaires pour ses commandants de terre et de mer de se retirer immédiatement en dedans des limites et dans les ports du pachalik d'Egypte.

§ 3.

Le tribut annuel à payer au Sultan par Méhémet-Ali sera proportionné au plus ou moins de territoire dont ce dernier obtiendra l'administration, selon qu'il accepte la première ou la seconde alternative.

§ 4.

Il est expressément entendu de plus que, dans la première comme dans la seconde alternative, Méhémet-Ali (avant l'expiration du terme fixé de dix ou vingt jours) sera tenu de remettre la flotte turque, avec tous ses équipages et armements, entre les mains du préposé turc qui sera chargé de la recevoir. Les commandants des escadres alliées assisteront à cette remise.

Il est entendu que dans aucun cas Méhémet-Ali ne pourra porter en compte, ne déduire du tribut à payer au Sultan, les dépenses qu'il a faites pour l'entretien de la flotte ottomane pendant tout le temps qu'elle sera restée dans les ports d'Egypte.

§ 5.

Tous les traités et toutes les lois de l'Empire ottoman s'appliqueront à l'Egypte et au pachalik d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus. Mais le Sultan consent qu'à condition du paiement régulier du tribut sus mentionné, Méhémet-Ali et ses descendants perçoivent, au nom du Sultan, et comme délégué de Sa Hautesse, dans les provinces dont l'administration leur sera confiée, les taxes et impôts légalement établis. Il est entendu en outre que, moyennant la perception des taxes et impôts susdits, Méhémet-Ali et ses descendants pourvoiront à toutes les dépenses de l'administration civile et militaire desdites provinces.

§ 6.

Les forces de terre et de mer que pourra entretenir le pacha d'Egypte et d'Acre, faisant partie des forces de l'Empire ottoman, seront toujours considérées comme entretenues pour le service de l'Etat.

§ 7.

Si, à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours après la communi-

cation qui lui aura été faite (ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut § 2) Méhémét-Ali n'adhère point à l'arrangement proposé, et n'accepte pas l'hérédité du pachalik de l'Egypte, le Sultan se considérera comme libre de retirer cette offre et de suivre, en conséquence, telle marche ultérieure que ses propres intérêts et les conseils de ses alliés pourront lui suggérer.

§ 8.

Le présent acte séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré mot à mot dans la convention de ce jour. Il sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres en même temps que celles de ladite convention.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze juillet, l'an de grâce mil huit cent quarante.

(L. S.) NEUMANN.

(L. S.) CHEKIB.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

3 Protocole signé à Londres, le 15 juillet 1840, par les plénipotentiaires

d'Autriche,
de la Grande-Bretagne,
de Prusse,
de Russie,
et de la Porte ottomane.

En apposant sa signature à la convention du jour, le plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte ottomane a déclaré :

Qu'en constatant par l'article 4 de ladite convention l'ancienne règle de l'Empire ottoman en vertu de laquelle il a été défendu de tout temps aux bâtiments de guerre étrangers d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, la Sublime Porte se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtiments légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels sont employés selon l'usage, au service de la correspondance des légations des puissances amies.

Les plénipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de la Grande-

Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie ont pris acte de la présente déclaration pour la porter à la connaissance de leurs cours.

(Signé) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

4. *Protocole réservé*, signé à Londres, le 15 juillet 1840 par les plénipotentiaires

d'Autriche,
de la Grande-Bretagne,
de Prusse,
de Russie,
et de la Porte ottomane.

Les plénipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse, de Russie et de la Sublime Porte ottomane ayant, en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs, conclu et signé en ce jour une convention entre leurs Souverains respectifs pour la pacification du Levant ;

Considérant que, vu la distance qui sépare les capitales de leurs Cours respectives, un certain espace de temps devra s'écouler nécessairement avant que l'échange des ratifications de ladite convention puisse s'effectuer et que les ordres fondés sur cet acte puissent être mis à exécution ;

Et lesdits plénipotentiaires étant profondément pénétrés de la conviction que, vu l'état actuel des choses en Syrie, des intérêts d'humanité aussi bien que les graves considérations de politique européenne qui constituent l'objet de la sollicitude commune des Puissances signataires de la convention de ce jour, réclament impérieusement d'éviter autant que possible tout retard dans l'accomplissement de la pacification que ladite transaction est destinée à atteindre ;

Lesdits plénipotentiaires, en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs, sont convenus entre eux que les mesures préliminaires mentionnées à l'article 2 de ladite convention seront mises à exécution tout de suite, sans attendre l'échange des ratifications ; les plénipotentiaires respectifs constatant formellement par le présent acte l'assentiment de leurs Cours à l'exécution immédiate de ces mesures.

Il est convenu en outre entre lesdits plénipotentiaires que Sa Hautesse le Sultan procédera de suite à adresser à Méhémet-

Ali la communication et les offres spécifiées dans l'acte séparé, annexé à la convention de ce jour.

Il est convenu de plus que les agents consulaires de l'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, à Alexandrie se mettront en rapport avec l'agent que Sa Hautesse le Sultan y enverra pour adresser à Méhémet-Ali la communication et les offres susmentionnées; que lesdits consuls prêteront à cet agent toute l'assistance et tout l'appui en leur pouvoir et qu'ils emploieront tous leurs moyens d'influence auprès de Méhémet-Ali à l'effet de le déterminer à accepter l'arrangement qui lui sera proposé d'ordre de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Les amiraux des escadres respectives dans la Méditerranée recevront les instructions nécessaires pour se mettre en communication à ce sujet avec lesdits consuls.

(Signé) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
BULOW.
BRUNOW.
CHEKIB.

2. *Note adressée par lord Palmerston à M. Guizot, le 16 Septembre 1840.*

Le 17 juillet, le soussigné a eu l'honneur d'informer S. Ex. M. Guizot qu'une convention concernant les affaires de la Turquie avait été signée le 15 du même mois par les plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de la Prusse et de la Russie, d'une part, et par le plénipotentiaire de la Porte ottomane, d'autre part. Les ratifications de cette convention ayant été échangées, le soussigné a l'honneur de transmettre à S. Ex. M. Guizot une copie de ladite convention et de ses annexes, pour qu'il la communique au gouvernement français. En faisant cette communication à S. Ex. M. Guizot, le soussigné ne peut s'empêcher de lui exprimer de nouveau les sincères regrets du gouvernement de Sa Majesté de ce que la répugnance du gouvernement français à s'associer aux mesures concernant l'exécution de ce traité, ait créé un obstacle qui ait empêché la France de se rendre partie au traité. Mais le gouvernement de Sa Majesté est convaincu que le cabinet des Tuileries verra dans les dispositions de ce traité des preuves irréfragables: 1^o que les quatre puissances, en s'imposant les obligations qu'il contient, ont été animées d'un désir désintéressé de maintenir les principes de politique à l'égard de la

Turquie, que la France a, dans plus d'une occasion, déclaré nettement et formellement être les siens: 2° qu'elles ne cherchent pas à obtenir, par les arrangements qu'elles ont en vue, un avantage exclusif pour elles-mêmes, et que le grand objet qu'elles se proposent est de maintenir l'équilibre politique en Europe, et de détourner les événements qui troubleraient la paix générale.

PALMERSTON.

Foreign Office, 16 Septembre, 1840.

3. *Protocole de la conférence tenue au Foreign Office, le 17 septembre 1840.*

Présents: les plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse, de Russie et de Turquie.

Les plénipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie, après avoir échangé les ratifications de la convention conclue le 15 juillet dernier, ont résolu, dans le but de placer dans son vrai jour le désintéressement qui a guidé leurs cours dans la conclusion de cet acte, de déclarer formellement: que, dans l'exécution des engagements résultant de ladite convention pour les puissances contractantes, ces puissances ne cherchent aucune augmentation de territoire, aucune influence exclusive, aucun avantage de commerce pour leurs sujets que ceux des autres nations ne puissent également obtenir.

Les plénipotentiaires des cours susdites ont résolu de consigner cette déclaration dans le présent protocole.

Le plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte ottomane, en rendant un juste hommage à la loyauté et au désintéressement de la politique des cours alliées, a pris acte de la déclaration contenue dans le présent protocole, et s'est chargé de la transmettre à sa cour.

NEUMANN.

SCHLEINITZ.

PALMERSTON.

BRUNNOW.

XI.

Dépêches échangées entre les gouvernements anglais et français sur l'exécution et les conséquences du traité du 15 juillet 1840.

1. *Memorandum de lord Palmerston, ministre de la Grande-Bretagne, adressé au gouvernement français, le 3 août 1840.*

Monsieur,

Différentes circonstances m'ont empêché de vous transmettre plus tôt, et par votre entremise au gouvernement français, quelques observations que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté désire faire sur le *memorandum* qui m'a été remis le 24 juillet par l'ambassadeur de France à cette cour, en réponse au *memorandum* que j'avais remis à Son Excellence le 17 du même mois ; mais actuellement je viens remplir cette tâche.

C'est avec une grande satisfaction le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a remarqué le ton amical du *memorandum* français et les assurances qu'il contient du vif désir de la France de maintenir la paix et l'équilibre des puissances en Europe. Le *memorandum* du 17 juillet a été conçu dans un esprit tout aussi amical envers la France : et le gouvernement de Sa Majesté est tout aussi empressé (*anxious*) que la France peut l'être de conserver la paix de l'Europe et de prévenir le moindre dérangement dans l'équilibre existant entre les puissances.

Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a également vu avec plaisir les déclarations contenues dans le *memorandum* français, portant que la France désire agir de concert avec les quatre autres puissances en ce qui concerne les affaires du Levant ; qu'elle n'a jamais été poussée dans ces questions par d'autres motifs que par le désir de maintenir la paix ; et que, dans l'opinion qu'elle s'est formée, elle n'a jamais été influencée par des intérêts particuliers qui lui sont propres, étant en fait aussi désintéressée que toute autre puissance peut l'être dans les affaires du Levant.

Les sentiments du gouvernement de Sa Majesté sont sur ces points à tous égards semblables à ceux du gouvernement français et y correspondent entièrement ; car en premier lieu, dans tout le cours des négociations ouvertes sur cette question pendant plus de douze mois, le désir empressé du gouvernement britannique a été constamment qu'un concert fût établi

entre les cinq puissances, et que toutes cinq elles accédassent à une ligne de conduite commune, et le gouvernement de Sa Majesté, sans devoir s'en référer, pour preuve de ce désir, aux différentes propositions qui ont été faites de temps en temps au gouvernement français, et auxquelles il est fait allusion dans le *memorandum* de la France, peut affirmer sans crainte qu'aucune puissance de l'Europe ne peut être moins influencée que ne l'est la Grande-Bretagne par des vues particulières ou par tout désir et espérance d'avantages exclusifs qui naîtraient pour elle de la conclusion des affaires du Levant; bien au contraire, l'intérêt de la Grande-Bretagne dans ces affaires s'identifie avec celui de l'Europe en général, et se trouve placé dans le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire ottoman, comme étant une sécurité pour la conservation de la paix, et un élément essentiel de l'équilibre général des puissances.

C'est à ces principes que le gouvernement français a promis son plein concours, et qu'il l'a offert dans plus d'une circonstance, et spécialement dans une dépêche du maréchal Soult, en date du 17 juillet 1839, dépêche qui a été communiqué officiellement aux quatre puissances; il l'a encore offert dans une note collective du 27 juillet 1839 et dans le discours du Roi des Français aux Chambres en décembre 1839.

Dans ces documents, le gouvernement français fait connaître sa détermination de maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire ottoman, sous la dynastie actuelle comme un élément essentiel de l'équilibre des puissances, comme une sûreté pour la conservation de la paix, et dans une dépêche du maréchal Soult il a également assuré que sa résolution était de repousser par tous ses moyens d'action et d'influence toute combinaison qui pourrait être hostile au maintien de cette intégrité, et de cette indépendance.

En conséquence, les gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de France sont parfaitement d'accord, quant aux objets vers lesquels leur politique, en ce qui concerne les affaires d'Orient, doit tendre, et quant aux principes fondamentaux d'après lesquels cette politique doit être guidée; la seule différence qui existe entre les deux gouvernements est une différence d'opinion quant aux moyens qu'ils jugent les plus propres pour attendre cette fin commune: point sur lequel, ainsi que l'observe le *memorandum* français, on peut naturellement s'attendre à voir se rencontrer différentes opinions.

Sur ce point il s'est élevé, en effet, une grande différence d'opinion entre les deux gouvernements, différence qui semble être devenue plus forte et plus prononcée (*wider and more*

confirmed), à mesure que les deux gouvernements ont plus complètement expliqué leurs vues respectives, ce qui, pour le moment, a empêché les deux gouvernements d'agir de concert pour atteindre le but commun.

D'un côté, le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a manifesté à diverses reprises l'opinion qu'il serait impossible de maintenir l'intégrité de l'Empire turc et de conserver l'indépendance du trône du sultan, si Méhémet-Ali devait être laissé en possession de la Syrie. Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a établi qu'il considère la Syrie comme la clef militaire de la Turquie asiatique, et que si Méhémet-Ali devait continuer à occuper cette province, outre l'Egypte, il pourrait en tout temps menacer Bagdad du côté du midi, Diarbekir et Erzeroum du côté de l'est, Koniah, Brousse et Constantinople du côté du nord; que le même esprit ambitieux qui a poussé Méhémet-Ali en d'autres circonstances à se révolter contre son souverain, le porterait bientôt derechef à prendre les armes pour de nouveaux envahissements, et que dans ce but il conserverait toujours une grande armée sur pied; que le sultan, d'un autre côté, devrait être continuellement en garde, contre le danger qui le menacerait et serait également obligé de rester armé; qu'ainsi le sultan et Méhémet-Ali continueraient d'entretenir de fortes armées pour s'observer l'un l'autre; qu'une collision devrait nécessairement éclater par suite de ces continuels soupçons et de ces alarmes mutuelles, quand même il n'y aurait d'aucun côté une agression préméditée; que toute collision de ce genre devait nécessairement conduire à une intervention étrangère dans l'intérieur de l'Empire turc, et qu'une telle intervention, ainsi provoquée, conduirait aux plus sérieux dissentiments (*differences*) entre les puissances de l'Europe.

Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a signalé comme probable, sinon comme certain, un danger plus grand que celui-ci, en conséquence de l'occupation continue de la Syrie par Méhémet-Ali, à savoir que le pacha, se fiant sur sa force militaire et fatigué de sa position politique de sujet, exécuterait une intention qu'il a franchement avouée aux puissances d'Europe qu'il n'abandonnerait jamais, et se déclarerait lui-même indépendant. Une pareille déclaration de sa part serait incontestablement le démembrement de l'Empire ottoman, et ce qui plus est, ce démembrement pourrait arriver dans des circonstances telles qu'elles rendraient plus difficile aux puissances d'Europe d'agir ensemble pour forcer le pacha à rétracter une pareille déclaration, qu'il ne l'est aujourd'hui de combiner leurs efforts pour le contraindre à évacuer la Syrie.

Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a, en conséquence, invariablement prétendu que toutes les puissances qui désireraient conserver l'intégrité de l'Empire turc et maintenir l'indépendance du trône du sultan, devaient s'unir pour aider ce dernier à rétablir son autorité directe en Syrie.

Le gouvernement français, d'un autre côté, a avancé que Méhémet-Ali une fois assuré de l'occupation permanente de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, resterait un fidèle sujet et deviendrait le plus ferme soutien du sultan ; que le sultan ne pourrait gouverner si le pacha n'était en possession de cette province, dont les ressources militaires et financières lui seraient alors d'une plus grande utilité que si elle était entre les mains du sultan lui-même ; qu'on peut avoir une confiance entière dans la sincérité du renoncement de Méhémet-Ali à toute vue ultérieure d'ambition, et dans ses protestations de dévouement fidèle à son souverain ; que le pacha est un vieillard et qu'à sa mort, en dépit de tout don héréditaire fait à sa famille, l'ensemble de puissance qu'il a acquise retournerait au sultan, parce que toute possession des pays mahométans, quelle que soit leur constitution (*tenure*), ne sont réellement autre chose que des possessions à vie.

Le gouvernement français a, en outre, soutenue que Méhémet-Ali ne voudra jamais librement consentir à évacuer la Syrie ; et que les seuls moyens dont les puissances d'Europe peuvent user pour le contraindre, seraient, ou bien des opérations sur mer, ce qui serait insuffisant, ou des opérations par terre, ce qui serait dangereux ; que des opérations sur mer n'expulseraient pas les Egyptiens de la Syrie et exciteraient seulement Méhémet-Ali à diriger une attaque sur Constantinople, et que les mesures auxquelles on pourrait avoir recours, en pareil cas, pour défendre la capitale, mais bien plus encore toute opération par terre par les troupes des puissances alliées pour expulser l'armée de Méhémet de la Syrie, deviendraient plus fatales à l'Empire turc que ne pourrait l'être l'état de choses auquel ces mesures seraient destinées à remédier.

A ces objections le gouvernement de Sa Majesté répliqua qu'on ne pouvait faire aucun fond sur les protestations actuelles de Méhémet-Ali ; que son ambition est insatiable et ne fait que s'accroître par le succès, et que donner Méhémet-Ali la faculté d'envahir et laisser à sa portée des objets de convoitise, ce serait semer des germes certains de nouvelles collisions ; que la Syrie n'est pas plus éloignée de Constantinople qu'un grand nombre de provinces bien administrées le sont, dans d'autres Etats, de leur capitale, et qu'elle peut être gouvernée de Constantinople tout aussi bien que d'Alexandrie ; qu'il est impossible que les ressources de cette province puissent être aussi utiles au sultan

entre les mains d'un chef qui peut, à tout moment, tourner ces ressources contre ce dernier, qu'elles le seraient si elles étaient dans les mains et à la disposition du sultan lui-même ; qu'Ibrahim ayant une armée sous ses ordres, avait le moyen d'assurer sa propre succession, lors du décès de Méhémet-Ali à tout pouvoir, dont celui-ci serait en possession à sa mort ; et qu'il ne serait pas convenable que les grandes puissances conseillassent au sultan de conclure un arrangement public avec Méhémet-Ali l'intention secrète et éventuelle de rompre cet arrangement à la première occasion où cela pourrait être opportun.

Néanmoins, le gouvernement français maintint son opinion et refusa de prendre part à l'arrangement qui supposait (*included*) l'emploi de mesures coercitives.

Mais le *memorandum* français établit que :

“ Dans les dernières circonstances, il n'a pas été fait à la France de proposition positive sur laquelle elle fût appelée à s'expliquer et que conséquemment la détermination que l'Angleterre lui a communiquée dans le *memorandum* du 17 juillet, sans doute au nom des quatre puissances, ne devait pas être imputée à des refus que la France n'avait pas faits.

Ce passage me force à vous rappeler en peu de mots le cours général de la négociation.

La première (*original*) opinion conçue par le gouvernement de Sa Majesté et dont il fut donné connaissances aux quatre puissances, la France comprise, en 1839, était que les seuls arrangements entre le sultan et Méhémet-Ali qui pourraient assurer un état de paix permanent dans le Levant, seraient ceux qui borneraient le pouvoir délégué à Méhémet-Ali à l'Egypte seule, et rétabliraient l'autorité directe du sultan dans toute la Syrie, aussi bien à Constantinople que dans toutes les villes saintes, en interposant ainsi le désert entre la puissance directe du sultan et la province dont l'administration resterait au pacha. Et le gouvernement de Sa Majesté proposa qu'en compensation de l'évacuation de la Syrie, Méhémet-Ali reçût l'assurance que ses descendants mâles lui succéderaient comme gouverneurs de l'Egypte, sous la suzeraineté du sultan.

A cette proposition, le gouvernement français fit des objections en disant qu'un tel arrangement serait sans doute le meilleur, s'il y avait moyen de le mettre à exécution ; mais que Méhémet-Ali résisterait, et que toute mesure de violence que les alliés pourraient employer pour le faire céder produirait des effets qui pourraient être plus dangereux pour la paix de l'Europe et pour l'indépendance de la Porte, que ne pourrait l'état actuel des

choses entre le sultan et Méhémet-Ali. Mais, quoique le gouvernement français refusât ainsi d'accéder au plan de l'Angleterre, cependant, durant un long espace de temps qui s'écoula ensuite, il n'eut pas à proposer de plan qui lui fut propre.

Cependant, en septembre 1839, le comte Sébastiani, ambassadeur français à la cour de Londres, proposa de tracer une ligne de l'est à l'ouest de la mer, à peu près vers Beyrouth, au désert près de Damas, et de déclarer que tout ce qui serait au midi de cette ligne serait administrée par Méhémet-Ali et que tout ce qui serait au nord le serait par l'autorité immédiate du sultan ; et l'ambassadeur de France donna à entendre au gouvernement de Sa Majesté que, si un pareil arrangement était admis par les cinq puissances, la France s'unirait, en cas de besoin, aux quatre puissances pour l'emploi de mesures coercitives ayant pour but de forcer Méhémet-Ali à s'y soumettre.

Mais je fis remarquer au comte Sébastiani qu'un pareil arrangement serait sujet, quoiqu'à un moindre degré, à toutes les objections qui s'appliquent à la position actuelle et relative des deux parties, et que, par suite, le gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne pouvait y succéder. J'observai qu'il paraissait incohérent, de la part de la France, de vouloir employer, pour forcer Méhémet-Ali à souscrire à un arrangement qui serait évidemment incomplet et insuffisant pour le but qu'on se proposait, des mesures coercitives auxquelles elle se refuserait pour le contraindre à consentir à l'arrangement proposé par Sa Majesté dont, aux yeux de la France même, l'exécution atteindrait entièrement le but proposé.

A ce raisonnement, le comte Sébastiani répliqua que les objections avancées par le gouvernement français pour employer des mesures coercitives contre Méhémet-Ali étaient fondées sur des considérations de régime intérieur (*domestics*), et que ces objections seraient écartées si le gouvernement français était en mesure de prouver à la nation et aux Chambres qu'il avait obtenu pour Méhémet-Ali les meilleures conditions possibles, et que celui-ci avait refusé d'accepter ces conditions.

Cette insinuation n'ayant pas été admise par le gouvernement de Sa Majesté, le gouvernement français communiqua, le 27 septembre 1839, et officiellement son propre plan, qui était que Méhémet-Ali serait fait gouverneur héréditaire d'Egypte et de toute la Syrie, et gouverneur à vie de Candie, et ne donnant autre chose que l'Arabie et le district d'Adana. Le gouvernement français ne dit même pas, au reste, s'il savait si Méhémet-Ali voulut adhérer à cet arrangement, et il ne déclara pas non plus que, s'il refusait d'y accéder, la France prendrait des mesures coercitives pour l'y contraindre.

Évidemment le gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne pouvait consentir à ce plan, qui était susceptible de plus d'objections que l'état de choses actuel, d'autant plus que donner à Méhémet-Ali un titre légal et héréditaire au tiers de l'Empire ottoman, qu'il n'occupe maintenant que par la force, c'eût été tout d'abord introduire un démembrement réel de l'Empire. Mais le gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour prouver son désir empressé d'en venir, sur ces questions, à une entente avec la France, établit qu'il ferait céder son objection bien fondée à toute extension du pouvoir de Méhémet-Ali au delà de l'Égypte, et qu'il se joindrait au gouvernement français pour recommander au sultan d'accorder à Méhémet-Ali, outre le pachalik d'Égypte, l'administration de la partie basse de la Syrie, bornée au nord par une ligne tirée du cap Carmel, à l'extrémité du méridionale du lac Tibérias, et par une ligne de ce point au golfe d'Akaba, pourvu que la France voulût s'engager à coopérer avec les quatre puissances à des mesures coercitives, si Méhémet-Ali refusait cette offre.

Mais cette proposition ne fut pas agréée par le gouvernement français, qui déclare maintenant ne pouvoir coopérer aux mesures coercitives, ni participer à un arrangement auquel Méhémet-Ali ne voudrait pas consentir.

Pendant le temps que ces discussions avaient lieu avec la France, une négociation séparée avait lieu avec l'Angleterre et la Russie, dont tous les détails et les transactions ont été portés à la connaissance de la France. La négociation avec la France fut suspendue pendant quelque temps, au commencement de cette année; 1^o parce qu'on s'attendait à un changement de ministère, et 2^o parce que ce changement eut lieu. Mais au mois de mai, le baron de Neumann et moi-même nous résolûmes, sur l'avis de nos gouvernements respectifs, de faire un dernier effort afin d'engager la France à entrer dans le traité à conclure avec les quatre autres puissances, et nous soumîmes au gouvernement français, par l'entremise de M. Guizot, une autre proposition d'arrangement à intervenir entre le sultan et Méhémet-Ali. Une objection mise en avant par le gouvernement français aux dernières propositions de l'Angleterre fut que, bien qu'on voulût donner à Méhémet-Ali la forte position qui s'étend du Mont-Carmel au Mont-Tabor, on le priverait de la forteresse d'Acre.

Pour détruire cette objection, le baron de Neumann et moi nous proposâmes, par l'intermédiaire de M. Guizot, que les frontières du nord de cette partie de la Syrie qui serait administrée par le pacha s'étendraient depuis le cap Nakhara jusqu'au dernier point nord du lac Tibérias, de manière à renfermer dans les limites la forteresse d'Acre, et que les frontières de l'est s'étendraient le long de la côte ouest du lac Tibérias,

et ensuite comme il a été proposé, jusqu'au golfe Akaba ; nous déclarâmes que le gouvernement de cette partie de la Syrie ne pourrait être donné à Méhémet-Ali que sa vie durant, et que ni l'Angleterre, ni l'Autriche ne pouvaient consentir à accorder l'hérédité à Méhémet-Ali pour aucune partie de la Syrie. Je déclarai de plus à M. Guizot que je ne pouvais aller plus loin, en fait de concessions, dans la vue d'obtenir la coopération de la France, et que c'était donc notre dernière proposition. Le baron de Neumann et moi nous fîmes séparément cette communication à M. Guizot ; le baron de Neumann d'abord et moi le lendemain. M. Guizot me répondit qu'il ferait connaître cette proposition à son gouvernement ainsi que les circonstances que je lui avais exposées, et qu'il me ferait savoir la réponse dès qu'il l'aurait reçue. Peu de temps après, les plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de Prusse et de Russie m'informèrent qu'ils avaient tout lieu de croire que le gouvernement français, au lieu de décider cette proposition lui-même, l'avait transmise à Alexandrie pour connaître la décision de Méhémet-Ali ; que c'était placer les quatre puissances qui s'occupaient de cette affaire, non pas en face de la France, mais de Méhémet-Ali ; que, sans parler du délai qui en résultait, c'était ce que leurs cours respectives n'avaient jamais eu l'intention de faire, et ce à quoi elles n'avaient non plus l'intention de consentir, et que le gouvernement français avait ainsi placé les plénipotentiaires dans une situation fort embarrassante.

Je convins avec eux que leurs objections étaient justes à l'égard de la conduite qu'ils attribuaient au gouvernement français, mais que M. Guizot ne m'avait rien dit sur ce que l'on ferait. On avait fait connaître à Méhémet-Ali que le gouvernement français était, en ce moment, tout occupé de questions parlementaires, et pouvait naturellement demander quelque temps pour faire une réponse à nos propositions ; qu'il ne pouvait d'ailleurs y avoir un grand mal dans un délai, dans cette circonstance. Vers la fin de juin, je pense que c'est le 27, M. Guizot vint chez moi et me lut une lettre qui lui avait été adressée par M. Thiers, contenant la réponse du gouvernement français à notre proposition. Cette réponse était un refus formel. M. Thiers disait : " Que le gouvernement français savait, d'une manière positive, que Méhémet-Ali ne consentirait pas à la division de la Syrie, à moins qu'il n'y fût forcé ; que la France ne pouvait coopérer aux mesures à prendre contre Méhémet-Ali dans cette circonstance et que par conséquent elle ne pouvait participer l'arrangement projeté."

La France ayant refusé d'accéder à l'*ultimatum* de l'Angleterre,

les plénipotentiaires des quatre Puissances durent examiner quelle serait la marche à adopter par leur gouvernement.

La position des cinq Puissances était celle-ci : toutes cinq avaient déclaré être convaincues qu'il était essentiel, dans des intérêts d'équilibre et pour préserver la paix de l'Europe, de conserver l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman, sous la dynastie actuelle ; toutes les cinq elles avaient déclaré qu'elles emploieraient tous leurs moyens d'influence pour maintenir cette intégrité et cette indépendance ; mais la France, d'un côté, soutint que le meilleur moyen pour arriver à ce résultat était d'abandonner le Sultan à la merci de Méhémet-Ali, et de lui conseiller de se soumettre aux conditions que Méhémet lui imposerait, afin de conserver la paix, *sine qua non* ; tandis, que, d'un autre côté, les quatre Puissances regardèrent une plus longue occupation militaire des provinces du Sultan par Méhémet-Ali comme devant détruire l'intégrité de l'Empire turc et être fatale à son indépendance ; elles crurent donc qu'il était nécessaire de renfermer Méhémet-Ali dans une limite plus étroite.

Après environ deux mois de délibérations, la France non seulement refusa de consentir au plan proposé par les quatre puissances comme *ultimatum* de leur part, mais elle déclara de nouveau qu'elle ne pouvait s'associer à aucun arrangement auquel Méhémet-Ali ne consentirait pas de son propre mouvement et sans qu'on l'y forçât. Il ne resta donc aux quatre Puissances d'autre alternative que d'adopter la principe posé par la France, qui consistait dans la soumission entière du Sultan aux demandes de Méhémet, ou d'agir d'après leurs principes qui consistaient à contraindre Méhémet-Ali à accepter un arrangement compatible, quant à la forme, avec les droits du Sultan, et, quant au fond, avec l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman. Dans la première hypothèse, on aurait obtenu la coopération de la France, dans la seconde, on devait s'en passer. Le vif désir des quatre puissances d'obtenir la coopération de la France a été manifesté assez par les offres qu'elles ont faites pendant plusieurs mois de négociations. Elles en connaissaient bien la valeur, non-seulement par rapport à l'objet qu'elles ont actuellement en vue, mais encore par rapport aux intérêts généraux et permanents de l'Europe. Mais, ce qui leur manquait, et ce qu'elles estimaient, c'était la coopération de la France pour maintenir la paix, pour obtenir la sécurité future de l'Europe, pour arriver à l'exécution pratique des principes auxquels les cinq Puissances avaient déclaré vouloir concourir. Elles estimaient la coopération de la France, non-seulement pour elles-mêmes, pour l'avantage et l'opportunité du moment, mais pour

le bien qu'elle devait procurer, et pour les conséquences futures qui devaient en résulter. Elles désiraient coopérer avec la France pour faire le bien, mais elles n'étaient pas préparées à coopérer avec elle pour faire le mal.

Croyant donc que la politique conseillée par la France était injuste et nettement judicieuse envers le Sultan, qu'elle pouvait occasionner des malheurs en Europe, qu'elle ne se coordonnait pas avec les engagements publics des cinq puissances, et qu'elle était incompatible avec les principes qu'elles avaient mis sagement en avant, les quatre Puissances sentirent qu'elles ne pouvaient faire le sacrifice qu'on exigeait d'elles, et mettre ce prix à la coopération de la France. Si, en effet, on peut appeler coopération ce qui devait consister à laisser suivre aux événements leur cours naturel. Ne pouvant donc adopter les vues de la France les quatre Puissances se sont déterminées à accomplir leur mission.

Mais cette détermination n'avait pas été imprévue, et les éventualités qui devaient s'ensuivre n'avaient pas été cachées à la France. Au contraire, à diverses reprises, pendant la négociation, et pas plus tard que le 1^{er} octobre dernier, j'avais déclaré à l'ambassadeur français que notre désir de rester unis avec la France sur cette affaire devait avoir une limite, que nous désirions marcher en avant avec la France, mais que nous n'étions pas disposés à nous arrêter avec elle, et que, si elle ne pouvait trouver moyen d'entrer en accommodement avec les quatre puissances elle ne pouvait être étonnée de voir celles-ci s'entendre entre elles et agir sans la France.

Le comte Sébastiani me répondit qu'il prévoyait que nous en agirions ainsi, et qu'il pouvait prédire le résultat : Que nous devions tâcher de terminer nos arrangements sans la participation de la France et que nous trouverions que nos moyens étaient insuffisants ; que la France serait spectatrice passive et tranquille des événements, qu'après une année ou une année et demie d'efforts inutiles, nous reconnâtrions que nous nous sommes trompés et que nous nous adresserions à la France alors et que cette puissance coopérerait à arranger ces affaires aussi amicalement après que nous aurions échoué qu'elle l'eût faite avant notre tentative, et qu'alors elle nous persuaderait probablement d'accéder à des choses auxquelles nous refusions de consentir pour le moment.

De semblables significations furent également faites à M. Guizot relativement à la ligne que suivraient probablement les quatre Puissances, si elles ne réussissaient pas à en venir à un arrangement avec la France. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement français ayant refusé l'*ultimatum* des quatre Puissances, et ayant,

en le refusant, posé de nouveau un principe de conduite qu'il savait ne pouvoir être adopté par les quatre puissances, principe qui consistait notamment en ce qu'il ne pouvait se faire aucun règlement entre le Sultan et son sujet, si ce n'est aux conditions que le sujet pourrait accepter spontanément, ou, en d'autres termes, dicter, le gouvernement français dût s'être préparé à voir les quatre Puissances agir sans la France; et les quatre puissances ainsi déterminées, ne pouvaient, à juste titre, être représentées comme se séparant elles-mêmes de la France, ou comme excluant la France de l'arrangement d'une grande affaire européenne. Ce fut au contraire la France qui se sépara des quatre Puissances, car ce fut la France qui se posa pour elle-même un principe d'action qui rendit impossible sa coopération avec les autres quatre puissances.

Et ici, sans chercher à m'étendre sur des observations de controverse, relativement au passé, je trouve tout-à-fait nécessaire de remarquer que cette séparation volontaire de la France n'était pas purement produites par le cours des négociations à Londres, mais que, à moins que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'eût été étrangement induit en erreur, elle avoit encore eu lieu d'une manière plus décidée dans le cours des négociations à Constantinople. Les cinq Puissances ont déclaré au Sultan, par la la note collective qui a été remise à la Porte le 27 juillet 1839, par leurs représentants à Constantinople, que leur union était assurée, et ceux-ci lui avaient demandé de s'abstenir de toutes négociations directes avec Méhémet-Ali, et de ne faire aucun arrangement avec le Pacha sans le concours des cinq Puissances. Mais cependant le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a de bonnes raisons de croire que depuis quelques mois, le représentant français à Constantinople a isolé la France d'une manière tranchée des quatre autres puissances, en ce qui concerne les questions auxquelles cette note se rapportait; et a pressé vivement et à plusieurs reprises la Porte de négocier directement avec Méhémet-Ali, et de conclure un arrangement avec le Pacha, non-seulement sans le concours des quatre autres Puissances, mais encore sans la seule médiation de la France, et conformément aux vues particulières du gouvernement français.

En ce qui concerne la ligne de conduite suivie par la Grande-Bretagne, le gouvernement français doit reconnaître que les vues et les opinions du gouvernement de Sa Majesté sur les affaires d'Orient, n'ont jamais varié le moins du monde, depuis le commencement de ces négociations, excepté en ce que le gouvernement de S. M. a offert de modifier ces vues et ces opinions dans l'intention d'obtenir la coopération de la France. Ces vues et opinions ont de tout temps été exprimées franche-

ment et sans réserve au gouvernement français, et ont été constamment appuyées auprès du gouvernement de la manière la plus pressante par des arguments qui paraissaient concluants au gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Dès les premiers pas de la négociation, des déclarations de principes, faites par le gouvernement français sur les moyens d'exécution, différaient, même dès le commencement des négociations, de celles du gouvernement britannique; la France n'a certainement pas le droit de qualifier de dissidence (*schisme*) inattendue entre la France et l'Angleterre celle que le gouvernement français reconnaît avoir existé depuis longtemps. Si les intentions et les opinions du gouvernement français relativement aux moyens d'exécution ont subi un changement depuis l'ouverture des négociations, la France n'a certainement pas le droit d'imputer à la Grande-Bretagne une divergence de politique qui provient d'un changement de la part de la France, et nullement de l'Angleterre.

Mais de toute manière, quand de cinq Puissances quatre d'entre elles se sont trouvées d'accord sur une ligne de conduite, et que la cinquième a résolu de poursuivre une conduite entièrement différente, il ne serait pas raisonnable d'exiger que les quatre abandonnassent, par déférence pour la cinquième, les opinions dans lesquelles elles se confirment de jour en jour davantage, et qui ont trait à une question d'une importance vitale pour les intérêts majeurs et futurs de l'Europe.

Mais comme la France continue à s'en tenir aux principes généraux dont elle a fait déclaration au commencement, et qu'elle continue à soutenir qu'elle considère le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire turc, sous la dynastie actuelle, comme nécessaire pour la conservation de l'équilibre des Puissances et pour assurer la paix; comme la France n'a jamais méconnu que l'arrangement que les quatre Puissances ont l'intention d'amener entre le Sultan et le Pacha fût, s'il pouvait être exécuté, le meilleur et le plus complet; et comme les objections de la France s'appliquent, non sur la fin qu'on se propose, mais sur les moyens par lesquelles on doit arriver à cette fin, son opinion étant que cette fin est bonne, mais que les moyens sont insuffisants et dangereux, le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a la confiance que l'isolement de la France des autres quatre puissances, isolement que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté regrette on ne peut plus vivement ne peut pas être de longue durée.

Car lorsque les quatre Puissances réunies au Sultan, seront parvenues à amener un pareil arrangement entre la Porte et ses sujets, arrangement compatible avec l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman et avec la paix future de l'Europe, il ne restera plus

de dissidence entre la France et ses alliés et il ne peut rien avoir qui puisse empêcher la France de concourir avec les quatre Puissances à tels autres engagements pour l'avenir qui puissent paraître nécessaires pour donner une stabilité convenable aux bons effets de l'intervention des quatre Puissances en faveur du Sultan, et pour préserver l'Empire ottoman de tout retour de danger.

Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté attend avec impatience le moment où la France sera en position de reprendre sa place dans l'union des Puissances, et espère que ce moment sera hâté par l'entier développement de l'influence morale de la France. Quoique le gouvernement français ait, pour des raisons qui lui sont propres, refusé de prendre part aux mesures de coercition contre Méhémet-Ali, certainement ce gouvernement ne peut rien objecter à l'emploi de ces moyens de persuasion pour porter le Pacha à se soumettre aux arrangements qui doivent lui être proposés, et il est évident qu'il y a plus d'un argument qui peut être mis en avant et plus d'une considération de prudence qui peut être appuyée auprès du Pacha avec plus d'efficacité par la France, comme puissance neutre, ne prenant aucune part à ces affaires, que par les quatre Puissances qui sont activement engagées à l'exécution des mesures de contrainte.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a la confiance que l'Europe reconnaîtra la moralité du projet qui a été mis en avant par les quatre Puissances, car leur but est désintéressé et juste : elles ne cherchent pas à recueillir quelques avantages particuliers des engagements qu'elles ont contractés ; elles ne cherchent à établir aucune influence exclusive, ni à faire aucune acquisition de territoire, et le but auquel elles tendent doit être aussi profitable à la France qu'à elles-mêmes parce que la France, ainsi qu'elles-mêmes, est intéressée au maintien de l'équilibre des Puissances et à la conservation de la paix générale.

Vous transmettez officiellement à M. Thiers une copie de cette dépêche.

Je suis etc.

PALMERSTON.

Foreign Office, 31 Août, 1840.

2. Réponse de M. Thiers, au Memorandum de lord Palmerston, du 31 août 1840.

LE PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES
ÉTRANGÈRES,

A. M. L'AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE A LONDRES.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, vous avez eu connaissance de la

dépêche que lord Palmerston a écrite à M. Bulwer, pour expliquer la conduite du gouvernement britannique dans l'importante négociation qui s'est terminée par le traité du 15 juillet. Cette dépêche dont je me plais à reconnaître que le ton est parfaitement convenable et modéré, contient cependant des assertions et des raisonnements qu'il est impossible au Gouvernement du Roi de laisser établir. Sans doute, pour ne pas aggraver une situation déjà si menaçante, il vaudrait mieux laisser le passé dans l'oubli, et ne pas revenir sur des contestations trop souvent renouvelées ; mais, outre que lord Palmerston aurait droit de trouver mauvais que sa communication restât sans réponse, il importe de représenter, dans sa vérité, la conduite respective de chaque Cour pendant cette importante négociation. La dépêche de lord Palmerston, communiquée à toutes les légations, sous la forme d'exemplaires imprimés, est déjà devenue publique. Il était donc indispensable d'y faire une réponse. Celle que je vous envoie, et dont je souhaite que le cabinet britannique ne croie pas avoir à se plaindre, donnera aux faits qui se sont passés entre les divers cabinets le sens véritable qu'ils nous semblent avoir. Vous voudrez bien en laisser copie au secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Si j'ai bien saisi l'ensemble de l'exposé présenté par lord Palmerston on pourrait le résumer comme il suit :

“La Grande-Bretagne, complètement désintéressée dans la question d'Orient, n'a poursuivi qu'un seul but, c'est l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman. C'est ce but qu'elle a proposé à toutes les cours, qu'elles ont toutes adopté, qu'elles ont toutes poursuivi, la France, comme les autres. Dans ce but, il fallait réduire à de moindres proportions les prétentions démesurées du vice-roi d'Egypte ; il fallait éloigner le plus possible du Taurus les possessions et les armées de cet ambitieux vassal. Ce qu'il y avait de mieux, c'était de mettre le désert entre le Sultan et le pacha ; c'était de réduire Méhémet-Ali à l'Egypte et rendre la Syrie au Sultan Abdul-Medjid. Le désert de Syrie aurait alors servi de barrière entre les deux Etats et rassuré l'Empire ottoman et l'Europe intéressée au salut de cet empire, contre l'ambition de la famille égyptienne.

“C'est toujours là ce que l'Angleterre a proclamé à toutes les époques de la négociation. La France, par la note collective signée à Constantinople, le 27 juillet 1839, par une circulaire adressée le 17 du même mois à toutes les cours, la France avait semblé adhérer au principe commun, en proclamant d'une manière aussi absolue que les autres cabinets, l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman.

“Cependant elle s'est ensuite éloignée de ce principe en

demandant au profit du vice-roi un démembrement de l'Empire, incomparable avec son existence. Dans le désir de s'assurer le concours de la France, les quatre cabinets signataires du traité du 15 juillet ont fait auprès d'elle des instances réitérées pour l'amener à leurs vues. Ils lui ont même fait des sacrifices considérables, car ils ont ajouté à l'Egypte, héréditairement concédée, le pachalik d'Acre moins la place de ce nom; et ensuite ils ont consenti à y joindre la place elle-même. Mais tous ces sacrifices sont demeurés inutiles, la France a persisté à s'éloigner du principe que les cinq cabinets avaient cru devoir proclamer en commun.

“Les autres cours n'ont pas pu la suivre dans cette voie. Quelque désir qu'elles éprouvassent de s'assurer son concours, elles ont dû enfin se séparer d'elle, et signer un acte qui ne doit pas la surprendre, car elle avait été plus d'une fois avertie que, si on ne parvenait pas à s'entendre il faudrait bien finir par résoudre à quatre la question qu'on ne pouvait résoudre à cinq.

“En effet, lord Palmerston avait soigneusement répété à l'ambassadeur de France que la proposition contenue depuis dans le traité du 15 juillet était son *ultimatum*, et que, cette proposition refusée, il n'en ferait plus d'autre. Il a bien fallu passer outre, et ne pas laisser périr l'Empire ottoman par de trop longues hésitations. Les autres cours ne sauroient être accusées d'avoir voulu offenser la France en cette occasion. Quatre cabinets, étant d'accord sur une question de la plus haute importance, ne pouvaient pas indéfiniment accorder à un cinquième le sacrifice de leurs vues et de leurs intentions parfaitement désintéressées.

“D'ailleurs, en agissant ainsi, les quatre cabinets se rappelaient que la France avait, au mois de septembre 1839, par l'organe de son ambassadeur à Londres, proposé un plan d'arrangement fondé à peu de choses près sur les mêmes bases que le traité du 15 juillet; que plus tard, en combattant le projet présenté par l'Angleterre, elle avait reconnu que, sauf la difficulté et le danger des moyens d'exécution, il serait incontestablement préférable à tout autre; qu'enfin, en toute occasion, elle avait manifesté l'intention de ne mettre aucun obstacle à ces moyens d'exécution. Ils devaient donc penser que, si, pour des considérations particulières, elle refusait de se joindre à eux pour contraindre Méhémet-Ali par la force, elle ne mettrait du moins aucun obstacle à leurs efforts, que même elle les seconderait par l'emploi de son influence morale à Alexandrie. Les quatre Cabinets espèrent encore que, lorsque le traité du 15 juillet aura reçu son accom-

plissement, la France se joindra de nouveau à eux pour assurer d'une manière définitive le maintien de l'Empire ottoman."

Telle est, si je ne me trompe, l'analyse exacte et rigoureuse de l'exposé que lord Palmerston, et les quatre cours en général, ne cessent de faire des négociations auxquelles a donné lieu la question turco-égyptienne.

D'après cet exposé,

La France aurait été inconséquente ;

Elle aurait voulu et ne voudrait plus l'intégrité de l'indépendance de l'Empire ottoman ;

Les quatre cours auraient fait des sacrifices réitérés à ses vues ;

Elle auraient fini par lui présenter un *ultimatum* fondé sur une ancienne proposition de son propre ambassadeur ;

Elles n'auraient passé outre qu'après cet *ultimatum* refusé ;

Elles auraient droit d'être surprises de la manière dont la France a accueilli le traité du 15 juillet, car, d'après ses propres déclarations, on aurait dû s'attendre qu'elle donne à ce traité plus qu'une adhésion passive, et au moins son influence morale.

Le récit exact des faits répondra complètement à cette manière de présenter les négociations.

Lorsque la Porte, mal conseillée, renouvela ses hostilités contre le vice-roi, et à la fois perdit son armée de terre et sa flotte, lorsqu'à toutes ces pertes se joignit la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, quelle fut la crainte de l'Angleterre et de la France, alors toutes les deux parfaitement unies ? Leur crainte fut de voir Ibrahim, victorieux, franchir le Taurus, menacer Constantinople, et amener à l'instant même les Russes dans la capitale de l'Empire ottoman. Tout ce qu'il y a en Europe d'esprits éclairés s'associa à cette inquiétude.

Quelles furent à ce sujet les propositions de lord Palmerston ? Une première fois, en son nom personnel, une seconde fois au nom de son cabinet, il proposa à la France de réunir leurs flottes, l'une anglaise, l'autre française, de les diriger vers les côtes de la Syrie, d'adresser une sommation aux deux parties belligérantes, afin de les obliger à suspendre les hostilités, d'appuyer cette sommation par les moyens maritimes, puis de réunir les deux flottes et de demander à la Porte, l'entrée des Dardanelles, ou de forcer ce célèbre passage, si la lutte entre le pacha et le Sultan avait ramené les Russes à Constantinople.

Ce que l'Angleterre, et avec elle tous les politiques prévoyants entendaient alors par l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire ottoman, c'était donc le préserver de la protection exclusive des armées russes, et, pour prévenir le cas de cette protection, d'empêcher le vice-roi de marcher sur Constantinople.

La France entra pleinement dans cette pensée. Elle employa son influence auprès de Méhémet-Ali et de son fils pour arrêter l'armée égyptienne victorieuse ; elle y réussit, et, pour parer au danger plus sérieux de voir les armées russes à Constantinople, elle pensa, qu'avant de forcer les Dardanelles, il convenait de demander à la Porte son consentement à l'entrée des deux flottes, dans le cas où un corps de troupes russes aurait franchi le Bosphore.

L'Angleterre, accéda à ces propositions, et les deux cabinets furent parfaitement d'accord. Les mots d'indépendance et d'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman ne signifiaient pas alors, on ne saurait trop le faire remarquer, qu'on enlèverait à Méhémet-Ali telle ou telle partie des territoires qu'il occupait, mais qu'on l'empêcherait de marcher sur la capitale de l'empire, et d'attirer, par la présence des soldats égyptiens, la présence des soldats russes.

Le secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique s'entretenant à ce sujet avec M. de Bourqueney, le 25 mai et le 20 juin, reconnaissait qu'il y avait en France et en Angleterre une opinion en faveur de la famille égyptienne ; qu'en France cette opinion était beaucoup plus générale ; que, par suite, le Gouvernement français devait être beaucoup plus favorable que le Gouvernement anglais à Méhémet-Ali ; que c'était là sans doute une difficulté de la situation, mais que c'était une considération secondaire ; qu'une considération supérieure devait dominer toutes les autres, c'était le besoin de sauver l'Empire ottoman d'une protection exclusive, et tôt ou tard mortelle pour lui si la France et l'Angleterre ne s'entendaient pas.

La France partageait ces idées. Sa politique tendait conséquemment à un double but, celui d'arrêter le vice-roi, lorsque de vassal puissant, mais soumis, il passerait au rôle de vassal insoumis et menaçant le trône de son maître, et de substituer à la protection exclusive d'une Puissance, celle des cinq Puissances prépondérantes en Europe.

C'est dans ces vues qu'elle signa, en commun, la note du 27 juillet, note tendant à placer la protection des cinq cours entre le Sultan vaincu et le pacha victorieux ; c'est dans ces vues qu'elle adressa, le 17 juillet, une circulaire à toutes les cours, pour provoquer une profession commune de respect pour l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman ; c'est dans ces vues qu'elle proposa elle-même, et la première, d'associer l'Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie elle-même à toutes les résolutions relatives à la question turco-égyptienne.

Lord Palmerston se rappellera sans doute qu'il était moins disposé que la France à provoquer ce concours général des cinq Puissances ; et le cabinet français ne peut que se souvenir avec

un vif regret, en comparant le temps d'alors au temps d'aujourd'hui, que c'était sur la France surtout que le cabinet anglais croyait pouvoir compter pour assurer le salut de l'Empire turc.

Personne n'était disposé à croire alors que l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman consistât dans la limite qui séparerait en Syrie les possessions du Sultan et du vice-roi. Tout le monde la faisait consister dans un double fait ; empêcher Ibrahim de menacer la capitale, et dispenser les Russes de la secourir. La France partageait avec tous les cabinets cette croyance à laquelle elle est restée fidèle.

L'Autriche et la Prusse adhèrent aux vues de la France et de l'Angleterre. La cour de Russie refusa de prendre part aux conférences qui devaient se tenir à Vienne, dans le but de généraliser le protectorat européen à l'égard du Sultan. Elle approuvait peu l'empressement des puissances d'Occident à se mêler de la question d'Orient. "L'empereur, disait M. de Nesselrode dans une dépêche écrite le 6 août 1839 à M. de Medem, et communiquée officiellement au gouvernement français, l'empereur ne désespère nullement du salut de la Porte, pourvu que les puissances de l'Europe sachent respecter son repos, et que par une agitation intempestive elles ne finissent pas par l'ébranler tout en voulant le raffermir." La cour de Russie jugeait donc peu convenable de s'interposer entre le Sultan et le pacha, croyait qu'il suffisait d'empêcher le vice-roi de menacer Constantinople, et semblait regarder un arrangement direct comme la ressource la plus convenable à cette situation. "Du reste, disait encore M. de Nesselrode à l'ambassadeur de France, au commencement d'août 1839, un peu plus, un peu moins de Syrie, donné ou ôté au pacha, nous touche peu. Notre seule condition c'est que la Porte soit libre dans le consentement qu'elle donnera."

A cette époque donc, les quatre cours, depuis signataires du traité du 15 juillet, les quatre cours n'étaient pas, comme on voudrait le faire croire aujourd'hui, unies de vues, en présence de la France seule dissidente, et empêchant tout accord par ses refus perpétuels.

Le danger s'était éloigné depuis qu'Ibrahim avait suspendu sa marche victorieuse. Les deux parties belligérantes étaient en présence, le pacha tout-puissant, le Sultan vaincu et sans ressources, mais immobiles tous les deux, grâce à l'intervention de la France. Le cabinet britannique proposa d'arracher la flotte turque des mains de Méhémet-Ali. La France s'y refusa, craignant de provoquer de nouvelles hostilités. Alors commença le funeste dissentiment qui a séparé la France de l'Angleterre, et qu'il faut à jamais regretter, dans l'intérêt de la paix et de la civilisation du monde.

Les mauvaises dispositions du cabinet britannique contre le vice-roi d'Égypte, éclatèrent avec beaucoup de vivacité : la France chercha à les tempérer. Le cabinet britannique, sur les représentations de la France, appréciant le danger d'un acte de vive force, renonça à recouvrer la flotte turque par des moyens violents. Cette proposition n'eut point de suite.

Il était devenu nécessaire de s'expliquer enfin pour savoir de quelle manière se viderait la question territoriale entre le sultan et le vice-roi. Le dissentiment entre les vues de la France et de l'Angleterre éclata plus vivement. Lord Palmerston déclara qu'à ses yeux le vice-roi devait recevoir l'Égypte héréditaire ; mais que, pour prix de cette hérédité, il devait abandonner immédiatement les villes saintes, l'île de Candie, le district d'Adana et la Syrie tout entière. Toutefois, il modifia un peu ses premières vues, et consentit à joindre à la possession héréditaire de l'Égypte la possession héréditaire aussi, du pachalik d'Acre, moins la place d'Acre.

La France n'admit point ces propositions : elle jugea que le vice-roi, vainqueur du Sultan à Nezib, sans avoir été l'agresseur, ayant de plus consenti à s'arrêter quand il pouvait fondre sur l'empire et renverser le trône du Sultan, méritait plus de ménagement. Elle pensa que, de la part des puissances qui l'avaient engagé, en 1833, à accepter les conditions de Koutaïé, il y aurait peu d'équité à lui imposer des conditions beaucoup plus rigoureuses, alors qu'il n'avait rien fait pour perdre le bénéfice de cette transaction. Elle crut qu'en lui enlevant les villes saintes, l'île de Candie, le district d'Adana, position offensive, et qui, restituée à la Porte, rendait à celle-ci toute sécurité, on devait lui assurer la possession héréditaire de l'Égypte et de la Syrie. La victoire de Nezib, gagnée sans agression de sa part, aurait pu seule lui valoir l'hérédité de ses possessions depuis le Nil jusqu'au Taurus. Mais en tenant la victoire de Nezib pour non avenue, en faisant acheter à Méhémet-Ali l'hérédité, au prix d'une partie de ses possessions actuelles, il y avait du moins rigoureuse justice à ne pas lui enlever plus que Candie, Adana et les villes saintes. D'ailleurs la France demandait par quels moyens on prétendait réduire Méhémet-Ali. Sans doute les cabinets européens étaient forts contre lui, lorsqu'il voulait menacer Constantinople ; dans ce cas, des flottes dans la mer de Marmara suffisaient pour l'arrêter. Mais pour lui ôter la Syrie, quels moyens avait-on ? Des moyens peu efficaces, comme un blocus ; peu légitimes, comme des provocations à l'insurrection ; très-dangereux, très-contraires au but proposé, comme une armée russe ! La France proposa donc, en septembre 1839, d'adjuger au vice-roi l'hérédité de l'Égypte et l'hérédité de la Syrie.

Jamais, à aucune époque de la négociation, la France n'a proposé autre chose, excepté dans ces derniers temps, lorsqu'elle a conseillé au vice-roi de se contenter de la possession viagère de la Syrie. J'ai examiné les dépêches antérieures à mon administration, et je n'y ai vu nulle part que le général Sébastiani ait été autorisé à proposer la délimitation contenue dans le traité du 15 juillet, ou qu'il ait spontanément pris sur lui de la proposer. Je lui ai demandé, à lui-même, quels étaient ses souvenirs à cet égard, et il m'a affirmé qu'il n'avait fait aucune proposition de ce genre. La France donc proposa en 1839 l'attribution au vice-roi de l'hérédité de l'Égypte et de l'hérédité de la Syrie. Elle fut malheureusement en dissentiment complet avec l'Angleterre.

Ce dissentiment, à jamais regrettable, fut bientôt connu de l'Europe entière. Tout à coup, et comme par enchantement, il fit cesser les divergences qui avaient séparé les quatre cours, et amena entre elles un subit accord. L'Autriche, qui d'abord avait donné une pleine adhésion à nos propositions, qui, sur le point de notifier cette adhésion à Londres, n'avait, nous disait-elle, suspendu cette notification que pour donner le temps de nous mettre d'accord avec l'Angleterre, l'Autriche commença à dire qu'entre la France et l'Angleterre elle se prononcerait pour celle des deux cours qui accorderait la plus grande étendue de territoire au Sultan. Il est vrai qu'alors elle protestait encore contre la pensée de recourir à des moyens coercitifs dont elle était la première à proclamer le danger. La Prusse adopta le sentiment de l'Autriche. La Russie envoya à Londres M. de Brunnow, en septembre 1839, pour faire ses propositions. La Russie, qui naguère repoussait comme peu convenable l'idée d'une intervention européenne entre le Sultan et le vice-roi, et ne semblait voir de ressource que dans un arrangement direct : la Russie adhérerait maintenant à tous les arrangements territoriaux qu'il plairait à l'Angleterre d'adopter, et demandait qu'en cas de reprise des hostilités, on la laissât, au nom des cinq cours, couvrir Constantinople avec une armée, tandis que les flottes anglaise et française bloqueraient la Syrie.

Ces propositions réalisaient justement la combinaison que l'Angleterre avait jusque-là regardée comme la plus dangereuse pour l'Empire ottoman, la protection d'une armée russe, combinaison redoutable, non par la possibilité qu'une armée russe pût être tentée de rester définitivement à Constantinople, mais uniquement parce que la Russie, ajoutant ainsi au fait de 1833 un second fait exactement semblable, aurait créé en sa faveur l'autorité des précédents.

Ces propositions ne furent point accueillies. M. de Brunnow quitta Londres et y revint en janvier 1840 avec des propositions

nouvelles. Elles différaient des premières en ce qu'elles accordaient à la France et à l'Angleterre la faculté d'introduire chacune trois vaisseaux dans une partie limitée de la mer de Marmara, pendant que les troupes russes occuperaient Constantinople.

La négociation s'est arrêtée là pendant plusieurs mois, depuis le mois de février jusqu'à celui de juillet 1840. Dans cet intervalle, un nouveau ministère et un nouvel ambassadeur ont été chargés des affaires de la France. Le cabinet français a toujours répété qu'il ne croyait pas juste de retrancher la Syrie du nombre des possessions égyptiennes; que, s'il était possible que le vice-roi y consentît, la France ne pouvait être pour le vice-roi plus ambitieuse que lui-même; mais que, s'il fallait lui arracher la Syrie par la force, le gouvernement français ne voyait, pour y réussir, que des moyens ou inefficaces ou dangereux, et que, dans ce cas, il s'isolerait des autres cours et tiendrait une conduite tout à fait séparée.

Pendant que le cabinet français tenait ce langage à Londres avec franchise et persévérance, l'ambassadeur français à Constantinople ne cherchait pas à négocier un arrangement direct entre le Sultan et le vice-roi; il ne donnait pas, ainsi que semble le croire lord Palmerston sans l'affirmer, il ne donnait pas le premier l'exemple de la séparation.

Jamais notre représentant à Constantinople n'a tenu la conduite qu'on lui prête; jamais les instructions du gouvernement du Roi ne lui ont prescrit une pareille marche. Sans doute la France n'a cessé de travailler à un rapprochement entre le Sultan et le vice-roi, à les disposer l'un et l'autre à de raisonnables concessions, à faciliter ainsi la tâche délicate dont l'Europe s'était imposé l'accomplissement; mais nous avons constamment recommandé, tant à M. le comte de Pontois qu'à M. Cochelet, d'éviter avec le plus grand soin tout ce qui eût pu être considéré comme une tentative de mettre à l'écart les autres Puissances, et ils ont été scrupuleusement fidèles à cette recommandation.

L'Angleterre avait à choisir entre la Russie, lui offrant l'abandon du vice-roi à condition de faire adopter les propositions de M. de Brunnow, c'est-à-dire l'exécution consentie par l'Europe, du traité d'Unkiar-Skelessi, et la France ne demandant qu'une négociation équitable et modérée entre le Sultan et Méhémet-Ali, une négociation qui prévint de nouvelles hostilités, et, à la suite de ces hostilités, le cas le plus dangereux pour l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman, la protection directe et matérielle d'un seul Etat puissant.

Avant de faire son choix définitif entre la Russie et la

France, le cabinet de Londres ne nous a pas fait les offres réitérées dont on parle pour nous amener à ses vues. Ses efforts se sont bornés à une seule proposition.

En 1839 on accordait au vice-roi la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte et du pachalik d'Acre, moins la citadelle ; en 1840 lord Palmerston nous proposa de lui accorder le pachalik d'Acre avec la citadelle de plus, mais avec l'hérédité de moins. Assurément, c'était là retrancher de la première offre plus qu'on n'y ajoutait, et on ne pouvait pas dire que ce fût une proposition nouvelle, ni surtout plus avantageuse.

Mais cette proposition, si peu digne du titre de proposition nouvelle, car elle ne contenait aucun avantage nouveau, n'avait en rien le caractère d'un *ultimatum*. Elle ne nous fut nullement présentée ainsi. Nous étions si loin de la considérer sous cet aspect que, sur une insinuation de MM. de Bülow et de Neumann, nous conçûmes l'espérance d'obtenir pour le vice-roi la possession viagère de toute la Syrie, jointe à la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte.

Sur l'affirmation de MM. de Bülow et de Neumann que cette proposition, si elle était faite, serait la dernière concession de lord Palmerston, nous envoyâmes M. Eugène Périer à Alexandrie pour disposer le vice-roi à consentir à un arrangement qui nous semblait le dernier possible. Ce n'était pas, comme le dit lord Palmerston, faire dépendre la négociation de la volonté d'un pacha d'Egypte, mais disposer les volontés contraires et les amener à un arrangement amiable qui prévint le cruel spectacle aujourd'hui donné au monde.

La France avait quelque droit de penser qu'une si longue négociation ne se terminerait pas sans une dernière explication, que la grande et utile alliance, qui depuis dix ans la liait à l'Angleterre, ne se dissoudrait pas sans un dernier effort de rapprochement. Les insinuations qui lui avaient été faites, et qui tendaient à faire croire que peut-être on accorderait la possession viagère de la Syrie au vice-roi, devaient l'entretenir dans cette espérance. Tout à coup, le 17 juillet, lord Palmerston appelle au Foreign-Office l'ambassadeur de France, et lui apprend qu'un traité avait été signé depuis l'avant-veille ; il le lui apprend sans même lui donner connaissance du texte de ce traité. Le cabinet français a dû en être surpris. Il n'ignorait pas, sans doute, que les trois cours du continent avaient adhéré aux vues de l'Angleterre, que, par conséquent un arrangement des quatre cours sans la France était possible ; mais il ne devait pas croire que cet arrangement aurait lieu sans qu'on l'en eût préalablement averti, et que l'alliance française serait aussi promptement sacrifiée.

L'offre que le vice-roi a faite, en juin, au Sultan de restituer la flotte turque, et de laquelle on a craint de voir sortir un arrangement direct secrètement proposé par nous, la possibilité qui s'est offerte à cette époque d'insurger la Syrie, paraissent être les deux motifs qui ont fait succéder dans le cabinet anglais, à une longue inertie, une résolution soudaine. Si le cabinet britannique avait voulu avoir avec nous une dernière et franche explication, le cabinet français aurait pu lui démontrer que l'offre de renvoyer la flotte n'était pas une combinaison de la France pour amener un arrangement direct, car elle n'a connu cette offre qu'après qu'elle a été faite ; peut-être aussi aurait-il pu lui persuader que le soulèvement de la Syrie était un moyen peu digne et peu sûr.

Tels sont les faits dont la France affirme la vérité avec la sincérité et la loyauté qui conviennent à une grande nation.

Il en résulte évidemment :

1. Que l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman ont été entendues, au début de la négociation, comme la France les entend aujourd'hui, non pas comme une limite territoriale plus ou moins avantageuse entre le Sultan et le vice-roi, mais comme une garantie des cinq cours contre une marche offensive de Méhémet-Ali, et contre la protection exclusive d'une seule de ces cinq Puissances ;

2. Que la France, loin de modifier ses opinions en présence des quatre cours toujours unies de vues, d'intentions et de langage, a toujours, au contraire, entendu la question turco-égyptienne d'une seule manière, tandis qu'elle a vu les quatre cours, d'abord en désaccord, s'unir ensuite dans l'idée de sacrifier le vice-roi, et l'Angleterre, satisfaite de ce sacrifice, se rapprocher des trois autres et former une union, il est vrai, aujourd'hui très persévérante dans ses vues, très-soudaine, très-inquiétante dans ses résolutions ;

3. Qu'on n'a pas fait à la France des sacrifices réitérés pour l'attirer au projet des quatre cours, puisqu'on s'est borné à lui offrir, en 1839, de joindre à l'Egypte le pachalik d'Acre, sans la place d'Acre, mais avec l'hérédité de ce pachalik, et à lui offrir en 1840 le pachalik d'Acre, avec la place, mais sans l'hérédité :

4. Qu'elle n'a pas été avertie, comme on le dit, que les quatre cours allaient passer outre si elle n'adhérait pas à leurs vues, que, tout au contraire, elle avait quelques raisons de s'attendre à de nouvelles propositions quand à la nouvelle du départ de Sami-Bey pour Constantinople et de l'insurrection de Syrie, on a soudainement signé, sans l'en prévenir, le traité du 15 juillet,

dont on ne lui a donné connaissance que lorsqu'il était déjà signé, et communication que deux mois plus tard ;

5. Enfin, qu'on n'a pas droit de compter sur son adhésion passive à l'exécution de ce traité, puisque, si elle a surtout insisté sur la difficulté des moyens d'exécution, elle n'a toutefois jamais professé, pour le but pas plus que pour les moyens, une indifférence qui permît de conclure qu'elle n'interviendrait en aucun cas dans ce qui se passerait en Orient ; que, bien loin de là, elle a toujours déclaré qu'elle s'isolerait des quatre autres Puissances, si certaines résolutions étaient adoptées ; que jamais aucun de ces agents n'a été autorisé à dire une parole de laquelle on pût conclure que cet isolement serait l'inaction, et qu'elle a toujours entendu, comme elle entend encore, se réserver à cet égard sa pleine liberté.

Le cabinet français ne reviendrait point sur de telles contestations si la note de lord Palmerston ne lui en faisait un devoir rigoureux. Mais il est prêt à les mettre tout à fait en oubli, pour traiter le fond des choses, et attirer l'attention du secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique sur le côté vraiment grave de la situation.

L'existence de l'Empire turc est en péril, l'Angleterre s'en préoccupe, et elle a raison ; toutes les puissances amies de la paix doivent s'en préoccuper aussi ; mais comment faut-il s'y prendre pour raffermir cet Empire ? Lorsque les sultans de Constantinople, n'ayant plus la force de régir les vastes provinces qui dépendaient d'eux, ont vu la Moldavie, la Valachie, et plus récemment la Grèce, s'échapper insensiblement de leurs mains, comment s'y est-on pris ? A-t-on, par une décision européenne, appuyé sur des troupes russes et des flottes anglaises, cherché à restituer aux sultans des sujets qui leur échappaient ? Assurément non. On n'a pas essayé l'impossible. On ne leur a pas rendu la possession et l'administration directe des provinces qui se détachaient de l'Empire. On ne leur a laissé qu'une suzeraineté presque nominale sur la Valachie et la Moldavie, on les a tout à fait dépossédés de la Grèce. Est-ce par esprit d'injustice ? Non certainement. Mais l'empire des faits, plus fort que les résolutions des cabinets, a empêché de restituer à la Porte soit la souveraineté directe de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, soit l'administration, même indirecte, de la Grèce ; et la Porte n'a eu de repos que depuis que ce sacrifice a été franchement opéré. Quelle vue a dirigé les cabinets dans ces sacrifices ? C'est de rendre indépendantes, c'est de soustraire à l'ambition de tous les Etats voisins les portions de l'Empire turc qui s'en séparaient. Ne pouvant refaire un grand tout, on a voulu que les parties détachées restassent des Etats indépendants des Empires environnants.

Un fait semblable vient de produire depuis quelques années relativement à l'Egypte et à la Syrie. L'Egypte a-t-elle jamais été véritablement sous l'empire des sultans ? Personne ne le pense, et personne ne croirait aujourd'hui pouvoir la faire gouverner directement de Constantinople. On en juge apparemment ainsi, puisque les quatre cours décernent à Méhémet-Ali l'hérédité de l'Egypte, en réservant toutefois la suzeraineté du Sultan. Elles-mêmes, en cela, entendent comme la France l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman ; elles se bornent à vouloir lui conserver tout ce qu'il pourra retenir sous son autorité. Elles veulent, autant que possible, un lien de vasselage entre l'Empire et ses parties détachées. Elles veulent en un mot, tout ce que veut la France. Les quatre cours, en attribuant au vassal heureux qui a su gouverner l'Egypte, l'hérédité de cette province, lui attribuent encore le pachalik d'Acre : mais elles lui refusent les trois autres pachaliks de Syrie, les pachaliks de Damas, d'Alep, de Tripoli. Elles appellent cela sauver l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman ! Ainsi, l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman est sauvée même quand on en détache l'Egypte et le pachalik d'Acre ; mais elle est détruite, si on détache de plus Tripoli, Damas et Alep ! Nous le disons franchement, une telle thèse ne saurait se soutenir gravement devant l'Europe.

Evidemment il ne saurait y avoir, pour donner ou retirer ces pachaliks à Méhémet-Ali, que des raisons d'équité et de politique. Le vice-roi d'Egypte a fondé un Etat vassal avec génie et avec suite. Il a su gouverner l'Egypte et même la Syrie, que jamais les sultans n'avaient pu gouverner. Les musulmans, depuis longtemps humiliés dans leur juste fierté, voient en lui un prince glorieux qui leur rend le sentiment de leur force. Pourquoi affaiblir ce vassal utile qui, une fois séparé par une frontière bien choisie des Etats de son maître, deviendra, pour lui le plus précieux des auxiliaires ? Il a aidé le Sultan dans sa lutte contre la Grèce ; pourquoi ne l'aiderait-il pas dans sa lutte contre les voisins d'une religion hostile à la sienne ? Son intérêt répond de lui, à défaut de sa fidélité. Quand Constantinople sera menacée, Alexandrie sera en péril : Méhémet-Ali le sait bien, il prouve tous les jours qu'il le comprend parfaitement.

Il faut, pour garder l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman, depuis Constantinople jusqu'à Alexandrie, il faut à la fois le Sultan et le pacha d'Egypte, celui-ci uni à celui-là par un lien de vasselage. Le Taurus est la ligne de séparation indiquée entre eux. Mais on veut ôter au pacha d'Egypte les clefs du Taurus ; soit : qu'on les rende à la Porte, et pour cela qu'on retire le district d'Adana à Méhémet-Ali. On veut lui ôter aussi la clef de l'Archipel ; qu'on lui refuse Candie : il y consent. La France, qui n'avait

pas promis son influence morale au traité du 15 juillet, mais qui la doit tout entière à la paix, a conseillé ces sacrifices à Méhémet-Ali, et il les a faits. Mais, en vérité, pour lui ôter encore deux ou trois pachaliks, et les donner, non au Sultan, mais à l'anarchie; pour assurer ce singulier triomphe de l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman déjà privé de la Grèce de l'Egypte, du pachalik d'Acre, appeler sur cette intégrité le seul danger sérieux qui la menace, celui que l'Angleterre trouvait si sérieux l'année dernière que pour le prévenir elle proposait de forcer les Dardanelles, c'est là une manière bien singulière de pourvoir à ces grands intérêts.

Admettons cependant, pour un moment, que les vues du cabinet britannique soient mieux entendues que celles du cabinet français; l'alliance de la France ne valait-elle pas mieux, pour l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman et pour la paix du monde, que telle ou telle délimitation en Syrie?

On ne s'alarmerait pas tant sur l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman si on ne craignait de grands bouleversements de territoire dans le monde, si on ne craignait la guerre, qui seule rend ces grands bouleversements possibles. Or, pour les prévenir, quelle était la combinaison la plus efficace? N'était-ce pas l'alliance de la France et de l'Angleterre? Depuis Cadix jusqu'aux bords de l'Oder et du Danube, demandez-le aux peuples? Demandez-leur ce qu'ils pensent à cet égard, et ils répondront que c'est cette alliance qui depuis dix ans a sauvé la paix et l'indépendance des Etats, sans nuire à la liberté des nations.

On dit que cette alliance n'est pas rompue, qu'elle renaîtrait après le but atteint par le traité du 15 juillet. Quand on aura poursuivi à quatre, sans nous et malgré nous, un but en soi mauvais, que du moins nous avons cru et déclaré tel, quand on l'aura poursuivi par une alliance trop semblable à ces coalitions qui ont depuis cinquante ans ensanglanté l'Europe, croire qu'on retrouvera la France sans défiance, sans ressentiment d'une telle offense, c'est se faire de sa fierté nationale une idée qu'elle n'a jamais donnée au monde.

On a donc sacrifié gratuitement, pour un résultat secondaire, une alliance qui a maintenu l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman beaucoup plus sûrement que ne le fera le traité du 15 juillet.

On dira que la France pouvait aussi faire la même réflexion, et qu'elle pouvait, si la question des limites en Syrie lui paraissait secondaire, se rendre aux vues de l'Angleterre, et acheter par ce sacrifice le maintien de l'alliance. A cela il y a une réponse fort simple. La France, une fois d'accord sur le but avec ses alliés, aurait fait, non pas de ces sacrifices essentiels

qu'aucune nation ne doit à une autre, mais celui de sa manière de voir sur certaines questions de limites. Elle vient de le prouver par les concessions qu'elle a demandées et obtenues du vice-roi. Mais on ne lui a pas laissé le choix. On lui a fait part d'une nouvelle alliance quand déjà elle était conclue. Dès lors elle a dû s'isoler. Elle l'a fait, mais elle ne l'a fait qu'alors. Depuis, toujours fidèle à sa politique pacifique, elle n'a cessé de conseiller au vice-roi d'Egypte la plus parfaite modération. Bien qu'armée et libre de son action, elle fera tous ses efforts pour éviter au monde des douleurs et des catastrophes. Sauf les sacrifices qui coûteraient à son honneur, elle fera tout ce qu'elle pourra pour maintenir la paix; et si aujourd'hui elle tient ce langage au cabinet britannique, c'est moins pour se plaindre que pour prouver la loyauté de sa politique, non-seulement à la Grande-Bretagne, mais au monde, dont aucun Etat, aujourd'hui, quelque puissant qu'il soit, ne saurait mépriser l'opinion. Le secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique a voulu prouver son bon droit; le secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français doit aussi à son Roi et à son pays de prouver la conséquence, la loyauté de la politique française dans la grave question d'Orient.

Recevez, monsieur l'ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le président du Conseil, ministre des affaires étrangères.

A. THIERS.

P.S. Paris, 8 octobre. Pendant que j'écrivais cette dépêche, monsieur l'ambassadeur, de déplorables événements sont venus ajouter encore à la gravité de la situation. Aux démarches conciliantes du vice-roi d'Egypte on a répondu par les plus violentes hostilités. La Porte, cédant à de funestes conseils, a prononcé sa déchéance. Il ne s'agit plus seulement de restreindre la puissance de Méhémet-Ali, on veut le faire disparaître de la face du monde politique. Si c'étaient là les intentions sérieuses des Puissances unies par le traité du 15 juillet, s'il fallait voir, dans ce qui vient de se passer, autre chose que l'entraînement presque involontaire d'une situation fausse dont on n'a pas su prévoir les conséquences, il y aurait à désespérer du rétablissement de l'harmonie entre les grandes Puissances.

En conséquence, je crois devoir ajouter à la présente communication la note ci-jointe.

3. *M. Thiers à M. Guizot.*

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

La grave question qui préoccupe aujourd'hui tout le monde

vient de prendre une face toute nouvelle depuis la réponse que la Porte a faite aux concessions du vice-roi d'Égypte. Méhémet-Ali, en répondant aux sommations du Sultan, a déclaré qu'il se soumettait aux volontés de son auguste maître, qu'il acceptait la possession héréditaire de l'Égypte, et qu'il s'en remettait, pour le reste des territoires qu'il occupait actuellement, à la magnanimité du Sultan. Nous avons fait connaître au cabinet anglais ce qu'il fallait entendre par cette manière de s'exprimer ; et bien que Méhémet-Ali ne voulût pas déclarer immédiatement toutes les concessions auxquelles il avait été disposé par les vives instances de la France, nous avons pris sur nous de les faire connaître, et nous avons annoncé que Méhémet se résignerait, au besoin, à accepter la possession de l'Égypte héréditaire et de la Syrie viagère, en abandonnant immédiatement Candie, Adana, les villes saintes. Nous ajouterons que, si la Porte avait adhéré à cet arrangement, nous aurions consenti à le garantir de concert avec les Puissances qui s'occupent de régler le sort de l'Empire ottoman.

Tous les esprits éclairés ont été frappés de la loyauté de la France qui, bien que tenant une conduite séparée, ne cessait pas d'exercer son influence au profit d'une solution modérée et pacifique de la question d'Orient. Ils ont aussi été frappés de la sagesse avec laquelle le vice-roi écoutait les conseils de la prudence et de la modération.

En réponse à de telles concessions, la Porte, soit qu'elle ait agi spontanément, soit qu'elle ait agi par des conseils irréfléchis reçus sur les lieux mêmes, la Porte, avant de pouvoir en référer à ses alliés, a répondu à la déférence du vice-roi par un acte de déchéance. Une telle conduite, aussi exorbitante qu'inattendue, excède même l'esprit du traité du 15 juillet et dépasse les conséquences les plus extrêmes qu'on pouvait en tirer. Ce traité que la France ne saurait invoquer car elle n'y adhère point, mais qu'elle rappelle pour montrer la rapidité avec laquelle on est entraîné déjà à des conséquences dangereuses, ce traité, dans le cas d'un refus absolu du vice-roi sur tous les points, laissait à la Porte la faculté de retirer ses premières offres, et d'en agir alors comme elle l'entendrait, suivant ses intérêts et les conseils de ses alliés ; mais il supposait deux choses, un refus absolu et péremptoire sur tous les points de la part du vice-roi et le recours aux conseils des quatre Puissances. Or, rien de tout cela n'a eu lieu. Le vice-roi n'a point fait de refus absolu, et la Porte ne s'est pas même donné le temps de concerter une réponse avec ses alliés. Elle a répondu à des concessions inespérées par la déchéance ! Les quatre Puissances ne sauraient approuver une telle conduite et nous savons en effet que plusieurs

d'entre elles l'ont déjà désapprouvée. Lord Palmerston nous a fait déclarer qu'il ne fallait voir en cela qu'une mesure comminatoire sans conséquence effective et nécessaire. M. le comte Appony, s'entretenant avec moi sur ce sujet, m'a annoncé la même opinion de la part de son cabinet. Nous prenons acte volontiers de cette sage manifestation, et nous en prenons aussi occasion d'exprimer à cet égard les intentions de la France.

La France a déclaré qu'elle consacrerait tous ses moyens au maintien de la paix et de l'équilibre européen. C'est le cas d'expliquer clairement ce qu'elle a entendu par cette déclaration. En acceptant avec une religieuse fidélité l'état de l'Europe tel qu'il résultait des traités, la France a entendu que, pendant la paix générale qui dure heureusement depuis 1815, cet Etat ne fût point changé, ni au profit, ni au détriment d'aucune des Puissances existantes. C'est dans cette pensée qu'elle s'est toujours prononcée pour le maintien de l'Empire ottoman. La race turque, par ses qualités nationales, méritait assurément pour elle-même le respect de son indépendance ; mais les plus chers intérêts de l'Europe se rattachent aussi à l'existence de l'Empire turc. Cet Empire, en succombant, ne pouvait servir qu'à augmenter les Etats voisins aux dépens de l'équilibre général ; sa chute aurait entraîné un tel changement dans la proportion actuelle des grandes puissances que la face du monde en aurait été changé. La France, et toutes les Puissances avec elle, l'ont tellement senti qu'elles se sont engagées à maintenir l'Empire ottoman, quels que fussent leurs intérêts respectifs relativement à sa chute ou à son maintien.

Mais l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman s'étend des bords de la mer Noire à ceux de la mer Rouge. Il importe autant de garantir l'indépendance de l'Egypte et de la Syrie que l'indépendance du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. Un prince vassal a réussi à créer une administration ferme dans deux provinces que depuis longtemps les sultans de Constantinople n'avaient pu gouverner. Ce prince vassal, s'il n'a pas fait régner dans les provinces qu'il régit l'humanité de la civilisation européenne, que peut-être ne comportent pas encore les mœurs des pays qu'il administre y a fait prévaloir plus d'ordre et de régularité que dans aucune partie de l'Europe turc. Il a su y créer une force publique, une armée, une marine ; il a relevé l'orgueil du peuple ottoman et lui a rendu un peu de cette confiance en lui-même qui est indispensable pour qu'il puisse défendre son indépendance. Ce prince vassal est devenu, suivant nous, partie essentielle et nécessaire de l'Empire ottoman. S'il était détruit, l'Empire n'acquerrait pas aujourd'hui les moyens qui lui ont manqué autrefois pour

gouverner la Syrie et l'Egypte, et il perdrait un vassal qui fait maintenant l'une de ses principales forces. Il aurait des pachas insoumis envers leur maître et dépendants de toutes les influences étrangères. En un mot, une partie de l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman serait compromise, et, avec une partie de cette intégrité, une partie de l'équilibre général. Dans l'opinion de la France, le vice-roi d'Egypte, par les provinces qu'il administre, par les mers sur lesquelles s'exerce son action, est nécessaire pour assurer les proportions actuellement existantes entre les divers Etats du monde.

Dans cette conviction, la France ; aussi désintéressée dans la question d'Orient que les quatre Puissances qui ont signé le protocole du 17 septembre, se croit obligée de déclarer que la déchéance du vice-roi, mise à exécution, serait à ses yeux une atteinte à l'équilibre général. On a pu livrer aux chances de la guerre actuellement engagée la question des limites qui doivent séparer, en Syrie, les possessions du Sultan et du vice-roi d'Egypte ; mais la France ne saurait abandonner à de telles chances l'existence de Méhémet-Ali, comme prince vassal de l'Empire. Quelle que soit la limite territoriale qui les sépare par suite des événements de la guerre, leur double existence est nécessaire à l'Europe, et la France ne saurait admettre la suppression de l'un ou de l'autre. Disposée à prendre part à tout arrangement acceptable qui aurait pour base la double garantie de l'existence du Sultan et du vice-roi d'Egypte, elle se borne dans ce moment à déclarer que, pour sa part, elle ne pourrait consentir à la mise à exécution de l'acte de déchéance prononcé à Constantinople.

Du reste, les manifestations spontanées de plusieurs des puissances signataires du traité du 15 juillet nous prouvent qu'en cela nous entendons l'équilibre européen comme elles-mêmes, et qu'en ce point nous ne les trouverons pas en désaccord avec nous. Nous regretterions ce désaccord que nous ne prévoyons pas, mais nous ne saurions nous départir de cette manière d'entendre et d'assurer le maintien de l'équilibre européen.

La France espère qu'on approuvera en Europe le motif qui la fait sortir du silence. On peut compter sur son amour de la paix, sentiment constant chez elle, malgré les procédés dont elle a cru avoir à se plaindre. On peut compter sur son désintéressement, car on ne saurait même la soupçonner d'aspirer en Orient à des acquisitions de territoire. Mais elle aspire à maintenir l'équilibre européen. Ce soin est remis à toutes les grandes Puissances. Son maintien doit être leur gloire et leur principale ambition.

Agréez, etc.

XIII.

Projet de discours pour l'ouverture de la session des Chambres de 1840, présenté au Roi le 20 octobre 1840, par le cabinet présidé par M. Thiers, et non agréé par le Roi.

Messieurs les Pairs,

Messieurs les Députés,

En vous réunissant aujourd'hui, j'ai devancé l'époque ordinaire de la convocation des Chambres. Vous apprécierez la gravité des circonstances qui ont dicté à mon gouvernement cette détermination.

Au moment où finissait la dernière session, un traité a été signé entre la Porte Ottomane, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, la Prusse, la Russie, pour régler le différend survenu entre le sultan et le vice-roi d'Egypte.

Cet acte important, accompli sans la participation de la France, et dans les vues d'une politique à laquelle elle n'a point adhéré, pouvait, dans l'exécution, amener de dangereuses conséquences. La France devait les prévoir et se disposer à faire face à tous les événements. Mon gouvernement a pris sous sa responsabilité toutes les mesures qu'autorisaient les lois et que prescrivait la situation nouvelle.

La France, qui continue à souhaiter sincèrement la paix, demeure fidèle à la politique que vous avez plus d'une fois appuyée par d'éclatants suffrages. Jalouse d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman, elle les croit conciliables avec l'existence du vice-roi d'Egypte, devenu lui-même un des éléments nécessaires de la force de cet empire. C'est en ménageant tous les droits, en respectant tous les intérêts, qu'on peut jeter en Orient les bases d'un arrangement durable.

Mais les événements qui se pressent pourraient amener des modifications plus graves. Les mesures prises jusqu'ici par mon gouvernement pourraient alors ne plus suffire. Il importe donc de les compléter par des mesures nouvelles pour lesquelles le concours des deux Chambres était nécessaire. J'ai dû les convoquer. Elles penseront comme moi que la France, qui n'a pas été la première à livrer le repos du monde à la fortune des armes, doit se tenir prête à agir le jour où elle croirait l'équilibre européen sérieusement menacé.

(Le paragraphe de l'Espagne manque.)

La satisfaction à laquelle nous avons droit n'ayant pas été

obtenue de la République Argentine, j'ai ordonné que de nouvelles forces fussent ajoutées à l'escadre dont la présence dans ces parages doit amener une conclusion favorable à nos justes réclamations.

En Afrique, le succès a couronné nos armes dans plusieurs expéditions importantes où s'est signalée la valeur de nos soldats. Deux de mes fils ont partagé leurs périls. Le plan de l'occupation définitive de l'Algérie est en partie réalisé. De nouveaux efforts seront nécessaires pour l'achever; mais, en ce moment tant que la situation générale de l'Europe ne changera pas, nous nous bornerons à occuper fortement les points où flotte notre drapeau.

A l'intérieur, l'ordre a été maintenu. La ville de Boulogne a été le théâtre d'une tentative insensée qui n'a servi qu'à faire éclater de nouveau le dévouement de la garde nationale, de l'armée et de la population. Toutes les ambitions et tous les souvenirs échoueront contre une monarchie créée et défendue par la toute-puissance du vœu national.

La Providence a encore une fois préservé ma tête des coups qui la menaçaient. L'impuissance n'a point découragé les passions anarchiques. Sous quelque forme qu'elles se présentent, la fermeté de mon gouvernement les combattra avec l'arme des lois. Pour moi, dans ces tristes épreuves, je ne veux me souvenir que l'affection dont la France m'a donné les touchants témoignages.

Cette session sera presque tout entière consacrée à l'examen des mesures que les circonstances ont commandées à mon gouvernement ou peuvent lui commander encore. Il ne vous présentera que des projets de loi indispensables à l'expédition des affaires. La loi du budget ne tardera pas à être soumise à votre examen. J'ai prescrit la plus sévère économie dans la fixation des dépenses ordinaires. J'ai l'espérance que l'état de nos finances nous permettra de satisfaire aux besoins du pays sans lui imposer de nouvelles charges.

Messieurs, j'aime à compter plus que jamais sur votre patriotique concours. Vous voulez comme moi que la France soit forte et grande. Aucun sacrifice ne vous coûterait pour lui conserver dans le monde le rang qui lui appartient. Elle n'en veut pas déchoir. La France est fortement attachée à la paix, mais elle ne l'achèterait pas d'un prix indigne d'elle, et votre Roi, qui a mis sa gloire à la conserver au monde, vent laisser intact à son fils ce dépôt sacré d'indépendance et d'honneur national que la révolution française a mis dans ses mains.

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